HC Deb 24 October 1988 vol 139 cc126-34

"No Minister of the Crown shall give assent to any Regulation, Directive or other instrument relating to the operation of the Decision named in section 1(e) unless the text of that instrument has been approved by a Resolution of the House of Commons.".—[Mr. Spearing.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Spearing

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I am grateful for your confirmation of the point that I made, Miss Boothroyd, because, in effect, the House has been prevented from having a Division on a rather important piece of glasnost. The Paymaster General said that all these things are available in different Government publications. I am not sure whether that is correct.

We have now moved from new clause 3 to new clause 4, in my name, which would require the Government to bring before the House any directive or regulation from Brussels in pursuance of the document that we are discussing, the decision for future taxation of the Community—[Interruption.]

The Second Deputy Chairman

Order. May we have a little more order in the Chamber? It is difficult for the hon. Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing) to be heard.

Mr. Spearing

I am obliged to you, Miss Boothroyd.

New clause 4 reads: No Minister of the Crown shall give assent to any Regulation, Directive or other instrument relating to the operation of the Decision named in section 1(e) unless the text of that instrument has been approved by a Resolution of the House of Commons.'. We are always told that the power of the House lies in its power to approve money and expenditure. That is an underlying constitutional matter that has been assumed not only in the House, but in the country since 1688. Those of us who attended the great ceremony in Westminster Hall not long ago will not be unaware of that fact. At this time the importance of that cannot be over-emphasised.—[Interruption.]

The Second Deputy Chairman

Order. I have already appealed for order in the Chamber. I should be most grateful if those hon. Members who wish to carry on conversations would do so behind the swing doors.

Mr. Spearing

The matter that I wish to advance is of considerable constitutional importance. In effect, it has been on the Order Paper far only a few hours because, although it appeared on Friday, we all know what happens on Fridays and hon. Members who did not arrive early today may not have had an opportunity to study it and understand its full import. Partly because of that and because of the constraints of time, my speech will be brief and probing. Any hon. Member who is not interested in the powers of the House and who does not wish to stay until the end of the debate is not constrained by any Whippery so to do.

In the previous debate, we talked a great deal about scrutiny and about the power of Ministers in Brussels to do this, that or the other. Under the Single European Act, their powers have been greatly reduced. In Brussels, there is now majority voting on a vast range of legislation, but we still have some control over money. In the previous debate, the Paymaster General, wagging his finger metaphorically at some of my hon. Friends, said that anything to do with taxation was still unanimous. Of course, in that respect he is defending Treasury rights.

Hon. Members should bear in mind the rights of the House. The Paymaster General knows, and the Prime Minister has emphasised, that she cannot get public expenditure through or reduce it unless the House permits. By our decision on Thursday, we shall hand over to the Commission vast areas of choice or discretion on expenditure. Following that decision, directives and regulations, including the annual budget and the annual increase in ratios, will be produced year on year.

The Bill is the outer envelope, and if, as we have heard, the Community is flush with money, it may not be necessary to go to the limits of legal expenditure, and regulations and budgets will show ratios and figures to delineate the amount. Year by year, the Scrutiny Committee and the House will receive financial regulations and directives. When those come before the Council of Ministers, the Paymaster General or some other Minister from the Treasury will go to Brussels to argue, bargain and put the Treasury point of view. On behalf of the United Kingdom, that Minister will agree disagree to a proposal from the Commission.

I hope that if I have said anything wrong the Paymaster General will briefly intervene. He has argued our case in Brussels for many years and is a most experienced operator, whereas I am not even allowed into the room to hear what will happen. That is one of the engines of authoritarianism as we know it in Brussels. The Paymaster General is our agent in Brussels doing his best for Britain. When he has agreed the document, it will come here for debate but probably not even approval. In many cases the decision will be made after an advisory debate in the Chamber probably brought about by the resolution of 30 October 1980 which says that if the Scrutiny Committee says that there will be a debate prior to a decision in Brussels, there will be a debate in the House.

The House will not have any control. It will have a preliminary and advisory debate and the Minister, who may not be the effective and efficient Paymaster General, will go to Brussels to do what he can and will then return to tell us what he has done. He may do things that are contrary to the will of the House, and the only penalty for that is in the hands of the House. Even if he resigns, what is done in Brussels is done, and the House has lost control of that financial part of its powers that stems from the envelope created by this decision. We call it a decision, but it is a package of many, varied and complex financial arrangements.

I believe that the Committee, on second thoughts, would not wish that arrangement to carry on for very much longer, if only because the discipline we were promised at Fontainebleau, and which was advertised as being promised in this decision, has not worked. Judging by the exchanges tonight, particularly between the right hon. Member for Worthing (Mr. Higgins), the Minister and myself, it does not look as if it will work in the future. In that case, the Committee will want to have the control of these matters that it does not have at the moment. The only way that the Committee can do that effectively is to pass an amendment on the lines of my new clause, so that it says to a Minister or a Government, "Bring us a proposal that the Commission has on the table, and if we approve it, go away and approve that," or, "Put it on the table here and we can give you on a motion or a resolution some sort of limits within which you can work. Go away to Brussels and negotiate within those limits."

Unless and until such a motion is carried by the Committee, either as a free-standing resolution or as an amendment, the Minister is not properly responsible to the Committee. He can come and tell us what he has done. He is accountable in a verbal sense for what he has done, but he is doing it as a representative and the Committee has not the same sort of control that it would have if we had a period of debate on estimates, as we do for domestic expenditure. Therefore, there is an entirely different procedure relating to the £3,000 million or £4,000 million that automatically goes direct to Brussels, when compared to what comes to us in domestic expenditure.

Unless we have some control over the Minister in the way that I have outlined, the House will lose control not just over legislation, as we have already, particularly through article 100A, but over what its own Government and Ministers do and approve in Brussels. That is a fundamental breach of the 300-year-old principle that alone gives this House power and authority to tax and to decide how money shall be spent. The new envelope of GNP will make good the deficit in existing own resources. The House decided that it would supply the deficit in the Crown's lack of money after its own revenues and resources had been taken into account. This is the deep constitutional principle on which the power of the House rests, and we should look at it most carefully.

I am opening a debate that needs much more time and much more internal discussion among hon. Members than we can give it tonight. It has been before us for only a few hours, and it is of fundamental importance.

If it is not done properly in the Bill, which is what I should like to see, it should come in another time. The Prime Minister has set the scene because in her speech in Luxembourg—the second in her Bruges series—she said something about being accountable to Parliament. "Accountable" is a financial term.

I put it to the Committee and to the Paymaster General that that accountability can be discharged only if the House decides what taxation moneys shall be sent to Brussels. If it is decided by the Executive in Whitehall, then it is entirely within the Euro-United Kingdom executive area. The legislature has lost its control, and that control must be reasserted. Because of the slippage of discipline and the 25 per cent. additional moneys being provided for the next five years under this decision, it is high time that that was done.

I hope that the Paymaster General will briefly tell us if he is against the general outline proposition that I am making—it is only an outline, but a fundamental one—why he is against it. I do not believe that the Government's stance, even as a loyal member of the European Community, will work. Any hon. Member who believes wholeheartedly in that institution should support my new clause, because without it, the mechanism will not work properly as it is intended to. Therefore, I look forward, in this introductory debate, to hearing what the Paymaster General has to say on both factual and constitutional grounds.

10.30 pm
Mr. Brooke

With slightly more time than on the previous occasion, let me apologise for the way that I addressed you, Miss Boothroyd, on the previous occasion.

The number of hon. Members in the Chamber exceeds the number who were present for the majority of the debate, but I realise that they are not necessarily here to hear the hon. Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing) and me, and I shall therefore be brief.

I owe an apology to the hon. Member for Newham, South, because he takes a keen interest in these matters, and the hon. Member for Vauxhall in that, to try to meet an artificial deadline in terms of winding up the previous debate, I did not speak at fully appropriate length on new clause 3. I shall write to the hon. Gentleman, as an olive branch in respect of these proceedings, with a copy to the hon. Member for Vauxhall, setting out at greater length the case that I have sought to put.

I fully accept the need for the Government to take careful note of the views of the House whenever possible before agreeing directives or regulations linked to the new own resources decision, but—I do not intend the next remark ironically, although it may be so taken—I nevertheless urge hon. Members to reject the new clause as it would impose an excessive and unnecessary constraint on the Government's freedom of action.

There may be occasions when the Government have to move quickly and agree to a directive or regulation linked to the new ORD when it has not proved possible to secure the assent of the House by way of a resolution. The hon. Member for Vauxhall quoted one such example in his opening speech in the clause 1 stand part debate, in which his hon. Friend the Member for Newham, South intervened on the subject of the GNP directive. I shall not rehearse the whole narrative relating to the GNP directive, but the hon. Member for Newham, South made the point in his intervention about the circumstances of that particular case and the timetable with which we were all confronted at the time.

However, even leaving aside the special circumstances, such as the GNP directive, I am still not persuaded that it would be right to require a resolution of the House before a directive or regulation linked to the new ORD might be adopted. There are two other reasons for that. The existing scrutiny arrangements work well. Under those arrangements, proposals for new directives or regulations linked to the ORD are submitted to the Scrutiny Committee which can then recommend them for debate, if that would be appropriate. Unless there are special circumstances, the Government will not adopt the directive or regulation concerned until the debate has taken place. I was certainly not aware that there were any serious shortcomings in those arrangements.

The hon. Member for Newham, South referred to me as an agent of the House in terms of what goes in Brussels. One's negotiating freedom would be severely constrained if all one's proposals were publicly stated in advance. I also commend to the House the fact that Mr. Delors, who was quoted earlier, went out of his way in the famous speech in Strasbourg on 6 July, to which so much attention has been paid, to draw attention to the amount of attention that this House and the Bundestag in Bonn pay to Community legislation by comparison with the other 10 member states.

If we were to agree to a provision such as is outlined in the new clause, we would thereby set a precedent for the handling of other types of Community legislation. In other words, the repercussions would go very wide indeed. The new clause would represent the thin end of a very important wedge. It would be wrong to prejudice the general discussion of scrutiny procedures by introducing special arrangements for one small class of Comm unity legislation in the way proposed in the new clause. On those grounds, I hope that the hon. Member for Newham, South will not press his new clause. If he does, I recommend my hon. Friends to reject it.

Mr. Cryer

The House is crowded because many hon. Members are here to vote and then leave; they are not interested in the Bill. That is not good enough. The proposed legislation is eroding the sovereignty of this place, and the erosion has continued for too long and has been allowed to go too far.

What is wrong with the Minister getting, as the new clause suggests, some sort of approval from the House before negotiations are entered into? It would be a strengthening measure. The Minister could argue with the strength and support of the House behind him, if that were the decision, or use the decision of the House as a bargaining counter in negotiations in the EEC.

There are those who imagine that the EEC is a sort of western European fraternal gathering, but it is not like that. It is a number of nation states that argue together so that they can obtain the best possible advantage. Britain nearly always loses out. We go to the negotiations and we are full of sound and fury", but that signifies little. We nearly always leave the negotiations in a worse position and with the obligation to pay more. The EEC is not a fraternal body of harmony and light in Western Europe.

The new clause would strengthen the Minister's hand because the British Parliament would constitute a considerable force and view. If the nation felt that we were being too abrasive towards the Common Market, to use the words of the Prime Minister—that is the accusation that she made against the Government of Lord Callaghan, as he now is—it would have the opportunity to make changes at the next general election. We always claim that there is democratic accountability. That being so, why cannot the Minister accept the new clause and accept shat if the House makes judgments that those outside do not like, they are in a position to change the composition of the House? There is nothing wrong with that.

Democratic accountability provides a backstop. It ensures that we shall remain in some degree of harmony with the nations that we represent in the Chamber. It would be a backstop if the nations felt that we were being too harsh or not harsh enough. There is nothing wrong with that.

The Minister wishes to throw out the new clause, and he argues that he must have freedom to manoeuvre. That freedom means that a Conservative Minister travels to the EEC after a Cabinet decision to give way yet again. He arrives at a deal, having come under pressure from other EEC Ministers. He returns to the House and makes a statement that, for example, regulation 2891/77 will allow the Common Market to have overdraft facilities with our national funds. It is a fait accompli. The regulation does not have to be debated by the House because it is a part of Common Market legislation that is directly applicable. In that way the matter is done and dusted. Of course, there might be a debate. The matter might be raised during a debate on the European Community, when we have about 25 documents before the House, most of them about half the size of the Bible and about as incomprehensible as the Bible written in Sanskrit. It is possible that someone might drag the issue into such a debate.

We are proposing that there should be some scrutiny before the negotiations are presented to the House as an accomplished fact. It is appalling that the Minister is rejecting the proposal, but it is not unusual for Governments, following advice from civil servants, to take such a view. It is more convenient not to bother too much with the House. The previous Labour Government took much the same attitude. I thought that it was the wrong one then and I think that it is wrong now.

I genuinely believe, not simply as a point of view held while in opposition, that the Government should be more accountable. If the ideas are strong enough and can be presented satisfactorily they may convince the Committee that new clause 4 should be passed.

New Clause 4 seems to have much merit and is a test of the Government's earnestness when they claim that the position of Parliament will be retained. Clearly it has not been retained. The Minister mentioned Jacques Delors. Jacques Delors meant what he said when he claimed that 80 per cent. of all legislation will emanate from Brussels after the next 10 years. Some hon. Members may accept that, and want to make themselves redundant and subordinate themselves to some kind of parish council function. I do not.

Let me make it absolutely clear. Jacques Delors is a former chairman of the institutional affairs committee of the EEC Assembly. As such, he was a supporter of Altiero Spinelli, who was the moving figure behind the Single European Act and regarded it as a crushing blow to his aspirations of federalism for western Europe and the creation of a western European united states. That is Jacques Delors's aim and the aim of the majority of the Commissioners. It is certainly the aim of the majority of the Assembly although fortunately not of all of it. However, there is a comfortable majority.

It is up to the Government, if they are serious about retaining some power and preventing the slide towards political union—which I guess the majority of hon. Members would reject if the issue was presented to them clearly—to show some spirit and accept proposals such as new clause 4.

The trouble is that the Government proclaim that they are not in favour of European union and she who must be obeyed by the Conservatives has already said that she does not favour it. However, she has allowed this legislation to come before the House. It has not been withdrawn. I do not know whether the Cabinet has discussed the bones of the Bill and decided that there would be no amendments and the whole Bill would be pushed through. That is the likely suspicion bearing in mind the drafting nature of the Bill. It appears likely that someone has said, "How can we draft a Bill that gives all the powers that we want to subordinate our position even further in the Common Market and is the most difficult form of words to allow amendments to be selected?"

We have a bare bones of a Bill. A new clause has been proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing). The Minister has an opportunity, but he has had his instructions to reject anything that modifies or changes the Bill. The Prime Minister's speech in Bruges was simply propaganda. It had no basis in truth. If there was any basis in truth in that speech, she would have given instructions to get the new clause agreed, as, indeed, the earlier new clauses should have been agreed. However, she did not do that. That is a sign that the Bruges speech is propaganda and has no basis in truth and that the country is sliding—although not inexorably—towards the European and western united states that the majority of our citizens do not seek. They accept the trading arrangements to some degree, but they do not accept the omnipotence of Brussels and nor should we.

Mr. Higgins

I presume that my right hon. Friend the Paymaster General will have given considerable thought to whether any regulations, directives or instruments relating to the operation of the decision covered by the clause will be necessary. If he has given careful thought to that, he will be able to tell the Committee whether he expects that there will be any such regulations, directives or other instruments. He could help the Committee by telling us whether that is so.

Mr. Brooke

It is necessarily the case, as emerged in the earlier dialogue, that there are issues that might arise and I cited the GNP directive as an example. In the normal course of events, there would be an opportunity for them to be debated in the House.

10.45 pm
Mr. Spearing

Those brief exchanges have been a very useful opener to what I believe is a profound constitutional issue. If we have a Paymaster General coming to the Dispatch Box—I know why—and speaking of this "small class" of legislation when talking about money Bills, it shows the extent to which our minds have either been distorted or our perspectives skewed. The First Lord of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer would, I believe, agree with my observations. I do not blame the Paymaster General for that slip of the tongue, but it illustrates the almost looking-glass land in which we are working.

I commend the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, South (Mr. Cryer) concerning European union. That is not a figment of the imagination. If right hon. and hon. Members will read my speech in the debate before the last Division, they will find my comment that European union is not just on the cards but is with us now. It has been assented to by the Prime Minister and by the House in various international treaties. It is an objective, even though we may be reaching it slowly and reluctantly. Therefore, we must assert the powers of this House over expenditure. because we have no other powers left.

The Government may say, "We want room to manoeuvre." I heard that said before, 10 years ago, when debating this matter with my right hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent (Mr. Foot). That may apply to legislation, but can it really apply to taxation? Or should it apply to this "small class" of expenditure? Of course not, because it is final and quantitative.

The right hon. Gentleman said that the Government must have room to manoeuvre. Perhaps he is unaware that nearly three years ago, the Prime Minister said, "We do not want to change the treaties, and I am against changing the treaty of Rome." They were able to change it only by using article 236, and that had to be by unanimity. Therefore, we had foisted upon us—I am not going into the merits, although obviously it is a controversial subject—all the amendments to the treaty of Rome, encompassed in the so-called Single European Act.

The Community negotiated with us so that even the Prime Minister had to accept what the Foreign Office probably said was the best of a bad deal. If a United Kingdom Government can force a Bill through the House under a guillotine that has resulted in the Single European Act bunch of amendments, which will cause a lot of trouble, against their own express will, we can see the downside of future negotiations. I leave the Committee with those thoughts, because they are factual. Nobody can controvert them.

I did say that this was in the nature of a probing amendment. I hope that it will prove to be the short opening debate in a very long and fundamental debate that will take place not just across the Floor of the Committee but throughout the nation and in all our political parties, whatever may have been their former stance. We are talking about the ability of the House, and of the United Kingdom Government, to determine what shall happen within this country. That is an issue that we should all address with the greatest seriousness at our command. It is too late to go on now, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the new clause.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Bill reported, without amendment; to be read the Third time tomorrow.