HC Deb 09 June 1988 vol 134 cc1104-10

Motion made and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Kenneth Carlisle.]

10.35 pm
Mr. John Heddle (Mid-Staffordshire)

I am most grateful for this opportunity to raise on the Adjournment the subject of the Department of Transport's report on the rail accident which occurred at Colwich junction in the middle of my Mid-Staffordshire constituency on 19 September 1986.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Minister for Public Transport for kindly being in the Chamber to reply to this debate, and I say that with the utmost sincerity because he has attended most diligently to the parliamentary questions that I have tabled in the intervening period on this matter. When the Department's inspector's report was published on 31 March 1988 he took the trouble to give me a copy at the same time as it was released to the press. For that I am extremely grateful because the press regionally and locally in Staffordshire and the west midlands paid particularly close attention and interest to the outcome of the report on the crash.

For the record I shall remind the House what occurred. There was a collision on a main railway line running from Euston to Liverpool at 28 minutes past six on Friday 19 September 1986 between the Euston to Manchester express train and a Liverpool to Euston express train in the London midland region of British Rail at a place called Colwich junction. The opening paragraphs of the report state: the 17.00 Euston to Manchester Piccadilly express passenger train, electrically hauled and consisting of 13 vehicles was diverted from the Down Fast line to the Down Slow line some 800 yards from the switch diamonds forming the Junction between the Down Slow-Down Manchester line and the Up Crewe-Euston line and ran past the signal protecting the Junction at Danger, coming to a stand, or nearly so, with the locomotive straddling the switch diamonds of the Junction, 259 yards beyond the signal. The other train was the 17.20 Liverpool to Euston express passenger train, again electrically hauled, but containing 12 carriages. The report continues: It was travelling under clear signals at a speed of 95–100 mile/h on the Up West Coast Main Line closely approaching Colwich Junction when, without time for the driver to apply the brakes, the locomotive of the Manchester train was seen ahead astride the junction. The two trains collided—obviously, since they were both express trains—with tremendous force. They were derailed, all wheels, and turned over on their sides. The pictures in the national press the following day and on the 9 o'clock news that evening were quite horrendous.

At this point I would like to place on record—it has been done at other times and in other places—the gratitude of my constituents and, I know, of the families involved in the crash with whom I have been in touch to all the emergency services—the ambulance service, the nursing services, the various hospitals in the Mid-Staffordshire health authority and the police. I would like to pay a particular tribute to my constituents in the villages of Colwich, Great Haywood, Little Haywood and Rugeley who took families and others involved in the collision into their homes to provide comfort and temporary accommodation.

Out of 373 passengers on the Manchester train and 500 passengers on the Liverpool train, 75 were injured, and the driver of one of the trains was tragically killed. It was a mercy that only one person was killed.

As I understand it, my hon. Friend instructed the railway inspectorate in the Department of Transport, on 22 September, to launch an inquiry and prepare a report on the events of that evening of 19 September. That report was sent to the Department of Transport on 29 February this year and, as I have reminded the House, published on 31 March. I do not wish to dwell in detail on the report; it is a very technical and, to my inexperienced and unschooled eye—my knowledge of railways, apart from commuting regularly from Euston to Birmingham International, derives from playing with my Hornby Dublo some years ago now—most extensively and comprehensively prepared. I am quite sure that my hon. Friend, who knows much more about these matters, because of his departmental responsibilities, will agree with that. I have learnt a great deal from having read the report thoroughly, but it raises a few disturbing questions regarding the conduct of certain aspects of British Rail's relationship with some of its employees, and other matters, and I felt it right to bring these to the attention of the House and to seek an assurance from my hon. Friend that some lessons will be learnt from this tragedy.

First, I cannot understand why it should have taken 18 months to prepare a report. I have said that it is a report of considerable comprehensiveness and thoroughness, but 18 months strikes me as a very long time, and I will explain why the delay has caused anguish to a number of people closely connected with the collision in a moment. I think it is a long time because, on the first Friday of March of last year, some six months after the Colwich crash, there was an even more horrendous collision—that of the Herald of Free Enterprise in Zeebrugge. The report in that respect, also commissioned by my hon. Friend's Department, was published on 24 July of last year, just four months after the collision. I find it difficult, therefore, to understand why the Colwich junction crash report took 18 months.

When a representative of the regional press, having read on the Order Paper that this Adjournment debate was to be held, made contact with British Rail, I understand that he was told that 18 months was par for the course. Those are the words that have been reported to me. If that is true, I find it a disturbing element of apathy, and I hope that my hon. Friend, if such a collision occurred again and he was in a position to instruct his inspectorate, would ensure that it prepared its report rather more swiftly. I say that because the report entirely exonerates from blame the driver of one of the express trains. I refer to Driver Eric Goode, who, as I have said, tragically died in the crash. He was a constituent not of mine but of the hon. Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mrs. Dunwoody). She hoped to be present to make a brief intervention this evening, but I have received a note from the Message Board indicating that she has been detained at Heathrow on her way back from a conference in Rome.

I had the privilege of meeting Driver Goode's widow at a memorial service which the BBC's religious affairs department staged in Colwich church three months after the tragedy. She has kept in touch with me ever since. I believe it to be true that very little contact was made by British Rail—and I have raised this point with my hon. Friend in the past—during the passage of the inquiry. If my information is correct, Driver Goode's widow has still not received a copy of the inspector's report.

Because of the publicity attracted by my campaign to persuade the authorities to speed up the inspector's report, by way of tabling written questions in the intervening period, the family of the signalman most directly involved at the particular point in the railway line concerned was also under considerable pressure between the time of the crash and the publication of the inspector's report. The report makes reference to him. He lives in the constituency of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence). That signalman, as with Driver Goode, is totally exonerated from any blame or responsibility for what occurred. However, the clouds of suspicion and guilt which hung over those two families during the period of the report's production must have been unbearable and intolerable. Anything that can be done to expedite inquiries of that nature, as happened in the case of the Zeebrugge disaster, must be to the benefit of those most directly involved.

I turn to the inspector's conclusions. First, the blame for the collision was placed, sadly and tragically, but fairly and squarely, on the shoulders of the driver of the other express train. One can, from a close inspection of the report, glean the information that he broke a number of rules, including having in his cabin a British Rail employee who should not have been allowed there.

I am concerned to be assured that the driver—and I shall not mention his name because that would be inappropriate—if he is still employed by British Rail, should not be driving express trains. I draw a comparison with someone who causes an accident on the M1 or M6, and who may as a result be convicted of driving carelessly, dangerously or recklessly, and banned from driving for a time or even for life. In a case of this nature, where there was clearly a breach of rules—and dare I suggest that there may have been an element of negligence—the public has a right to know whether the person responsible is still entrusted with driving trains, be they goods trains, suburban trains or express trains.

The recommendation of the inspector at paragraph 83 was: The reduction in the number of motive power inspectors, as part of the general 'slimming' down of the railway staff, is, in my opinion, a retrograde step which can only lead to less efficient supervision on vital safety matters. I am not sufficiently technically qualified—indeed, I am not technically qualified at all—to know what a motive power inspector is, but clearly he is of considerable importance in ensuring the safety of the rolling stock. If there has been a general slimming down of such personnel, that must have a bearing on the safety of our rolling stock. I invite my hon. Friend, when he replies, to tell me the present position.

I also wish to draw the attention of the House to paragraph 84 of the inspector's recommendations, which is very disturbing: In addition, this accident emphasises the importance of the continual updating of the British Railways Rule Book, together with associated safety documents. I find the fact that Section C Clause 3.1.1. was not amended or expanded from its original issue dealing with Yellow Flashing Aspects on the approaches to diverging junctions in 1977 until after and resulting from this accident in 1986 most disturbing". To me that means that British Rail's rule book had not been updated for 11 years until these recommendations were published. I hesitate to think what the position might be today if the Colwich crash had not occurred. I wonder when British Rail would have got round to updating the rule book—presumably every engine driver's working manual. I ask my hon. Friend to obtain assurances, if possible, (a) that the rule book has been updated, and (b) that express train drivers familiarise themselves with it at regular intervals.

The final point which attracts my attention, and one which disturbs me greatly, is contained in paragraph 86: A considerable part of this Report has dealt with the braking of train 1H20 immediately prior to the collision. Despite invoking the braking experts of the Director of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering and the Director of Research, also carrying out two sets of speed and braking tests using the coaches actually involved in the collision, or where that was not possible, similar coaches, I am still not completely convinced that the braking after the emergency brake application by"— the driver who was subsequently found to be guilty— was as effective as one would have expected. Considerable attention has been paid to the effect of the operation of wheel slide prevention equipment on MkIII coaches and, while I accept that the Lucas Girling equipment, as fitted to the coaches on train 1H20, has not been found to suffer from spurious cyclic activity, I accept the evidence of Senior Technician Morgan that he heard considerable wheel slide prevention activity as the MkIII coaches passed Colwich Signal Box. The fact that the inspector was not completely convinced that the braking after the emergency brake application by the driver was as effective as it might have been leads me to suggest to my hon. Friend that members of the travelling public have a right to be assured that all possible attention is paid to these braking systems, however sophisticated they may be, to ensure that if such a crash ever occurred again it would not draw the sort of adverse comment that I have just quoted.

I raise these points and invite my hon. Friend's comments simply to ensure that we as Members of Parliament can scrutinise as far as possible the activities and the management of British Rail and other nationalised bodies. If I had written to the chairman of British Rail or to the person specifically responsible for the inquiry, I would probably not have got as full, frank and direct a reply as I shall get from my hon. Friend the Minister. I am most grateful for the opportunity to raise the issue.

10.54 pm
The Minister for Public Transport (Mr. David Mitchell)

My hon. Friend will be aware that the functions of the railway inspectorate of the Department of Transport involve the inspection and approval of new railway works and the investigation of railway accidents.

Of course, principal responsibility for railway safety rests with the railway operators themselves. The British Railways Board has a duty under section 3(1) of the Transport Act 1962 to have due regard to efficiency, economy and safety of operation, and it is always conscious of that.

My hon. Friend will also know that the inquiry into the Colwich collision was held under section 7 of the Regulation of Railways Act 1871. Any recommendations made by the inspector in his report are not statutorily binding, and thus British Rail is not forced to adopt them. It is an accepted practice, however, that the British Railways Board gives due consideration to the report as a whole, and to the recommendations in particular. The member of the board responsible for safety, David Rayner, will reply to the Secretary of State in due course—it normally takes two or three months—commenting on the report and the action that the board proposes to take on the recommendations. I say that because my hon. Friend may find the context helpful.

My hon. Friend has referred to the cause of the accident. I confirm that the immediate cause of the collision was that the driver of the Euston-Manchester train passed the signal protecting Colwich junction at danger and, despite making an emergency application of the brakes shortly before reaching the signal, failed to bring the train to a halt until the locomotive was on the actual junction.

The reason for the driver passing the signal at danger was his ignorance of the meaning of the flashing yellow aspects and the associated signals approaching Colwich junction. It was the first time he had driven over the route since the signalling had been altered and flashing yellow aspects introduced on the approach to the cross-over from the down fast to the down slow line on the approach to the junction. The driver had received and signed for two weekly notices the month before the accident which gave details of the signalling alterations, but he had not read them. Had he studied them, there is little doubt that he would not have mistaken the meaning of the signals and would have braked so that he came to a halt before the signal protecting the junction.

I shall deal separately with braking, a possible contributory cause to the accident.

I join my hon. Friend in congratulating the emergency services on the efficiency with which they evacuated those involved. In particular, I praise the exemplary action of Signalman Millward, who was on duty in the Colwich signal box. He was completely unable to prevent the accident, but, immediately it occurred, he took all the necessary steps to stop all approaching trains and alert the emergency services. I understand that he subsequently found it a strain to work in that signal box and that he has been moved to another signal box in the area where he is more settled.

As my inspector has stated, the death of Driver Goode, the driver of the Liverpool-Euston train, was particularly tragic, as he had no chance to protect himself. I am sorry also to learn that his widow has recently died. Although it was in no way his duty, throughout his inquiry, my inspector kept in touch with Mrs. Goode and her son Stewart, the latter expressing gratitude on behalf of his mother for the sympathetic attitude shown to the family. I am also assured that the regional operations manager of London midland region personally visited Mrs. Goode after the accident and ensured that the welfare department was providing all the necessary help. I hope that my hon. Friend will be glad to receive that assurance.

My hon. Friend mentioned the delay in publishing the report. He questioned the 18-month time scale and asked whether it was par for the course. The answer is no. The normal time scale is about half that. My hon. Friend has asked me several questions about that matter.

I should explain that the delay in completing the report was due to the extensive technical investigations that had to be carried out. The responsibility for delaying the publication of the report until the technical investigation had been completed lies with the inspector who held the inquiry. I believe that he acted correctly in trying to determine by all means possible why the brakes appeared not to operate as efficiently as usual when the driver made an emergency brake application. These investigations included carrying out a number of speed-brake tests with trains as similar as possible to the Euston-Manchester express involved in the accident. When those tests proved inconclusive, he arranged for a special working party of the directorate of mechanical and electrical engineering and the research directorate, British Railways Board, to carry out further investigations in depth into the braking of the train and the possible effect of the malfunctioning or the excessive operation of the wheel slide prevention equipment fitted to the Mark III coaches—in layman's terms, a device to prevent skidding. The inspector was closely associated with those investigations and it was only at the end of last year that he accepted that no definite results could he obtained to explain the apparent poor braking of the Manchester express. He then produced his report as rapidly as possible.

My hon. Friend raised a number of other specific points, particularly with regard to the question of the position of the driver of the train who was at fault. I am sure that my hon. Friend is aware that any disciplinary action taken by British Railways concerning its staff is a matter entirely for the railway management, and it would be quite wrong for me to comment on the action taken over the driver of the Euston-Manchester train. I understand, however, that the driver, after a long period of sickness, has now been reinstated as a driver, but is now confined to shunting and other local duties.

My hon. Friend also raised the question of the motive power inspectors. I noticed that the hon. Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing) nodded knowingly at that point because he thought that that was a sign that the Government have been cutting corners. I shall show the hon. Gentleman and my hon. Friend that there is no truth in such an assertion. The report emphasises the importance of motive power inspectors who travel in the cab to check the correct handling of locomotives by drivers and their knowledge of the "road" generally, and signalling in particular.

I understand that there are difficulties in computing the number of motive power inspectors who carry out this function because some of them also instruct drivers. I now understand that the number of inspectors involved has in fact remained much the same for several years, but because the number of drivers has declined the number of inspectors in relation to the number of drivers has actually increased, and the standard of supervision has improved. I am sure that the House will be glad to have that information and correction to the inspector's report.

My hon. Friend also referred to the updating of the rule book. He drew attention to the inspector's remarks about the importance of continual updating of the British Railways rule book and his recommendation that more attention should be paid to updating rules and other relevant safety documents.

As the report states, the rule dealing with the use and meaning of signal aspects, including flashing yellow ones, was altered on 4 April 1987, clarifying the meaning of main aspects. Since then, the board has issued a complete revision of the rule book which came into effect on 4 June 1988. That too clarifies the meaning of signalling aspects, and I am sure the board will heed my inspector's recommendation and pay special attention to keeping the rules up to date.

I refer finally to braking. Somewhat against the clock I must state that, despite extensive investigations into the braking of the Euston-Manchester train, including two sets of speed and braking tests carried out with the coaches actually involved, the inspector has not been completely convinced of the reason why braking after the emergency brake application was not as effective as it was expected to be.

The full emergency application of the brakes is likely to introduce wheel slide even on dry rails, particularly if adhesion is reduced by any contaminant. That would activate the wheel slide prevention equipment where fitted. Therefore, there must be some reason to believe that it was not mechanical failure that caused the wheel slide mechanism to operate and therefore to slow the effectiveness of the emergency application of brakes. We can never know for certain, but possibly there was some matter on the surface of the track that acted as a lubricant and therefore led to skidding. The reaction of the mechanism, perfectly properly, tried to prevent that skidding from continuing. That led the inspector to recommend that, in the full emergency application of brakes, all brakes should be fully applied even if wheel slide occurs and wheel flats are made on the wheels. The inspector recommends the fitting of equipment to eliminate automatically the operation of the wheel slide prevention equipment in the event of an emergency brake application being made.

That is a somewhat technical explanation. I hope ghat my hon. Friend will find it helpful. I am grateful to him for raising the matter this evening and giving me the opportunity to explain to him and to the House the background to the four key matters that he raised that arise from the report.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at five minutes past Eleven o'clock.