§ Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Kenneth Carlisle.]
12.34 am§ Mr. Patrick Thompson (Norwich, North)Mr. Speaker, I am grateful to you for giving me the opportunity this morning to raise on the Adjournment the case of the late Corporal Michael Owen. I am also grateful to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces for his trouble over the case during the past year and also for his attendance tonight. The case was brought to my attention by Mr. and Mrs. J. J. Nooney, who live in Hellesdon in my constituency of Norwich, North.
Corporal Michael Owen was in the 8th Field Workshop, REME, at Colchester, and was admitted to hospital on 15 June 1985. In this distressing case, as it turned out, he was terminally ill, and he died on 2 October 1985, having returned home just one or two days before he died. At that time he was still a serving soldier, although in normal circumstances if he had not taken ill he would have left the Army on 22 July 1985, with a terminal grant. In the event, because of his illness, his time in hospital and because he was still a serving soldier, he received a gratuity which, according to a letter that I received from the Under-Secretary on 9 July 1986, was payable to
his widow, provided that she was not separated from him at the time of his death. If no eligible widow exists it is paid to any eligible child or children".Corporal Owen was separated from his wife, and divorce proceedings, as far as I am aware, were under way and still in progress at the time of his death. Therefore, through this gratuity, money was paid by the Army to his 18-year-old daughter, Joanne. In the months during which I have been dealing with the case, it has become clear to me that Corporal Owen's definite intention was that his estate should be left to his mother, Mrs. Irene Muriel Nooney, who, as I said, lives in my constituency at 34 Coppice Avenue, Hellesdon. Corporal Owen signed an Army will form, of which I have a copy, on 22 June 1985, and made it clear to his family that he had done this and that it was his intention that any money that came into his estate or that he received would go to his mother.The question whether Corporal Owen's service continued beyond 22 July 1985 is important. According to a letter from the Ministry of Defence to Mrs. Nooney's solicitor dated 20 March 1987, if a serving soldier is in hospital at the time that he is due normally to leave service in the Army, he can be retained on full pay until treatment ceases or after five months from the period that he was last on duty, in which case a medical board is called and a decision taken as to whether the soldier is then discharged or kept in hospital for further treatment and remains a serving soldier before ultimate discharge. Further boards can be called at intervals of a maximum of 18 months.
In this case, if Corporal Owen had remained in hospital and had not died, a board would have been due after five months—on 22 December. If Corporal Owen had lived after that five-month period, his case would have been due for further examination by a medical board and a decision would have been taken whether to extend his time in hospital, extend his service or discharge him from the Army. On my reading of the regulations and the letter from the Ministry of Defence, Corporal Owen could, if he 344 wished, have requested an earlier board and obtained release while receiving medical care, and the moneys due to him.
I believe that Corporal Owen was in total ignorance of this fact and that he was fully confident that the intention of his will, made in June, would be carried out. I want to stress that I think that it is important that Corporal Owen was under that firm impression.
A further and more serious complication arose, which makes the case more difficult to judge. The Army was definitely at fault in its handling of the case. My hon. Friend the Minister has expressed regret—he apologised when he wrote on 6 October 1986. According to the Army, Corporal Owen signed a form to extend his service from 22 July 1985 to 22 December 1985. It may be a coincidence, but this is also a five-month period —identical to that which I mentioned earlier.
Nobody can establish why Corporal Owen was asked to sign such an extension of his service. It was not relevant because, if he had stayed in hospital, he would have remained a serving soldier and if, after a medical board, it was decided that he should be discharged, he would have been discharged. I am not clear even now why he should have wished to fill in the form, or why anyone else, including the Army, should have wished him to fill it in. There appear to have been serious errors.
The date on the form—the certificate of amendment to terms of service—of which I have a copy here, is 28 September. That is the date on which the form was supposed to have been signed by Corporal Owen and countersigned as witness by Captain Powers. It was signed by the commanding officer somewhat later.
According to the family and all of the evidence that I have, Corporal Owen returned home—a sick man about to die—on the day before, that is 27 September. In the letter from the Ministry of Defence to the solicitor of 20 March, it was stated that the witnessing of the signature did not take place when the form was signed but that it was signed in Otterburn — miles from Colchester — by Captain Powers, who had apparently satisfied himself that Corporal Owen's signature was the correct one. Goodness knows how he did that.
In the words of the Ministry of Defence, this could have been better organised. That is the understatement of the year. Somewhat later, the commanding officer countersigned the form saying that he was satisfied that Corporal Michael Owen had been interviewed and fully understood the implications of completing the extension of service form. As, after many months of study, I am still baffled as to how the form was remotely relevant. I fail to understand how Corporal Owen could have been interviewed, let alone how he could have understood the implications of what was going on. I reject that explanation and believe that there was a serious error of administration which throws the competence of the Army into doubt.
Filling in the form had no direct bearing on whether Corporal Owen was a serving soldier. If and when he signed the form—there is some doubt about it in the family—it is clear that he had no idea that it could have had any effect on his intention to leave money due to him to his mother.
The Army regulations, as quoted in the "Army Pensions Warrant," refer to terminal grant, which a soldier gets if he leaves the Army in normal circumstances, or a 345 gratuity if he dies in service, as happened here. The "Army Pensions Warrant" says that in the case of a gratuity, which happened in this case
the widow of an officer or a soldier who dies while serving on full pay on the Active List or after 31st March 1973 may be granted a gratuity which will either be the amount of the terminal grant or gratuity to which her husband would have been eligible had he been invalided from the Army.I stress the word "may" there because there is an element of discretion to which the Army did not appear to give even a moment's thought when considering Michael Owen's case. It is worth noting in passing that it makes it clear in that passage that the amount of money involved is not different if we are talking about terminal grant or gratuity, so that is not a factor in this case.The "Army Pensions Warrant" adds in section 14:
Subject to any exception which the Defence Council may approve, a gratuity shall not be granted to a widow who was separated from her husband at the time.That was appropriate in this case because the separation was in effect, and thus the section applied. It goes on in paragraph 260:Where the officer or soldier did not leave a widow eligible for an award under this section, but a child or children, the Defence Council may at their discretion award a gratuity to the child.As we know, that happened; the 18-year-old daughter was awarded a gratuity. But again, the word "may" appears and it is at the discretion of the Defence Council.I have seen no evidence in this case of any exercise of discretion having been involved. From my reading of the papers and letters, what happened occurred automatically, as though the regulations said, "This shall happen", rather than "This should be given some thought before a final decision is made."
To sum up, there is uncertainty in the law and the regulations. Does the Minister think that that uncertainty can be cleared up? I am not necessarily opposed to the intention of the regulations, which is to look after dependants in the event of the death of a soldier during his time in the Army. But the provision should be clarified, and I hope that the Minister will comment on that when he replies.
Then there was administrative bungling. Apologies have been received by the family from the Ministry of Defence on that count, so perhaps the Minister need not comment at length about that, except in so far as it has a bearing on the equity and fairness of the case, and in so far as it relates to the confusion which was clearly in the mind of Corporal Owen, who believed, until he died, that what he wanted to happen would happen. In my view, nothing happened to make him believe anything to the contrary.
Some compensation should be paid to the mother, to the family, because they and Corporal Owen were effectively, if not deliberately, misled, and at the time and since that has caused great distress and uncertainty to the family, certainly for the two years or so since Corporal Owen died.
I hope that the Minister will be positive in response to the three major points I have made—the uncertainty of the law, the bungling of the administration involved and the need in equity for some compensation for Mrs. Nooney. I look forward to his reply.
§ The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. Roger Freeman)I congratulate my 346 hon. Friend the Member for Norwich, North (Mr. Thompson) on securing this Adjournment debate and I pay tribute to the considerable interest he has shown in this case and to the support he has given to Mrs. Nooney and her family. I am sure she is most appreciative of all the efforts he has made during these months — indeed, almost a year—in pursuit of her interests and those of her late son.
My hon. Friend has raised a number of wide-ranging issues relating to the "Army Pensions Warrant" and the armed forces policy concerning personnel who become ill, particularly in respect of retention in service and financial guidance. Before dealing with the specific points raised by my hon. Friend—and I shall, in the time available, deal with them as fully as I can —I will set out briefly the history of this sad case concerning some of the points raised by my hon. Friend.
Michael Owen was a Corporal in the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, who was due to leave the Army on completion of a 22-year engagement on 22 July 1985. As my hon. Friend knows, when a service man completes 22 years' reckonable service he is eligible on discharge to be granted an immediate pension and a non-taxable terminal grant. Corporal Owen was admitted to hospital on 15 June 1985, about five weeks before he was due to leave the Army. In these circumstances and in accordance with normal practice, he was automatically retained in the Service on full pay. I think my hon. Friend will agree that that practice is generous and humanitarian.
Sadly, Corporal Owen died of cancer on 2 October 1985, while still on full pay. He was never discharged. His widow would have been granted a gratuity, equal to the amount of the terminal grant, for which he would have been eligible had he been invalided from the Army on the date that he died. However, as he was separated from his wife, he did not leave a widow eligible for the award and, in accordance with the provisions of the "Army Pensions Warrant", the money was paid to his daughter.
As my hon. Friend stated earlier, the problem arises over the fact that Mrs. Nooney considers that the gratuity paid on her son's death should have formed part of his estate and, as such, should have been paid to her as the named beneficiary of her son's will.
Those briefly are the facts. However, there are two or three points that I should like to go into in more detail and some questions raised by my hon. Friend which I would like to answer rather more fully. I hope it will become clear that everything done by the Army during the last few months of Corporal Owen's life was done with his best interests in mind.
I shall deal first with Corporal Owen's retention in the Army past his due date of discharge. For compassionate reasons, it is our practice to postpone a soldier's discharge if he is in hospital on the due date. This is to the clear benefit of soldiers and their dependants. The soldier continues to receive his full pay and all the support the Army can provide. If he is married, he remains entitled to a married quarter. Although in Corporal Owen's case he would immediately have become eligible to be granted his pension if he had left the service this would not be the case for a soldier who had not given 22 years' service.
We certainly would not wish to introduce a system which resulted in all individuals who were unfit on the date that their engagement was due to terminate being discharged forthwith. Wherever possible we want to see them restored to full health before they return to civilian 347 life. I know that my hon. Friend agrees with that principle. Of course, if a soldier in hospital, who had completed his engagement, requested his immediate discharge, no obstacle would be placed in his way. He would be medically boarded and would then be released to pension and lose his service pay, of course, although still entitled to service medical care. However, at no time did Corporal Owen ask for a medical discharge. Indeed, he expressed a clear wish to the doctor in charge of his case that he wanted to remain in the Army.
Service medical regulations stipulate that an individual who is in hospital on the date of his normal termination of service is to be retained on full pay until in-patient treatment ceases to be required or five months have elapsed since he was last on duty. By the five-month point it is normal—this can be delayed—for a medical board to be held, which will either recommend a medical discharge or, if the individual is only part way through his engagement and has a good chance of recovery, the continuance of treatment with periodic future boards up to a maximum of 18 months. Under this system Corporal Owen would have been due a medical board by November, but an earlier board could have been arranged had he requested it. If he had been medically discharged he would have received an invaliding pension and terminal grant and may also have been eligible for a war pension from the Department of Health and Social Security.
My hon. Friend has raised the matter of the element of discretion in the relevant articles of the "Army Pensions Warrant". Where these state that
a gratuity may be granted"—my hon. Friend stressed the word may—that should not be taken to imply any discretion other than to pay or withhold the appropriate sum. Furthermore, that discretion itself can be exercised only within certain limits. Article 250 of the warrant provides that where there is an eligible widow a gratuity may or may not be paid to her. No further discretion is allowed for save that the Defence Council may divert a part of that sum to any eligible children.Article 260 provides that where there is no eligible widow a gratuity may or may not be paid to an eligible child or children. Where there is no eligible wife or children Article 177 provides that a lump sum may be paid to a soldier's estate. It should be noted that the discretion to make such a payment arises only in those circumstances. If there is a wife or child the only choice is whether to pay them or not.
The Army is very much aware that it has a great obligation towards its sick and injured and to their dependants. By definition soldiers may be required to risk their lives for their country and they are entitled to expect the best support possible for them and their families, including immediate payment of pensions and gratuities where appropriate. Were the rules to be changed so that any benefits owing would pass under the deceased's will, it would be necessary in all cases to demand that probate, or letters of administration, be obtained before the terminal benefits could be paid. This would inevitably involve the dependants of soldiers in additional worry, delay and expense. Obviously we would not wish to move in this direction. However, I assure my hon. Friend that I have asked that consideration be given to the possibility of introducing a limited option which would allow 348 divorced soldiers without dependent children, if they so wished, the opportunity to nominate a particular individual to receive their death benefit. My hon. Friend will appreciate that this is a matter which requires careful study and, of course, it will not benefit in any way the estate or dependants of the late Corporal Owen. I hope that my hon. Friend will welcome the initiative that the Ministry is pleased to take.
We know that on 27 June 1985 Corporal Owen signed a will leaving all his estate, including his service benefits, to his mother, Mrs. Nooney. The evidence suggests he was not aware on 27 June that under the "Army Pensions Warrant" if he died in service his service benefits would go to his daughter, not his mother. If he had been aware, he could have initiated steps to change matters. That is common ground between my hon. Friend and myself.
In view of the issues which this case has highlighted, I am instructing my officials to re-examine the procedures for financial counselling of patients in hospital, including formal communication in writing. It will be appreciated that this is a subject that needs to be considered with great care in view of the possible psychological effects on a patient, particularly on one whose death could be imminent. I have therefore asked for consideration to be given to how best patients can be made aware, on being admitted to hospital, of the ways in which they might be financially affected, including the implications of remaining in the service and the consequences of being medically discharged; and to how further financial counselling might be made available on request.
One other point that has emerged from our inquiries is the fact that Corporal Owen was asked to sign a form whilst in hospital to extend his service. My hon. Friend referred to that in some detail. That incident has caused his mother a degree of concern as she feels that it was the real reason why she did not receive the death gratuity.
It is true that while in hospital Corporal Owen was asked to sign this form which deferred the termination of his colour service until 22 December 1985. That was requested purely as an administrative tidying up exercise by those responsible for maintaining his record of service. As an in-patient there was no requirement for him to sign such a form. The procedure was invalid since extensions of service must be agreed before the completion of the earlier contract, the completion of Corporal Owen's period of engagement. The form is designed for use in the unit where it can be witnessed at the time of signature by an authorised officer. Although there has been some difficulty in establishing exactly when Corporal Owen signed the form, we know that, when he had done so, the form was returned to his former unit which was on exercise at Otterburn where it was countersigned and dated by the administrative officer. That was some two months after the due date of his discharge.
I apologise to my hon. Friend for that incorrect procedure. While it is regrettable that Corporal Owen was asked to sign the form, I assure my hon. Friend that it made no material difference. As I have said, the evidence suggests that Corporal Owen wished to remain in the Army and not be discharged. However, to avoid any recurrence of that situation I issued appropriate instructions. In September 1986 those instructions were reissued to all manning and records officers to prevent any such unfortunate recurrence.
Various questions have been asked about whether Corporal Owen understood the implications of remaining 349 on full pay. The service medical authorities are, however, very clear that Corporal Owen specifically stated that he did not wish to be discharged. Against this background, the medical staffs formed the view that to initiate a medical discharge could, in Corporal Owen's case, have had a harmful psychological effect which might have further undermined his health.
Corporal Owen's finances do not appear to have suffered in any way. While alive he remained on full pay rather than pension and when deceased the gratuity payable equalled the terminal grant that he would have received on discharge. As the terminal grant is calculated on the basis of length of reckonable service, the amount payable actually increased as a result of the extension of his service.
To sum up, taking first the broader issues raised, I must thank my hon. Friend for raising this debate and providing the opportunity for me to examine the procedures and rules governing discharges and related payments. I am satisfied that in general terms the procedures are just, humane and serve the armed forces' needs very well.
350 However, there is room for improvement and as a result of the investigations arising out of this case, I intend to review the question of counselling service men in hospital at the time of their discharge date, and, as I have said, to examine the possibility of introducing limited nomination schemes under the "Army Pensions Warrant". I have already issued instructions that the form mentioned by my hon. Friend should not be used for service men in hospital. All those are improvements to deal with cases such as that raised by my hon. Friend.
My hon. Friend has also stated that Corporal Owen's mother considers that she should receive a payment equal to the sum paid to her granddaughter on the grounds that her son's intentions were thwarted by the provisions of the "Army Pensions Warrant". I have listened carefully to all the points raised this evening and, although I am already very familiar with this case, I give my hon. Friend the assurance that I will read the record again and seriously reflect on it. I shall write to my hon. Friend in due course.
§ Question put and agreed to.
§ Adjourned accordingly at one minute past One o'clock.