HC Deb 11 March 1986 vol 93 cc789-91
1. Mr. Hoyle

asked the Secretary of State for Defence what will be the effect of President Reagan's current intermediate nuclear forces proposals on the Trident programme.

The Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. John Stanley)

None, Sir.

Mr. Hoyle

Does the Minister realise that the Prime Minister's rejection of the Russian proposal for a ban on intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe is disgraceful? It is a blow to peace. It means that, as usual, the Prime Minster has got it wrong. Will the Minister confirm that the reason for the rejection is to enable the Government to continue their folly of the deployment of Trident in this country?

When the Prime Minister talks of the goal of a nuclear freeze being long term, she is not speaking for Britain. We cannot afford to wait, because every nuclear weapon that is based in Europe brings the danger of nuclear war ever nearer.

Mr. Stanley

The hon. Gentleman has got it comprehensively wrong. The Government remain committed, as do the American Administration, to a zero-zero solution to the INF problem based on a zero-zero which must be expressed in global terms. The possibility of a zero-zero solution based solely on European long-range INF weapons is certainly not satisfactory. The hon. Member seems to forget that SS20s are highly mobile.

Sir Anthony Buck

Does my right hon. Friend agree that if we were to cancel our involvement with Trident it would have a disastrous effect on the various peace initiatives?

Mr. Stanley

I entirely agree with my hon. and learned Friend.

Mr. Strang

Will the Minister acknowledge that what was encouraging in the Gorbachev proposals of 15 January was that, for the first time, he was proposing the removal of all Soviet and American intermediate range missiles from Europe, while allowing France and Britain to retain their existing nulear missiles provided that they did not modernise them? Is it not a scandal that the Government have vetoed that proposal by rejecting out of hand the suggestion that we should not go ahead with Trident?

Mr. Stanley

I entirely disagree with the hon. Member. There is no possible basis for making prohibition of the modernisation of British and French systems a pre-condition of an INF agreement when the Soviet Union is taking no steps to make prohibition of the modernisation of its strategic forces a pre-conditon of an INF agreement.

Mr. Wilkinson

Does my right hon. Friend agree that if there were to be an agreed reduction in intermediate range nuclear forces, the importance of modern and effective strategic deterrents in France and the United Kingdom would be enhanced in the defence of Europe?

Mr. Stanley

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend.

Mr. Wallace

Is not the Prime Minister's wholly negative response to the initiative—the first constructive, far-reaching initiative to come out of the Soviet Union for almost over a generation — profoundly disappointing? It makes the Government's claim to support multilateral disarmament somewhat threadbare. Are we not approaching the situation where the Government's obsession with Trident will make us losers twice over: first, the extent to which Trident will crowd out other new defence equipment expenditure; and, secondly, the possibility of Trident becoming an effective hurdle to proper disarmament talks at Geneva?

Mr. Stanley

The hon. Gentleman is not correct. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has made a thoroughly positive and constructive response in correspondence with Premier Gorbachev. My right hon. Friend is entirely right to rest on the basic principle, which NATO has followed, of a zero-zero global based INF agreement. If the Soviets want a long-range INF agreement, based on equal numbers of like systems, they most certainly can have it. It is for them to accept that fundamentally fair principle in such negotiations.

Mr. Bill Walker

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the Trident programme is merely a modernisation and updating of the Polaris programme, which has contributed handsomely to the peace of the West? If Opposition Members do not recognise that, at least the Leader of the Opposition recognises that Rosyth is important to the Trident programme, because he deliberately leaves out any comment about Trident in letters which are critical of the Government's plans as he knows of Trident's importance to Scottish workers.

Mr. Stanley

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. We have noticed a certain inconsistency between what the Leader of the Opposition says in the Devonport area and what he says in the Rosyth area. I agree with my hon. Friend that we are modernising the British strategic deterrent. Many of us find it difficult to understand why the Opposition, having set in hand a major modernisation of our existing deterrent, should not be prepared to accept a continuance of that policy with a successor system.

Mr. Denzil Davies

Is it not a fact that the Prime Minister's rejection—for it was that—of a multilateral attempt to freeze the development of nuclear weapons demonstrates the hollowness of the Government's repeated claim that they believe in multilateral nuclear disarmament? Is not the right hon. Gentleman's determination to go ahead with Trident, despite the fact that it will affect arms talks between the United States and the Soviet Union and mean cuts in conventional forces, a major stumbling block to any agreement on arms control in Europe?

Mr. Stanley

The right hon. Gentleman is wholly incorrect. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has made a positive response in an INF context. It must be fundamental to an INF agreement that we deal with equal numbers of like systems. As for Trident, I do not understand the Opposition Front Bench's stance. It seems that they want to rest on wholly conventional defence. I suppose that means that they are prepared to rest behind American nuclear strategic weapons. If so, why do the Opposition continue to propagate their highly irresponsible policy of kicking the Americans out of their nuclear bases in Britain?

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