Chemical Weapons (Hansard, 17 June 1986)

§ 2. Mr. Caborn
asked the Secretary of State for Defence what are the implications for the speed of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's reaction to a chemical attack from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in a future conflict of all North Atlantic Treaty Organisation chemical weapons being stored in the United States of America.

§ Mr. Stanley
If the hon. Member is implying a reaction with chemical weapons, the implications would be determined by a variety of factors, such as which delivery systems the United States chose and whether there had been any contingent deployments of chemical weapons to other NATO countries by the time any Warsaw pact attack with chemical weapons took place.

§ Mr. Caborn
I thank the Minister for that answer. Does he agree that such a movement of chemical weapons across the Atlantic could be seen as being extremely provocative in times of tension? Has he seen any estimates of shipping such weaponry across the Atlantic, for example, for the stockpiles in West Germany?

§ Mr. Stanley
On the basis of the hon. Gentleman's argument, NATO would have no reinforcement plans whatsoever. I would put to him a contrary point of view: that, at times of tension, it is fundamentally important that the NATO Alliance shows its resolve to resist and so preserve deterrence.

§ Mr. Lyell
Is it not a fact that, at the moment, the Russians have a massive chemical capability which would put our conventional forces at a huge disadvantage if there were an attack in north-western Europe, and that unilateralism and its disadvantages apply just as much to chemical warfare as to nuclear disarmament? Should the House not remember that before the second world war Britain had a massive gas capability and that, as a result. Hitler never dared to use gas?

§ Mr. Stanley
My hon. and learned Friend is entirely right to draw attention to the relationship between preserving a viable chemical deterrent and preserving our conventional deterrent. He is entirely right to stress, as we have done often from the Dispatch Box, that if the Warsaw pact, through being able to launch chemical 895 attacks on our forces with impunity, was able to oblige our forces to fight continuously in protective clothing while not being under any such disadvantage itself, it would confer an enormous advantage on its conventional forces.

§ Mr. Wallace
Does the Minister think that the deployment of chemical weapons across the Atlantic at a time of tension would help to heighten, or to relieve, tension?

§ Mr. Stanley
That would obviously depend entirely on the circumstances of the time. As I said in reply to the hon. Member for Sheffield, Central (Mr. Caborn), we believe, as previous Governments believed, that it is critical that NATO countries should have reinforcement plans and show their will and determination to reinforce at a time of tension.

§ Mr. Tony Lloyd
Why is it automatically assumed that the way to deter chemical weapons is by the use of chemical weapons and that the way to respond to a chemical weapon attack is to use them, when there are plenty of other options which the Minister does not seem to allow for in his answers?

§ Mr. Stanley
The hon. Gentleman will be aware that the NATO defensive posture is one of flexible response. It is, therefore, open to NATO countries to use the range of their capabilities. The essence of our deterrence is that we do not signal in advance the form of response that we might make to any form of Soviet agression.

§ Mr. Terlezki
Does my right hon. Friend agree that we ought to ask the Soviet Union to get rid of 300,000 tonnes of chemical weapons so that there is no need for other countries to produce or use them, thereby increasing the peace, security and well-being of the whole world?

§ Mr. Stanley
That is, and remains, the first objective of the Government's policy. Everybody's defence and security interests would be best served by disposing of these weapons altogether. As some of my hon. Friends have already rightly said, the Soviet Union has been responsible for this major escalation and extension of the chemical threat, as it has modernised and expanded its chemical stocks, when none has been produced by Britain since the 1950s and by the United States since 1969.

§ Mr. Denzil Davies
Is it not a fact that these binary weapons are no use in the United States, and that they are of use only if they are located in Europe, because that is presumably where the war would come? Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the next step is for the United States to request that the bigeye bomb and other versions of these weapons be located in Britain at Upper Heyford and Lakenheath? If so, what would be the Government's response?

§ Mr. Stanley
As we have told the right hon. Gentleman and the House often, United States policy is that these weapons should remain in the United States during peacetime. As to what would happen at a time of tension or war, as we have said many times it would be matter for decision by the Government of the day in the light of all the circumstances at the time.