Binary Nerve Gas Weapons

HC Deb 28 April 1986 vol 96 cc661-4 3.30 pm

Mr. Denzil Davies (Llanelli)

I beg leave to ask the Secretary of State for Defence, although I see that he is not here—I hope that he is not giving a radio interview in Scotland—a question of which I have given him private notice, namely, whether he will make a statement on the British Government's policy on the talks in NATO on a new generation of binary nerve gas weapons.

The Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. John Stanley)

I am sure that, if my right hon. Friend is giving a radio interview, he is not giving it in Scotland but at the Independent European Programme Group.

The Government note with concern the massive chemical warfare capability of the Soviet Union. We consider that the Alliance should continue, as its first priority, to work urgently in the current negotiations in Geneva for a comprehensive and verifiable global ban on all aspects of chemical warfare. A force goal requiring the United States to modernise its chemical weapons stocks with binary munitions is being discussed collectively within NATO in accordance with normal Alliance procedures. We believe that United States moves towards modernising its limited retaliatory capability with binary weapons will underline to the Soviet Union the benefits of reaching early agreement on a total ban. In the event that it is not possible to achieve such a ban, United States chemical weapons modernisation would contribute to upholding NATO's deterrent strategy of flexible response.

Mr. Davies

Is it not the case that a recommendation that binary nerve gas weapons should be part of NATO's armoury has already been accepted by NATO military representatives, including the United Kingdom representative? Is that recommendation soon to be discussed and considered by the civilian permanent representatives and Ministers of Defence, including the British Secretary of State for Defence?

Will the right hon. Gentleman tell the House whether one of the proposals is that the F111 aircraft based at Upper Heyford and Lakenheath should be equipped with chemical bombs—I believe that they are described as binary spray bombs in the trade—or are we to be told that the Government do not know, and apparently do not ask, what bombs can be carried by the F111s? Thirdly, is the Minister aware that if these proposals are accepted they will do considerable political damage to the NATO Alliance, especially at this time? Far from helping at the talks in Geneva, the proposals will jeopardise those talks and lead to a further escalation in the arms race. Will he make it clear that if necessary the British Government will veto these proposals and never allow these hideous new weapons on British soil?

Mr. Stanley

I can confirm to the right hon. Gentleman that the proposal for a force goal for the modernisation of the American chemical weapon capability has been considered by the military representatives. It has not yet been considered by the NATO ambassadors or by NATO Ministers. The right hon. Gentleman asked about basing in the United Kingdom. As I have previously made quite clear to the House, the United States Government have said that they have no plans to deploy binary chemical weapons in any foreign country in peacetime, and that should such deployment be considered in future, they will consult beforehand with the countries concerned.

I do not agree with the right hon. Gentleman's assessment of the implications for arms control. As has been well demonstrated, the intermediate nuclear forces deployment has made the Soviet Union negotiate much more seriously than ever before about INF arms control. I assure the House most fervently that the priority of the Government is to continue to try to achieve a total worldwide ban on chemical weapons. The right hon. Gentleman spoke about escalation. The basic military position must be considered when talking about escalation. For many years, the Soviet Union has taken advantage of no modernisation whatever by the United States since 1969. The Soviet Union has established a massive chemical warfare capability and it is in the interests of everybody in Western Europe and of vital importance against that massive Soviet capability our chemical warfare deterrent is maintained.

Sir Peter Blaker (Blackpool, South)

Is my right hon. Friend aware that every hon. Member on this side welcomes his restatement of the NATO objective of securing a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons? We agree with him that the present proposal before NATO is more likely to persuade the Soviet Union to agree to such a ban or to move towards such a ban than the point of view of the Opposition, which seems totally devoid of common sense.

Mr. Stanley

I entirely agree with my right hon. Friend. As he well knows, not having a retaliatory capability and not preserving chemical warfare deterrents confer a major handicap on one's own conventional forces; that process tends severely to reduce the nuclear threshold, which I hope every hon. Member will want to keep as high as possible.

Dr. David Owen (Plymouth, Devonport)

Will the Minister of State accept that while the Soviet Union has nuclear weapons, many of us accept the need for nuclear weapons to be deployed by NATO forces? However, we find morally repugnant the idea that Britain should give any support to the deployment of nerve gases that are a hundred times more potent than mustard gas. Such weapons are not necessary for NATO and it is a weapons system and a form of warfare that we should utterly condemn and not agree to deploy.

Mr. Stanley

As the right hon. Gentleman is aware, there is no question of deployment in the United Kingdom and our policy remains wholly unchanged. The right hon. Gentleman says that the deployment of such weapons is repugnant. I remind him that throughout the time he was Foreign Secretary the United States had a national chemical weapon capability.

Mr. Peter Viggers (Gosport)

Does my right hon. Friend agree that, despite our self-denial of chemical weapons, the Russians have continued to accumulate, to test and to deploy chemical weapons and have 80,000 specially trained troops and 20,000 special reconnaisance and decontamination vehicles? Surely this proves that unilateral disarmament does not work with chemical weapons or other weapons.

Mr. Stanley

I endorse what my hon. Friend has said. The lack of efficacy of one-sided disarmament is graphically illustrated by chemical weapon development and by what he has said about the scale of the Soviet capability. It is estimated that the Soviet stockpile of chemical weapon agents totals 300,000 tonnes. It is a massive stockpile and the Soviet Union has a range of methods of delivering the weapons. I hope that every hon. Member recognises the crucial importance of deterring the Soviet Union from using that capability.

Mr. A. E. P. Duffy (Sheffield, Attercliffe)

The Minister has said that a decision has yet to be taken by NATO defence Ministers and by ambassadors. The right hon. Gentleman knows that, if the defence review committee establishes today a new generation of chemical warfare weapons as a force goal, it will become a common Alliance objective, to which Britain will subscribe. Despite him saying that the United States hopes that it does not have to stock chemical weapons outside the United States, what are the storage implications for Britain in certain circumstances?

Mr. Stanley

There are no storage implications, until such time as the United States approaches Britain and requests that chemical weapons be based in this country. The United States has made no such request and it has made it clear that such a request would not be made in peacetime.

Mr. Neil Thorne (Ilford, South)

Will my right hon. Friend confirm that it takes about three times as many men to perform a task in nuclear/biological/chemical kit than without it, and that if we have no such protection to afford our troops we shall require at least three times as many men as we already have? As the Soviet bloc already has three times as many men as we have, that would entail us having nine or 10 times the number of service men that we have now.

Mr. Stanley

I confirm what my hon. Friend says, which is that fighting a conventional war with one's own forces in NBC kit while the forces of other countries do not have to wear it would result in a serious degradation of one's conventional operating capability.

Mr. Roland Boyes (Houghton and Washington)

Does the Minister accept that we on the Opposition Benches agree that there should be a comprehensive and verifiable reduction in chemical weapon stocks? Does he agree also that the talks in Geneva are not advancing quickly enough? Does he accept that there is something illogical, contradictory and obscene about the argument that we must increase the number of chemical weapons before we can begin to reduce their number? The Minister says that everyone agrees with that argument, but I think that no one agrees with it.

Mr. Stanley

I see nothing obscene in the proposition that we should give ourselves the basic deterrent capability to ensure that these profoundly evil weapons are not used against our own people, whether civilians or service men, in western Europe.

Mr. Patrick Cormack (Staffordshire, South)

Is my right hon. Friend aware that every sane person hopes that a complete ban can be achieved, and that anyone who has seen the extra vulnerability of our troops on the sparsely populated northern flank that would stem from the extra protective clothing that they would have to wear to withstand chemical weapons will understand at a stroke how expensive and disastrous a policy of unilateralism would be?

Mr. Stanley

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. He is entirely right to reflect on what he has seen and on his own experiences on the northern flank. Fighting in aircraft or in armoured vehicles on the ground in NBC kit would severely degrade our operating capability.

Mr. Eric Deakins (Walthamstow)

Why is NATO being asked to endorse these appalling new weapons for United States forces in the USA when it was not asked for its views on the introduction of the SDI or the updating of the American nuclear strategic deterrent?

Mr. Stanley

As the hon. Member knows, there have been detailed discussions with all the NATO countries on the SDI programme. He will be aware that it was one of the requirements for congressional approval, and a reasonable one, that the NATO countries, whose deterrent would be added to by these weapons, endorsed a force goal indicating that they favoured the deployment.

Mr. Anthony Nelson (Chichester)

Does my right hon. Friend accept that some of us who are the staunchest proponents of our nuclear strategic deterrent are nevertheless gravely concerned about the wisdom of developing and building up a stockpile of ever more hideous and novel means of killing one another? Will he confirm that, whatever decision the United States takes about acquiring and building up such a stockpile on its own territory, the Government will be no party to the acquisition of those stocks in peacetime by other NATO states?

Mr. Stanley

One can speak only for this country, and, as I have made clear, there is no question of the deployment of American binary munitions in the United Kingdom in peacetime. It is of paramount importance that the NATO countries, and in this case the United States, maintain a viable deterrent capability against the formidable chemical weapons stockpile that the Soviet Union has acquired.

Mr. D. E. Thomas (Meirionnydd Nant Conwy)

Is it conceivable that these weapons will be brought to Caerwent to the United States arms dump in a time of emergency? Has the Minister's deterrence argument developed into an argument for continuing modernisation of the deterrent capability? How will a chemical deterrent deter the Soviet Union, and how is that an additional component to the existing nuclear deterrent? Will he explain this development in his deterrence theory?

Mr. Stanley

I hope that the hon. Gentleman will cast his mind back 40 years, and recall that perhaps it was because both sides had a chemical warfare capability that chemical weapons were never used between 1939 and 1945.