Falkland Islands (Foreign Affairs Committee Report)

HC Deb 14 March 1985 vol 75 cc492-530

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Neubert.]

7.18 pm

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Sir Geoffrey Howe)

I am glad that the House has the opportunity this evening to discuss the Government's policy towards the Falkland Islands. I am grateful to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, under the chairmanship of my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Sir A. Kershaw), for the important contribution which its report will make to the debate. Its wide-ranging review of the many questions arising was published in December last year. The Government's observations on that report were made available to the House in February. These are the two principal documents for our debate tonight. In the limited time available this evening, I shall not be able to cover the many subjects dealt with in those documents. My hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Renton) will be ready to respond at the end of the debate to points that hon. Members may wish to pursue.

I hope that the House will forgive me if I am not able to remain for the whole of the debate. I have to attend an engagement with President Mubarak of Egypt which it would not be possible for me to escape. I apologise to the House.

I wish at the outset of this debate to remind the House of the twin themes that guide our policy towards the Falkland Islands and Argentina. The first is our determination to fulfil our commitments to the Falkland Islanders. The second is our efforts to promote better relations with Argentina.

Britain's responsibilities towards the islanders are clear. They are to enable them to live in a climate of peace and security, under a Government of their own choosing, and in that setting to promote their political, social and economic development.

Our concern for the political development of the islanders has been reflected in the way in which we have considered with them the proposals for a new constitution. The islanders consider — and we agree — that the Falklands should have a modern constitution which matches their aspirations in the circumstances of today.

A Select Committee of the island's Legislative Council had begun work on that subject before the Argentine invasion in 1982. Its report on July 1983 recommended, first, that the number of the elected members on the Legislative Council should be increased from six to eight, to be elected four each from two constituencies within the islands; secondly, that the number of elected members in the Executive Council should be increased from two to three; thirdly, that the islands' Government should no longer be able to appoint two members to the Executive Council; and, fourthly, that in each council the two ex-officio members would no longer have a vote. Her Majesty's Government have accepted these recommendations.

Some concerns were expressed in the islands about the Government's decision to promulgate separate constitutions for the Falkland Islands and for the dependencies on the ground that this might imply an intention to relinquish sovereignty over the Falkland Islands while retaining the dependencies. I can assure the House that there are absolutely no grounds for that anxiety. We have no such intention. Our position on sovereignty is firm.

That is one of the few points on which we take a different view from the Committee. I have to say that we were disappointed that its report did not reach a categorical conclusion on the legal validity of Britain's title to the Falkland Islands. Successive British Governments have had no such doubts. In their view—and in our view—the islands are British territory.

Even so, there is good reason to make separate constitutional provision for the two territories. Although the dependencies have for convenience been administered from Port Stanley, they are a separate dependent territory with their own requirements. Unlike the Falkland Islands, they have no permanent population and, therefore, no need for representative government.

Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow)

How can the right hon. and learned Gentleman say that successive British Governments have had no doubts? The Government in which Sir Edward Grey of Fallodon was the Foreign Secretary had the Gaston de Bernhardt report. In the 1930s, Campbell and other senior members of the Foreign Office noted that our case had certain weaknesses. In the 1940s, the Marquis of Willingdon went to Latin America. As a result of that visit, there is a file to be opened in 1991 in the Foreign Office called "Proposals to Reunite the Falklands with Argentina". Those who talk about reunification must at least have some doubts. Come off it.

Sir Geoffrey Howe

The hon. Gentleman is entitled to the view to which he has clung so tenaciously, but in fact and in practice the attitude of successive British Governments has been founded on the proposition that I have explained.

I come now to the close relationship between the two constitutions about which I was speaking. The close relationship that has long existed between the two territories will be reflected in the new arrangements that we propose. The Governor of the Falkland Islands will also be commissioner for South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. In this capacity, he will consult the Executive Council of the Falkland Islands on matters relating to the dependencies which might affect the Falkland Islands.

The new constitution for the Falkland Islands contains one important new element. The island councillors expressed the view that the constitution should include a reference to their right of self-determination. We agree with them. Accordingly, the preamble to the human rights chapter of the constitution now recalls the provisions on self-determination from article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966. The United Kingdom ratified it in 1976.

Argentina has not subscribed to that covenant. On the contrary, the Argentine Government seek to deny the Falkland Islanders the right of self-determination. In our view, the Falkland Islanders, like any other people, have that right. They make up a peaceful and homogeneous community which has developed democratic institutions over more than a century. Their right to self-determination will now be reflected in their constitution, and we shall uphold it.

It has been suggested that these provisions might derogate from the sovereignty of Parliament. That is not so. The ultimate authority in matters affecting any dependent territory is of course this Parliament.

The constitutions are being promulgated in accordance with the normal procedures. They were approved by the islands' Legislative Council on 16 January. They are embodied in Orders in Council which will be made under the provisions of the British Settlement Acts 1887 and 1945. Drafts of the two orders were placed in the Library of the House on 24 January. A revised text, taking account of further consultations with the islands' councillors, was placed in the Library on 11 March.

There is one new point in the revised text that I should mention to the House. We have accepted the wish of the islanders to revert to the title of Governor rather than Civil Commissioner. The latter title was introduced, at the same time as that of Military Commissioner, immediately after the liberation of the islands in June 1982. We have taken the view that the introduction of the new constitution is the right time to return to the more familiar titles of Governor and Commander British Forces. The title of Governor is, of course, the customary one for a dependent territory of this kind.

The Foreign Affairs Committee, in its report, recommended that the House should raise no objections when those orders come to be laid. The Government, of course, warmly welcome that recommendation.

Let me now tell the House something of our efforts to repair and develop the islands' economy. The tasks immediately after the conflict were daunting. Much of the infrastructure was damaged or destroyed. Local resources were overstrained. Today, however, I am glad to be able to tell the House that, although — inevitably — some constraints remain, and will continue to hamper the pace of future development, the position has greatly improved.

The longer-term needs of the islands were analysed by Lord Shackleton in his 1982 economic study. The Government responded to this within only three months by making an allocation of £31 million for spending over a five or six-year period. We have not been able to accept every one of the recommendations in that report, but Lord Shackleton himself observed in the other place that he doubted whether any author of a report has had so much of that report actually implemented by a Government"— [Official Report, House of Lords, 6 December 1983; Vol. 445, c. 1020.] We are making progress too in areas not covered in the Select Committee report. Following the terrible fire which destroyed the Stanley hospital in April 1984, the Government promptly agreed to finance the construction of a replacement. This will be a hospital on the same site shared between the civil and military authorities. Detailed planning and design work is well advanced. Meanwhile, Port Stanley's electricity and water supplies are being improved.

The Government welcome the Foreign Affairs Committee's acceptance that a gradual approach to land reform is right. Four farms have now been sub-divided under arrangements made by the Falkland Islands Government. Of the 27 owner-occupied farms now on this land, 12 were in existence before the conflict and 15 have been created subsequently.

The Falkland Islands Development Corporation will have an important part to play in promoting a programme of land redistribution in keeping with demand.

That brings me to another of the few points on which the Government take a different view from the Select Committee. I have to say that we do not accept the criticisms in its report of the Chief Executive, Mr. David Taylor. I do not believe that the Committee has given sufficient weight to the practical difficulties that face the small administration in the islands. Development needs to be a gradual process, keeping in step with the needs and resources of the islands.

Another of Lord Shackleton's recommendations was the proposed declaration of a 200-mile exclusive fisheries limit around the Falklands. The Government are of course well aware of the activity of foreign fishing fleets in Falklands waters and the consequent danger of over-exploitation of fish stocks. Under normal conditions, the unilateral declaration of a 200-mile limit could well have been an appropriate response because it would offer a means of ensuring conservation and management of this valuable resource. In considering that possibility in the circumstances of the Falklands, however, the Government have had to give full weight to the serious difficulties that could arise in that context. The Select Committee, quite rightly, drew attention to the political and practical problems of enforcing and policing a unilaterally imposed fisheries zone in an area where British sovereignty was in dispute. For that reason, the Committee was not convinced that the establishment of such a zone could be justified.

The Government take the same view. For the same reason, we have decided instead to explore possible ways in which to establish a multilaterally based conservation and management regime. We are therefore taking steps to develop that approach.

Mr. Austin Mitchell (Great Grimsby)

A 200-mile limit seems crucial to the development of the Falklands to me and others who have been there. If we do not set such a fishing limit and enforce it with our present naval presence, is that not tantamount to saying that we do not have confidence in our claims?

Sir Geoffrey Howe

No. It is a realistic recognition, such as commended itself to the Select Committee, of the fact that there is a dispute about sovereignty in the area. It would not be right to conclude in the face of that that existing naval forces would be appropriate or sufficient to enforce a claim, nor would that be the most secure foundation for the protection of fisheries. That is why we have taken the view that we should explore the possibility of establishing a multilaterally based conservation and management regime.

Mr. George Foulkes (Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley)

It would be helpful to the House if the Foreign Secretary could say which countries he envisages being involved in such a multilateral regime and confirm that Argentina will be one of them.

Sir Geoffrey Howe

At this stage, I do not think that I can say more about how these matters are being explored. It will be complicated, but we are taking steps to develop the proposal. It would not be helpful to go into detail now. The hon. Gentleman's point must be borne in mind, but I cannot say more about it now.

It is clear that political and economic development on the lines that I have described can be achieved only if the islanders are sure that they can live in peace, free from the threat of a further attack. I emphasise that it is for that reason and for no other that we maintain in the islands the minimum level of forces necessary to ensure that there is no repetition of the tragic events of 1982.

As we have said many times, our military dispositions have no wider purpose. Allegations, for example, about a "NATO base" are manifest nonsense.

Mr. Robin Maxwell-Hyslop (Tiverton)

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that there is no realistic exploitation of the waters that he has mentioned by British fishermen? Once there is an all-weather airport at Mount Pleasant, which would mean that fishery crews could be rotated, would it not be a more positive approach for British fishery firms to participate fully in the exploitation of those resources?

Sir Geoffrey Howe

That is one of the possibilities that might flow from the establishment of air communications, but we must still consider the framework within which such participation could take place. That is why we have reached the conclusion that I have suggested.

There is a related matter on which we take a rather different view from the Committee. It suggested that the time was now ripe for us to give unilateral undertakings on security — for example, on lifting the Falkland Islands protection zone. A declaration of cessation of hostilities by Argentina would, of course, be a positive step, but that could not, in the Government's view, be the sole trigger for action to lift the zone.

I should now like to say something about the role of the new airport at Mount Pleasant, 30 miles from Port Stanley. That airport has always been intended to play a dual role — first, of course, to promote the security of the islands, and, secondly, and by no means less important, to make a major contribution to their economic development. The main airport runway will open in May. For all-weather facilities, a second runway is needed, and it will be completed by February next year.

The construction of a full modern airport in such a short time, and on such a remote site, has been a remarkable achievement. British engineering, management skills and the efforts of the work force have made this feat possible. I am sure that the whole House will wish to pay tribute to that success.

The airport will have the important function of providing a rapid reinforcement capability. As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence has explained, once the aiport is fully operational it should be possible to reduce the numbers of permanently stationed forces on the islands.

The Government have from the first intended the airport to have a major and growing civil role as well. Lord Shackleton recommended the provision of better communications with the outside world and stressed the importance of air services. Mount Pleasant airport will meet those needs. Its main runway will be capable of handling the largest long-range aircraft. The completion of the airport will make possible the establishment of commercial air services linking the Falklands with the outside world.

I come, finally, to the future of this country's relationship with Argentina. Once again, I assure the House that we attach great importance to the improvement of our relations with Argentina. Even before the establishment of a democratic Government in Argentina, which we warmly welcomed, we were taking steps to that end. As long ago as September 1982—within months of the end of the conflict—I took steps as Chancellor of the Exchequer, at the International Monetary Fund meeting in Toronto, to promote and reach agreement with the Argentine Government for the withdrawal on both sides of the financial restrictions that were imposed at the start of the conflict. Britain implemented that agreement in full, and immediately. Argentina has still not done so.

Mr. Dalyell

Will the Foreign Secretary allow me one question as he has to leave the Chamber? Can he assure us that all relevant papers which were relevant to the considerations of Lord Franks and his colleagues were made available to them? Have any relevant papers somehow become available since the Franks committee conducted its deliberations?

Sir Geoffrey Howe

I have no reason to doubt that the answer is yes, but would not swear so without having had much more notice of the question. If the hon. Gentleman wishes to press such matters, he is familiar with the custom of tabling written questions. I hesitate to encourage him further in that.

Since September 1982, we have continued to make genuine and sustained efforts to find a basis for direct talks with the new Argentine Government. With the wholehearted support of all my colleagues, I took the greatest possible interest and the greatest possible care in arranging the scene for the talks in Berne which took place last July. They broke down because the Argentine representatives took a position that ran directly counter to the basis for the negotiations that had been explicitly agreed by them in advance. That was a sadly missed opportunity.

The Argentine representatives knew then, and the House knows now, that we are not prepared to discuss with Argentina sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The Government believe that Argentine actions in 1982 have ruled that out. And yet the Argentine representatives insisted at Berne, in the face of the clear prior agreement to the contrary, that no progress could be made towards normalisation without the certainty that a mechanism would be established that would in practice lead to a transfer of sovereignty.

Dr. David Owen (Plymouth, Devonport)

The Foreign Secretary said that the Government are not prepared to discuss sovereignty. I understood that they were not prepared to discuss the transfer of sovereignty from the United Kingdom to Argentina. There is a difference, and there is another option, which is to discuss shared sovereignty. Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman ruling out discussions on any possible sharing of sovereignty?

Sir Geoffrey Howe

The point which we have made throughout, and which was understood by the Argentines at the time, is that we are not prepared to discuss sovereignty. There are many ways in which sovereignty can be discussed. We do not think that it is right to do so. We think that it is right to begin addressing ourselves to the many practical questions—

Dr. Owen

With respect, the right hon. and learned Gentleman has not answered the question, which was specific. The White Paper—the answer to the Select Committee—refers to not being prepared to discuss the transfer of sovereignity from the United Kingdom to Argentine. But there is another option — shared sovereignty, which is part of the United Nations charter, to which we are a signatory. We need to remind ourselves that we went to war in the south Atlantic invoking the United Nations charter and our right to self-defence.

Sir Geoffrey Howe

With great respect to the right hon. Gentleman, I did answer the question. I said that there were many ways of discussing sovereignty, and many arrangements that could be suggested for it, but we are not prepared to discuss sovereignty. As we have made clear, we are anxious to begin discussing the range of practical questions which could sensibly be addressed and which we thought would be sensibly addressed at that talk in Berne.

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

Sir Geoffrey Howe

If my hon. Friend will forgive me, I do not want to give way too often, and I must make headway on this point.

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop

It is an important point.

Sir Geoffrey Howe

I shall give way after I have made this point.

The reaction of the Argentine representatives at Berne was repeated explicitly by President Alfonsin when he spoke at the General Assembly of the United Nations on 24 September last year. His Foreign Minister said publicly in December that negotiation must be about an indivisible package, which must include sovereignty, and the Argentine Government have since maintained that position. The Select Committee deals with the matter in its report, saying: It is clear that when referring to negotiations on sovereignty, the new Argentine Government is pursuing a policy essentially no different from that of its predecessors: that such negotiations, once begun, must lead eventually and inevitably to the relinquishment of the United Kingdom's claim to and administration of the Falklands. It is the indivisibility of that link, as set out in all the approaches made to the subject by the Argentine Government, that is so totally contrary to any sensible foundation for discussion of other matters. It is for that reason that we have been trying to find a way of discussing those other matters. We agree with the assessment that was made by the Select Committee.

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop

I am most grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for giving way. I wanted to refer to the point that the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) made in his intervention. Will my right hon. and learned Friend remind the House that the right to self-defence does not depend on the United Nations charter, and antedates by centuries beyond mind the United Nations charter?

Sir Geoffrey Howe

I am sure that my hon. Friend is right about that. In so far as his intervention fortifies my position, I am grateful for it.

Those who call on us to negotiate on the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands should consider what exactly it is that they are asking us to do. For Argentina, such negotiations are intended to have only one outcome: the transfer of sovereignty, irrespective of the wishes of the islanders. It is for precisely that reason that we have devoted so much effort to finding a basis for direct talks with Argentina on a range of practical issues, where progress is possible to the benefit of both sides. Quite frankly, that is the only realistic policy, and we shall persevere with it.

Earlier this year we transmitted the latest in the series of messages that we have been exchanging with the Argentines through the protecting powers. The details must remain confidential. But that message once again put forward practical steps that would enable confidence to be re-established between our two peoples. We look to the Argentines for a constructive reply.

The improvement of commercial and economic relations is a natural starting point. Both sides have a clear interest in improved trade. The Argentine Government have publicly stressed the need to increase their exports as a contribution to tackling their daunting economic problems. They could take a major step forward by agreeing to the reciprocal lifting of the trade embargo that has been in place since the conflict. Both Her Majesty's Government and the European Community have several times proposed that course.

As I have already explained to the House, we have been continuously helpful in our approach to the international arrangements for the rescheduling of Argentina's official debt in the Paris Club. When we come to follow that up bilaterally, our approach will be similarly positive.

We have made plain too, and on a number of occasions, that we would be ready to see a visit to the Falklands by the next-of-kin of Argentine servicemen who lost their lives there in 1982. We have recently reiterated to the Argentine Government our readiness to accept a genuinely humanitarian visit by next-of-kin.

The House will, I am sure, be glad to acknowledge that on almost all of those subjects we are working on lines that have been specifically endorsed by the Select Committee.

It is encouraging that the Select Committee has taken the same view as the Government on so many of the subjects about which I have been speaking. The Committee's support fortifies us in our resolve both to fulfil our commitments to the islanders and to persevere in the search for better relations with Argentina. I am confident that those twin objectives will commend themselves very widely to the House.

Mr. Dalyell

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I do not want to be gratuitously rude either to the House or to the Foreign Secretary, but after his speech he really should listen to the replies, not from myself—

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Ernest Armstrong)

Order. I think that in a sense the hon. Gentleman is raising a point of debate rather than a point of order.

Mr. Dalyell

No.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

The hon. Gentleman must come quickly to his point of order for me.

Mr. Dalyell

I should like to say this in the presence of the Foreign Secretary. Bluntly—I am putting this as politely as I can—the right hon. and learned Gentleman has got his priorities wrong. There are other people who will dine with President Mubarak and wear a white tie and tails, but it is important from the point of view of the House of Commons that the right hon. and learned Gentleman should hear, if not what I say, what his colleagues say.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

The hon. Gentleman knows that that is not a point of order for the Chair.

7.46 pm

Mr. George Foulkes (Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley)

The Opposition welcome this opportunity to discuss the future of the Falkland Islands, notwithstanding the slight hiccup at the start of the debate, for which I must apologise to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and to the whole House. The official Opposition accept that the Foreign Secretary has other prior engagements, and we are grateful to him for informing us in advance.

I also wish to put on record our thanks to the members of the Committee for their work, particularly the Chairman, the hon. Member for Stroud (Sir A. Kershaw), an old friend and sparring partner of mine, although I do not think he will be surprised to hear that we do not agree with all his conclusions. In fact, one of the remarkable things about the report is that the Committee seems to have provided some conclusions which are likely to be acceptable to us and others which are more likely to be acceptable to the Government. It is interesting to note that it is only the latter that are referred to in detail in the Government's response to the Committee's report.

Without diminishing the importance of the issues surrounding the sinking of the General Belgrano — I have been involved with them, too, along with my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell)—we consider that this matter—the achievement of a stable, acceptable solution to the future of the Falklands—is of even greater importance.

It is our view that fortress Falklands is untenable. It is not in the islanders' real interest. It is enormously expensive in money, in international relations and in its distortion of our defence commitment. Fortress Falklands has been regularly rejected by previous Governments. The Franks report summed it up well when it said: On every occasion that a new government — or new Ministers—came into office a full range of policy options was put before them. In every case Ministers made a decision of policy and chose to seek a negotiated settlement that would be acceptable to Argentina and to the Islanders. Without exception they rejected the alternative of 'Fortress Falklands', which would have involved the isolation of the Islands from Argentina and probably from the rest of Latin America. On the distortion of our defence commitment, in its third report, in Session 1982–83, the Select Committee on Defence expressed the hope that the commitment in the South Atlantic would not indefinitely absorb an unduly large part of scarce defence resources. It also expressed concern that if continued at present levels it would represent a substantial burden on the defence budget and the economy. The reduction in recurrent expenditure which the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary have predicted when the airport is completed will not be substantial.

Fortress Falklands in its present form represents over 3 per cent. of the defence budget. With the escalating cost of Trident, the difficulties within the Alliance over the amount of British expenditure on NATO's conventional forces and the difficulty which the Government know only too well is involved in sustaining any real growth in the defence budget, 3 per cent. is a significant sum.

On the wider front, with prescription charges now having been raised to £2 to bring in only £17 million, with the trauma of Conservative Members up in arms over saving a mere £10 million on student grants and with the prospect of the Chancellor of the Exchequer levying value added tax on almost anything that moves, just to raise revenue, options which could avoid continuing expenditure of this kind in the South Atlantic must be given serious consideration by the Government. Conservative Members who tend to be more impressed by public opinion than by finance may find the results of the Gallup poll carried out last autumn to be more convincing. The British people, in a ratio of three to one, considered that the cost of fortress Falklands was both too great and undesirable.

The Government's policy on the Falklands is peculiarly instransigent. They are willing to discuss and have already transferred sovereignty over albeit a small part of Hong Kong to the Communist Government of China. What is even more relevant, they are also discussing with the Spanish Government the possible transfer of the sovereignty of Gibraltar. Although the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs is not sure how far the word of Senor Alfonsin's Government can be regarded as an Argentine bond", in the case of Spain—also a relatively recent democracy — no such question has, rightly, been raised. It is difficult to see why such a question is raised in the case of Argentina.

Recent military appointments in Argentina ought to demonstrate to the Government that President Alfonsin is in charge of events in his country. In January 1983 the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East (Mr. Pym), the then Foreign Secretary, said that if Argentina returned to democracy that would be a "big change" and "an advance". He continued: Equally, or more important, is if there was a Government there which paid due respect to human rights. On both criteria Argentina has advanced. I am sure that the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East would be the first to agree about that. Both Houses of Argentina's legislature are elected. Argentina's head of state is also democratically elected. Amnesty International has commended the vast improvement in its human rights record. Why are the Government not prepared to acknowledge this? Do they not see that by turning our back on such a democracy and by failing to recognise such advances we are in danger of undermining Argentina?

It is nonsense for the Foreign Secretary and the Government to repeat, parrot fashion, that they are willing to discuss bilateral normalisation of relations between Britain and Argentina, when the Foreign Secretary and the Government know — it is so obviously central — that a prerequisite for any such discussions is some agreement to discuss also the future of the islands. I choose that phrase carefully. Argentina is not saying that it must be top of the agenda, or even that the detailed nature of such discussions must be agreed in advance, but that there should be an open agenda which would allow the future of the islands to be discussed eventually. Why is that unreasonable?

Even our former ambassador to the United States, Sir Nicholas Henderson, who was brought out of retirement by the Government to undertake that important task, said in evidence to the Select Committee: Let us sit down together with an open agenda so that we can define what we are going to discuss later on … I think that is a good basis upon which to approach this subject. We recognise that both Governments made a genuine attempt at Berne to try to get talks under way. There are differing accounts of why the talks were interrupted. But just because the formula at Berne did not succeed, that should not be an excuse for not looking at other formulae which can deal with the sticking point of sovereignty. Indeed, it would be considered very strange if, having been willing to try once, the Government continued to reject any other ways of trying to resolve the dispute.

From my visit to Buenos Aires, and from conversations that I have had with Falklanders and Argentines, I believe that it would be possible to move towards a solution which was acceptable to both Britain and Argentina and which would protect the interests of the islanders, which we consider to be important. The Foreign Secretary will, I hope, have received a copy of the communiqué from the Maryland conference which was attended by one of his hon. Friends and me. Parliamentarians from Britain and Argentina and an observer from the Falklands Government met one another at that conference. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will respond soon, if not today, to the positive suggestions contained in the agreement arising from the Maryland conference.

At Maryland we said that progress towards an agreement between Britain and Argentina was not incompatible with respect for the wishes of the islanders. The Argentines put their names to that. They said that they would respect the wishes of the islanders. It emerged that when the Argentines talks about sovereignty they mean something very different from what we think they mean. They are more concerned with titular sovereignty. My hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George) was at that conference. He will confirm that the Argentines are more concerned with titular sovereignty — with the flag, the colour on the map and with their pride, which we ought to understand. They believe that the transfer of sovereignty need not mean a change of life for the islanders.

Dante Caputo, the Argentine Foreign Minister, confirmed this in the "Brass Tacks" programme on 12 December 1984, when he said: I believe that it is entirely acceptable that the inhabitants of the islands should decide forms of administration, of education, and forms of social organisations best suited to their interests. More recently, in an interview in The Times, he spoke about the possibility of a dialogue rather than negotiations. That is not the hostile, intransigent picture of the Argentines that the Foreign Secretary has painted. Why, the Opposition ask, are the Government unwilling even to discuss options which might satisfy Argentine claims and continue to preserve the way of life of the islanders, without the need for an expensive fortress on the islands? Are we wise—there can be changes in this country as well as in Argentina — to let the islanders believe that the enormous costs, in every sense, of fortress Falklands can be or will be maintained for ever? Is this not, in reality, a cruel deception of the islanders?

Sir John Biggs-Davison (Epping Forest)

The hon. Gentleman said that there could be a change of Government in this country as well as in Argentina. Yes, indeed, and that is what worries me. There has been democratic government in Argentina and there has been dictatorship in Argentina. How can the hon. Gentleman or anybody else guarantee that there will not again be a relapse from a peace-loving democracy to an aggressive dictatorship?

Mr. Foulkes

I cannot guarantee that in Argentina. I cannot guarantee it in Spain either where we are discussing the future of Gibraltar. The faint possibility of Senor Alfonsin's Government being undermined increases if we are not seen to be having discussions with a democratically elected Government in Argentina.

The islanders, closer as they are to the situation than any of us, are more aware of the reality than are the Government, and they recognise that other options may need to be considered by them.

The United Kingdom Falkland Islands committee, in evidence to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, said that its "favoured solution" was a variant of the constitutional position of Andorra". So it is looking at other options. In the "Brass Tacks" programme, Alastair Cameron, the Falkland Islands Government representative in the United Kingdom who was with us in Maryland, said: it was up to the British Government to provide a policy and to give it then to the islanders to discuss". That is also what the right hon. Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. Ridley) said as Under-Secretary of State at the time.

Incidentally, in the same programme representatives of the associations of parents of the Falklands dead confirmed that they would not consider it a betrayal of their sons if we were to talk to Argentina about the future of the islands.

However, instead of embarking on such a positive approach, certain actions of the Government have been interpreted as moving backwards rather than forwards—the Prime Minister's quasi-regal Christmas message to the islanders, the sudden granting of oil prospecting rights to Firstland Oil and Gas, and particularly the publicity surrounding the publication of the new draft constitution.

On that last matter, will the Under-Secretary of State confirm when he replies what the Prime Minister has already said in her letter to the leader of the Social Democratic party that that constitution gives no veto to the islanders over any future change in the status of the islands, and, in that matter, respecting the wishes and the interests of the islanders, this Parliament is and will remain sovereign?

To pretend that the new constitution is a great advance for democracy — a democracy which we fought to protect — on the islands is nonsense. Under the new constitution the islands remain firmly under colonial administration. I suppose that we must accept that it is appropriate to acknowledge that by restoring the title of governor.

Let us imagine that we are talking about another country, even a South American country. The president of that country would have power to preside over meetings of the Parliament; prorogue or dissolve the Parliament at any time under his own discretion; control the public service; approve the Parliament's standing orders; give assent to laws; declare a Bill to have been passed whether or not the Parliament approves; be the executive authority; summon the Cabinet, have sole control over the Cabinet's agenda; by-pass the obligation to consult the Cabinet; act against the Cabinet's advice; dispose of land; appoint judges; and be totally exempt from judicial review of his actions. That power would be relished by any dictator of any country. That is the power given under the new constitution, which is supposed to be an advance in democracy, to the governor of the islands. To pretend that that is any real advance in democracy is nonsense.

The pretence at any real interest in the future of the individual islanders is shown up by the Government's approach to the economic development of the islands. It is not the rosy picture that the Foreign Secretary painted earlier. First, there are serious doubts, whatever the Foreign Secretarry may say, about the extent to which the airport will be available for civilian use. Will the Minister give us an assurance when he replies that the use of the airport for civilian purposes will not be impeded unnecessarily either by military use or by excessively high costs? In particular, why have the Government, as was revealed in a written reply to me, refused the subsidy for civilian use which the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs said would be necessary? Will that encourage the economic development of the islands?

Secondly, will the Minister confirm his answer to me of 30 January that there are no proposals for civilian flights, whatever the Foreign Secretary may have said in his introduction? The 1982 Shackleton report considered that to be of the highest priority. Will he explain why there are none?

Finally, will the Minister reply to the Select Committee's criticisms — not mine — that the Falkland Islands Development Corporation, which ought to be an "urgent response" to a "critical situation", is instead proceeding at what is described as a "funereal pace"? Why is that the case? Does that show concern for the development of the islands?

It is the Opposition's view that the intransigence of the Government, particularly the Prime Minister, on this issue is expensive, damaging to our international relations, against public opinion in the United Kingdom, distorts our defence commitment, and, above all, is against the long-term interest of the islanders.

We specifically call for a simultaneous declaration by Argentina of the formal ending of hostilities and a lifting by Britain of the protection zone—simultaneous, agreed in advance—which was accepted by the Prime Minister in January last year. We regret that the White Paper seems to have backtracked on that.

We urge the Government to seek a resumption of the talks interrupted at Berne and the restoration of diplomatic relations between Britain and Argentina.

I ask the Foreign Secretary, back hotfoot — or perhaps coldfoot — from the Soviet Union, why, since he is able, rightly, to discuss major issues, as he has done, with leaders of a country with a system very different from our own, he is so unable even to meet and discuss with a sister Western democracy which we now know Argentina is.

Above all, we remind the Government that the true interests of the islanders will not be served if they are for ever isolated from their nearest neighbours on mainland South America.

8.6 pm

Sir Anthony Kershaw (Stroud)

I shall deal with some of the points that the hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley (Mr. Foulkes) has deployed with his usual eloquence. However, I fear that I may not be in entire agreement with all of them.

I have no doubt that the British claim to sovereignty over the Falklands is sound in law. It must be granted that the various claims made before 1833 and the landings that took place present a somewhat confusing picture. The British occupation in 1833 was a legitimate and legally respectable action, which, having been followed by continuous occupation and administration, enthusiastically supported by the population, makes undeniably good our legal claim to sovereignty. The fact that the Argentines believe the opposite is irrelevant.

Mr. Foulkes

Why, therefore, is the first conclusion of the report that the Committee could not come to a decision on the respective claims of sovereignty? Is the hon. Gentleman distancing himself from the first and main conclusion of the report?

Sir Anthony Kershaw

The hon. Gentleman knows from his experience on the Committee that we are a democratic assembly. The Chairman does not necessarily endorse everything that goes on in that Committee. Nor does the Chairman have a vote, unless there is a tie, which there was not.

The Argentine invasion in no way alters the validity of their claim, but it did alter the feelings of the inhabitants, who were even more determined, especially after having seen the way in which the Argentine officers treated their troops, never to submit themselves to that kind of treatment. It would be intolerable for Britain to hand the islanders back to such a Government.

It is said that the new Argentine Government is so much better and more democratic than the old one that we should bolster their prestige and hand back the islanders to them. I see no reason whatever why we should do such a thing.

In the first place, I am not confident—any more than my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest (Sir J. Biggs-Davison)—that the democratic Government in the Argentine will survive for long. Inflation is running at 1,000 per cent per annum, resentful and revengeful armed forces are waiting in the wings, there is continued administrative incompetence, and a vast foreign debt has been recklessly incurred in a country that has a history of revolutions and coup d'etats that is remarkable even by South American standards. None of those things leads me to suppose that a long period of benign and peaceful domestic bliss lies ahead in the Argentine, whether or not we hand over our fellow citizens. Who knows what sort of regime will succeed it?

Secondly, the conduct of this democratic Government of the Argentine has been so unfriendly towards us that it is hard to see them behaving properly to our people in the Falklands. For example, they refuse to say that the war is over. They maintain trade and other barriers against us. They have rearmed, and still are rearming, with sophisticated weapons of aggression. They also maintain, with a vigour no less strident than that of the junta that they displaced, that they alone have the right to sovereignty over not only the Falklands but the dependencies as well — the last claim being historically and legally preposterous.

Finally, when, in Berne, we offered talks — having arranged in advance how we should deal with the sovereignty issue — the Argentines went back on the agreement as soon as they got to the table, proving yet again what unreliable interlocutors they continue to be. When the Argentines say that they want to negotiate sovereignty, they mean that they want to fix a date for the handover. Until they realise that that is not on offer, it is pointless talking about lease-back or other modifications. If we talk about lease-back, we shall at once give away the sovereignty position. As the Argentine position is as I have described it, there is no point in holding other negotiations on other matters.

There is, of course, the problem that we have every year with the United Nations. There will be a resolution inviting us to negotiate face to face with the Argentines. The Argentines — in my opinion deceitfully — say that they are anxious to do that. But despite the misgivings voiced by my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary this evening, I believe that there are some unilateral steps that could be valuable and would show the world that we are peaceful and co-operative in our intentions.

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop

Before my hon. Friend leaves that point on sovereigny, will he share with us his thoughts on the following point? If even titular sovereignty were transferred and the Argentine then broke every other agreement and moved in its armed forces, we could not move our armed forces in without invading Argentine territory.

Sir Anthony Kershaw

My hon. Friend is perfectly right. The basis of negotiations for the future must lie in a certain trust, and I confess that I have not got that trust in the present Argentine Government or in any Government likely to succeed them.

There are individual things that we could give away without danger to ourselves or to the Falkland Islanders. I believe that there is room to negotiate about the protection zone and that we can co-operate over natural resources. Indeed, I was glad to hear my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary suggest that something is being done in that regard, albeit cautiously. We can, and obviously will, reduce the garrison once the airport is in operation. Those things would certainly help our position vis-a-vis other South American countries.

I should like to add my congratulations about the airport. It is a remarkable feat of construction, and the work has been done far quicker and at less expense than at one time seemed possible. The Government do not differ fundamentally from the Select Committee about the direction in which we think that developments should go. Of course, we ask for more speed. It is always up to the Legislature to urge the Executive along that path, but we realise that the distance is great and that development opportunities are comparatively scant. The only really big new investment available is, I suppose, deep sea fishing, but at present neither the Government nor the Committee can quite see how that can be exploited. However, it should be done not only for political but for technical reasons, as soon as we have a little more information about it.

My hon. Friend the Member for Ryedale (Mr. Spence) has publicly suggested recently that some of the difficulties about enlargement of the EC in relation to Spain might be overcome by an accord with Spain about fishing. Perhaps that could be investigated.

A Select Committee should, and must, range far wider in discussion than a Goverment should or can do. In our paper we discuss several possibilities, of which I understand the Government do not approve. In the end, the Select Committee and everyone else must allow the facts to speak for themselves. The fact is that this country would find it totally unacceptable to hand over its fellow citizens on the Falklands to any alien power, let alone the Argentine. The hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley suggested that this country wanted to do that, but he is absolutely wrong. All experience teaches us that that is quite impossible. Of course, one would not expect the Falklanders to agree to being handed over. But every time a Minister—whether Labour or Conservative—has even suggested that we might do that, he has been, to coin a phrase, happy to escape in his underwear. It was terrible that my right hon. Friend the Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. Ridley) should have been put up to make such suggestions. It was perfectly clear that neither this House nor the other House would agree to such a handover. The Falklands are, and will remain, very expensive, but there is a price to pay for liberty. It is, I trust, a price that this country will always be prepared to pay.

8.16 pm

Dr. David Owen (Plymouth, Devonport)

In many ways the House is holding one of its more important debates and, in a sense, I regret the time and the way in which we are discussing the subject.

My first comments relate to the Select Committee's report. I do not believe that in 1977 the Government entered into negotiations with Argentina over the Falkland Islands because we doubted the British claim to sovereignty over those islands. I certainly challenge that assumption in the Select Committee's report. I know that there is a detailed and difficult legal tangle, but, having been deeply involved in those negotiations, I can say that I did not at any time feel that we did not have an honourable claim in international law to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. It is still my belief that we have such a claim. With that point of agreement with the Government under my belt, I turn to a fundamental area of disagreement.

Both the House and the country will come to regret that in the aftermath of the successful retaking of the Falklands we did not use that opportunity of maximum international diplomatic strength to lay down the direction in which we felt it reasonable for the Falklands to go. I believe that as the months and years pass we will once again find ourselves in an untenable position in maintaining an absolutist affirmation that the Falkland Islands are a dependent territory of the United Kingdom. Thus, it is not just a question of legal interpretation and of what we believe. It is noteworthy that no Government have yet been prepared to test this issue in the international courts.

It is worth remembering that President Alfonsin has not only proved his democratic credentials in opposition and in government, but has solved the Beagle channel dispute with Chile, over which both countries nearly went to war in 1979. He held a national referendum on his solution, and 79 per cent. of the electorate voted for it. Only this morning, the Argentine Senate ratified the treaty. President Alfonsin is going to Washington tomorrow to persuade the Americans to have a better understanding of the Falklands problem. There is a grave danger, therefore, that over the succeeding years it will become at first an irritant and then a major cause of division between Britian and the United States, and Britain and our European allies, about how we handled the Falklands. They simply do not understand why we will not grapple with the issue of sovereignty.

I make no secret of the fact that I would not transfer sovereignty to Argentina. I believe that there are penalties for armed aggression. Where one might have been prepared to contemplate such a solution before, it is not possible now. I must make it clear that when in office I was never prepared to contemplate it. I never accepted lease-back, and have great difficulty with it. The furthest that I was prepared to go was a sharing of sovereignty.

In those days, one of the options that I thought was most hopeful was that sovereignty over the uninhabited islands would be transferred to Argentina, and the inhabited islands—the greater space, I admit—would remain with Britain, with a shared economic unit covering all the islands, inhabited and uninhabited, and the territorial waters. That may not be possible to negotiate, although I still think that no Government should rule out a shared sovereignty solution. It has great potential. The Foreign Secretary stuck to a form of words which made it impossible to discover what he meant. He said that we were not prepared to discuss sovereignty, and then said that there were many other ways of solving the problem. It is fair enough to say that we will not discuss the transfer of sovereignty.

I do not favour the open agenda. That is a source of misunderstanding. There might not be a problem for the first year or two, but down the track are all the problems, anxieties and misapprehensions such as those which led to the invasion of the Falkland Islands. It would be clearer for the Government to say that transfer of sovereignty is out, but that they are prepared to discuss all the different options of shared sovereignty and of vesting sovereignty of the Falkland Islands in an international body.

The United Nations charter was invoked constantly in the House, by both sides, as the justification for our sending the task force and then for using it, and rightly so, but in the aftermath of victory the Government have not shown the same commitment to the UN charter. That charter instructs all member states to resolve their problems by peaceful negotiation. To refuse to use the charter in its entirety—to use it when it suits, but not to use it when it is not satisfactory — is an absolute recipe for international cynicism and despair. Having used the UN charter to our advantage, we must live with it in areas which we may find somewhat difficult.

Chapter 13 of the charter gives power for trusteeship. In particular, the charter sets out an alternative system for strategic trust territories. This was included because the United States Government, and especially the Defence Department, were unwilling to subject the Japanese occupied islands to a normal system of trusteeship, on the ground that those islands could be essential to US defence, and the United States therefore wanted an ultimate safeguard about what happened to them. Micronesia thus became the only strategic trust territory.

The main difference from the normal system was that it was laid down under article 82(3) that the functions of the United Nations in supervising such territories would in that case be exercised by the Security Council. That is vital, because it means that Britain, which would never be able to command an automatic majority in the General Assembly, would be able to use its veto in the Security Council. If we were to use article 82 for a strategic trust territory, we would be able to safeguard it.

The administration might well be vested in the Organisation of American States. I do not need to remind the right hon. and learned Gentleman that the OAS contains the United States and a number of Commonwealth countries. Within the United Nations system, regional organisations are often used. Of course, the problem that we face in any vesting of sovereignty in an international body is whether Argentina, under a different regime, would tear up all its obligations and simply invade. We must face the fact that that could happen again. I believe that Argentina will remain a democracy, but I cannot guarantee it. That is why I want a strategic trust territory if we are to vest sovereignty in an international body. Perhaps we need not use the charter, but could make an agreement with the Secretary General. I would still want the safeguard of the Security Council. Furthermore, I would want a peacekeeping safeguard so that Argentina could not under a different regime tear up its obligations.

We would need a purely token peacekeeping presence. It need not be a great size. We would not need a greater number of marines than were there before the invasion — perhaps fewer would suffice. The crucial point — this might satisfy the right hon. and learned Gentleman — is that no British Government will take seriously a peacekeeping force, even a token force, for preserving sovereignty vested in an international body unless there is a credible country associated with it. For us the absolute touchstone is that it should involve the United States — even if only a couple of marines are included — and a few Commonwealth countries: Argentina could be satisfied by the inclusion of other countries. Hon. Members may decide that they do not want that, but it is only one option. It would save face all round. No country would retain sovereignty. If the Government object to shared sovereignty, it is a solution.

Why do I believe that it is necessary to grapple with the issue of sovereignty? We must remember Antarctica. The real problem behind all this is the Antarctic treaty, involving the vast continent of Antarctica and its economic, commercial, strategic and social implications. This is one of the most precious treaties. I do not believe that it would be possible to negotiate it now. It has 31 signatories, but there are many anomalies. For example, Chile, Argentina and Britain are claiming the same territories. Let the House not forget the military force that went down to Southern Thule in 1976. Let us not forget the potential of Argentina to operate in areas where we would find it immensely difficult to do anything about it. Then let us consider the relationship between the Falklands and Antarctica.

I come to the documents which we are being asked to consider. The Government are making a great mistake in not keeping separate the constitutions of the Falklands Islands and South Georgia and the Sandwich Islands. They are constitutionally different. It is vital that we assert in the House that they are separate elements. The Government have made a great mistake in listening to the Falkland Islanders on this. Let them listen to the islanders on all aspects affecting security and negotiations with Argentina. I do not believe that we should make a move without consulting them as fully as possible. I think that I can fairly claim about the period when I was Foreign Secretary that neither I nor the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr. Rowlands) ever made a move in negotiation without Kelpers knowing full well what we were doing. But they have no right to tell us how we should handle the constitution of Sandwich and South Georgia.

The Government and the House will rue this. I hope that the Minister will tell us that the Government will think again about this. I, too, apologise for the fact that I may not be here for the reply to the debate. The Government are making a mistake. It is necessary to point out to Alfonsin and others in Argentina that there is a separation. As recently as June 1984 President Alfonsin said that his claim was not just to the Falklands, but to the South Georgia, the Antarctic peninsular and to the Scotia sea. Successive Governments have long wanted a constitutional separation. I know what the Foreign Office legal advice to Ministers would have been—to separate the constitutions.

The Government have bent to pressure from the Falkland Islanders on the issue. Let them have a named governor. The office of commissioner was never an attractive idea. Let them have some other things, but not this. Let us go back and separate the constitutions. I believe that that is the will of the House. By doing so the Government would be making it clear that we will not give any ground on our claim to Antarctica and that we are prepared to see the whole series of problems in the wider context of Antarctica. The treaty will come up for review in 1991. It is fragile, and major concessions will have to be made. There will have to be adjustments to the treaty over the next few years to ensure greater clarity. We cannot achieve that if we are in a state of war with Argentina.

A fortress Falklands would be economical and political nonsense. Nobody denies what must happen now. We have to spend money on an airfield, but to go on planning, in perpetuity, to keep a squadron of Phantoms on the Falkland Islands is nonsense. But that will have to happen if we continue armed hostilities with Argentina. The Argentines have only to scramble their aircraft every six months for us not to dare to take away our Phantoms. This is an extraordinary diversion of scarce and expensive resources. It means that we do not live in the real world. That is why our allies wonder what we are up to.

We understand the Prime Minister's problem. She was the first British Prime Minister to offer to give away the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. She allowed her junior Ministers to give the impression to the Falkland Islanders and to the Argentine negotiators that she was prepared to contemplate lease-backing. The Government crossed the threshold of sovereignty.

I refuse to listen to lectures from the Prime Minister about the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. I held the position against the transfer of the Falklands' sovereignty through difficult and different circumstances and through the military threat that we faced in 1977. The Prime Minister must now be got off the hook. I urge the Minister gradually to move her off the hook. I hope that he will say to her "By all means be categorical. You will not transfer sovereignty to the Argentine, but hold open your options on either vesting sovereignty in an international body, or ensuring an arrangement for shared sovereignty." Anything else is frankly dangerous and ludicrous, and would create considerable international tension.

8.31 pm

Sir Peter Blaker (Blackpool, South)

The right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) is wrong in saying that the Prime Minister was the first British Prime Minister to be prepared to cede sovereignty over the Falkland Islands to Argentina. I refer him to paragraph 29 of the Select Committee report which refers to the statement by Mr. Michael Stewart in 1967. The report states: for the first time he stated formally to Argentina that they" — that is, the then British Government— would be prepared to cede sovereignty over the Islands under certain conditions, provided that the wishes of the Islanders were respected. I mention that only to put the record straight.

I was pleased at the robust line taken by my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Sir A. Kershaw). It was notably more robust than the line taken by the Select Committee. I regret, and I am surprised, that the Select Committee was unable to reach any categorical conclusion about sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The reasons for this seem to have been twofold: first, their doubt whether in 1833 Captain Onslow succeeded in persuading the Argentines, who were then on the islands, to leave peacefully or by force; and, secondly, the fact that in the 19th century and, to some extent, in this century the Argentines have protested about the British presence on the islands.

Mr. Ivan Lawrence (Burton)

That was not the reason. The Select Committee did not consider itself to be an appropriate court of international law and was therefore not prepared to inquire as if it were.

Sir Peter Blaker

It is a pity that the Select Committee did not say that. I am concerned about the impression that the Select Committee report made in Buenos Aires. I am sure that it will have made an even stronger impression there than it did here, after reports in the newspapers, that the Select Committee was in doubt about the question of sovereignty. If my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) is right, the Committee should have made that clear in its report.

Mr. Foulkes

The Foreign Affairs Committee might not consider itself to be an international court or a body capable of making such judgments. Might the International Commission of Jurists be such a body? It came to the same conclusion as the Select Committee that valid claims about sovereignty can be made by both Britain and Argentina.

Sir Peter Blaker

With respect to that body, I am not as persuaded by its remarks, which I have not read, as by the remarks of the Government in their White Paper in response to the Select Committee report. Paragraph 3 of the White Paper states: Britain's title is derived from early settlement, reinforced by formal claims in the name of the Crown and completed by open, continuous, effective and peaceful possession, occupation and administration of the Islands since 1833 … The exercise of sovereignty by the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands has, furthermore, consistently been shown to accord with the wishes of the Islanders, expressed through their democratically elected representatives. I am not an expert in international law, but over 30 years I have had some acquaintance with diplomatic matters. Those words certainly strike me as being consistent with the general line adopted by successive British Governments on questions of sovereignty when sovereignty is in dispute.

Did the Committee consider the effect of its report in Argentina? I cannot imagine that it has been helpful. Did it consider the wider implications of that remark about sovereignty?

I recall a conference that I attended in 1964 with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hendon, South (Mr. Thomas) when he was Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and I was his private secretary. The conference was with the Somalis, and with the Kenyans who were about to become independent. With us were Tom Mboya, Mr. Gichuru, Mr. Murumbi and other Kenyan Ministers. The question at issue was the future of the northern frontier district of Kenya which was claimed by Somalia on grounds of race and history.

My right hon. and learned Friend, who led our delegation, wisely asked the Kenyan Ministers to speak and to take a large part of the burden of putting the British case. They said that if one started to reopen borders and questions of sovereignty on the ground that the territory concerned had been acquired by force or because people had been making claims to that territory over past decades and centuries there would be no limit to what we would have to do to the international map. The Kenyan Ministers said "Look at the map of Africa. Every country has a territorial dispute with its neighbour. If you concede the Somali claim on the ground of history you will have to concede all sorts of claims in Africa's 50 or so countries because practically every country in Africa has a territorial claim." The same can be said of South America. Argentina has a territorial dispute with almost all of its neighbours. Round the world territorial disputes are based upon history. I think of Vietnam and China, Vietnam and Cambodia, Thailand and Cambodia, Venezuela and Guyana. I mention a few disputes which occurred to me in five minutes' thought before I came into the Chamber. I think of the Soviet Union and Japan, Rumania and Hungary, Germany and Poland, India and China. Where do we stop?

The implication of the Select Committee report is that if there is doubt about our sovereignty over the Falkland Islands because of the factors to which it refers there must be doubt in many countries. I cannot believe that it wishes that implication to be drawn.

Mr. Peter Thomas (Hendon, South)

I well remember the meeting that we had in Rome 20 years ago. My right hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, South (Sir P. Blaker) is right. We had to consider whether the Somali Government had any right to part of the northern frontier district of Kenya. It is quite true that a very strong line was taken by the Kenyan members of our delegation about how impossible it would be if one were to alter those lines which were drawn quite firmly by the colonial rulers in the past on the map of Africa. It is quite true that there are many similar barriers between countries which were drawn in that way.

This, surely, is different. The historical quality of the claims which are put forward by both Argentina and Britain are based on 1833, and the argument which has gone on and which was put before our predecessor Committee was so conflicting and so complicated that we as a Committee were unable to reach what we considered to be a categorical conclusion. It did not mean that we did not think that we had a case; it just meant that, having taken on the task — which we probably should not have done— of trying to look into the historical background we were unable to reach a categorical conclusion. But we made it perfectly clear that by reason of the invasion in 1982 the whole situation had changed; that whatever the strength of the Argentine claim its invasion had changed the situation and its position had been damaged.

Sir Peter Blaker

I am very much obliged to my right hon. and learned Friend for that explanation, which elaborates on the point made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence). It is useful that that point, which relates to the role which the Committee took upon itself, has been made. It is important, bearing that in mind, that we make it clear in this debate what we really believe, because the record of this debate will no doubt be read in Buenos Aires. I believe that we should assert the fact that, since we have had, in the words of paragraph 3 of the Government's reply, open, continuous effective and peaceful possession, occupation and administration … since 1983", we have a valid claim to sovereignty. It is certainly a very much longer claim than that made by the Kenyan Ministers at the conference to which we were referring. We were talking then about a much shorter period than 150 years.

Referring to the question whether we should be prepared to discuss sovereignty with Argentina, I welcome the fact that the Committee said in paragraph 96 that what it had reported in the previous paragraph does not mean that the United Kingdom Government should now agree to the inclusion of the 'sovereignty issue', as at present defined by Argentina, on the agenda for talks in the immediate future". I would have wished the Committee to go further, because there are certain passages in the Committee's report which are in danger of misleading Argentina. I do not believe that we can possibly discuss sovereignty with Argentina in the foreseeable future because I do not think that the public of this country would tolerate it. I believe that if we started to discuss sovereignty with Argentina there would be uproar. There certainly would be in my constituency and, I suspect, in many other constituencies.

Mr. Foulkes

How does the right hon. Member explain the results of the two Gallup polls held at the end of last year which showed that the vast majority of the British people would be prepared for the Government to enter into discussions about sovereignty? Those polls represented the views of the people. I think that the right hon. Member is completely out of touch.

Sir Peter Blaker

We are not governed, fortunately, by Gallup poll. I think that the Gallup poll is wrong about what the reaction of the public would be if we started to discuss sovereignty with Argentina in any meaningful way.

The right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) suggested that we should be prepared to contemplate shared sovereignty. I have some experience of shared sovereignty because I was responsible a few years ago for the New Hebrides. I have been concerned with some difficult diplomatic problems in the past 30 years, but that was worse than anything I have ever experienced. That involved only two countries sharing sovereignty. The right hon. Gentleman is suggesting, apparently, that the administration of the Falklands should be shared by the countries of the OAS. The mind boggles at the confusion that would result.

Dr. Owen

Eleven trustee states.

Sir Peter Blaker

The right hon. Gentleman is reinforcing my point.

One of the various points considered in the report is that since we were prepared to discuss sovereignty before 1982 we should be prepared to discuss it now. It is clear from what has been said already in the House that the war of 1982 changed all that. One of the things that it did — and I do not think that this has been sufficiently brought out — was to give the Falkland Islanders experience of Argentine rule. If they were reluctant to have sovereignty discussed before — and they were — they are triply reluctant now in view of that experience.

I support the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud made about the relevance or otherwise of the fact that Argentina is now a democracy. Of course, we welcome that fact and hope that it will remain a democracy, but the record shows that in this century no democratically elected Government in Argentina has completed its term. I am not sure that that is absolutely correct—there may be exceptions—but the general rule has been that democracy has been of short duration.

The Argentine Foreign Minister was reported in The Times on 11 March to have made the point that the militarisation of the islands has made the Falklands a strategic target. I think that he has scored an own goal by that remark. One of the things that we have to bear in mind is that the Falklands are potentially of strategic imrortance in the context of Antarctica—a point to which the right hon. Member for Devonport referred. If Antarctica is important, I cannot understand why that should be an argument for our giving up sovereignty or sharing sovereignty or, indeed, for reducing our forces in the Falklands. If the Panama canal were to be closed everybody would suddenly realise that the Falklands were of strategic importance and wonder why they had not thought of it before.

The tone of the report is more apologetic and pessimistic than I would have wished. It is a pity that in paragraph 94 the Committee says: the present situation, although understandable in the short term, can only offer an uncertain future for the Islands in the long term and … some kind of accommodation with Argentina is not only inevitable, in view of the cost of the present policy to the United Kingdom, but also desirable". It goes on to elaborate on that point.

Again, one has to ask what the effect is on the Argentines if they read that sort of remark. They will read that and other remarks in paragraphs 96 and 98 of the report as showing that our resolve to retain sovereignty over the Falkland Islands is less than firm. People in Argentina will be reading into the general tone of this report an assumption on the part of the Committee that, even though we may not be prepared to discuss sovereignty now, we will be prepared to do so before long.

Is it not possible, if that is the conclusion that is drawn in Argentina, that it will make the Argentines less willing to discuss practical matters such as trade, shipping, flights, visits, financial services and perhaps joint exploitation of the fish and oil resources of the south Atlantic? They will be pushing us towards the point at which they believe we shall discuss sovereignty. It is possible that the more we appear to be apologetic and anxious about the future of the Falkland Islands, the less likely we are to get the Argentines to the table to discuss the practical matters.

Indeed, the report itself condemns that approach. Referring to the statement by Mr. Michael Stewart, paragraph 29 states: There is little doubt that this early indication of the United Kingdom's willingness to consider the transfer of sovereignty both coloured subsequent discussions between the two governments and provided fertile soil in which Argentina's subsequent sense of grievance could grow. I fear that that might be the immediate or long-term consequence if we continue to appear apologetic and doubtful about our position.

I believe that the British public are prepared to bear the cost of defending the Falklands — that cost will fall when the airfield is completed — and are prepared to continue to demonsrate the will to protect our position in the Falklands. That is in the interests of the Falkland Islanders. It corresponds to the will of the British public and is less likely to mislead Argentina.

8.51 pm

Mr. Tom Clarke (Monklands, West)

The right hon. Member for Blackpool, South (Sir P. Blaker) spoke with the clarity that the House has come to expect, but his judgment was at fault. His finger is less on the pulse of the true feelings of the British people than, for example, my hon. Friend the Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley (Mr. Foulkes) and, to be fair, the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen). I do not believe that the British people will encourage the Government to continue with the type of intransigence that we have seen during industrial disputes and that runs contrary to some of the Government's own achievements abroad. The Government are entitled to claim achievements over settlements in Zimbabwe and Hong Kong. I regret that this evening we have not heard that kind of language.

Lord Carrington had considerable influence on the Prime Minister over the settlement in Zimbabwe. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had the same influence over the Hong Kong agreement. That type of realistic and reasonable thinking is required in these circumstances but, so far, it has not been reflected in contributions by Conservative Members.

The Foreign Secretary referred in passing to the views and role of the United Nations. I believe that Parliament would wish to take on board much more firmly the genuine dedication to a peaceful solution that is in the minds of the United Nations and especially of Mr. Perez de Cuellar. We owe it to international diplomacy to stop talking in terms of the type of chauvinistic approach we have heard during this debate and to think reasonably of the type of settlement that can be achieved.

It was to be expected that a great deal would be said about sovereignty. We must consider another aspect in the context of these problems—our word, and the views of British Governments past and present. If we have a major change of mind, we are entitled, and expected, to offer a better explanation than has been given so far. The Franks report referred clearly to this matter. Under "The 'Memorandum of Understanding,'" paragraph 22 states: in March 1967 the British Government for the first time stated formally to Argentina that they would be prepared to cede soverignty over the Islands under certain conditions, provided that the wishes of the Islanders were respected. There is no reason to depart from that commitment — a commitment that was repeated by successive Governments. The onus lies on the present Government to tell us why they appear to be going back on that commitment.

It is true that dramatic events took place in 1982, but we are entitled to ask why the forces went to the Falklands. They went not simply to fly the flag — to do so would be to take away seriously from the objectives that the House set at that time — but to provide long-term security, and that is the overriding influence that we should be considering during this debate.

How can we consider long-term security if we refuse to accept that there has been a genuine change by the Argentines, especially their present Government? That change should be met by a more sensitive response by the United Kingdom. It would be damaging to the Argentines, to the British and to the islanders themselves if the present intransigence prevailed and if we did not attempt to seek a secure relationship with our south Atlantic neighbours.

During the debate there has been a great deal of criticism of the present Government of the Argentine, but it must be said bluntly that things have changed. Galtieri is no longer in control; many of the generals have gone on trial; and the new President and Parliament are dealing with some challenging problems. The House should understand the way in which they are attempting to solve those problems so soon after the traumatic events of 1982. The new rulers of the Argentine have a distinguished record in fighting the previous regime to which we have rightly taken so much exception. The present rulers of the Argentine were bravely fighting that regime in a way that can stand comparison with many hon. Members. That point should be seriously considered.

There is a danger that our approach to these matters could offer succour to the hard-liners in the Argentine. That would be a great mistake. They would welcome intransigence as a springboard from which to mount their own chauvinistic ambitions, which have not disappeared and which should not be encouraged by the attitude and role that we adopt.

My hon. Friend the Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley referred to the cost of fortress Falklands. I believe that the right hon. Member for Blackpool, South and the hon. Member for Stroud (Sir. A. Kershaw) seriously underestimated the deep feelings of the British people on this matter.

I do not believe, given our domestic problems and the demands made upon us, for example, in Northern Ireland — I do not attribute blame but the present unhappy conflict is a drain on our resources — that the British people will say that it is right to pay about £2 million a day to support 1,800 people.

Mr. Dalyell

£3 million.

Mr. Clarke

I accept the figure suggested by my hon. Friend, who is much better informed on these matters than I am. In a global sense, the British people will not accept that amount of expenditure without a more reasonable explanation about discussions on sovereignty and the future role of the Falkland Islands—islands 8,000 miles away.

The Foreign Secretary referred to strategic implications. He said that the suggestion that the Falkland Islands would become a NATO base were manifest nonsense, but so long as we have such a clear military commitment people will see it as a possibility and some even as a danger. I do not believe that that is the kind of contribution to peace in the south Atlantic that most right hon. and hon. Members would wish to see.

I refer, as did other hon. Members, to Hong Kong. I accept that there is no positive and clear parallel, but there are matters of mutual interest and anxiety. The most important aspect of Hong Kong before the negotiations began was perhaps that the Prime Minister took a belligerent and hostile approach to a settlement. She was in due course persuaded. In addition, to her credit, she did still more. She prepared the people of Hong Kong for a reasonable settlement. Had she not done so, acceptance of those negotiations would have been much more difficult.

There is an opportunity for the Prime Minister and her colleagues to embark upon discussions with the people of the Falkland Islands. I am not certain that the Prime Minister's Christmas message was the kind of approach that would be helpful in reaching a constructive solution to the problem.

I have not had the opportunity to visit the Falklands as many hon. Members have been able to do. However, last year, I visited Belize and had the opportunity — I should say privilege—to speak to some of our officers and men who were involved in the Falklands exercise. My admiration for them is, I know, shared by other hon. Members. They attempted to relate to me their experiences and views on the loss of life on our side and on the Argentine side.

I took the view then, as I do strongly now in the debate, that it would be one of the greatest tragedies in our history if we had a repetition of that kind of exercise, which many people believe — my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) is not alone in this view — could have been avoided by a diplomatic settlement. I hope that there will be no repetition of that exercise and that loss of life.

The United Nations will take an increasing role in our discussions on these matters. It will say to us that it is not beyond the wit of modern diplomacy to reach a sensible, reasonable solution to the problem. It is that solution which I commend to the House for acceptance.

9.3 pm

Mr. Robert Harvey (Clwyd, South-West)

There is much in the Government's response to the Select Committee's report on the Falklands that is sound common sense. The White Paper makes the point that, following the return of British administration in June 1982, the Government faced a completely new situation — a war had been fought and negotiations could not revert directly to where they left off before the war. That point has been made again by my hon. Friends this evening. It has been far too little understood by the Argentines, even though we recognise that the constitutionally elected Government of President Alfonsin bears no responsibility for the acts of their unconstitutional predecessor.

The Government's underlining of the Falklanders' right to determine their own future is also welcome. The Government's reply is correct in drawing attention to the Argentine's continuing refusal to announce a cessation of hostilities which would open the way to the ending of the trade embargo and of the protection zone around the islands.

All the same, hon. Members must feel a sense of disappointment at the absolute deadlock that seems to have persisted since the end of the Falklands war.

There are two sources of concern on the British side. The first, and least, although it was mentioned by the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), is the danger that Britain's allies in the world may lose sympathy with our position. Secondly, and more important, Britain has a duty to the people of the Falklands to provide them with a stable and foreseeable future.

In the absence of any negotiations, or even speaking terms between the two countries, the Falklanders have only our present profound sense of commitment to them on which to rely. That commitment goes deep, but no British Government can bind the hands of their successors. No Government can promise that, irrespective of the costs, we shall continue to provide necessary military protection of the islands ad infinitum. The Falklanders are realists and do not believe that the present commitment is for ever. It will endure for as long as we can afford it, no other way forward can be discerned and Argentina continues to be unreasonable.

However, should Argentina become more reasonable, it will be the historic duty of the British Government to seize the opportunity and not let it slip in case one day, heaven forbid, a less responsible Government should come to power and negotiate a much less favourable deal to make savings, for example, on their defence budget.

That begs the question of how unreasonable the Argentines are being at present. As I said, their refusal to call a formal end to hostilities is unreasonable, but perhaps the problem could be resolved by a simultaneous ending of the exclusion zone at the same time. This who-goes-first argument should not stand in the way of talks.

The central problem to the whole issue is what should or should not be on the agenda, which scuppered the last talks in Berne. It was agreed there that the Argentines could mention the word "sovereignty" provided that we said at once that we were not prepared to discuss it. The talks were then turned to other matters, and the Argentines withdrew in a huff when we stood by that agreement. Clearly, they were being unreasonable then.

In discussions that hon. Members on both sides of the House have had with Argentine parliamentarians, it seemed that we could detect an attitude of greater reasonableness, although whether that extended to their Government one could not say. They seemed prepared to consider a suggestion by which official negotiations would deal with the return to peaceful relations, while unofficial talks, for example, between retired but respected diplomats on both sides, would simultaneously consider not the issue of sovereignty but that of the future of the islands.

From the British point of view, that would give away nothing, even less than the Berne formula did. Obviously, these views of parliamentarians are not official views, but I am sure that the Government are considering all suggestions carefully as a way of getting talks started and creating a friendlier climate without prejudice on either side.

It would be churlish of us not to recognise that the democratic successes of the dictator Galtieri cannot be expected to have absolutely nothing to show in return for the normalisation of relations with Britain. No Argentine Government could go back to their people and say, "We shall mend fences with Britain, but we have agreed not even to raise the issue of the future of the islands".

Britain has won a war. Let us not detract from that victory by appearing to be at all insensitive. Our courageous fighting men fought and died to defend the principle that territorial disputes must not be resolved through the use of force and that the Falklanders remain British for as long as the majority of their inhabitants so wish.

They did not fight and die to defend the principle that we are unwilling ever to talk about the future of the Falklands. Their sacrifice will be debased if we absolutely rule out the chance of getting a secure and permanent settlement for the Falklanders now. We would give nothing away by saying that we were prepared to discuss the future of the Falklands, just as over Gibraltar we have given nothing away by saying explicitly that we are prepared to discuss sovereignty with Spain. We need not accept a single proposal that they make, but it is just conceivable that we might discover in such talks an arrangement that might be acceptable as a long-term solution to the people of the Falklands, as of Gibraltar.

I have a hunch that, in the Falklands at least, Argentina might be prepared to offer the sort of guarantee that would ensure the continuation of British administration and the preservation of the Falklanders' way of life. Of course, that would have to be acceptable to the people of the Falklands. Of course, trust and perhaps third-party guarantees would have to underwrite such a deal—the sort of trust that allowed reconciliation between Germany and its neighbours after the second world war, and the sort of trust that allowed Israel to reach peace with Egypt after not one but three wars had been launched upon it by that country.

To fight in defence of principle requires courage and statesmanship of the highest order, and the Government have shown it. To achieve a secure and binding peace that will permanently guarantee the Falklanders' way of life will require no less of both, but I am confident that a Government who have achieved the historic settlement in Hong Kong and the opening of the gates of Gibraltar can and will rise to the occasion.

9.11 pm

Mr. Bruce George (Walsall, South)

I am delighted to be called to speak in the debate, although I hope that it will not affect my chances of being called to speak in tomorrow's important debate on the west midlands. It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Clwyd, South-West (Mr. Harvey), who spoke courageously. One suspects that in the massed ranks of Conservative Members his voice, although not a lone one, does not necessarily reflect the ethos of his party in the light of what we have heard this evening. Remembering the famous saying about the Hapsburgs, may I say that five, 10 or 15 years from now I do not wish Britain to be forced down the path down which it was forced three years ago, fortunately successfully. We may not be as fortunate in the future.

This debate is important not simply because of the topic that we are discussing. I hope that people will not regard the vast empty spaces in the Chamber this evening as representing indifference. The debate contrasts sharply with the excitement and enthusiasm during that Saturday morning a few years ago, which has left an indelible mark on my mind. Never again do I wish to go through what we experienced on that occasion. Our lot was an easy one compared with that of the British troops, who were forced to accept the consequences of the failure of Government policy and the failure of Parliament to create an environment in which discussions with Argentina could have led somewhere and could have precluded the fact that more than 250 British citizens and many more Argentine citizens paid the price for that failure on both sides.

This is an important debate from the standpoint of the House of Commons. Select Committees, which I support totally — I am an active member of the Select Committee on Defence — are not debating clubs that spend months producing reports which end up in pigeon holes. There must be a bridge between what happens in Select Committees and what happens in the Chamber. Far too few Select Committee reports make it as far as the Chamber. I do not suggest that they are not read or debated in one form or another, but only a handful of reports have been debated on the Floor of the House. It is important that the link is maintained to show that the work done by Select Committees has a significance greater than simply a means of whiling away the time, after which their reports are conveniently forgotten. This report does not deserve to be forgotten.

The right hon. Member for Blackpool, South (Sir P. Blaker) has the mistaken view that the Foreign Affairs Committee is a branch of the Foreign Office, perhaps its public relations arm. He thinks that the principal task of the Foreign Affairs Committee is to advance the negotiating position of the Foreign Office. The Committee should not be expected to perform that task. It has not done so in the past. It has produced many challenging reports, reports that have almost invariably been a finger in the eye of the Foreign Office and the Government, but that is no reason why the Foreign Affairs Committee should be deprecated. It produced excellent reports on Canada, Central America and the Caribbean, Gibraltar and the aftermath of what happened in Afghanistan. Many of its reports ignored the prevailing view in the Foreign Office and have been vital because they have done that. It has stimulated thought and has shown that it does not have to be a mirror image of the Government's view. I commend the Foreign Affairs Committee and its Chairman for what has been done.

However, when I listened to the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, I thought that it was the Chairman of the Select Committee on Transport who was making the speech, such was the gulf between his speech and what was contained in the report. To advance the view that he as the Chairman has no vote is to show that his Committee may be unique among Select Committees. In our Committee, the Chairman not only participates in the debates but votes.

In the Foreign Affairs Select Committee report, I see that no vote was cast against paragraph 22. I am not arguing the case for Argentina, but it has a solid claim. Its claim is more spurious than ours. Ours may have some validity, but we have not put it to the test of international jurisdiction. Surely the answer to the rival sovereignty claims is what is suggested in paragraph 22, that neither side has an unchallenged claim to sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. I commend the courage of the Foreign Affairs Committee in advancing that view.

I have visited the Falklands. I just wish that more Argentine politicians had visited the Falkland Islands, which in the past I have called the diplomatic equivalent to a cold shower, as their enthusiasm might have abated somewhat if they had. However, although we may dismiss the validity of their claim, we have failed to understand that, in psychological terms, the Falklands or the Malvinas, as they would call it, have an importance way in excess of the economic, diplomatic or political value. Argentina is a country with enormous potential, but unfortunately it has failed dismally both economically and politically, and in almost every respect. To an Argentine, the reason for this failure is their failure to have reacquired the islands off their coast.

One shudders to think what would happen if ever the Argentines had control of the islands and nothing changed. What then would they blame for their miserable failure as a nation? We must always remember that if we pursue our "Fortress Falklands"' policy in perpetuity, perhaps not under this Government or the next, but at some time there will be another attempt to secure control of the Falkland Islands.

I am certain that the democratic Government of President Alfonsin has no desire to retake the islands. However, having read the report of Dr. Paul Rogers and magazines such as Jane's Defence Review I am aware that there is a growing capability in Argentina. If the capability were matched by the will, the situation would be frightening.

Argentines argue, with some validity, that the impressive acquisition of weaponry is merely the receipt of equipment that was ordered by the military Government. The civilian Government are seeking buyers for some of the equipment and the size of the armed forces has been reduced. There has been a reorganisation and some units and regiments have been disbanded, but it is still a capable force. Smaller forces can be more capable than their larger predecessors.

Maintaining the islands as British for ever will be a heavy drain on our resources. I am a member of the Defence Select Committee, but it is clear from published evidence that there is no way in which the Government will be able to meet their military commitments on presently available resources. There are whispers in the press and people are using Kremlinology, and I suspect that our amphibious capability will be on the list for the chop. The fact that we are considering that capability is a clear sign of the problems that the Government have got into on defence spending. The military, political and diplomatic costs of fortress Falklands are high. A series of pressures should make us consider some form of settlement some time in the future.

The pressures on Argentina are also great. Argentines must realise that they failed to achieve their objectives militarily and that they will not get in peacetime what they failed to secure by military means unless they are prepared to compromise. It is all very well to point the finger at the Prime Minister — rightly — for her obduracy, but the Argentine Government do not have much flexibility either. The Argentine President has more problems with his public opinion that does a British Prime Minister.

Neither side has an interest in developing an arms race in the south Atlantic. Both of us should be diverting resources to things other than maintaining a fruitless and possibly disastrous arms race. It is in the interests of the islanders, both Governments, both peoples and the world community that we get away from the conflict and down to the negotiating table. Neither side will get everything that it wants, but that is the essence of diplomacy. Both sides give but both gain.

I am not arguing for a lease-back arrangement. I have examined 20 possible constitutional solutions. Many might not advance any cause, but somewhere lies a possibility of a settlement. I hope that the report, today's debate and negotiations between politicians, publicly and privately, will somehow help to resolve the crisis. We avoided a crisis three years ago, but if we are not prepared to be diplomatic we shall be in far greater difficulty. The House must try to avoid that.

9.24 pm

Mr. Bowen Wells (Hertford and Stortford)

In my experience, it is quite often at the end of a debate that we have some of the wisest and most thoughtful words in hon. Members' speeches. The speech by the hon. Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George) was one of those, and, indeed, that of my hon. Friend the Member for Clwyd, South-West (Mr. Harvey) was another.

The sense of the report of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs and, indeed, the sense of the debate as it concludes is that we need to seek a way forward that will require compromise. I was pleased to note the advice that the hon. Member for Walsall, South gave to the Argentine Government. Compromise on their part will be needed.

It is wrong to assume that negotiations by President Alfonsin's Government with our country are seen by him to be likely to produce a result that will benefit him within Argentine political circles. It is a false argument to say that not to negotiate with him is to undermine him. If President Alfonsin, the first democratically elected president in Argentina for some time, and certainly the first non-military president for some time, returns with anything other than full sovereignty over the Falkland Islands or the Malvinas, as the Argentines call them, the political support that he enjoys in Argentina will be undermined. That is something that informs us about Argentina's actions towards Britain on negotiations. It explains why the Argentines have refused to concede that hostilities are at an end, which would facilitate the possibility of the British Government speaking to them about the whole issue of the Falkland Islands. Indeed, I believe that it explains their conduct in Berne, in Switzerland.

The Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, taking evidence for its report in pursuit of the facts, visited the United Nations and went around the ambassadors there, including the ambassador for Argentina. That was three months before the Berne talks in Switzerland. The ambassador gave us to understand that an open agenda, which included sovereignty, but which the Argentines would not expect to discuss, would be the way in which other issues could be discussed. Thus the two countries could begin to re-establish that essential trust which could bring about the opening of discussions on issues on which we could agree, and then we could move on to more difficult subjects. That is what the ambassador gave the Select Committee to understand, and that is what was reported to Ministers in the Government. Why did Ministers abort that opportunity to bring about negotiations? We can only speculate, but I suggest that it is because the President of Argentina is sufficiently insecure that he cannot bring back anything other than a total handover of sovereignty to Argentina. I believe, as Opposition Members have said, that Argentine public opinion would not tolerate anything else.

If that is the background, we are faced with an extremely difficult position because the Argentine cannot make any compromise. The compromise that the Argentines must make is that they must realise that, by invading the Falkland Islands, they have forgone the opportunity ever in our lifetime or in the foreseeable future of being able to take over the sovereignty of those islands. That action offended against the United Nations charter in every way and, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, South (Sir P. Blaker) said, was carried out in pursuit of the principle that a country may not try to settle its arguments on territorial and boundary disputes by taking the law into its own hands and making a military attack. For a member of the Security Council such as Britain to agree to that would be to unleash on the whole world a variety of territorial disputes that would lead to untold deaths and terrible disputes continuing throughout our lives. It would undermine the principle of the United Nations charter. That is what Britain did to resecure its territory in the Falkland Islands. That is the principle we supported, that our men died for and that the United Nations, almost unanimously, agreed to support.

May I remind the House that the hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley (Mr. Foulkes) throughout the whole of the Falklands Islands crisis—we have to consider this point in the light of his remarks today—consistently opposed in the House the despatch of the task force in defence of that principle.

Mr. Foulkes

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Wells

I shall give way in a minute. If the hon. Gentleman would not have despatched the task force to defend that principle, he is saying that he agreed with the claims of Argentina and would have handed over the islands to Argentina in any event. Therefore, his arguments must be set in that context.

Mr. Foulkes

I would ask the hon. Gentleman to accept — he knows me well — that I did not concede Argentina's claim. I thought that we should try to achieve a settlement by other than military means. May I also point out that on all those occasions I was speaking as a Back Bencher? Today I have spoken on behalf of the Opposition. That is a clear and important difference.

Mr. Wells

Of course I accept that difference, but the hon. Gentleman is a very persuasive member of his own Front Bench. I do not believe that we can absolve him from his own views on these matters by reason of his assumption of his great position, upon which I compliment and congratulate him. I am glad to see him in it. However, on this matter he and I must disagree, as we have always disagreed. Fortunately, hon. Members can disagree but retain great respect and friendship for those with whom they disagree.

I must record my disagreement, and also that of my colleagues on the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, with the Foreign Office about the creation of a fisheries protection zone round the Falkland Islands. Permission ought to be given only to those who are licensed to fish in that zone not only to conserve the stocks of fish so that they do not become totally exhausted but also because it is the most obvious source of income for the Falkland Islanders other than the traditional sheepmeat and wool. Without this additional prop to the economy, I do not believe that it will be possible to ensure that the Falkland Islanders can look forward to an economically stable and long-term future. It is their long-term future that we have to consider.

As the hon. Members for Walsall, South and for Clwyd, South-West said, the future of the Falkland Islanders and therefore their interests, which are not necessarily the same as their wishes, must lie in the conclusion of an agreement between themselves and this country and the South American mainland, namely, Argentina. Without such an agreement they will not attract the economic investment that is necessary to ensure that they have a long-term future. A means has to be found of ensuring that long-term solution.

Argentina will have to make compromises. They cannot expect sovereignty. We should not give the impression to Argentina that they ought to have sovereignty. It will be recalled that time and again the Government were accused in the House that because they explored lease-back before the invasion they gave the impression to Argentina that Britain would hand over to Argentina sovereignty of the islands and of the people. That mistake must not be made again. I appeal for a compromise and for an approach by Argentina to this country that shows that they are willing to try to re-establish the trust that is necessary in order to bring about the compromise solution that this country has shown that it is willing to make in other very difficult circumstances — in Zimbabwe, in Hong Kong, in Gibraltar and, indeed, at Fontainebleau in relation to the European Community. There is the will to compromise in Britain, provided that it can be done in the interests of the Falkland Islanders and in pursuit of the vital principle that no nation should pursue its territorial ambitions by military force.

9.34 pm

Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow)

The Minister should have time to answer the debate. Therefore, in three minutes I shall ask three questions.

The first is of the past. Is it true that the distinguished Conservative historian, Lord Blake, the Provost of Queen's college, Oxford has any grounds for referring in his most recent book to a Cabinet discussion in which it was decided that up to 1,000 British deaths would be acceptable during the conflict?

Mr. Robert Rhodes James (Cambridge)

rose—

Mr. Dalyell

No, not for a three-minute speech. Secondly, in the light of discussion on the airport, has account been taken of the fact that Argentina now has possession from Matra in France of the Durandel anti-runway bombs which can create havoc from low altitudes, making holes 2 m deep and 5 m in diameter, which could put out of action temporarily the Mount Pleasant runway and, therefore, the Phantom cover? What assessment has been made of the whole range of Argentine arms—the Nesher Israeli adapted Mirage 3s or the Mirage 5s, and the many armaments to which I have previously referred in the House?

Thirdly, I am dismayed at the attitude of many Conservative Members. All right, the Falkland Islanders have rights, but they do not have the right to keep a sizeable portion of the British Navy down there for the lifetime of the youngest among us. If they want, they have the right to be British, and that means coming to Britain.

Will the Government look at how the Scots and Welsh communities get on in Southern Patagonia? After all, in the words of Sir Richard Evans, our excellent ambassador in Peking, the legacies of history should be resolved by peaceful means. The Scots communities and Mr. Tuan McCafferty and the Welsh communities and Mr. Pablo Llewelyn get on very nicely. Not a finger was laid on them during the conflict. The whole Anglo-Argentine community must be considered in future. The truth of the matter is that, although Alfonsin will not start a conflict, he is pretty vulnerable. It is an embryo democracy, and surely it is in the British national interest to help him.

Mr. Austin Mitchell

rose—

Mr. Robin Maxwell-Hyslop

rose—

Mr. Dalyell

I give way to my hon. Friend.

Mr. Speaker

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop.

Mr. Dalyell

My God.

9.38 pm

Mr. Robin Maxwell-Hyslop (Tiverton)

The white coat can go away if he wants to. There are questions which will not go away. One is about sovereignty. Britain could not realistically use armed forces today merely because Argentina was in breach of a treaty. If sovereignty were ever conceded to Argentina as part of a general settlement and an Argentine Government in the future then tore up that settlement but were in possession of sovereignty, we could not move armed forces into the Falklands without invading Argentine territory. That is a fact which will not go away.

Secondly, among the events which have happened since 1982, whether the hon. Gentleman in the white coat likes it or not, is that people throughout the British Commonwealth, including in the Falklands, have seen what happens when leased territory comes to the end of its lease. The leased territories in Hong Kong are coming to the end of their lease, and that is a fact which is discussed in the Falklands. The significance of that is not lost on the Falkland Islanders.

Then again the right to be protected by the state of which one is a citizen is the most elemental right. It is not attenuated by distance. The inhabitants of the Shetland Islands are not less entitled to defence by the forces of the Crown than the inhabitants of Luton because they are further from London. Similarly, the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands are not less entitled to defence by the forces of the Crown because they are further from London than the inhabitants of the Shetland Islands. I have been to the Falklands since the conflict and I know that the Falkland Islanders will say that themselves.

Those who wish to make their own assessment of opinion on the Falkland Islands should bear in mind that Stanley is no more the Falklands than London is Britain. The history of Argentina is a history of chaos interrupted by very occasioal and brief periods of elected government. The standard picture of Argentine history is one of conflict —sometimes between the military Government and their citizens, and very often between the citizens themselves.

The present elected Government of Argentina may, or may not, last longer than the Government of Dr. Illia, following the military deposition of Peron, but morally we cannot assume for our own convenience and for the saving of defence Estimates that the present manifestation of politics in Argentina is even probably going to last. Judging by the history of Argentina to date, we have no reason to make such an assumption.

Mr. Foulkes

Governments here can change too.

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop

I am not sure whether the hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley (Mr. Foulkes), who is sitting on the Opposition Front Bench, is speaking as a Front Bench spokesman, but I remind him that our established pattern is that we have a democratic Government, even if Governments change after elections. That is not the established pattern in Argentina. Argentina has had 36 presidents in the past 100 years. It is no good the hon. Gentleman shaking his head. Does he disagree with that statement of demonstrable fact? How many of those presidents have been elected? Argentina has had fewer than Bolivia, but that is not a very great achievement.

Anyone who talks about the transfer of sovereignty or titular sovereignty is condemning the Falklands Islands to that. Once Argentina has titular sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, the fate of the Falkland Islanders will be left to happenchance. If we want to get away from the arguments about sovereignty, we must look to mutual interest. There are immense resources of minerals in Antarctica. At present prices they may be uneconomic to mine, but that will not always be so. As Arab supplies of oil and European supplies of coal are worked out—as one day they will be — the economic viability of harvesting Antarctica will become more real. —[Interruption.] If the white coat would be quiet, he would extend the same courtesy to other hon. Members as they extended to him.

In the historic carve up of Antarctica, Britain, Chile and Argentina participated in overlapping claims from which much of the rest of South America, including Brazil, was excluded. I should have thought that the way forward in terms of mutual interest would be to have new negotiations, not on the sovereignty of the Falklands, but on the sovereignty of Antarctica as a whole. In those negotiations we should offer to put into the pool our claim to Antarctica so long as Brazil and other South American countries had a share, divorced from historic claims. That might put an end to the hostility between Argentina and Chile and the feeling of Brazil that she was excluded. That is the way that we should follow to change the focus from sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, which is, and must remain, ours as a safeguard to the British population in those British islands.

9.46 pm

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Tim Renton)

I should like to thank all those on both sides of the House who have made such constructive and thoughtful contributions to this important debate. I should particularly like to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Sir A. Kershaw) and the members of his Select Committee, whose sound and thorough work has offered such a good basis for our discussions. My hon. Friend himself made a useful speech. In the words of my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, South (Sir P. Blaker), it was a robust speech. My hon. Friend the Member for Stroud has sent me his apologies because he could not be here for the reply to the debate.

I assure the hon. Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George), who is not in his place at the moment, that none of us at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office ever thinks of the Foreign Affairs Committee as an arm of the FCO —quite the opposite. I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, South, as a former Minister at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, would himself never think of the Select Committee in those terms.

Without further preamble, and not having much time, I should like to answer some of the points that have been raised in the debate. In his opening remarks my right hon. and learned Friend made it abundantly plain that we wish to normalise our commercial relations with Argentina, but that we are not prepared to discuss the issue of sovereignty. Many hon. Members referred to this issue, including the hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley (Mr. Foulkes), the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, South.

The hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley never made any mention of the right of the Falkland Islanders to self-determination, although he said that we should put the matter on the table. I remind him of these words: However, I hope that the whole House supports the right of the Falkland Islanders to self-determination and to live in peace under a Government of their own choosing, as they have been able to do for the past 150 years."—[Official Report, 7 April 1982; Vol. 21, c. 965.] Those were not the words of the Prime Minister or of the Foreign Secretary. They were the words of the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) in the House on 7 April 1982, not three years ago. What has changed that to make the hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley now feel so strongly that without considering the right of the islanders to self-determination we should put the issue of sovereignty on the table to be discussed?

That is particularly important because we all know that when the Argentines talk about sovereignty they mean the transfer of sovereignty. President Alfonsin made that abundantly plain in his speeches at the United Nations Assembly. When he talked about lease-back, he made it clear that he was talking in terms of three to five years before the ownership of the islands reverted to Argentina.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford (Mr. Wells) and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hendon, South (Mr. Thomas) said, it is as if the Opposition believe that the events of 1982 can be totally forgotten. They cannot be forgotten. Least of all can they be forgotten by the islanders themselves.

The hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley suggested that at the Maryland conference islanders gave the impression that they were willing to discuss the future ownership of the islands. In all the discussions that we regularly have with the islanders' elected councillors, we see no sign of that whatsoever.

Mr. J. Cheek, a Falkland Islands councillor, in the fourth committee of the United Nations General Assembly in October last year, said: Members may question what is the percentage of islanders who wish the Falklands to remain a dependent territory of Britain. I can assure members that islanders are almost unanimous in this belief. The right hon. Member for Devonport talked about the Beagle channel and the approval by the Argentine Senate today. He said that it showed that President Alfonsin is now more flexible. We welcome any reduction in tension in the south-west Atlantic. Of course we are pleased about the agreement between Chile and Argentina. However, no invasion was required by Argentina of Chile to obtain that agreement. Instead, a referendum was held. President Alfonsin held a referendum of his own people and there was an 80 per cent. vote in favour. Why does he not show any sensitivity about the rights and wishes of the islanders?

We have been privileged tonight to hear speeches by all three of the hon. Members who were present at the Maryland conference—the hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley, my hon. Friend the Member for Clwyd, South-West (Mr. Harvey) and the hon. Member for Walsall, South. All hon. Members will be grateful to them for their reports of the proceedings at Such contacts between parliamentarians can usefully complement official exchanges through the protecting powers, but some of the references to the Maryland communiqué are starry eyed. It would be wrong for the House to go away with the idea that the communiqué represents a breakthrough. The reference to respecting the wishes of the Falkland Islanders comes at the end of a paragraph listing various means of transferring sovereignty.

The document reiterates the Argentine insistence of a linkage between the normalisation of bilateral relations — which we want—and discussion about sovereignty. Indeed, Argentine participants at the conference have subsequently emphasised that they insisted at all times on Argentine sovereignty.

The hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley, the right hon. Member for Devonport, the hon. Member for Walsall, South and the hon. Member for Monklands, West (Mr. Clarke) referred to the cost of the Falklands. The overwhelming cost has been that of recovering the islands, of reconstruction and of the construction of Mount Pleasant airport. Once the airport is completed expenditure will come down sharply, and when it is fully operational it should be possible to reduce the size of the forces permanently stationed on the island.

In any event, it is surely wrong, however tempting, to put a cash value on the principles that are at stake. The price of liberty and self-determination comes dear, and when hon. Members of the Opposition speak, as they do constantly, of fortress Falklands, I must put it to them that this is a misnomer. It is no more a fortress Falklands policy than it is a fortress Britain policy. It is the right of the Falkland Islanders to be defended from the threat of attack, and it is our duty to defend them. We are keeping there the minimum force that is necessary for the purpose of defence. Obviously, the policy of defending the Falkland Islands was not specifically of our choice. It was forced upon us by the 1982 invasion.

I hope that the hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley will allow me to write and give him the answers to the various questions that he asked me about the airport, since they are somewhat detailed and time is short.

To the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), who asked me three questions, I would say, first, that I do not think that Lord Blake has written a new book for a long time. Secondly, it really is not appropriate for us to go publicly into our assessment of the military strength of Argentina. However, we note, as he will have noted, that Argentina, from spending 6 per cent. of its gross domestic product on defence military purposes in 1983, has reduced this to 4 per cent. in 1984 and an estimated 3.2 per cent. in 1985.

I should like to come back to the twin themes of our Falklands policy as described by my right hon. and learned Friend in his opening remarks. Of course, I agree with the comments made by, for example, my hon. Friend the Member for Clwyd, South-West on the need now to search for solutions. In this respect I agree with the hon. member for Linlithgow, who talked about our long-standing friendship with Argentina. That is of course true. Our relations and friendship with Argentina went back a long way, and throughout the 19th century we had an honourable financial connection with that country. We never wanted it otherwise, and it is unnatural that it should be otherwise. Sadly, it was Argentina which so rudely destroyed that friendship in April 1982.

How do we start rebuilding that friendship? I must put it to the House that it is we who have been making the patient efforts to promote normality and rebuild confidence in our relations. It is we who from the first have made the running in seeking better bilateral relations. It is we who have looked to the democratically elected Argentine Government to show a greater spirit of realism and flexibility in their response than their predecessors did. It is we who have been trying constantly to open the window and it is the Argentines who so far have always slammed it shut again.

We regret that they are not yet ready to accept that, while the issue of sovereignty must be set aside, discussion of other outstanding problems would help promote a climate of greater trust, to our mutual benefit. So far Argentina has not been prepared to share this reasonable approach, but we shall persevere in our attempts and we must hope that Argentina will respond to the steps that we have proposed.

This strand of our policy is matched by the other strand — our commitment to the Falkland Islanders. We are giving them in the new constitution the means to exercise a measure of control over their own future. The new airport will enable us to make some reductions in the size of the garrison but to reinforce it swiftly should the need arise. It will play an increasingly important part in enhancing the economic and social development of the islands.

We want to improve relations with Argentina. We stand by our commitments to the Falkland Islands. There is nothing incompatible in those two aims. We are confident that this is the right approach, and that no sensible alernative to it exists. We shall, therefore, continue to implement it with determination and energy. I have no doubt that the House will endorse that approach.

It being Ten o'clock, the motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

It being Ten o'clock MR. SPEAKER proceeded to put forthwith the deferred Question necessary to dispose of the proceedings on Supplementary Estimates 1984–85, Class IV, Vote 5.

Resolved, That a supplementary sum not exceeding £20,000,000 be granted to Her Majesty out of the Consolidated fund to defray the charges which will come in the course of payment during the year ending on 31st March 1985 for expenditure by the Department of Energy in connection with the energy industries including related research and development, selective assistance to industry, energy conservation, oil storage, and certain other services including grants in aid and an international subscription.

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1. ESTIMATES, 1985–86 (NAVY), VOTE A 22 words
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2. ESTIMATES, 1985–86 (ARMY), VOTE A 61 words
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3. ESTIMATES 1985–86, (AIR), VOTE A 47 words
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4. SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES 1984–85 56 words
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5. ESTIMATES, EXCESSES, 1983–84 89 words
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6. CONSOLIDATED FUND (No. 3) 52 words
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7. BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE 22 words