Test Ban Treaty

HC Deb 07 June 1985 vol 80 cc613-20

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Garel-Jones.]

2.31 pm

Mr. Gavin Strang (Edinburgh, East)

It is convenient and appropriate that this Adjournment debate should follow that initiated yesterday by the hon. Member for Bristol, East (Mr. Sayeed) dealing with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Progress towards a comprehensive test ban treaty is crucial to the future of the non-proliferation treaty. I say that at the outset because the most remarkable and disturbing element in the reply to yesterday's debate from the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the hon. Member for Shoreham (Mr. Luce), was the statement that the non-proliferation treaty and progress towards a comprehensive test ban treaty should not be linked. In reality, progress towards a comprehensive test ban treaty is crucial to the future of the non-proliferation treaty on which the third review conference will take place in Geneva in September.

It should not be necessary to point out that adherence to a comprehensive test ban treaty would stop non-nuclear countries testing and developing their own nuclear weapons. At present there are five members of the so-called nuclear club — the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China—but a considerable number of other countries are on the brink of joining. The United Nations non-proliferation treaty is a bargain between three countries that have nuclear weapons—the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom —and 121 countries which do not. Article 6 of the treaty requires the nuclear states to make progress towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race. For the Minister to suggest to the non-nuclear Governments participating in the review conference that the present disarmament talks between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva are an adequate response to article 6 is unrealistic, to put it mildly.

Progress towards a comprehensive test ban treaty is crucial. The preamble to the non-proliferation treaty states: Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end. Third world participants in the 1975 review conference called for specific undertakings from the nuclear weapons states. Among them was a call for

A comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, including those underground. Failure to make progress in that area was one of the reasons for the break-up of the 1980 review conference.

We must take note of the debates taking place in countries that may become nuclear weapons states. We have to acknowledge that in those countries, whether or not they are signatories to the non-proliferation treaty, reference is rightly made to the progress that ought to be made towards banning nuclear tests.

Next week we shall discuss the Government's defence Estimates. Among other matters, we shall debate the respective positions of NATO and the Warsaw pact. Ministers will argue that the deployment of nuclear weapons by east and west has been a major factor, if not the major factor, in the avoidance of war in central Europe, but Ministers will not carry that argument to the point of suggesting that it is in the interests of the world that all states should have nuclear weapons. I hope that the Government recognise the danger to both this and future generations of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. I make no apology for dwelling at length upon the fact that these two issues will be linked in the minds of those Governments who have such an important nuclear role to play.

The House has debated on a number of occasions during the last two years the pollution that has been caused by the British atmospheric tests in the 1950s. We are aware of the controversy surrounding the pollution in the south Pacific. Underground tests are less of an environmental hazard than atmospheric tests, but underground tests produce radioactivity which seeps into the water table. Hon. Members know of examples of that kind.

In June 1963 President Kennedy unilaterally announced a halt to United States atmospheric testing and challenged the Soviet Union to do likewise. In 10 days the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States had negotiated a treaty prohibiting tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. This partial test ban treaty was the first significant arms control agreement. It committed the three depository signatories to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. But, in fact, underground nuclear testing continued unabated. In 1974 the threshold test ban treaty limiting underground nuclear weapons tests to yields of 150 kilotons was signed, followed in 1976 by the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty which extended this limit to nuclear tests for peaceful purposes. Although both sides have adhered to the conditions of these treaties, neither has been ratified by the United States Congress.

In 1977 Britain, America and the Soviet Union initiated a new round of talks for a comprehensive test ban treaty and by 1980 the main framework for a verifiable ban, including on-site inspection, installation of tamperproof seismic detection stations by each country in the territory of the others and international exchange of seismic data, had been agreed upon. But, after his election in 1980, President Reagan suspended the talks, and in 1982 he reversed what had for a long time been United States policy by announcing that the United States would not resume negotations for a CTBT, and that that could be only a long-term goal.

At the Geneva conference on disarmament in 1982-83, Britain and America prevented any progress being made towards a nuclear test ban by insisting that discussions were limited to problems of verification and compliance. Of course, verification is an important issue and, indeed, that was the argument that dominated the 1984 UN conference on disarmament. The Minister knows well the depressing report—in relation to the position of Britain and the United States — that emerged from that conference.

It is correct to say that real progress has been made towards verification. Many experts in various countries have expressed their views on that issue. The Minister does not need me to refer to important statements by senior figures. I shall simply confine myself to telling him that I had the privilege earlier this week, as chairman of the parliamentary Labour party defence committee, of meeting Lord Carrington, the Secretary General of NATO. When I raised the issue of verifiction with him, he acknowledged that major progress had been made in that area. He certainly did not say that all the problems had been solved in terms of a comprehensive test ban treaty, but it was clear that the issue is whether we can now make progress and get down to a discussion of the banning of all but very small nuclear explosions— of perhaps 1 kiloton or somewhat higher than that. There is no point in being drawn at this stage about the size of explosions. It is no longer possible to sustain the case that there are sound scientific arguments for the lack of progress in this area. I hope that the British Government will desist from advancing that case, which is not a convincing one, in relation to their opposition—one might almost say—to a comprehensive test ban treaty.

There will be an important review conference in September on the non-proliferation treaty. There is a campaign in various countries of the world, including the United States, to try to bring pressure on the three nuclear weapon states which are signatories to the NTBT—the USSR, United States and Britain—to make real progress towards a comprehensive test ban treaty, and towards a reduction of the threshold from 150 kilotons to a much lower figure for underground nuclear tests. The proposal was put forward by a group in the United States, supported by Greenpeace and others, that a ban on testing should be a voluntary undertaking, with a moratorium to be announced by the United States. The Soviet Union responded in April, as the Minister knows, by saying that it would be willing to agree to a moratorium on underground tests from August this year, the date of the anniversary of Hiroshima. So the British Government have a chance to make a real contribution.

There is, of course, a limit to what we can do in the area of multilateral nuclear disarmament. I have not time to develop the indictment—I have to use that word—which can be advanced against the Government's record in the area of progress towards nuclear disarmament and a pulling back from the almost relentless drive by the world towards a nuclear abyss.

The case for Britain taking an independent stance on that issue and being prepared to speak as Britain as opposed to merely echoing the position of the Reagan Administration is overwhelming. We must see this debate as one element in the campaign towards a ban on underground nuclear tests and to help ensure that the review conference on a non-proliferation treaty in September does not break up in failure and lead to an outcome that could be even worse than that of 1980.

I hope that we can obtain a positive response from the Minister this afternoon. This is an important issue. Most Members will acknowledge that the threat of nuclear war, whether it be in the short, medium or long-term, is the overriding issue facing our people and all Governments. I urge the Government to reconsider their stance on this issue and to try to give a lead, at least, on the issue of banning underground nuclear tests.

2.45 pm

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Richard Luce)

I congratulate the hon. Member for Edinburgh, East (Mr. Strang) on raising this important debate about the comprehensive test ban. I welcome the chance to set out the Government's position on that important objective. I appreciate the strength of the hon. Gentleman's feelings on the issue. I ask him, however, to acknowledge the fact that we in the Government feel equally strongly. We share that objective. We wish to make positive progress towards a comprehensive test ban. He is wrong to suggest, therefore, that the Government are opposed to such a treaty. We are interested in making progress towards a treaty and hope that we can reach agreement that will allow for a treaty that will hold and will not be eroded because of inadequate verification.

The Government, in accordance with their international obligations, remain firmly committed to the pursuit of a verifiable comprehensive test ban. We are actively working on the problems that remain in achieving one. Such a ban, in the context of the substantial reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons which we and our allies are trying to achieve in other forums, such as Geneva, could be an important step. We should be proud of the fact that Britain played a leading and distinctive role in the early 1960s, in drawing up the partial test ban treaty.

Few countries have demonstrated fuller support for effective constraints in this field than ourselves, as our treaty commitments show. Together with the United States and the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom participated fully from 1977 to 1980 in trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty. The hon. Gentleman referred to that. These were adjourned following the failure to resolve a number of important compliance questions. Therein lies the enduring problem, on which I must spend a little time.

The United Kingdom has played a full and active part in relevant multilateral discussions at the Geneva conference on disarmament, where a nuclear test ban working group was established in 1982. In 1983, the Government tabled for consideration two important working papers on "Peaceful Nuclear Explosions in Relation to a Nuclear Test Ban" and "Verification Aspects of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty". As I said in my speech to the conference on disarmament on 12 March, it is paradoxical and disappointing that detailed work on those subjects was under way there during the 1982 and 1983 sessions but has since been interrupted by the refusal of some non-aligned and Warsaw pact delegations to agree a renewed mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban.

As a result, the technical issues raised in the two British working papers have not so far received the attention they deserve. Indeed, some countries have evaded these issues. In a spirit of compromise, the United Kingdom and the other western delegations proposed at the conference on disarmament last July a broader mandate for an ad hoc committee. This was designed to permit the "detailed examination of specific issues relating to a comprehensive test ban, including the issue of scope as well as those of verification and compliance, with a view to negotiation of a treaty on the subject".

At the United Nations General Assembly last autumn, a large number of states voted in favour of the resumption of work at the conference on disarmament taking place on this very basis.

Unfortunately, a minority of other countries remain apparently reluctant to agree this. But we remain convinced of the value of further work in Geneva towards a comprehensive test ban. We continue to be closely involved in the useful technical work performed by the ad hoc group of scientific experts appointed by the conference on disarmament, and we want to see this continue.

I shall deal now with verification. I know that the hon. Gentleman will acknowledge that it is a salient part of any treaty that we may draw up. I have already set out the efforts which have been made towards getting the problems of a comprehensive test ban thoroughly discussed in international forums, but what about the goal itself? On this, the Government are firmly convinced that no test ban treaty can be truly worth pursuing which does not contain adequate safeguards of compliance by all its signatory parties. The importance of resolving outstanding difficulties over how to verify such compliance lies at the very heart of discussions about a comprehensive test ban.

I should make it clear that we are not looking for perfect or 100 per cent. verification. But we must be absolutely clear about what verification we do require. When I addressed the United Nations first committee on disarmament last November, I made the point that the definition of adequate verification would always be a matter for careful political judgment, which must none the less rest upon technical factors. I then posed a number of questions which, in studying the verification provisions of any arms control agreement, we must be prepared to ask. First, will any undetected evasion of the agreement provide a significant military advantage? Secondly, will significant non-observance of the agreement be detected early enough to allow any necessary counter-measures to be taken? Thirdly, even if the evidence of such non-observance is available, will it be convincing enough to justify such counter-measures? Lastly, if we are confident that we can give the right answers to these questions, will we then be able to deter any temptation to depart from strict compliance with the agreement?

Let us consider a comprehensive test ban treaty in the light of these questions. It is clear that the clandestine continuation of nuclear testing at levels sufficient to confer a significant military advantage would have disastrous consequences for the treaty itself and for international security and stability. So it is an essential element of a comprehensive test ban that such clandestine testing is effectively precluded. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will agree with that. I stress that an unverifiable comprehensive test ban would be no ban — a bogus disarmament measure of benefit to no one except those who might seek to violate it. That is the problem that has bedevilled our efforts to make progress since the 1960s.

Those very issues were directly addressed in the United Kingdom working paper on verification that I mentioned earlier. It identified seismic monitoring as by far the most promising, indeed virtually the only, technology for the long-range collection of those data on underground explosions which would be needed for any realistic verification arrangement. It drew attention to the fact that the current techniques of seismic monitoring require improvement before adequate verification of a treaty could be envisaged. We believe that any realistic progress towards a comprehensive test ban requires fuller examination of this aspect at the conference on disarmament. We hope in future, and provided work can be resumed, to make further substantial contributions on this subject.

It is not enough to assert that seismological means are already adequate to verify a comprehensive ban. There is no scientific evidence for that assertion, which ignores two of the most intractable problems on which our scientists, together with their colleagues abroad, are continuing to work. Those problems are, first, the detection of signals from seismic disturbances against background noise in the surrounding environment and, secondly, discrimination or identification of seismic signals caused by nuclear explosions from the signals emitted by earthquakes. I ask the hon. Gentleman to bear those problems in mind.

Our studies show that seismic disturbances have to register at least four on the Richter scale for them to be reliably detected. Without crossing this detection threshold, however, large nuclear tests could be conducted by employing a number of evasion techniques, which are well documented in scientific literature and which might appear attractive options to a state wishing to cheat on a CTB treaty. Moreover, the threshold for distinguishing nuclear tests from the many thousands of earthquakes that occur around the globe each year is significantly higher than for the mere detection of a seismic disturbance, and would not, under a CTB treaty, rule out the dangerous possibility of clandestine tests at yields of up to several tens of kilotons.

I have set out in detail our anxieties on technical questions, because adequate verification is at the heart of the matter and there are serious problems still to overcome.

So-called peaceful explosions cannot be distinguished in character from tests of nuclear weapons. That is why we attach importance to verification on peaceful nuclear explosions and we have tabled a paper on that issue.

I should like to deal more expansively than I did last night with what the hon. Gentleman has said about linkage with the non-proliferation treaty. Article 6 of that treaty requires nuclear parties to show that they are using their best endeavours to make progress towards nuclear disarmament. Indeed, that is the Government's objective. I do not want the hon. Gentleman to get the impression that the Government are not interested in seeking a comprehensive test ban treaty. I make it plain that we are interested in that; it is one of our objectives.

However, it would serve no one's interests for progress towards a comprehensive test ban to be artifically linked to continued adherence to the non-proliferation treaty and its future. That treaty is important in its own right and we must not jeopardise it by holding it hostage to progress in other areas, however important they may be.

However, I stress that that does not detract from the importance that we attach to the Geneva talks making progress. We give our fullest possible support to those talks and we hope that they will make progress. We hope that, by the time the review conference meets in the autumn, there will be evidence of progress. We also attach importance to making progress on a comprehensive test ban.

I have dwelt on the technical aspects of verification to save the House and the hon. Gentleman from falling into the trap of thinking that the signature of an effective test ban treaty is merely a question of political will and to dispel the suggestion that verification is no more than a political smokescreen. I hope that I have made it plain to the House that the technical problems are real and solid.

I reiterate that the premature conclusion of a treaty that did not contain adequate verification provisions would not serve our interests or those of our allies. However, we remain committed to seeking progress towards a comprehensive test ban, as does the hon. Gentleman, and

we will continue to take an active part in the Geneva conference on disarmament in discussions about the problems of verification.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at one minute to Three o'clock.