HC Deb 13 December 1985 vol 88 cc1187-9 9.34 am
Mr. Robin Maxwell-Hyslop (Tiverton)

With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I beg leave to present a petition in due form addressed

To the honourable the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great britain and Northern Ireland in Parliament Assembled.

The humble Petition of Anthony John Miller, of 85, Alexandria Road, Sidmouth, in the County of Devon, national Chairman of the Taxation Committee of the National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Limited, sheweth: That whereas in a letter dated 30th April 1984 to John Moore Esq. M.P. , Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Anthony John Miller stated inter alia that The provision contained in the 1983 Finance Bill, relating to election for appeals to be heard by the Special Commissioners has been put forward again in substantially the same form in the 1984 Finance Bill under Schedule 22. The effect of these changes in the law is to remove from the taxpayer their absolute right to elect to bring an appeal before and to be heard by the Special Commissioners. We object most strongly to any change of this absolute right. Nicholas Ridley states in his letter that the intention is to remove this right only in respect of 'delay cases'. With respect, we can see nothing in the proposed legislation which will ensure that it will be applied only to 'delay cases'. The decision is left entirely to the discretion of the General Commissioners, who have to be satisfied that certain conditions are fulfilled.'

and whereas in a letter dated 17 May 1984 to Anthony John Miller, John Moore Esq., MP, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, stated inter alia that: The concern of the National Federation is Clause 122 and Schedule 23, paragraph 3. You say that the effect of this provision is to remove from the taxpayer his absolute right to elect to bring and appeal before and to be heard by the Special Commissioners… I fully understand your concern and would straightaway reiterate that it is the intention of the Government (and the Inland Revenue if the proposals became law) that the provision should apply only to 'delay cases' …The provision does not disturb the right of the taxpayer to be heard by the Special Commissioners. It is not concerned with cases where there is a dispute about the correctness of a return, where the right will continue to run. It does not interfere with the rights of a taxpayer who particularly does not wish to appear before the General Commissioners. It merely provides that if an appellant has not troubled to supply the Inspector with his accounts or a return in support of his appeal —in practice within about 15 months of the end of the year of assessment, as Nicholas Ridley explained to Gerald Malone —he really cannot in this day and age expect to take up the time of a specialist tribunal.

The problem has been one of definition and we finally decided to use an existing definition in Section 45(4) Taxes Management Act 1970, that is a case where the appellant has arguments to present or evidence to adduce on the merits of the appeal. This wording was originally devised to define a delay case in deciding on a quorum for the present Special Commissioners' hearings. It was agreed with the professional organisations"—

Mr. Speaker

Order. The hon. Member is a great expert on procedural matters. I draw his attention to Standing Order No. 119, which lays down that a petition should be summarised and that only the prayer should be read out.

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop

My understanding is, Mr. Speaker, that the petition "may" be summarised, not "must" be summarised. The House is entitled to hear the petition, more than half of which I have completed. Is that not so?

Mr. Speaker

The Standing Order states that a Member shall confine himself to a statement of the parties from whom it comes, the number of signatures attached to it, and the material allegations contained in it, and to reading the prayer of such petition.

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop

Yes, Mr. Speaker. I am presenting the material allegations to the House. They are complex and cannot be further compressed without their thrust being lost. The petition is of great importance to thousands of taxpayers who believe that they have been wrongly assessed. I certainly shall not add any comment to it.

The letter continues: It was agreed with the professional organisations when it was drafted, has stood the test of time and has been generally understood and accepted. The Inland Revenue have assured me that there would be no question but that submission of full accounts and/or a complete return would be covered by this definition.' And whereas in a reply to a question by Neil Hamilton MP in a debate on the Finance Bill in Standing Committee A on 21 June 1984, Mr. Ian Stewart MP Economic Secretary to the Treasury said inter alia. The hon. Gentleman asked about the effect of clause 122 and the schedule on the ability of taxpayers to elect whether the case goes before the general or the special commissioners …I can confirm that paragraph 3 of Schedule 22 covers only delay cases. The general rights of appeal to either the general or the special commissioners therefore still remain. If papers and accounts relating to a case are submitted in time, which for normal purposes is a 15-month period, the taxpayer's rights are fully protected and it would not normally qualify the 'delay case."' and whereas in a letter dated 2 July 1984 to Robin Maxwell-Hyslop Esq. MP the Rt. Hon. Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone stated inter alia that The provision is intended to restrict the right of the taxpayer"—

Mr. Speaker

Order. Once the hon. Member starts including in his summary what he has himself said we are creating an unhappy precedent.

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop

Yes, Mr. Speaker. I am not quoting anything that I have said; I am quoting what the Lord Chancellor said in an official letter to a Member of Parliament. It is because the Government have not done what the Lord Chancellor undertook in an official letter that this petition has been presented to the House.

Mr. Speaker

My point is —I think that the hon. Member would be with me on this —that we must not create precedents here. The rule is that a summary should be made.

Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop

I am three quarters of the way through, you will be relieved to hear, Mr. Speaker.

The petition refers to the Lord Chancellor's letter, which stated: The provision is intended to restrict the right of the taxpayer to elect to have his case heard by the Special Commissioners instead of the General Commissioners only in cases where the taxpayer has appealed against the tax assessment but has not produced any evidence to support his appeal ('delay' cases)" — I am on the last page, Mr. Speaker— The general right of election between the General Commissioners and the Special Commissioners remains. I understand that when the Inland Revenue consulted on this matter, the policy was generally welcomed and I have no objection to it. As to the way in which the provision has been drafted, the legislative language used to identify delay causes in the Finance Bill is that used in Section 45(4) of the Taxes Management Act 1970. I am informed by the Revenue that when Section 45 was drafted it was agreed with the professional organisations and it has stood the test of time. The petition continues: and whereas Clause 122 and Schedule 22, paragraph 3 of the 1984 Finance Bill was enacted as amendments to Section 31 of the Taxes Management Act 1970. and whereas the practical effect of the amended legislation is that H.M. Inspectors of Taxes are applying Section 31 (5B) of the Finance Act 1970 to cases which are not "delay cases" and referring them to the General Commissioners and the General Commissioners are directing in such cases that the election to appear before the Special Commissioners be disregarded, and the taxpayer is thereby being denied the general right of election between the General Commissioners and the Special Commissioners. Therefore your Petitioner humbly prays this honourable House to take the premises into consideration and to do therein as to this honourable House shall seem meet.

To lie upon the Table.

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