HC Deb 22 May 1984 vol 60 cc1149-56
Dr. John Cunningham (Copeland)

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I wish to raise with you the question of the possible hybridity of the Local Government (Interim Provisions) Bill.

Mr. Wrigglesworth

So that is what the hon. Gentleman has been doing all night.

Dr. Cunningham

The hon. Member for Stockton, South (Mr. Wrigglesworth) is not renowned for his attendance here, day or night. I make no apologies for staying up all night and then going to Portsmouth to help the Labour candidate launch a by-election.

As you know, Mr. Speaker, I and my right hon. Friend the Chief Whip would have wished to see you first privately to talk about this issue. The events of the past 24 hours are to blame for the fact that we were not able to do so. I apologise for any inconvenience that raising the matter in this way might cause. I have received two opinions on the possible hybridity of the Bill. I have submitted both to you, Mr. Speaker, because there is conflict on the matter. I am not trying to deny that. There are three arguments. The first is that the Bill discriminates between electors in relation to their votes; secondly, that discrimination also relates to their representation; thirdly, that there is discrimination between elected bodies. As the Bill stands, all of those issues are open to doubt.

One of the opinions makes it clear that the issues raised are of considerable importance. Because of that, I have decided that the matter should be pursued with you. The issue of possible hybridity relates to the omission from part II and schedule 1 arrangements for the representation of electors who live in the City of London and will be disfranchised by the interim arrangements. Under the Bill, no representation will be awarded to electors who live in the City.

The Government have implied in statements that representation of the City would be undertaken by Westminster city council representatives. There is no provision for that arrangement in the Bill and, on the advice of both opinions, the Government's position appears to be based on a misunderstanding of the effects of their own Bill.

The opinions address the possible hybridity that arises from the lack of representation that I have described. The first quotes a narrow definition of hybridity that relates to the differential effects on private interests. It concludes that a hybrid Bill is one to which, if it were a private Bill, the Standing Orders relating to private business would apply. It is a procedural definition. Counsel is of opinion that Standing Orders relating to private business are concerned exclusively with the rights of property or interests of a financial type.

The second opinion, however, considers those matters much more deeply and widely and concludes that existing definitions of hybridity do not require the interests concerned to be private. A hybrid Bill is therefore a public Bill that affects the interests of some individuals or corporations differently from those of all individuals or corporations in the same or similar categories or classes. Counsel does not consider that interests that might give rise to hybridity are necessarily restricted to those of a financial or property type. In other words, the issue of representation and the force of votes is considered to fall within the general remit of hybridity.

It would appear that the second opinion raises substantial arguments in relation to the Bill's hybridity. You will have noted, Mr. Speaker, that it does not presume to answer the question that we recognise is a matter for you and the Examiners, but it considers that forceful arguments exist for such an interpretation to be made.

It is also worth recalling the statement by Mr. Speaker Hylton-Foster on 10 December 1962 that, if a view can be taken that a Bill is hybrid, it ought to be referred to the Examiners. In these circumstances, I believe that important matters have been raised in relation to the procedures adopted for consideration of the Local Government (Interim Provisions) Bill. I believe that a prima facie case exists for consideration of the Bill as a hybrid Bill.

I ask you, Mr. Speaker, to consider my submission.

Mr. Speaker

I thank the hon. Member for Copeland (Mr. Cunningham) for sending me earlier this afternoon two differing opinions concerning the alleged hybridity of the Bill. On every Bill of this kind, I look most carefully into the possibility of hybridity and I did so in this case with particular care. The hon. Member argues that, because the Bill does not include the City of London as one of the constituent authorities of the interim GLC, it discriminates against the City.

The proper time for such objections—when, as in this case, all the facts are clearly known from the moment of the Bill's introduction—is on Second Reading, which took place as long ago as 11 April. I can, however, give the hon. Gentleman the ruling that he seeks.

My predecessors have always ruled that a Bill which concerned matters of public policy and, insofar as it dealt with private interests, dealt with them generally as a class was not hybrid. In my view, this Bill deals with matters of public policy and the category of constituent authorities in London — namely, the London boroughs — is a genuine class. The fact that the City does not fall within the class of London boroughs does not alter that situation.

The City of London has always been a separate chartered corporation of great antiquity, with its own distinct constitution. Unlike the London boroughs, it is not a principal council within the meaning of the Local Government Act 1972.

The Bill does not purport to offer rights to the electorate. It gives certain rights to a class of local authorities — namely, the London boroughs in London and metropolitan district councils outside London. All that I have to determine is whether the class of London boroughs is a proper class, and I have so determined.

I therefore rule that the Bill is not prima facie hybrid and I could not, therefore, give priority to a motion to refer it to the Examiners.

Mr. John McWilliam (Blaydon)

Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Without in any way wishing to challenge your ruling on this, I believe that two matters should be considered in dealing with this.

The first and most important is that the Common Council of the City of London itself relies for its existence on private legislation. Secondly, the electors of the City of London will still be subject to precept from the re-established authority.

Therefore, in this one case in the entire United Kingdom, the Bill involves the granting of taxation without representation. That is a fundamental point which ought to be considered, because that class of persons will be subject to taxation without the right in any way to have that taxation questioned.

I believe, therefore, that the opinions that my hon. Friend the Member for Copeland (Dr. Cunningham) kindly made available to you, Mr. Speaker, and also to me, although contradictory in a way, are not entirely contradictory. The person giving the first opinion did not help by lumping all Standing Orders together, whereas in the second opinion they were dealt with deliberately and in detail.

I believe that if we do not deal with hybridity in relation to the Bill, we shall be in danger of denying people their rights.

Finally, it is only one and a half hours since hon. Members—not Opposition Members—voted to include schedule 1. Until that schedule was included, the question of liability was not clear. That question having been decided by the House, it is only one and half hours since we first had the opportunity to make this argument.

Mr. Speaker

Order. Nothing that the hon. Member for Blaydon (Mr. McWilliam) has said changes my ruling. I also had the opportunity to look with great care at the two detailed opinions and I am grateful to the hon. Member for Copeland (Dr. Cunningham) for sending them to me. In the light of what was said in those opinions, and in the light of the investigations which I previously made and have made again this afternoon, I can see no cause for changing the ruling that I have already made.

Mr. John Morris (Aberavon)

Without in any way questioning your ruling, Mr. Speaker, my recollection is that on the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Bill Mr. Speaker Thomas heard argument and was prepared to consider the matter further overnight. I recollect that initially he was extremely doubtful about hybridity, or saw no hybridity whatever, but, having heard argument, he was prepared to consider the matter further.

I recall that you said, Mr. Speaker, that the right moment at which to raise the question of hybridity was at an earlier stage, on Second Reading, but I submit that, although it is preferable that it should be raised at the earliest opportunity, if matters concerning hybridity come to light late in the day, it is within the jurisdiction of this House and within your jurisdiction to consider whether there is a prima facie case.

You seemed to indicate initially, Mr. Speaker, that it was wrong to raise the question of hybridity so late in the day, but according to the precedents in "Erskine May", the matter of hybridity on the Park Lane Improvement Bill was raised late in the day, after Second Reading. Certainly, on the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Bill, the question was raised well after Second Reading. Therefore, I submit that the question of hybridity can be raised at any stage before Third Reading, after which it ceases to be a matter for the House.

I have had the opportunity to look quickly at the two opinions of learned counsel. In your ruling, Mr. Speaker, you emphasised the word "class". You said that there was no difference in class between one matter and another. May I draw your attention to page 588 of "Erskine May", where it is stated: The Speaker has defined a hybrid bill as 'a public bill which affects particular private interests in a manner different from the private interests of other persons or bodies of the same category or class'. I ask you to rule specifically, Mr. Speaker, that, although you emphasised the word "class", some distinction might be made in regard to the word "category". That aspect is dealt with at some length in one of the learned opinions, where it is suggested: Standing Orders 4A and 10 relating to Private Business and Table of Fees treat a London local authority as including the Common Council or the Council of a London Borough". That would seem to put the Common Council on the same level as a London borough. Learned counsel goes on to say: a Bill that alters functions of a member of a local authority shall for the purposes of the Order be deemed to alter functions of the authority; Bills altering the function of a local authority must be published in a newspaper or newspapers circulating in the area of the authority". The opinion then deals with newspaper advertisements, and lastly it makes the point that Bills relating exclusively to the City of London tend to be treated as private Bills.

For all those reasons, and because of the way in which we deal with the City of London, I submit that my submissions are germane to the argument before the House and to the proposition that you, Mr. Speaker, have put in your opinion. I should be grateful for your guidance on those additional points.

Mr. Speaker

I hope that I did not mislead the right hon. and learned Member for Aberavon (Mr. Morris). What I said about the proper time for such objection applied to when, as in this case, all the facts are clearly known from the moment of the Bill's introduction.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman has also drawn my attention to "Erskine May". That does not make any difference to my ruling. I have looked, as the House would expect, with immense care at the submissions that have been made to me. I have no hesitation in saying that, prima facie, this is not a hybrid Bill.

Mr. Tony Banks (Newham, West)

I would yield to no hon. Member in my respect for your office and judgment, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Dennis Skinner (Bolsover)

My hon. Friend does not need a trowel.

Mr. Banks

My hon. Friend should wait and see.

It is not the function of an Opposition to facilitate Government legislation. If that were so, we would not be here at the moment. Precedent would seem to allow for the question of hybridity to be entered at any time that is felt to be appropriate. I am sure that there has been much consideration of the arguments surrounding the possibility of hybridity in the Bill.

The opinions of two learned counsel have been sought. The one from Mr. Henderson would seem to be most persuasive. May I encourage you, Mr. Speaker, to dwell at greater length on Mr. Henderson's judgment? Although, as you correctly said, the Common Council is not in the same class as the London borough councils, there is a remarkable similarity of functions between them, including a uniformity of interests as provided by the Bill, which, I suggest with great respect, lead to argument that the Common Council is, in effect, in a similar category to the London borough councils.

The second point that I want to put to you for your consideration, Mr. Speaker, is that the franchise is a piece of property. The electors of the City of London who presently take part in the elections for a GLC member will have that right taken away from them if the Bill becomes law. I ask you, Mr. Speaker, to say how electors of the City of London can lobby, or demand that their interests in GLC matters be paid heed to, if they do not have an elected or indirectly elected representative to whom they can turn.

On both the grounds of the similarity between the city of London and the boroughs in terms of their functions, and the fact that electors in the city in respect of GLC elections or indirectly appointed bodies will not have the same rights as other electors in London, the Bill could surely be considered seriously as hybrid.

May I ask you, Mr. Speaker, to study at greater leisure the judgment of learned counsel and to return later?

Hybridity can be entered at a later stage.

Mr. Roger Stott (Wigan)

It will be within your memory, Mr. Speaker, that the last time the House filibustered on the question of hybridity was under your distinguished predecessor, Mr. Speaker Thomas. You will recall that the hon. Member for Tiverton (Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop) raised the point of hybridity on the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Bill. Your predecessor came to the House having examined the claims made by the hon. Gentleman and ruled that there was no prima facie case for hybridity. The Secretary of State for Defence, who was then the shadow spokesman on industry, then rose in his place at the Dispatch Box and asked your predecessor to reconsider his ruling in the light of new evidence that was becoming available that day. He asked your predecessor to suspend his judgment on the hybridity, to have another look at the evidence and return to the House a little later that day to make a further ruling. Your predecessor suspended his original judgment, studied the evidence that was before him and returned three or four hours later to rule that the Bill was hybrid.

I put it to you, Mr. Speaker, that there is a precedent for such a request to be made. I would humbly suggest that you accept the overtures by my hon. Friend the Member for Newham, North-West (Mr. Banks) and accede to his request in the terms in which a similar request was acceded to by your predecessor when it was made by the Secretary of State for Defence at the Dispatch Box some years ago.

Dr. Cunningham

Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I put it to you that there is a question in our minds about the part of your ruling which relates to what you said about being aware of the content of the Bill from the time of Second Reading? That is clearly a statement of fact that we cannot contradict, but it is surely the case that, at any time during the passage of the Bill, the Government may have come forward with an amendment to change the nature of the Bill.

I ask you to reconsider or clarify the fact that the timing of the matter has nothing to do with the judgment that is to be made. Like everyone else, we have given a great deal of consideration to this matter, as have learned counsel who have produced these opinions. It is not always possible to examine and report on such matters in time for Second Reading. In any event, even if they were reported at that time, subsequent Government amendments could have changed the position.

I regret, Mr. Speaker, that we have had to raise this matter in this way on the Floor of the House without discussing it with you. I hope that you would at least agree, as your predecessors have on similar occasions, to give further consideration to this matter and perhaps meet us to discuss it before a final decision is made.

Mr. Banks

rose—

Mr. Speaker

Order. I do not think that I need a further point of order from the hon. Member for Newham, North-West (Mr. Banks); he has put his case plainly. The two cases that the hon. Member for Wigan (Mr. Stott) raised are different, because something arose during the course of those proceedings which caused a change. The matter was therefore different. There have been no amendments to the Bill and no changes have been made to it since it was introduced. To that extent, all the facts about it were known. To deal with the point about the City of London made by the hon. Member for Newham, North-West (Mr. Banks), if he felt that it was relevant, it is something to which he could have sought to put down an amendment during the progress of the Bill. As far as I know, that was not done. I have to deal with the facts as they are and, with the benefit of two opinions from learned counsel, which I have had an opportunity to study in great detail, I have come to the conclusion that my ruling is correct.

Mr. Michael Foot (Blaenau Gwent)

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I would ask you to consider the matter afresh. I fully understand, and I am sure that the whole House is aware, that you have given detailed consideration to the matter already. I should like to put to you some other aspects of the matter and how the House has had to deal with it today. It is evident from the exchanges that have taken place, and our recollections of what happened on the hybridity clauses in the earlier measure, that the question of hybridity can be raised at any time during discussions on the Bill, before proceeding with the Third Reading, which is the point that we have now reached.

If the House were to proceed and the Bill were to be given a Third Reading, the chance of raising any question of hybridity would be overruled. At the moment we have not reached that stage, and there is nothing in the precedents to forbid the raising of the question at this stage of our proceedings. Indeed, this is the most appropriate time for it to be raised if any question has been mooted about it. Therefore, on that aspect of the matter I suggest that it has been raised at the last appropriate moment.

The second consideration is that the House is dealing with the matter in extraordinary circumstances because of the events of the night. I am not passing any judgment on those events, but if it had not been for the timetable the matter could have been discussed before the opening of the Third Reading tomorrow. Then the whole House would have had the opportunity that you have had, Mr. Speaker, to consider the documents and submissions. You have had the opportunity to look at them, Mr. Speaker, but many other hon. Members have not had that opportunity.

If it had not been for the extraordinary circumstances in which we are proceeding with the Third Reading, the rest of the House would have had the chance to consider the matter. I suggest to you, Mr. Speaker, that it would not be any infringement of the rights of the House but would indeed enhance them if you were to rule—this is open to you, because it would not mean any change in your judgment—that it would be better in the interests of the House not to proceed with the Third Reading now.

The Leader of the House is here and if you, Mr. Speaker, were to make a request on that basis, I am sure that he would accede to it. The whole House would then be able to discuss the matter properly tomorrow. What happened on the previous occasion surely reinforces that suggestion. Some of us were not able to consider the matter until it was raised a short time ago. If it had not been for the interruption of the business of the House, all hon. Members would have had the chance to consider the matter properly at the beginning of a proper day's proceedings.

I ask, Mr. Speaker, that you should give the rest of the House the opportunity which you and others have had to consider the matter. The important issue of the conceivable hybridity of the Bill should be considered at the beginning of a proper day's proceedings.

Mr. John Morris

Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. I am grateful to you for the care that you have shown in looking at the opinions of learned counsel. I want to return to the very narrow ground of the right moment for making the submission as regards hybridity. This is an important constitutional issue. By the standing of your ruling, Mr. Speaker, where the facts are already known this point should be made at an earlier stage.

First, as regards your decision today, Mr. Speaker, that view is not strictly necessary for your determination. In those circumstances, I reinforce the view of my right hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent (Mr. Foot) that you should give further time to consider this very important matter on which it is not absolutely necessary to reach a decision today.

I make the point on these grounds. If certain facts are changed in the course of a Committee deliberation surely at this stage it would be right and proper to raise the matter. Even if the facts remain constant, the application of those facts to the hybridity rule, if that becomes apparent at a later stage, should be within the province of the House and it should be within your jurisdiction to receive a submission about any stage, otherwise the House would be blinding itself to a truth that is apparent but, unhappily and regrettably, has not been raised at an earlier stage.

Since this matter may be of considerable importance in other deliberations in future years, it would be wrong to rule without giving further consideration to the matter, so that future Speakers and you yourself are not bound by a decision that it is not strictly necessary for you to make today.

Mr. Speaker

I think that I can deal with that very shortly. I looked at the Bill at the beginning to make a judgment on whether it was hybrid or not. I came to the conclusion, with careful advice, that it was not. I looked at it with great care, because I am well aware of the precedents that the hon. Member for Wigan (Mr. Stott) has mentioned. I happened to be present at that time. All the facts were known at that time, and nothing has changed since. I do not think the hon. Gentleman should labour the point as to when it should be brought forward. It is perfectly in order to bring it forward now.

However, since attention has been drawn to the legal opinions which have been sent to me, I must say to the right hon. and learned Member for Aberavon (Mr. Morris) that one of them is dated 18 April, so it is not exactly a new one. The other one is somewhat later. There have been plenty of opportunities during the course of the Bill to raise this matter. That it is raised now is of no particular significance. Of course it is in order to raise it now. I have had a further opportunity to consult the opinions which have been sent and the submissions which have been made to me and to look again at the situation. I have to rule that it is not prima facie a hybrid Bill, and I cannot give it priority.

Mr. Skinner

Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Bearing in mind that this Bill, I suppose more than any other in the parliamentary Session, is of the kind that could be dramatically changed when it reaches the House of Lords, in view of the fact that in the other place their Lordships are more concerned than, for instance, most hon. Members on the Opposition Benches about the City of London, and because I think it would be generally accepted on both sides of the House that a simple statement of hybridity or non-hybridity could be challenged at any time during the passage of the Bill, rather than at a specific moment, I suggest that there should be a suspension of judgment. Since their Lordships are so interested in that aspect, they may make changes of a kind that they would not dare to make to any other Bill. On that basis, Mr. Speaker, I think that you should examine the matter afresh, bearing in mind that the Bill can be very much changed when it comes back from the other place.

Mr. Speaker

The hon. Gentleman raises a point that may very well be valid, but it is a purely hypothetical question at present.