§ Mr. John Ryman (Blyth Valley)On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I wish to raise a point of order with you, of which I have given notice, relating to the scope of the sub judice resolutions of 1963 and 1972.
There have been a number of well-publicised criminal and civil cases recently. My respectful submission is that the scope of the sub judice resolutions has been deliberately misunderstood by Ministers to stifle legitimate debates and to avoid answering awkward questions.
The resolutions are set out in "Erskine May" on page 343. I shall summarise them to save you reading the entire page and subsequent paragraphs, Mr. Speaker. The effect of the resolutions is that a criminal case is sub judice from the moment of arrest for committal, trial and appeal procedures, providing notice of appeal has been given. A civil case is sub judice in the circumstances set out in paragraph 2 of the 1963 resolution, which are from the time that the case has been set down for trial or otherwise brought before the courts.
I mention that elementary principle because the Leader of the House obviously does not understand it. On 20 March the right hon. Gentleman was asked a question which proved to be the latest in a series of examples of Ministers of the Crown seeking to hide behind the sub judice principle. The right hon. Gentleman was asked about the "Panorama" programme relating to allegations about certain hon. Members. The right hon. Gentleman said:
The 'Panorama' programme is itself now the subject of legal representations and I shall very properly curtail my comments on that account."—[Official Report, 20 March 1984; Vol. 56, c. 908.]That is a misunderstanding of both the law and the rules of the House. A writ had been issued, pleadings had not been completed, interlocutory proceedings had not taken place and the case was nowhere near ready to be set down for trial — as is required in the prohibition of the resolution. It is one example of an important Minister, who should know far better, failing to answer a question by invoking the sub judice resolutions when in fact they did not apply.I submit that there is nothing in law to prevent an evasive Minister, for political reasons, from falsely quoting the sub judice rule to avoid answering questions. It would be helpful to hon. Members on both sides of the House if you, Mr. Speaker, gave some guidance about the scope of the resolutions, as there are many criminal and civil cases now awaiting hearings, about which questions can and should be asked, without discussing the facts of individual cases.
Within the law and the rules of the House, it is perfectly proper to discuss the general principles involved in criminal and civil cases, provided that the facts of a particular case are not discussed. It is an unwarranted stifling of the freedom of the press and of this House if Ministers hide behind the resolutions. Indeed, the Contempt of Court Act 1981 had as one of its purposes a provision to remove the muzzling writ to prevent discussion of a legitimate interest. It would be a sad day for Parliament if, in that atmosphere, Ministers sought to hide behind the sub judice rule. I ask for your ruling, Mr. Speaker.
§ Mr. SpeakerI am most grateful to the hon. Gentleman for having given me notice of this matter, as that has enabled me to make a deep study of it, which has taken me a great deal of time. The hon. Gentleman's question is really directed more towards the Leader of the House than to me.——
§ Mr. SpeakerOh, did I? Nevertheless, I think that the hon. Gentleman's question is more for the Leader of the House. The right hon. Gentleman is not here, but he will no doubt study carefully what the hon. Gentleman has said about his answer to a question on 20 March. It would not be appropriate for me to seek to explain all the ramifications of the sub judice rule. As the hon. Gentleman has hinted, it is an extremely complicated one. Hon. Members who wish to pursue questions about the sub judice resolutions should seek procedural advice from the usual sources and from "Erskine May", which the hon. Gentleman correctly quoted.
The underlying principle is that, unless the House is considering legislation, hon. Members should not comment on matters that are before the courts.