Trident (Hansard, 26 June 1984)

§ Mrs. Beckett
asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether there will be any change in targeting policy or strategy of the United Kingdom's strategic forces as a result of Trident acquisition.

§ 9. Mr. Bidwell
asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether there will be any change in the strategy of the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent forces as a result of Trident acquisition.

§ 19. Mr. Allen McKay
asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether there will be any change in the targeting policy or strategy of the United Kingdom's strategic forces as a result of the Trident question.

§ 20. Mr. Strang
asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether there will be any change in the targeting policy or strategy of the United Kingdom's strategic forces as a result of the Trident acquisition.

§ Mr. Heseltine
No. As we made clear in the Open Government Document 80/23 "The Future United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Force", the British Government's concept of deterrence is concerned essentially with an ability to pose a potential threat to key aspects of Soviet state power. That concept will remain the basis of our approach when Trident enters service.

§ Mrs. Beckett
As Trident's accuracy makes it a first-strike weapon for use in fighting a nuclear war, and as United States policy has adjusted to meet that change in availability, should not the Secretary of State now admit that either our Government's policy has changed in the same way, or he has wasted the country's money?

§ Mr. Heseltine
The hon. Lady must be fully aware that Trident is a replacement for the Polaris system, which the Labour Government supported for many years.

§ Mr. McNamara
Enhancement of the deterrent, not replacement.

§ Mr. Heseltine
The hon. Gentleman says that as though it were a condemnation. It is an enhancement because the Soviets have introduced a new generation of radar and ABM systems.

§ Mr. Bidwell
May I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that the British public as a whole are far more worried about the prospect of nuclear warfare than they were a few years ago? As Polaris is not supposed to be a first-strike weapon because of the placing of the silos of the Soviet missiles, what faith can we have in the story that Trident will not be fully aimed? How are the Russians to know that? Does this not bring us nearer to the prospect of nuclear war?

§ Mr. Heseltine
I do not know whether the public are rightly or wrongly more concerned today. I know that they have always been concerned, and that is understandable. The one thing that I know about public opinion is that the public believe that the maintenance of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent is an essential part of our defence strategy.

§ Mr. McKay
Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that we are to purchase D5 missiles from the United States, with complete MIRV facilities? If we purchase them, will the missiles be with the 17-warhead capability, and if so, is it the Secretary of State's intention fully to utilise that capability?

§ Mr. Heseltine
The hon. Gentleman will realise that we have not yet taken the final decision about the procurement of the systems.

§ Mr. Strang
Will the Secretary of State acknowledge that the Trident 2D5, unlike Polaris, has the capability to destroy Soviet missiles in their silos? While that may not be the British Government's purpose, is not the fact that it has that capability enormously destabilising?

§ Mr. Heseltine
I wish that Labour Members, before telling us about the destabilising effect of our deterrent system, would spend more time concentrating on the threat that we face from the Soviet Union, with its continuing enhancement.

§ Mr. Dickens
Does my right hon. Friend accept that if the Japanese had had a nuclear deterrent such as Trident at the end of the second world war the Americans might not have dropped their atom bombs? If that is the case, will my right hon. Friend further accept that it is a jolly good justification for our nuclear deterrent?

§ Mr. Heseltine
My hon. Friend raises a key point. We have had a nuclear deterrent in this country for nearly four decades, and we have lived in peace. The coincidence does not escape any independent observer of the scene.

§ Mr. Sackville
Does my right hon. Friend agree that no hon. Member has yet made a convincing case for an alternative to Trident which constitutes a credible independent nuclear deterrent?

§ Mr. Heseltine
That is why the Government took the decision that they did. I support what my hon. Friend has said.

§ Mr. Bill Walker
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the submarines based in Scotland, however efficient the targeting system, and however effective the warheads, could not, under any circumstances, knock out the SS20s?

§ Mr. Heseltine
The purpose of basing submarines in Scotland, along with a whole range of other decisions that we take about weapon systems, is to prevent a war breaking out, not to calculate the precise use of weapons that would be made in the event that it did.

§ Mr. Tony Lloyd
Does the Secretary of State accept that any first use of Trident would be suicidal, both nationally and throughout the world? Will he give a clear commitment on behalf of the Government that there will be no first use of Trident and other British nuclear weapons?

§ Mr. Heseltine
I give precisely the same assurances as those which the last Labour Government gave when they were responsible for these matters. Everybody knows the consequences of the use of the weapon systems and their very existence is the single greatest guarantee of peace that we have.

§ Mr. Denzil Davies
Does the Secretary of State recall that he said to the Select Committee a few weeks ago that neither side would contemplate using nuclear weapons, on the basis of a rational judgment, because of their horrendous nature? If he accepts that he is a rational man, as I am sure he does, does that mean that he would not contemplate the use of Trident or any other nuclear weapon? If that is the case, what does that do to the Government's theory of deterrence?

§ Mr. Heseltine
I was going to say that I am as rational as the previous members of the Labour Government, but that is a pitfall into which I would rather not leap. No responsible Secretary of State for Defence would spell out in advance the hypothetical circumstances in which our deterrent would be put to use. The whole purpose of our weapon system is to deter, and in that it has been extraordinarily successful.