POWERS OF REMOVAL

HC Deb 25 January 1984 vol 52 cc942-63

'(1) Where the Secretary of State decides not to revoke an exclusion order, the person to be excluded may apply within 30 days to an Exclusion Tribunal for an order that the exclusion order be revoked.

1. (2)(a) the Exclusion Tribunal shall consist of three High Court Judges. It shall have the power to revoke or confirm the exclusion order. It shall hear representations and evidence, by or on behalf of the Secretary of State, and representation and evidence by or on behalf of the person to be excluded under the order,
2. (b) the Secretary of State shall inform the person to be excluded in advance of the reasons for the order and of the evidence against him,
3. (c) the person to be excluded shall have the right to legal representation and to legal aid.

(3) Where:—

1. (a) an exclusion order has been made against a person, and
2. (b) notice of the making of the order has been served upon him the Secretary of State may have him removed from Great Britain, Northern Ireland or the United Kingdom as the case may be—
1. (i) if he consents;
2. (ii) if the period mentioned in subsection (4) of section 7 above has expired and he has not made representations relating to the matter in accordance with that section; or
3. (iii) if he has made such representations but the Secretary of State has notified him that he has decided not to revoke the order and thirty days have elapsed without an application having been made to the Exclusion Tribunal, or if such application has been made, it has been determined by the order being confirmed.

(4) A person the subject of an exclusion order may, after one year has elapsed from the making of the order, or after one year has elapsed from any proceeding consideration of the exclusion order by the Exclusion Tribunal, apply to the Exclusion Tribunal for an order that the exclusion order be revoked.

(5) The Secretary of State shall not impose a further exclusion order if no further substantial evidence has been presented to him other than that on which the original exclusion order was based.'. —[Mr Soley.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

5.15 pm

Mr. Soley

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Ernest Armstrong)

With this it will be convenient to take amendment No. 20, in page 7, line 22, leave out clause 8.

Mr. Soley

We now come to a particularly important part of the Bill dealing with exclusion orders. We have argued many times, especially in Committee, that exclusion orders represent by far the most serious attack on civil liberties in this country for many years. I appreciate that the decision was taken in the aftermath of the Birmingham pub bombings, with all the emotion that prevailed at that time. It was part of an Act which was then regarded as helpful in preventing terrorism. We have consistently argued that time has shown that it is not a very effective way to prevent terrorism, but it remains a major infringement of civil liberties.

If the Minister, who was so dismissive in the previous debate, proposes to come out with any further pathetic innuendo about the Labour party changing its policy, I remind him that the purpose of the House is to consider legislation enacted in the past on the basis of evidence as to its effectiveness. If, in all reason and conscience, the House finds that the evidence does not prove that the legislation is achieving its aim, then there are strong and positive grounds for repealing the legislation. That is the position of the Labour party on this matter and the evidence is extremely strong. I hope that there will be no further pathetic innuendo from the Minister as he has repeated it so many times already that one day it will be put to music and perhaps reach the Top Ten.

Mr. Waddington

Is the hon. Gentleman including the Harrods bombing in his new strong evidence?

Mr. Soley

Yes, I am doing precisely that. I should like the Minister now to give me any evidence that the Prevention of Terrorism Act has taken the Government one step forward towards catching the people responsible. There is overwhelming evidence — one or two hon. Members will provide that evidence — that the legislation has resulted in several people being picked up, held, questioned and released without any charges being laid against them. We know that about 5,600 people have been arrested under the provisions of the legislation, but fewer than 100 charges have been laid. Every time the Minister makes statements he must take into account the way in which the measures alienate the minority community in Northern Ireland, and many people of Irish extraction in this country, from the forces of law and order.

We are fighting a propaganda battle, and the way to win it is not by alienating those whom the terrorist seeks to represent. That is the fallacy of the Minister's statement. I again challenge the Minister to give the House and the public one example of how the Prevention of Terrorism Act has helped to catch or has enabled a move to be made towards catching anyone who planted the bomb outside Harrods. I shall give way now if the Minister wishes to put on record that he believes that the legislation has done so. I am not surprised that we are not receiving a response from the Minister. The Government have consistently failed to face the fact that the Prevention of Terrorism Act has alienated many people and damaged the credibility of successive Governments in fighting the terrorist menace.

Mr. Proctor

Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that this legislation caused or promoted the Harrods bombing?

Mr. Soley

I can give positive evidence that the legislation is effectively used by the Provisional IRA and the INLA as a propaganda weapon with which to beat the British and as a way of appealing to the minority community to support and, in some cases, to join those organisations. If the hon. Gentleman wants an example, I advise him to read last week's edition of the Provisional IRA's paper "Republican News" which refers to the Act. The hon. Gentleman will then understand my point, but whether he agrees is another matter.

I am in danger of getting out of order on this issue, and I do not want to do that. Successive Governments have recognised the use of exclusion orders. I am not criticising either the present Government or previous Governments on the issue whether they regard this measure as a serious infringement of civil liberty. All Governments and all Home Secretaries, and the Minister of State, recognise that. Sometimes we give nice labels to horrendous ideas against civil liberties, and so, for example, refer to exclusion orders.

We should be frank and blunt and recognise that we are talking about internal exile. We should not dress it up with slightly better words. We are saying that if a person lives in one part of the United Kingdom and the Government think fit, that person will not be allowed to go to or live in another part of the United Kingdom. That is what we complained about so bitterly when the Soviet Union exiled Sakharov. I realise that the reasons for that action are fundamentally different, but we must recognise what we are doing: for the first time since the middle ages this country and the House are involved in political legislation which allows internal exile. That is the important point of the new clause.

In Committee, the Opposition argued strongly that it was time for exclusion orders to go. Lord Jellicoe recognised that this was one of the most important points that should be reviewed more frequently. We lost the vote, but I believe that we won the argument. People outside Parliament who would like to consider that debate should read it in the Official Report. There are some convincing arguments in that debate. Above all, they ought to examine the statistics in the back of Lord Jellicoe's report, which will tell them about the dangerous road on which we are travelling.

It is not just internal exile that troubles me. The Labour party is increasingly concerned about and recognises— we recognised this from the beginning, and there is an honesty of discussion within the Labour movement on this matter—that exclusion orders represent a slide from the rule of law and the judicial process, which means that politicians and police officers decide whether a person should be exiled from one part of the United Kingdom to another. I understand why we have allowed ourselves to slide into that position.

I remember the feelings after the Birmingham pub bombing and know the intense hostility and anger that I and all hon. Members observe each time a bombing or killing occurs. I say to many of those people who approach me that I wish there were the same degree of anger when such incidents occur in Northern Ireland, as happens all the time. I say that confidently as a shadow spokesman on Northern Ireland affairs. If there were anywhere near the same degree of hostility in Britain towards the killing and torture by paramilitary groups on both sides in Northern Ireland, I should be more confident that we could raise the level of the debate in this country about the nature of the political problem in Northern Ireland and the inability of the House to deal with it.

Lord Jellicoe, in a straight and clear admission, in page 95, paragraph 191 of his report, states: Exclusion is a matter of public policy. Lord Jellicoe is at one with Lord Gardiner in saying that reference to a court or tribunal is not appropriate because of public policy.

Why table a new clause that introduces such a court or tribunal? The argument must be that if we cannot abolish exclusion orders—as we argued in Committee—the next best thing is to say, "For heaven's sake, let us take this dangerous power that we have given to politicians and police officers and put it under at least some aspect of judicial control." The essence of new clause 2 is that some attempt must be made to bring exclusion orders under judicial control and take them outside the decision-making powers of police officers and Home Secretaries who are politicians elected to represent specific interests.

Between 1975 and 1980, the number of exclusion orders was relatively high. Sometimes there were as many as 45 per annum. Since 1980, the number has dropped considerably. In the last couple of years it has averaged about 10 per annum. A two-edged argument results. One argument is that, as so small a number of people are involved, is this matter of such importance that we should do anything about it now?

The other side of the argument—the one that weighs most heavily with me—is that, if the exclusion order is used so infrequently, do we want this draconian power — successive Home Secretaries have said that it is draconian—to deal with only 10 or 11 people, with all the shame that that brings to the House with its long history of protection of civil rights and liberties? I suggest that it is a fallacy to say that we want that power, and we should not allow ourselves to go down that road.

Lord Jellicoe, in page 94 of his report, states: the possibility of abolishing it"— the exclusion power— should be kept under regular review, without prejudice to the Act's other powers. Lord Jellicoe recognises that exclusion orders are by far the most draconian part of the Bill and that we need constantly to examine the other powers in the legislation. He is right. Given that we are using this power against only 10 or 11 people, the time has come to say that we can manage without it. I go further and say that our fight against terrorism could be enhanced if we showed that we were beginning to get on top of this aspect of the problem. That is the only interpretation in the light of the number of exclusion orders dropping from about 45 per annum to about 10 per annum. If we are beginning to get on top of the problem, it is time to do without exclusion orders.

I recognise the force of the arguments of those who say, "You could cause a loss of life by doing that. A person who is excluded might otherwise have caused a bomb explosion." I have never argued that various parts of the Act have not saved some lives; they probably have.

5.30 pm

However, there are two arguments to put in the balance against that. The first is that the Act alienates the community that we are seeking to win over. The Act is used by Republican paramilitary forces as a recruiting sergeant. They use it to persuade unemployed youngsters in the north of Ireland who are impressed by the argument for nationalism to join their forces. However much we may dislike that argument, it is understandable, in the circumstances, that it has attractions.

There is no way of knowing which way the balance tilts — whether the Act is more productive or less productive. We have to make a judgment, and I say that we should come down on the side of civil liberties.

The second argument to be put in the balance is that, if we are talking only about saving lives, a lot of other legislation could save lives. I give what may sound a slightly unusual example, but it is one which I want to use and examine carefully. It would be possible to save several hundred lives every year by putting a massive police presence outside every pub visited by people who drink and drive. We could clamp down heavily and have numerous breath tests all over the country. That would be opposed by many Conservative Members who have spoken out publicly against random breath tests in the past few months.

Figures from the Department of Transport and elsewhere show that if we substantially reduced the number of people who drove while under the influence of drink we would lower the death rate on the roads by several hundred a year. The price would be measured in terms of civil liberties, and a democracy has to make judgments about such matters. It has to weigh the balance. No matter how unpopular its decisions may be when a bomb goes off outside a shop and kills people, the balance has to be weighed. One of the jobs of hon. Members is to act as leaders.

Ms. Harriet Harman (Peckham)

Does my hon. Friend accept that there is no evidence that the Act has done anything to help prevent a single act of terrorism or to detect the perpetrators of any terrorist act? The claim that the Act prevents terrorism is not proven, and that is why the House should not re-enact it in this form.

Mr. Soley

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. Her words "not proven" are appropriate. I can envisage that the Act may have prevented terrorist acts, just as I can say that it may have caused loss of life by acting as a recruiting sergeant for paramilitary groups. That is a matter of judgment.

Ms. Clare Short (Birmingham, Ladywood)

My hon. Friend makes an enormously important point when he says that the Act may have saved lives. I disagree fundamentally with that. [Interruption.] This is an extremely important matter and not a subject for laughter.

The important powers in the Bill to catch criminals and terrorists exist in other legislation and it can be demonstrated that the Act has led to an increased danger of people losing their lives.

In Committee, we asked the Minister of State to tell us whether anyone who had been excluded from Great Britain to Northern Ireland had subsequently been convicted of terrorist offences. There is a significant number of such people—15 certain cases and a possible 31 more. If we did not have the exclusion power and the police did their job properly and kept an eye on those people, they would not be sent to Northern Ireland and left free to commit other terrorist offences.

I take the opposite view to my hon. Friend. The Act does not prevent terrorism. Indeed, the exclusion power gives people a second chance to engage in terrorist activity.

Mr. Soley

My hon. Friend is not as far from me as she thinks. I did not say that the Act prevents terrorism. I said that what is in question is the balanced judgment whether the Act does that. There is subjective evidence on both sides of the case and no definite proof on either side. We have to make a judgment based on the figures and our assessment of people's feelings here and in Northern Ireland. My hon. Friend the Member for Peckham (Ms Harman) was right to use the words "not proven". There is no evidence to show that the Act has prevented terrorism and none to show that it has not. The case is not proven, and therefore we have to judge the matter by other standards.

We must recognise that when we exclude a person we are saying, in effect, "We know what your are up to." It is rather like the spy who is caught; his usefulness is immediately diminished. If we believe that a person is involved in paramilitary activity, the weapons that we should use against him are the normal weapons of surveillance that the security forces employ. If we exclude someone, we are saying to him, "We know that you are involved." We also say to all contacts, "We know that he is involved." As a result, the contacts are broken, hidden or changed. It does not cure the problem; it merely puts it on another plane.

We argue for a tribunal of three High Court judges. The hon. Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile) said earlier that our proposal would expose some secret matters to public view. It would not do so. Tribunals and courts can sit in camera.

Mr. Alex Carlile

The hon. Gentleman misunderstood what I said. Of course courts can sit in camera, but if the provisions of the new clause are intended to mean what they say the detainee would hear the evidence of the information that led to the decision to detain him. That would pose great dangers to members of the public who had supplied information to the police.

Mr. Soley

It is a two-edged weapon. If the hon. Gentleman were involved in the debate in Northern Ireland, he would know that the problem is not unknown there. People face it and give evidence in the trials of members of paramilitary forces. I admire their courage, but it has to be done. There is a price to be paid for democracy. I hope that I am not putting it too high when I say that when we are challenged by a paramilitary threat, we have to ask people to put their lives and welfare on the line. Indeed, hon. Members who represent constituencies in Northen Ireland do that and some of them have died doing so. I recognise that, and the hon. Member for Montgomery, who speaks as a lawyer, also needs to recognise that.

Mr. David Ashby (Leicestershire, North-West)

Does the hon. Gentleman envisage that the tribunal would sit in open court or, as I would expect, always in closed session? Would there be direct evidence? There would be considerable difficulty about that. What standard of proof would be required? Such questions are pertinent to the new clause.

Mr. Soley

The hon. Gentleman is correct. If I do not answer his questions; as I move on, I shall be happy to allow him to intervene again.

I assume that in the vast majority of cases, the tribunal would sit in camera. That option would always have to be available to it. That is the simple answer to the hon. Gentleman's first question. I am not sure about direct evidence. I was intending to say that there is a clear case on both sides of the argument. The relevant point is that the person facing exclusion should have legal aid, because he would then have a legally qualified person to speak and ask questions for him. That is important and could perhaps deal with the problem of direct evidence. I do not pretend that I have a detailed answer, but I should like to see the tribunal build up a body of practice and legal knowledge to deal with the problem. I cannot see any alternative

If the Government are determined to stick by their rigorous decision to retain exclusion orders, I have to say that, if we are to have them, there must be some judicial practice. I will concede, as I am sure that the Minister will, that many difficulties; would be involved. Some of them have already been described. However, a decision must be taken.

For how much longer are exclusion orders to be retained? If the figure drops from 10 to two a year, will we keep the orders or drop them at that stage? If, one year, no orders are made, shall we still retain the power to make them? The orders may be with us for many years. I assume that a tribunal or court could build up a body of legal practice which would enable it to deal with them. I do not pretend that the process would be easy or even always entirely logical, but it would be an effort to reduce the element of straight political legislation in this part of the Act and to increase its involvement with the rule of law and judicial interpretation.

At the moment, an excluded person can only make representation in writing to, and seek a personal interview with, a nominee of the Secretary of State. He does not have direct access to the person who excluded him. He writes down his views as to why he should not be excluded. If he does not receive a satisfactory answer, he may then ask for the Secretary of State to appoint a nominee. The nominee may talk to him. That is the only defence against internal exile.

It is easy to stand here and pick holes in the new clause. However, one must ask what the alternatives are. If the Government have decided that they wish to retain this part of the Act, I can understand that. If they wish to drop this part of the Act sooner or later, we must ask at what point they will do so. How do we judge when a power should be dropped? How rarely must it be used before it is abandoned? Those are the questions that the Government must answer if they object to the new clause.

Finally, subsection (5) enacts and tightens up the statement made by the Home Secretary in Committee that, without further evidence, he would only in the rarest of circumstances" — [Official Report, Standing Committee D; 15 November 1983, c. 144.] make another exclusion order on an individual who had already been excluded. He would insist on fresh evidence. To make repeated exclusion orders on the basis of old evidence could not be justified. That is what we are trying to make clear in the new clause.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell

The new clause refers to that part of the Bill which is concerned with exclusion orders. There is nothing that the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr. Soley) can say against exclusion orders which has not been said, and is not strongly held, by my hon. Friends and myself. From the very beginning we have protested against this institution, which the hon. Gentleman correctly describes as internal exile. It is internal exile with the additional implication that Northern Ireland, distinguished for this purpose from the rest of the United Kingdom, is treated as a leper colony to which terrorists or potential terrorists can be exported.

I have no desire to trench upon discussion of the next amendment, which is aimed at eliminating internal exile from the Bill. I trust that my hon. Friends and I will have the support of the official Opposition for that amendment, in the light of the words just used by the hon. Member for Hammersmith. The hon. Gentleman was right to say that the institution of exclusion orders in 1974, and their retention, has represented a slide away from the rule of law. It entrusts an administrative discretion to a Minister to impose upon a citizen the severe penalty of being ordered to remove from one part of the United Kingdom to another, and to impose that penalty, not for an offence, but for what is apprehended administratively as a danger.

5.45 pm

The hon. Gentleman was quite correct in his assertion. Where I believe that he is mistaken is in recommending the new clause as a remedy and as some partial restoration, as it were, of the rule of law. That is not possible. We are attempting, if we adopt it in that light, to combine incompatibles.

What the new clause represents is the creation of an executive power. My hon. Friends and I do not believe —and nor does the hon. Gentleman—that that executive power is any longer justified—whatever the case in the past-or that its existence outweighs its disadvantages, but we cannot alter its nature by setting up a commission of three judges. They will not be exercising a proper judicial function, taking the law and deciding whether a particular individual falls within the mischief of the law as made by this Parliament, but will be covering an administrative act of the Secretary of State. They will be a sham cover for an act which is not judicial but administrative.

I can prove that. Let us suppose that it were possible —this is only hypothetical—to demonstrate that failure to exclude X had resulted in the commission of a terrorist atrocity. If that failure to exclude had been the result not of the Secretary of State's decision not to use his power, but of a decision of a court, the Secretary of State could say to members of the public who complained that the Secretary of State had powers and was not using them for their protection that he had washed his hands of the matter and that it was nothing to do with him: the House of Commons had said that it was to go to the court, and the court had thrown it out.

The effect of such an amendment would be to blur the fact that the responsibility lies with the Secretary of State. It would blur the essentially executive nature of the decision which he has, on his own responsibility—his responsibility ultimately to this House—to make.

It would also have another undesirable effect. It would degrade and place in a false light the function of the judiciary. We have gone too far down that road already. Too frequently use is made of High Court and other distinguished judges to chair tribunals and courts of inquiry, especially in the case of hot political subjects. If we were to adopt the new clause we would put that error on to the statute book. We would give to High Court judges, whose business is to interpret the law, the function of deciding whether the balance of risk — not on probative evidence, but on such evidence as in these cases the Secretary of State has to take account of—justified their condemning someone to internal exile. We should put the judiciary in a false position if we attempted to introduce this safeguard. In fact, it is not a safeguard, in the sense that it exaggerates and increases the disadvantages of the exclusion provision.

One beneficial result that is likely to come from this debate is that we shall see that we must have the exclusion procedure, or that we must get rid of it altogether. We cannot simply compromise and cover it up by discovering some sort of tribunal or instance of appeal which will make it harmless or less harmless.

Therefore, I fear that as much as my hon. Friends and I dislike—as we will prove presently by debate and in the Lobby — the existence of this power, we cannot support Her Majesty's Opposition on this amendment.

Mr. Martin Flannery (Sheffield, Hillsborough)

I have a great deal of sympathy with the views of the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell), but when we consider the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the Bill, one of the matters which stand out to those who have been in Committee—this is a new development for us—is that hardly one jot or title of the Bill has been altered. In fact, so little has been changed that when there was a tiny alteration—I say this with the deepest respect to the right hon. Gentleman—the Minister made a witticism and boasted about it.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell

But he did not vote for it.

Mr. Flannery

No, he did not vote for it. We know that the feelings of Conservative Members—the bombings deepen this—are not dissimilar to those during the panic in 1974 when, with no dissent, a Bill was enacted following the Birmingham bombings. That attitude returns every time anything dreadful, such as the Harrods bombing, takes place.

Knowing that we cannot kick out or mitigate the effects of the Bill in some way, we are trying to bring back the rule of law and give some sustenance to the people who are attacked by such draconian measures, as they were described when they were first enacted. We are aware that the exclusion orders do no provable good. My hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith (Mr. Soley) said that with many things, such as breath tests, we are convinced that we save lives. These exclusion orders may be saving lives, but that cannot be proved. We condemn many innocent people in the process and antagonise many innocent Irish people, and people such as myself with Irish names, who are immediately subjected to abuse and obscene telephone calls when the Irish are being condemned.

One matter which has not been mentioned, although I am sure that hon. Members are aware of it, is that most of these exclusions or internal exiles are to Northern Ireland. It is using Northern Ireland as a dustbin and in effect saying, "If you are going to do something dreadful, do it over there and not over here." That is not treating Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom by those who insist that it is.

The provision causes misery and leads to the abuse of anyone connected with Ireland or who raises his voice about it. I have never spoken in the House, as far as I can remember, without saying to Members of the Official Unionist party that I worry as deeply about them as about anyone. My heart goes out to the people who must live in Northern Ireland, but at the same time I want to point out that exclusion orders, which are the most objectionable part of the Bill, are an abrogation of natural justice and the rule of law. They do no good. They treat people as if they are all potential criminals.

I remember Gerry Fitt, who was then the hon. Member for Belfast, West, and of whom I have been a friend for many years, saying I particularly resent this legislation because of the exclusion orders … I am convinced—again, one can only use one's intelligence, and I have a reputation for being opposed to the men of violence—that utterly innocent people have been excluded from this part of the United Kingdom without their having been involved in any action or support for terrorist organisations." —[Official Report, 15 March 1982; Vol. 20, c. 167.] I object to the draconian nature of the violation of the rule of law. People have no right to know why they are being excluded; no right to know the evidence against them or to cross-examine those who are supposed to have collected it; and no right to a trial or a formal hearing. That is dreadful. The danger is that the power will be extended. I noticed that a man called Stokeley Carmichael was excluded from this country the other day. People may know all kinds of reasons for that. I know that when there is an exclusion provision, it is later used to exclude wider and wider groups of people.

Amendment No. 20 and new clause 2 are a serious attempt by the Opposition to try to introduce some slight measure of law and democracy into this dreadful Bill. We do not have much hope, but we wish to get it on the record that we are trying to do that, because it is vital to let it be known that those who have spent all their time struggling against the Bill since the beginning—as some of us have — are on the side of the rule of law and are profoundly against terrorism, from whichever side it comes.

Ms. Harman (Peckham)

Exclusions orders are really internal exile. Internal exile is a form of punishment without charge or trial. What is being said to people who are subject to internal exile is, "Although you are citizens of the United Kingdom, you cannot live here in Great Britain." That will mean losing their job, if they have one, and if they are excluded to Northern Ireland they have a fat chance of finding a job there. They are forced to separate from their spouse and children or to disrupt their lives and take them. That could mean disrupting their education and jobs and making them leave their friends.

To cap it all, they would be forced to live away from Great Britain under the stigma of an accusation of terrorism. That is a severe punishment. It cannot be described as anything else. It is nonsense to say that it is not.

The Government say that it is not a punishment, but merely an administrative measure, because if they were to concede that it was a punishment they would have to allow a fair trial. Calling it an administrative measure is sleight of hand to preclude natural justice for the person subject to an exclusion order.

As the Bill stands, there is no natural justice. The person whose life is likely to be seriously disrupted has no right to know what he is suspected of. He has no right to know, hear or challenge the evidence which, apparently, has been put forward against him.

We know that if evidence is not subject to challenge, a low standard of evidence can be used. The provision for making representations to the Secretary of State is a sham, because how can one make representations that one has not done something when one does not know what one is accused of? The representation point is slender.

6 pm

The same is true of the so-called right to interview. The interviewer is nominated by the Secretary of State, so he is not independent. This is about as fair as the Secretary of State would feel it to be if the potential interviewer were to be chosen by the person to be excluded. What a bizarre sort of interview it will be. Will the interviewer tell the person being interviewed anything about the suspicions against him or about the evidence? Will he be allowed legal representation? The chances are that he will not get legal aid because there is no criminal charge entitling him to legal aid. Will the person be entitled to know what representations the interviewer will make to the Secretary of State?

I remind the House of what Lord Jellicoe said about exclusion orders: I have found consideration of the system of exclusion to be the most difficult part of my task. It is in many ways the most extreme of the Act's powers: in its effect on civil liberties, it is in my view more severe than any other power in the Act; in its procedure and principles it departs more thoroughly from the normal criminal process than any other part of the Act it has aroused substantial resentment even among many, particularly in Northern Ireland, who support the aims and content of the remainder of the legislation. The House must accept that internal exile is a punishment. If any of the hon. Members on the Government Benches who intend to vote for the Bill were subject to internal exile, they would regard it as a punishment. We should not mete out punishment without even a nod in the direction of natural justice. The new clause will go part of the way to mitigate that injustice. I take the point made by the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) that the Act is so rotten at its best that the new clause does only a small amount, but we feel that it does enough to make it worthwhile introducing and supporting.

The new clause would do that by the introduction of an exclusion tribunal. At least the three High Court judges would not be directly nominated by the Secretary of State. They would be more independent than that. At least the tribunal would hear evidence and arguments from both sides and the person who was likely to be punished with an exclusion order would have an opportunity to hear the evidence and arguments against him. He would at least be entitled to legal representation and legal aid and would be able to ask for a review of the exclusion order after one year. If there were no further charges or evidence against him, the exclusion order would then lapse.

Mr. Ashby

The hon. Lady is a lawyer, so will she explain how one can have legal aid when there are no rules governing the form of evidence? Where evidence will be circumstantial or hearsay, there cannot be any rule of law. One would be looking at reviews and reports. In no way would there be a judicial proceeding. As the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) said, that turns the whole system on its head. How can the hon. Lady's system work properly?

Ms. Harman

Internal exile as an administrative procedure is rotten. It is difficult to graft on to something that is fundamentally rotten a partially fair procedure. However, that is what we are trying to do, although we would rather see the Bill go altogether. We lost that in Committee, and we are trying, on behalf of the people who might get caught up in this, for some mitigation. If some hon. Members were innocently caught up in something about which they knew nothing, they would be grateful for such mitigation, small as it is, and would want to know the evidence against them and be able to have legal representation.

Without the new clause, and even with it, internal exile as an administrative procedure breaches the European convention on human rights. We should be prepared to apply the same standards to ourselves as we are so ready to apply to others. When internal exile occurs in other countries, we are quick to point the finger and say that it is a disgraceful denial of human rights, but we are doing it in this country.

If someone is involved in terrorism and there is evidence to that effect, he should and must be prosecuted. If there is no evidence, he should be regarded as innocent until he is proved guilty. That is supposed to be one of our fundamental principles of law. If the people who are being subjected to exclusion orders are guilty of criminal offences and of instigating terrorism, should we export them to Northern Ireland? That is nonsense. Internal exile brings the law into disrepute and we should vote in favour of the new clause, but bear in mind that the system of exclusion orders is fundamentally wrong.

Mr. Gerald Bermingham (St. Helens, South)

We had many debates at some length in Committee on the subject of exclusion orders. I say now, as I said in Committee, that the exclusion order is an affront to our society because it leads to the dumping of people in one part of our land—Northern Ireland—and means that the Siberia concept is imported into our law.

In Committee, on the debates on clause 8 and in various other debates, time and again an important series of questions was asked of the Minister. I asked about the quality of evidence and why there could not be an investigation. His reply bears looking at with some care, particularly when we begin to try to rectify the mess of the Bill. I go along with what my hon. Friend the Member for Peckham (Ms. Harman) said, that the new clause is by no means the ideal solution but it might import some fairness into our system, a system that is patently and blatantly unfair. The Minister said: Sometimes there is information against a person that points to his being a terrorist, but which would not be admissible in court. I have always thought that the basis of our system was that we needed real evidence, evidence that was admissible, not tittle-tattle, prejudice, adverse comment, supposition or suspicion. The Minister went on: There is often evidence against him which would be admissible, but it cannot be disclosed publicly because it might lead to the death of the person who had given the information to the police." — [Official Report, Standing Committee D, 15 November 1983; c. 125.] We pointed out to the Minister, as I have done time and again, that it is not unusual in an English court room for a witness to be at risk, and steps can be taken to protect him. That happens all the time and has happened in a recent series of robbery trials in the Old Bailey in which the witnesses were thought to be at risk. They were given a new identity in another land.

I do not accept the Minister's reply in Committee. We pressed the point but failed to get another answer. It seems that the Government are determined not to learn the lessons of history or to learn that this land, which prizes so greatly its ability to abide by the rule of law, sometimes gets wrong laws. We bring in Acts that are later shown to be a disgrace. The prevention of terrorism legislation has always been a disgrace because it is a series of infringements of fundamental liberties. If a society is worth having, it is worth having only if it keeps to its basic principles and concepts.

This is not the first time that we have flown in the face of the European convention on human rights. I can give two examples, one very recent and one not so recent. The not-so-recent case concerned our laws for the mentally ill. I declare an interest, because I was involved in the case that went to Europe, which resulted in alterations to the Act. My ex-practice took that case. We still do not have our mental health laws right, but we are a long way further down the road of doing so.

The same can be said of the parole system. That was the subject of much challenge in a recent decision on admissibility. It appears that we have also got that wrong. Equally, I suggest that we are wrong in the way in which we deal with people under the prevention of terrorism legislation, and once again we risk the condemnation of the European courts. In a way, I would welcome this matter being tested in the European courts. As a country that prides itself on the rule of law, it is essential that we should have laws that comply with the European convention on human rights.

The hon. Member for Leicestershire, North-West (Mr. Ashby) asked how legal representation could be given. Under the new clause, a person subject to an exclusion order, or faced with exclusion, would at least have some hope of having his side of the story put, as a result of which the method of determining exclusion might be changed. All that happens under the present system is that forms are passed and notes are made without the party involved knowing what is going on.

Under clause 7(6), such a person is entitled to be advised by a person who is nominated—almost like a friend. But even clause 7(6) has its limitations when one considers the provisions of clause 7(8), which contains a get-out in certain circumstances. The Bill will give a person few or no rights, but the new clause will at least give him the right to apply within 30 days to an Exclusion Tribunal for an order that the exclusion order be revoked". Subsection (2)(a) of the new clause says: the Exclusion Tribunal shall consist of three High Court Judges. Earlier this afternoon the hon. Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile) talked about secrecy. I remind him that from time to time treason trials are held in this country, and everyone involved maintains the secrets that are disclosed in the "in camera" hearing. Therefore, what is the danger of three High Court judges hearing the evidence? There is none. Our judiciary has always been bound by silence, as have our lawyers. If lawyers were made subject to the Official Secrets Act, that would be no worry to them. One of the great advantages of our legal system is that our lawyers know when to keep a secret. They can disclose only on the authority of a client, or they will be in breach of their professional rules.

Subsection (2)(a) also states: It shall hear representations and evidence". The judges will be in a good position to sift the tittle-tattle, innuendo, suspicion and smear. If someone is to be sentenced—exclusion is a sentence—he ought at least to be informed of the evidence.

We cannot have punishment without trial, not in a civilised society, because the minute we reach that stage we are well on the Orwellian road. Regrettably, we began going down that road not in 1984 but in 1974. Perhaps after 10 years' experience we will have the courage to leave that road.

Subsection (2)(b) of the new clause states: the Secretary of State shall inform the person to be excluded in advance of the reasons for the order and of the evidence against him". Were that to become part of our legal system, it would at least give the person the right of reply, as well as knowledge of the allegation. It is difficult for someone to talk to a person appointed to interview him if he does not know what the interview is about. One could have an endless and useless conversation based on speculation. At least some effort has gone into the new clause to avoid that.

6.15 pm

Subsection (2)(c) says: the person to be excluded shall have the right to legal representation and to legal aid. That simply means that the person will have the right to advice. Whether or not he can afford it, he will get that advice, and the person giving such advice will be able to sift the value of the evidence and allegations, prepare the counter-arguments and, ultimately, present them to three High Court judges.

That is not an ideal solution, but it is at least an attempt to correct a great and horrific injustice in the Bill. The ideal solution would be not to accept new clause 2 but to reject clause 8 in its entirety. However, the Committee has already felt the weight of Conservative votes, and no doubt the weight of those votes will again be used tonight.

I hope and pray that Conservative Members will begin to understand that if we are to call ourselves a civilised society, the least we can have is civilised laws. Internal exile is not civilised. It is a disgrace. New clause 2 is but a humble and poor attempt to try to rectify a great wrong.

Mr. Waddington

The debate began with some general remarks from the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr. Soley) about the exclusion powers. We shall shortly debate those exclusion powers. It is, however, important to consider what the hon. Gentleman said, because presumably that explains the birth of the new clause

He said that the legislation alienates the Irish in this country. I do not believe that it alienates the well-disposed, but I do not pretend that I am an expert in this matter. All I can say—I know that the hon. Gentleman resents this type of remark, but in this context I am perfectly entitled to make it—is that it has taken the Labour party a long time to discover that the legislation creates such great alienation and causes such great disadvantage that it counterbalances the advantage that he has conceded may well flow from exclusion clauses.

Ms. Clare Short

Throughout Committee, and twice in his speech today, the Minister has sneered at the Labour party for previously supporting the legislation and, in the light of experience, changing its mind. He has also said that the Conservative party reluctantly supports such draconian powers which endanger civil liberties and cells us that they will get rid of the Bill at the earliest opportunity. Does it not therefore follow that one day the Conservative party will change its mind and cease to support the Bill? If so, will the hon. and learned Gentleman refrain from making such a totally inconsistent argument?

Mr. Waddington

The difficulty about the hon. Lady's argument—and we must not waste time on it—is that the Labour party suddenly had a change of mind without any change in the circumstances. That has always puzzled many people.

Ms. Harman

Will the Minister accept that it is not a sudden change of mind? What was sudden was the passing of the prevention of terrorism laws, and since then we have been able to reflect on their effect. It is in the light of that experience that many people who agreed with the laws when they were first put on the statute book have genuinely changed their minds.

Mr. Waddington

That is a difficult argument to follow. The hon. Lady was saying that it took about eight years for the Labour party to come to the conclusion that what it had decided was necessary when it was in office was no longer necessary.

Let us not spend too much time on this matter. Although the hon. Member for Hammersmith concedes that lives might be saved by the exclusion arrangements in the Bill, he thinks that more lives might be lost because of the alienation of people as a result of the existence of these powers. He is entitled to hold that opinion, but it is an opinion that I, and I am sure my hon. Friends, do not hold.

Mr. Soley

The Minister keeps pursuing this matter, and as long as he does so I am afraid that we shall have to intervene to put him right. We know the figures that were given by Lord Jellicoe. Back in the 1970s, about 144 people were detained for more than 36 hours. Now the figure is down to about 10 or 12. However, the Minister could not tell us why. The same is true with exclusion orders. The figures produced by his own office demonstrate the need for change. The problem is that the Conservative Government do not learn from experience.

Mr. Waddington

If there were many uses of this power, the hon. Gentleman would argue that it proved how purposeless it was to have the powers because they were not proving of any use. Terrorism was going on, hundreds of exclusion orders were being made. He would say that, because it was having no impact, we should not renew the legislation. The hon. Gentleman cannot expect the House to pay much attention to that argument.

The main thrust of amendment No. 20 and new clause 2 is to introduce into the exclusion system a judicial appeal procedure by setting up a tribunal of three High Court judges to hear the cases of the Secretary of State and the excluded person. The hon. Member for Hammersmith, at the start of the debate, and to his credit, accepted that Lord Jellicoe strongly refuted the argument, which he is now advancing on behalf of the Labour party, that the final decision should not rest with the Secretary of State. The hon. Gentleman has already referred to the key passage in paragraph 190 of Lord Jellicoe's report: Exclusion is a matter of public policy. It is based not merely on the conduct of the excluded person, but also — once his terrorist involvement is established—on matters such as the security situation at the time exclusion is considered and the danger the person poses to the public at large. Neither the courts nor any form of tribunal could properly be expected to carry out an examination of all these issues and to reach a binding decision. It is noteworthy that Lord Gardiner's committee which in the mid-1970s examined, amongst other things, the procedures governing internment in Northern Ireland recommended that the final decision should rest not with any body or tribunal, but solely with the Secretary of State. In the next paragraph, Lord Jellicoe went on to deal with the argument that the review process should incorporate more safeguards and place greater emphasis on elements of due process". He concluded in paragraph 193 that the introduction of such procedures would lead not only to no improvement in the process of reviewing exclusion orders but would in practice constitute no more than a parody of due legal process and would thus contribute to a loss of public confidence in the legal system". The right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) echoed those words. We must decide whether we want to have the exclusion powers. There is no benefit whatever in trying to pretend that one can draft on to that executive power this window dressing of judicial process.

Lord Jellicoe accepted that exclusion decisions are not based on evidence of the kind dealt with in a court of law. This deals with the matter that was raised by the hon. Member for St. Helens, South (Mr. Bermingham). We went over the matter repeatedly in Committee. If such evidence were available, the exclusion system would not be needed. It is designed to place some control on people against whom prosecutions cannot be brought, even although it is known that they are involved in terrorism. Often there is no firm evidence of such involvement, only intelligence, which gives a picture of terrorist activity over a long period.

Mr. Bermingham

Does the Minister accept that he is saying, in effect, "If we think it and we cannot prove it, we will punish you by excluding you. However, if we think it and we can prove it, we will prosecute you." Is not that conviction by innuendo rather than conviction by evidence?

Mr. Waddington

The hon. Gentleman has never recognised that the only justification for these powers is the fact that sometimes it is impossible to produce evidence that would lead to a conviction in court and that sometimes, even although there is clear evidence that would lead to a conviction in court, such evidence cannot be disclosed, because it would lead to revealing the source of that evidence and his possible demise. The hon. Gentleman has had that said to him on many occasions. He may disagree with it, but he knows perfectly well that that is the justification for the legislation. He does not like the legislation. I happen to believe that what has happened in Northern Ireland makes it necessary, and that is the Government's view at present.

Ms. Harman

A moment ago, the Minister called our new clause "window dressing". If he were an innocent person — there is always the possibility of suspicion falling on such a person — on whom suspicion had fallen, would he rather have legal representation, a right to know the evidence, and a hearing by three High Court judges, or would he say, "Sorry, I am not interested. That is window dressing." In my opinion, that is an ultra-Leftist view.

Mr. Waddington

I do not know what view the imaginary person would take. I am saying that the three judges would not, by definition, be listening to evidence. If they were listening to evidence, we should not need this Bill. We are dealing with a situation in which Parliament has deemed it necessary over a period of years to take special powers that are invoked as a result not of the presentation of evidence but of the existence of intelligence.

I do not intend to go into the ways in which such intelligence is gathered. That is not necessary. However, I am sure that the House will understand that to make such information public, for example, by giving it to the excluded person, might destroy not only the chances of obtaining more information from the same source, but endanger the lives of those people who collect it. As intelligence gathering, both in Great Britain and Northern Ireland, has often enabled the police to pre-empt or frustrate planned terrorist attacks, I am sure that the House will agree that everything possible should be done to protect such activities. For those reasons, the suggestion that the person to be excluded should be told of the evidence against him is quite unacceptable.

Mr. Bermingham

Does the Minister accept that Lord Jellicoe says in his report that the basis of the evidence is normally from what is called secret service sources— that is to say, Army officers, special branch, and so on? Does the Minister accept that if the excluded person is told that the allegation against him is, for example, that on 13 March he was present at a meeting in Dungannon or somewhere else in Northern Ireland, and that that is the nature of the evidence, that will not endanger anyone? Will it not at least give the excluded person the right to reply, "I was not there. I was in fact elsewhere," and he can then produce evidence to support that. There is a way in which evidence can be given which does not disclose the source and does not endanger anyone else.

Will the Minister further accept that it is possible in major criminal trials in Britain to protect witnesses who are thought to be in danger? We are discussing a fundamental principle of human rights, which is the right to know the allegation that is made against the person.

6.30 pm

Mr. Waddington

I do not know what is meant by "evidence", as the word appears in the new clause. The hon. Gentleman is right to say that some limitations could be put on the meaning of the word. In spite of the plain wording of the clause, the Labour party might mean that the whole of the evidence should not be disclosed to the person concerned. I have not the faintest idea of the thinking that lies behind the clause. However, if the evidence in the true sense is to be revealed to the person concerned, it is almost inconceivable that there would not also be revealed to that person the identity of the person who had given the information to the police.

It seems that there is a misunderstanding of the existing schemes to provide legal aid. Legal advice and assistance is available under section 1 of the Legal Aid Act 1974. It operates on a sliding scale of remission of fees and provides for oral or written advice by a solicitor, and by counsel if necessary. It may not initially exceed work to the value of £40, but that ceiling may be raised in certain circumstances.

Legal aid is also available for civil and criminal proceedings before the courts and certain tribunals. It is intended to provide for legal representation in those proceedings where, because of complex rules of evidence and procedure and because an adversarial system is applied, it would be unreasonable to expect the litigant himself, or a lay representative, to present the case adequately. As for assistance with representation under clause 7, the necessary advice and assistance is already available, subject to means, for the likely circumstances.

It will be clear from what I have said that the Government's opposition to the establishment of a tribunal rests on a number of planks: the need for the power to exclude to remain with the Secretary of State, Lord Jellicoe's view that the judicial process is an inappropriate one for exclusion and the need to protect sources of information.

It will be no surprise, therefore, that we are resisting also the suggestion in subsection (4) of the new clause that the tribunal should have the power annually to review exclusion orders. The three-year life for exclusion orders, which was recommended by Lord Jellicoe and implemented in clause 3, is a relaxation of the provisions in the 1976 Act. It is designed to ensure that a person who is the subject of an order does not suffer unnecessary hardship, and that he has time to demonstrate by disengagement that he is no longer involved in terrorism. If, after three years, the police are not satisfied that the excluded person has terminated his involvement, they may make an application for a new order to the Secretary of State. I am satisfied that this is the right way to provide a safeguard for excluded persons against indefinite extension of their orders, especially in the light of the assurance that was given in Committee by my right hon. and learned Friend.

Subsection (5) of the new clause would prevent the Secretary of State from making a further order against an excluded person unless there was further substantial evidence over and above that on which the original order was based. I am not sure precisely what the Opposition mean by "substantial evidence". It appears that they are imposing a more stringent requirement on the Home Secretary than that in clauses 4,5 and 6, which require him only to be satisfied of an involvement in terrorism. I hope that they will find it helpful if I quote the statement that my right hon. and learned Friend made in Committee on 15 November 1983 on the subject of further orders: It is necessary that there should be a power to make a fresh order for the reasons that were given by my hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State. It would be absurd if fresh circumstances arose which satisfied the Secretary of State that some people had been involved in the commission of acts and terrorism. Therefore he must not be prevented from making an exclusion order merely because he made one previously on the basis of different evidence. However, if events during the three years in which an exclusion order is in force indicate that nothing fresh has occurred, that there is nothing to give rise to a fresh application—if all that is being relied on is material which led to the initial application—I envisage making a fresh exclusion order only in the rarest of circumstances. I would not simply rely on stale material that had been the basis of the original order. I am talking about a fresh order. Only rarely will previous material which is unsupplemented and uncorroborted by more contemporary material be regarded as sufficient for that purpose." — [Official Report, Standing Committee D; 15 November 1983, c. 143–44.]

Mr. Bermingham

I listened to that undertaking in Committee and I have listened to it today. The issue that has troubled me and many other hon. Members is that there is no way in which anyone can know upon what basis the original order was made. We never know the details of the allegations or anything else. Therefore, there is no yardstick by which we can subsequently test the new order that is being sought. I know that it is stated in the Jellicoe report that we should rely on parliamentary scrutiny and announcements to Parliament, but I am a practical man and I must ask the Minister how we are to know that there is adherence to the undertaking. There is no yardstick and there are no criteria on which we can judge in each individual case.

Mr. Waddington

If one accepts the necessity for the legislation, there can be no way in which the hon. Gentleman will always be able to discover the information which was given to the Secretary of State. It is likely that he will never be able to so discover. That is the inevitable result of operating a system which depends on information as well as evidence, as I said a short while ago.

Mr. Flannery

The Minister will probably remember that I said in Committee that under this procedure the accused is not tried but is found guilty and is then made the subject of an exclusion order. If the order is withdrawn, the same system is operated and he is not tried but is found guilty again. What sort of justice is that?

Mr. Waddington

I would not accept for one moment that an exclusion order has been wrongly made because there may thereafter be an acquittal of a specific criminal offence. It would be nonsense so to suggest, any more than it is right to suggest, although it has often been suggested from the Labour Benches, that because a criminal charge does not follow an exclusion order, the exclusion order should not have been made.

The hon. Gentleman was rather churlish when he said that the Bill was not changed in Committee. I am sure that he will agree that there have been considerable changes in the Bill compared with the 1976 Act, which was introduced by the then Labour Government. New safeguards have been inserted because we recognise that we are dealing with serious powers. I urge the hon. Gentleman to give credit where credit is due. The fact that there can be no use of an exclusion order after three years of residence instead of 20 years of residence is a new protection for the individual. The fact that an exclusion order lasts for only three years instead of indefinitely is a new protection for the individual. The wider provisions to make representations that are set out in clause 7 are new protections for the individual.

To revert to the passage that I read from the Home Secretary's speech in Committee, the Opposition may be seeking to embody his assurance in the Bill by framing this part of the new clause. However, I draw their attention to the fact that my right hon. and learned Friend reserved his position by referring to the rare circumstances in which he might wish to make an order without new data. The subsection would deny him that possibility, and bring into the public domain the question of what constitutes substantial evidence. Therefore, I ask the House to reject the amendment and the new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

The House divided: Ayes 112, Noes 250.

Division No.139]	[6.40 pm
AYES
Alton, David	Janner, Hon Greville
Archer, Rt Hon Peter	Jones, Barry (Alyn & Deeside)
Atkinson, N. (Tottenham)	Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald
Bagier, Gordon A. T.	Kilroy-Silk, Robert
Barron, Kevin	Kinnock, Rt Hon Neil
Beckett, Mrs Margaret	Leadbitter, Ted
Bennett, A. (Dent'n & Red'sh)	Leighton, Ronald
Bermingham, Gerald	Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
Blair, Anthony	Lewis, Terence (Worsley)
Boothroyd, Miss Betty	Litherland, Robert
Boyes, Roland	Lloyd, Tony (Stretford)
Brown, Gordon (D'f'mline E)	Lofthouse, Geoffrey
Buchan, Norman	Loyden, Edward
Callaghan, Jim (Heyw'd & M)	McCartney, Hugh
Campbell-Savours, Dale	McDonald, Dr Oonagh
Canavan, Dennis	McGuire, Michael
Clark, Dr David (S Shields)	McKay, Allen (Penistone)
Clay, Robert	McKelvey, William
Cohen, Harry	Mackenzie, Rt Hon Gregor
Cook, Frank (Stockton North)	McNamara, Kevin
Corbyn, Jeremy	McTaggart, Robert
Cowans, Harry	McWilliam, John
Craigen, J. M.	Madden, Max
Davies, Ronald (Caerphilly)	Marek, Dr John
Davis, Terry (B'ham, H'ge H'I)	Maxton, John
Dewar, Donald	Morris, Rt Hon A. (W'shawe)
Dormand, Jack	Nellist, David
Dubs, Alfred	O'Neill, Martin
Eadie, Alex	Orme, Rt Hon Stanley
Eastham, Ken	Park, George
Edwards, Bob (W'h'mpt'n SE)	Parry, Robert
Ellis, Raymond	Patchett, Terry
Evans, John (St. Helens N)	Pike, Peter
Ewing, Harry	Powell, Raymond (Ogmore)
Fatchett, Derek	Prescott, John
Faulds, Andrew	Redmond, M.
Fields, T. (L'pool Broad Gn)	Richardson, Ms Jo
Fisher, Mark	Roberts, Allan (Bootle)
Flannery, Martin	Rogers, Allan
Foot, Rt Hon Michael	Ross, Ernest (Dundee W)
Foster, Derek	Sedgemore, Brian
Garrett, W. E.	Short, Ms Clare (Ladywood)
George, Bruce	Short, Mrs R.(W'hampt'n NE)
Godman, Dr Norman	Silkin, Rt Hon J.
Harman, Ms Harriet	Skinner, Dennis
Harrison, Rt Hon Walter	Smith, C.(Islton S & F'bury)
Haynes, Frank	Soley, Clive
Heffer, Eric S.	Strang, Gavin
Hogg, N. (C'nauld & Kilsyth)	Thomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)
Holland, Stuart (Vauxhall)	Thomas, Dr R. (Carmarthen)
Home Robertson, John	Thorne, Stan (Preston)
Hughes, Mark (Durham)	Wardell, Gareth (Gower)
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)	Wareing, Robert
Hughes, Sean (Knowsley S)	Welsh, Michael
Hughes, Simon (Southwark)	Williams, Rt Hon A.

Wilson, Gordon	Tellers for the Ayes:
Winnick, David	Mr. James Hamilton and
	Mr. Don Dixon

NOES
Alexander, Richard	Heathcoat-Amory, David
Alison, Rt Hon Michael	Henderson, Barry
Arnold, Tom	Hickmet, Richard
Ashby, David	Hicks, Robert
Ashdown, Paddy	Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.
Atkins, Rt Hon Sir H.	Hill, James
Atkins, Robert (South Ribble)	Hind, Kenneth
Baldry, Anthony	Hirst, Michael
Batiste, Spencer	Hogg, Hon Douglas (Gr'th'm)
Beaumont-Dark, Anthony	Holland, Sir Philip (Gedling)
Beggs, Roy	Holt, Richard
Beith, A. J.	Hooson, Tom
Bellingham, Henry	Hordern, Peter
Biggs-Davison, Sir John	Howard, Michael
Body, Richard	Howarth, Alan (Stratf'd-on-A)
Boscawen, Hon Robert	Howarth, Gerald (Cannock)
Bottomley, Peter	Howell, Ralph (N Norfolk)
Brandon-Bravo, Martin	Howells, Geraint
Bright, Graham	Hubbard-Miles, Peter
Brittan, Rt Hon Leon	Hunt, David (Wirral)
Brooke, Hon Peter	Hunt, John (Ravensbourne)
Bruce, Malcolm	Hunter, Andrew
Burt, Alistair	Irving, Charles
Butcher, John	Jenkin, Rt Hon Patrick
Butterfill, John	Jessel, Toby
Carlile, Alexander (Montg'y)	Jones, Gwilym (Cardiff N)
Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)	Jones, Robert (W Herts)
Carlisle, Rt Hon M. (W'ton S)	Kennedy, Charles
Chapman, Sydney	Key, Robert
Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)	Kirkwood, Archibald
Clegg, Sir Walter	Knight, Gregory (Derby N)
Cockeram, Eric	Knight, Mrs Jill (Edgbaston)
Coombs, Simon	Knowles, Michael
Cope, John	Knox, David
Couchman, James	Lang, Ian
Cranborne, Viscount	Latham, Michael
Crouch, David	Lawler, Geoffrey
Currie, Mrs Edwina	Lee, John (Pendle)
Dicks, T.	Leigh, Edward (Gainsbor'gh)
Edwards, Rt Hon N. (P'broke)	Lester, Jim
Eggar, Tim	Lewis, Sir Kenneth (Stamf'd)
Favell, Anthony	Lightbown, David
Fenner, Mrs Peggy	Lilley, Peter
Finsberg, Sir Geoffrey	Lloyd, Ian (Havant)
Forsyth, Michael (Stirling)	Lloyd, Peter, (Fareham)
Forsythe, Clifford (S Antrim)	Luce, Richard
Fowler, Rt Hon Norman	Lyell, Nicholas
Fox, Marcus	McCrea, Rev William
Freeman, Roger	McCrindle, Robert
Gale, Roger	McCurley, Mrs Anna
Galley, Roy	McCusker, Harold
Garel-Jones, Tristan	Macfarlane, Neil
Glyn, Dr Alan	MacGregor, John
Goodhart, Sir Philip	MacKay, Andrew (Berkshire)
Goodlad, Alastair	Maclean, David John.
Gow, Ian	Maclennan, Robert
Greenway, Harry	Macmillan, Rt Hon M.
Gregory, Conal	McQuarrie, Albert
Griffiths, E. (B'y St Edm'ds)	Maginnis, Ken
Griffiths, Peter (Portsm'th N)	Malins, Humfrey
Ground, Patrick	Malone, Gerald
Grylls, Michael	Maples, John
Gummer, John Selwyn	Marlow, Antony
Hamilton, Hon A. (Epsom)	Mates, Michael
Hamilton, Neil (Tatton)	Mather, Carol
Hampson, Dr Keith	Maude, Francis
Hanley, Jeremy	Mawhinney, Dr Brian
Hannam, John	Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin
Hargreaves, Kenneth	Mayhew, Sir Patrick
Harvey, Robert	Meadowcroft, Michael
Haselhurst, Alan	Mellor, David
Hawkins, C. (High Peak)	Merchant, Piers
Hawksley, Warren	Meyer, Sir Anthony
Hayes, J.	Miller, Hal (B'grove)
Hayward, Robert	Mills, Iain (Meriden)

Mills, Sir Peter (West Devon)	Speller, Tony
Miscampbell, Norman	Spence, John
Mitchell, David (NW Hants)	Spencer, D.
Moate, Roger	Spicer, Jim (W Dorset)
Molyneaux, Rt Hon James	Stanbrook, Ivor
Montgomery, Fergus	Stanley, John
Morris, M. (N'hampton, S)	Steen, Anthony
Morrison, Hon C. (Devizes)	Stern, Michael
Moynihan, Hon C.	Stevens, Lewis (Nuneaton)
Murphy, Christopher	Stevens, Martin (Fulham)
Neale, Gerrard	Stewart, Allan (Eastwood)
Needham, Richard	Stewart, Andrew (Sherwood)
Nelson, Anthony	Stradling Thomas, J.
Newton, Tony	Sumberg, David
Nicholls, Patrick	Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)
Norris, Steven	Temple-Morris, Peter
Oppenheim, Philip	Terlezki, Stefan
Ottaway, Richard	Thomas, Rt Hon Peter
Owen, Rt Hon Dr David	Thompson, Donald (Calder V)
Page, Richard (Herts SW)	Thompson, Patrick (N'ich N)
Pawsey, James	Thorne, Neil (Ilford S)
Peacock, Mrs Elizabeth	Thornton, Malcolm
Pollock, Alexander	Thurnham, Peter
Powell, Rt Hon J. E. (S Down)	Tracey, Richard
Powell, William (Corby)	Trotter, Neville
Powley, John	Twinn, Dr Ian
Prentice, Rt Hon Reg	van Straubenzee, Sir W.
Proctor, K. Harvey	Viggers, Peter
Raffan, Keith	Waddington, David
Rathbone, Tim	Wainwright, R.
Rhodes James, Robert	Walden, George
Ridsdale, Sir Julian	Wallace, James
Robinson, Mark (N'port W)	Waller, Gary
Robinson, P. (Belfast E)	Wardle, C. (Bexhill)
Roe, Mrs Marion	Watson, John
Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)	Watts, John
Rossi, Sir Hugh	Wells, Bowen (Hertford)
Rowe, Andrew	Wheeler, John
Rumbold, Mrs Angela	Wiggin, Jerry
Ryder, Richard	Wilkinson, John
Sackville, Hon Thomas	Winterton, Mrs Ann
Sainsbury, Hon Timothy	Winterton, Nicholas
Sayeed, Jonathan	Wolfson, Mark
Shaw, Sir Michael (Scarb')	Wood, Timothy
Shelton, William (Streatham)	Woodcock, Michael
Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)	Wrigglesworth, Ian
Shepherd, Richard (Aldridge)	Yeo, Tim
Silvester, Fred	Young, Sir George (Acton)
Sims, Roger
Skeet, T. H. H.	Tellers for the Noes:
Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)	Mr. John Major and
Soames, Hon Nicholas	Mr. Michael Neubert.

Question accordingly negatived.