Non-verifiable Nuclear System (Hansard, 14 February 1984)

§ 1. Mr. D. E. Thomas
asked the Seretary of State for Defence what is the policy of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the United States Administration's planned deployment of a non-verifiable nuclear system; and if he will make a statement.

§ The Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. John Stanley)
Before answering question No. 1 it may be helpful to the House if I say that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State regrets that he has had to make a visit to Scandinavia this week to coincide with an important NATO exercise.
I am not aware of any planned United States deployment of a nuclear system that could not be made satisfactorily verifiable.

§ Mr. Thomas
Does the Minister agree that the only successful arms limitation negotiator of the United States, Ambassador Gerard Smith, has said that the proposed deployment of the sea-launched cruise missile system will pose a major threat to the possibility of verification? Does he not accept that, at a time when the Government are making great play of the need for opening a new dialogue with the Soviet Union, this deployment should immediately be halted by the United States?

§ Mr. Stanley
The problems of verification depend very much on what the owners of a particular system are prepared to do by way of inspection and disclosure. With regard to the deployment of the ship-launched cruise missile, I would make the point to the hon. Gentleman that it is certainly apparent that the Soviet Union is likely to have an operational capability for ground-launched, air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles in the relatively near future.

§ Mr. Boyes
Is the Minister aware that I have received a letter from him stating that the cruise missiles at Greenham common are under the command of an American colonel, Colonel Miller, named in the letter, and that the British forces are answerable to that colonel? Is it not ridiculous that British forces are answerable to a United States colonel, and does it not show that the Americans have complete control of the ground-launched cruise missiles at Greenham common?

§ Mr. Stanley
If the hon. Gentleman chose to quote the full text of the letter that I sent him, he would observe that the arrangements to which he has referred are jointly agreed between the two Governments, but I am delighted that he managed to make a visit to Greenham common, and I am only sorry that he was not there for the full briefing, which might have helped him even more.

§ Mr. Denzil Davies
To revert to the original question, is it not a fact that the United States is embarking upon a massive deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles? Is not one of the problems with cruise missiles that it is not possible to tell whether they carry nuclear warheads or non-nuclear warheads, and that that is where the verification problem arises?

§ Mr. Stanley
The point that the right hon. Gentleman makes applies to any dual capable system, of which a great many have been deployed for a long time. As to the United States deployment of cruise missiles, they are all of nuclear capability.

§ Mr. Boyes
On a point of order, Mr. Speaker.

§ Mr. Speaker
I shall take points of order afterwards.