Disarmament (Hansard, 12 December 1984)

§ 8. Mr. Malone
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what is the Government's response to the United States-Soviet talks on disarmament, planned to take place in Geneva in January 1985.

§ Mr. Luce
We have consistently supported the United States in its willingness to negotiate, without preconditions, balanced and verifiable agreements on limiting nuclear weapons. We therefore welcomed the announcement that Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko are to meet in January. We firmly hope that this will lead to agreement on how to carry forward the process of negotiating arms control agreements covering both nuclear and outer space questions.

§ Mr. Malone
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that reply. Does he agree that the recent Soviet offer secured by the Leader of the Opposition not to target nuclear weapons on this country and to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear weapons is anything but helpful? Does it not simply amount to a unilateral renunciation of our nuclear weapons? Does not the other matter, which was conceded off-the-cuff by the Leader of the Opposition when in the Soviet Union, that we can simply replace all our missiles with cardboard ones, say all that needs to be said about the Opposition's policy on this issue?

§ Mr. Luce
In so far as it is possible to understand the offer made to the Leader of the Opposition by the Soviet Union, it would seem that in return for us renouncing our independent strategic deterrent and getting rid of all nuclear weapons in this country the Russians would make proportionate reductions in their country—which, given the size of their strategic force, would represent a tiny, minimal reduction—and would point their weapons in a different direction. If the Leader of the Opposition thinks that that would enhance the security of this country, he had better think again.

§ Mr. Johnston
Are the Government prepared to involve the British independent nuclear deterrent in such disarmament negotiations?

§ Mr. Luce
The first thing, obviously, as the hon. Gentleman knows is that there is to be a preparatory meeting between Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko in early January with a view, we understand, to discussing the parameters within which they will review the whole question of nuclear reductions and arms activities in outer space. That is the purpose of that meeting. Therefore, we have to hope that it will lead to a discussion between the Soviet Union and the United States which will, in due course, lead to a reduction in nuclear weapons.
My right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary has frequently made it absolutely clear, as far as Britain's independent strategic force is concerned, that if there is clear evidence that both of those countries agree to substantial reductions in nuclear weapons, and there is no increase in the defence capability of the Soviet Union, we shall consider the situation with regard to the British deterrent force.

§ Sir Peter Blaker
Will my hon. Friend be even more specific about the relationship between our nuclear deterrent force and the size of the Soviet strategic arsenal? Is it not true that our nuclear force represents less than 3 per cent. of the strategic arsenal of the Soviet Union? 1044 Therefore, is not the proposal discussed between the Leader of the Opposition, the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) and Mr. Chernenko that we should throw away the whole of our nuclear arsenal in return for a reduction to 97 per cent. in the Soviet Union arsenal both ridiculous and positively dangerous?

§ Mr. Luce
My right hon. Friend, who has had responsibility for these matters, is absolutely right. The British deterrent force constitutes only 3 per cent. of the total nuclear force of the Soviet Union. It must be seen in perspective. In the forseeable future there is a need to maintain our security in Britain by the retention of an independent nuclear deterrent. As I have said, if there is real progress and substantial reductions, we can review the position again.

§ Mr. Healey
Either the Minister was badly briefed or he did not read his brief. Is it not true that the United States Government and the Soviet Union Government will discuss in January not only the abolition of weapons in space but a substantial reduction in offensive missiles, whether based in Europe or elsewhere? Does that not put the British nuclear force, like the French nuclear force, in the middle of the argument?
Does the Minister agree that as the Conservative Government in the early 1970s agreed that British weapons should be counted in SALT I, for the Prime Minister now to oppose the counting of British weapons in the forthcoming negotiations will present a severe obstacle to their conclusion? Does the hon. Gentleman not feel a little embarrassed because President Reagan and the Opposition are talking to the Russians about arms control while the Government absolutely refuse to engage in discussions?

§ Mr. Luce
As is often the case, the right hon. Gentleman is talking absolute nonsense. The position is clear. If Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Shultz, as a result of their preparatory meeting, get together to discuss all nuclear weapons reductions as well as those in outer space—which is absolutely right—that will involve discussions about the Soviet and the United States missile systems. The right hon. Gentleman is not showing a sense of perspective. If there is substantial progress on nuclear weapons, which we all hope there will be, and there is an agreement for substantial reductions, that will be the right moment for us to review the position on Britain's deterrent force.