HC Deb 27 April 1984 vol 58 cc1070-6

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Garel-Jones.]

2.48 pm
Mr. Malcolm Bruce (Gordon)

Even since I applied for this debate, a series of serious near misses between civilian helicopters and military aircraft have been reported. One occurred on 17 April when an S61 leaving the Beatrice platform in the Moray Firth was overtaken by two military Jaguars that came within 60 yards of the southbound helicopter.

The Minister's Department has already confirmed that there were five other misses reported in the first quarter of this year over north-east Scotland. I wish to draw out one of these which is a particularly graphic example that happened on 14 March. A Bristow Tiger helicopter was flying out from Aberdeen and cruising over the coast with a full load of passengers bound for a North sea platform when suddenly, and without any warning, a military jet swooped in from over the North sea and passed directly under the helicopter at only 100 ft distance when the helicopter was at 2,000 ft The passengers saw it and the pilot, who was very experienced and who had been many years flying the North sea, was understandably extremely shocked and shaken by the incident.

On checking with civil air traffic control, he was advised that there were no aircraft reported in his vicinity. When he reported what had just happened to him, he was told that the jet involved was last reported at high altitude. That implied either that the military pilot had undertaken his low-level approach without notifying the military controller or that the military' controller had not notified the civil controller. Either way, it was a most disturbing occurrence.

I have been advised today of two other incidents involving military aircraft en route to the Rosehearty bombing range. On 9 April, a near miss was reported by a Sprite helicopter involving an F111 jet at 2,000 ft. On 18 April there was an incident involving a fixed-wing aircraft flying from Wick to Aberdeen when an F111 climbed through its own cruising altitude at 5,000 ft. The pilot of the civil aircraft did not see the military plane and could not, therefore, report it as a near miss, but an incident report has been filed.

As I have prepared for this debate, I have found that official figures on near misses are difficult to come by, as the Civil Aviation Authority is reluctant to release them and the Ministry of Defence apparently refuses to discuss the matter fully with anyone involved. It is clear from the information that I have gleaned and from official reports that have been secured that there are significantly more incidents than those formally reported. I suggest that there could be as many as three or four a month, which is alarmingly high.

Since being awarded this debate, I have received reports of similar incidents occurring with helicopters flying out of Humberside en route to the southern gas fields. It would appear that the main reasons for this high level of military activity in the helicopter lanes are the two test bombing ranges at Rosehearty on the Moray coast north of Aberdeen and at Donna Nook on the Humber estuary. The location of these sites is historical—they have been there for some time—and predates the rapid development of helicopter traffic in recent years.

These and other incidents have been referred to the joint air miss working group, which includes military and civil representatives. The military authorities argue that they need to train in an area where they might be expected to operate in wartime conditions and that they can handle flying through areas of relatively dense traffic.

The civil operators and pilots have accepted that and have co-operated, but misses by only feet and split seconds cannot be tolerated. Although in the case of the Rosehearty bombing range the majority of military approaches come from the west, which is away from the main area of helicopter traffic, problems particularly arise when jets turn from over the North sea and make a second run at right angles cutting directly across the helicopter routes to the rigs.

During military exercises an RAF liaison officer is with civil air traffic control, but it is surprising that he does not have direct communication with military jets. He has only a sheaf of paper showing planned movements, so that when an incident develops and can be seen on the radar screen to be developing he is helpless to do anything but watch. Further concern has been expressed about the persistent penetration of controlled air space immediately around Aberdeen airport—not not even in the more open areas further away—and this adds further to air traffic control's difficulties.

The operators of helicopters in the North sea are anxious to stress that they have, and accept, prime responsibility for the safety of their passengers. They operate in an increasingly busy, tightly controlled air space. Their worry, which is the reason why this debate has been brought forward, was highlighted in the current issue of Flight International in a letter from my constituent, Mr. David Warren, who wrote: It seems beyond belief that, into this busy and closely controlled environment, the Ministry of Defence insists on injecting a Russian Roulette factor by consistently requiring its fast jets, bombers, transports and long-range maritime-patrol aircraft to operate freely, and seemingly with scant regard for the presence of other traffic, specifically oil support helicopters. There are an average of 150 helicopter movements a day from Aberdeen airport. They are bunched at certain times of the day. The helicopter is the North sea taxi and the normal vehicle for travel to work for thousands of offshore workers. Aberdeen airport handles more than 600,000 helicopter passengers per year. In the year ended 31 March, there were approximately 55,600 movements, including training flights, 45,300 of which were air transport movements. A total of 658,200 passengers were carried. That is a significant number of flights and passengers.

On 22 July 1983, I raised the matter of helicopters in an Adjournment debate. Tragically, that debate followed crashes—an accident at Aberdeen airport, which was miraculously without loss of life, and the sad loss of the British Airways helicopter which crashed in the sea off the Scillies killing 20 people. This time, I am raising the issue to avert what many people fear will occur if action is not taken now. This matter is being raised precisely because helicopter operators and pilots are so worried about this problem and see a need for action.

What should be done? The bombing ranges at Rosehearty and Donna Nook predate the growth of North sea helicopter traffic. Unless there are overwhelming defence and security reasons—it is hard to see that there are—test bombing ranges should be relocated in an area that does not involve such a dangerous and frequent mix of high-speed low-flying jets and low-speed low-flying passenger helicopters. The military's training requirements will not be accepted as a valid explanation or excuse if a catastrophe occurs.

Most of the civilian helicopter pilots are ex-service men. They understand the military requirements and have sought to co-operate. They are not satisfied with a position that allows such dangerous incidents to occur with, to date, no adequate response to by the Ministry of Defence to deal with the problem. The Ministry must sit down openly and discuss with the civil operators how best to separate civil and military traffic. As long as military aircraft operate at a low level, direct communication with civil air traffic control must be available, so that any developing or potential incident is averted.

There have even been suggestions that helicopter flying should be curtailed during military exercises. As I am sure the House recognises, that could lead to significant delays, inconvenience and even destruction of North sea operations, which we wish to avoid.

In the longer term, we should be prepared to consider whether regulations should allow helicopters to operate in icy conditions — something on which the Norwegians already insist. Although that presents difficulties in the short term, the benefit would be to allow helicopters to climb more quickly above the low level where military jets operate on bombing runs.

I have made much mention of the Ministry of Defence. It is unfortunate—I hope that my fears will prove to be unfounded—that the reply to the debate will come from a Transport Minister when the problem arises almost entirely from military operations. It seems to many, not just me, that the Ministry of Defence is hiding behind the Transport Ministry and is refusing to disclose information or take any initiative to allay fears. I hope that the Minister has noticed written question No. 158 on today's Order Paper, which seeks information from the Ministry of Defence on whether the Ministry is reporting near misses of the type I have described. In some cases, it appears that military pilots have been unaware of their close proximity to helicopters. In other cases, they have felt that there was no problem, as Mr. John Dent, the chairman of the Civil Aviation Authority suggested in a letter to me.

It is regrettable that many have the overall impression that the Ministry of Defence is at best evasive and hiding behind its security cloak and at worst apparently complacent, as it is not prepared to discuss the issue in the light of sustained concern that has been expressed by many experienced and professional operators. I can only hope that the Minister has had more success in getting information and assurances from the MOD than others who have sought it. I hope, too, that the Minister will recognise that many will be seeking a sign of positive action to prevent collision. I suggest to him, in advance of his reply, that assurances will not be acceptable and will not be accepted. There is a problem and there are solutions to it. I hope that I have spelt out clearly and graphically what the risks are, and I do not believe that military exercises can be justified in peace time if innocent lives are needlessly put at risk.

One pilot told me today that the issue cannot be sensationalised. He explained that it is a shocking sensation when a military jet roars past only feet away from one's helicopter. If the Minister takes action now he will help to ensure what I hope can be ensured, which is that I never have to rise in this place to question him on how a fatal mid-air collison occurred.

3 pm

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Mr. David Mitchell)

It is natural that the hon. Member for Gordon (Mr. Bruce) should be worried by reports of air misses. However, as I shall show, I do not think that the issue is as serious as the phrase "air miss" makes it sound. My hon. Friend the Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. McQuarrie) has raised the matter with me in correspondence and in parliamentary questions, so I am aware of the extent of unease to which the hon. Member for Gordon has given voice.

It might be helpful if I set out the background. Within the United Kingdom's air space there are areas of quite intensive aerial activity, and the characteristics of flying operations taking place at any one time can be a mix of slow moving light aircraft and helicopters, often unpredictable in their intentions, and the usually predictable public transport aircraft and high performance military aircraft of the Royal Air Force and the air forces of our NATO allies. In some areas there are to be found gliders and microlight aircraft. Each aeroplane or glider has a legitimate right to be in the air. It is the Government's responsibility to provide rules and regulations and an air space management system so that diverse activities can take place with the minimum restriction, consistent with maintaining a high level of safety. In the context of this Adjournment debate, that means activities that are free from the risk of collision.

In practice, the management system is implemented by the national air traffic services, which are provided jointly by the Civil Aviation Authority and the Ministry of Defence. The air space above the United Kingdom and its surrounding waters is divided into two types. First, there is controlled air space. This has been established around the principal airports, which links them to one another and continues seaward to join similar airways, which are usually corridors of 10 miles in width, which have been established by neighbouring countries in Europe. Virtually all of this air space is covered by radar, and air traffic controllers give instructions to pilots to achieve an orderly flow of traffic and a safe separation between their aircraft. Aircraft may be assigned different levels at which to fly, and those flying at the same level will be monitored by radar to ensure that they are at least five nautical miles apart. Almost all public transport operations into and out of the United Kingdom operate wholly or for the most part in air space that is controlled in this way.

In the remaining United Kingdom air space, responsibility for avoiding collision rests positively on the pilots. It is often referred to as the areas in which the "see-and-be-seen" rule applies. Pilots are required to conform to the rules of the air. The rules are similar in content and purpose to the highway code. For example, a pilot must give way to an aircraft approaching from his right and he must overtake the preceding aircraft on its right. In some of this air space pilots are able to call for information on the position of other air traffic from one of the many radar units of the national air traffic services. Such advice does not transfer responsibility from the pilot to the controller. Collison avoidance remains the responsibility of the pilots.

Some years ago the NATS introduced the system of air miss reports which has given rise to today's debate. Civil and military pilots are required to file an air miss report whenever, in their opinion, their aircraft may have been endangered during flight by another aircraft because a risk of collision existed. All air miss reports are considered by the joint air miss working group, which is composed of experienced military and civil air space users, and includes representatives of the British Airline Pilots Association and the Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators.

Investigation is detailed and evidence is taken. It has always been the practice for the anonymity of those involved to be maintained and for evidence and reports to remain confidential. Individuals are encouraged by such an assurance to give full and frank descriptions of the circumstances which led to the air miss report so that maximum safety benefits may follow.

Summaries of the findings of the working group are widely distributed to the air space industry and representative aviation organisations. In these, the reports of air misses are categorised as A, B and C. Category A covers those incidents where the working party concluded that there was a risk of collision; B, those with a possible risk; and C, where the assessment was that there was no risk of collision. About 200 reports are filed each year, of which about 8 per cent. only are category A. About 40 per cent. showed a possible risk of collision and over half the reports, on investigation, showed there to be no risk. The House should note that, because it helps to put what otherwise might seem alarming circumstances somewhat more in context.

It must be remembered that there are 2 million or more aircraft movements within United Kingdom air space every year. Slightly fewer than half the air miss reports involve military and civil aircraft, but a high proportion involve light, private air club aircraft, and only about 10 per cent. of air miss reports involve military and civil public transport aircraft. It must be remembered that more than one pilot may file a report of the same incident.

The hon. Member for Gordon and my hon. Friend the Member for Banff and Buchan have expressed anxiety about three air miss reports in March involving civil helicopters and military aircraft in the area offshore east and north-east of Aberdeen. There have been six reports from that area this year so far. That figure is significantly lower than the 13 over the same period in 1983 or the 17 in 1982. Those six are all under investigation by the joint working group, and I have asked to be informed of the outcome of its considerations.

The area of the North sea extending to the east Shetland basin is one in which there are real problems of air space management. It is in the national interest that helicopter support flights to the offshore oil and gas installations and low-flying, high-performance military aircraft can operate in the same area. Close inshore and around Aberdeen, controlled air space has been established which provides a full air traffic control service applying the accepted civil separation standards to all aircraft arriving at or departing from Aberdeen airport. However, further offshore civil helicopters and military aircraft operate together at times in uncontrolled air space where responsibility for avoiding collision has to be primarily for the pilot. It is in that air space that the six incidents leading to the air miss reports occurred this year.

While procedures have been developed over the years in the North sea support operation which enable NATS to provide increasingly detailed guidance and information on traffic and other matters essential to safety and operation, they do not substitute for the full air traffic control service which is available elsewhere to virtually all public transport operations.

The situation is well known to both civil and military pilots and is kept constantly under review by the Civil Aviation Authority. All measures which can help to improve safety are given the most careful consideration. Indeed, earlier this month a new system of helicopter tracks to be flown to, from and between offshore installations was introduced, which should add to the safety of the operations.

It is not practicable to introduce in these areas full controlled air space of the kind that I have described as applying in some other parts of the United Kingdom. The helicopters need to fly closely spaced tracks at low level while military pilots are undertaking training needs with great operational flexibility. Radar cover cannot be provided at those low levels for long distances out to sea. As the hon. Gentleman may know, there is a rising plane on the bottom of a radar cover, and when one gets a certain distance away from the radar it has risen sufficiently high that it cannot possibly operate on the very low levels involved, so the techniques used in controlled air space are unsuitable for these operations.

Mr. Bruce

Does the Minister recognise that, in the light of that information, it is necessary to have direct communication between the military aircraft and the civil aircraft controller?

Mr. Mitchell

I am assured by the controller of the national air traffic services that the procedures in use represent the best way in which the two conflicting activities, which are essential to the national interest, can be accommodated in this air space. The characteristics of this operating environment are brought clearly to the attention of pilots operating in the area, and I intend to maintain a close personal interest in the safety levels which are maintained there.

Some of the matters raised by the hon. Gentleman have a bearing on military training requirements. They are, of course, matters for Ministry of Defence Ministers rather than for the Department of Transport. What I have sought to do in responding to the debate is to make clear to the hon. Gentleman and to the House that the description of an air miss, implying a risk to the lives of those involved, gives a somewhat misleading impression. As I have said, over half of those investigated last year did not involve any risk, and those that were examined in detail and involved an element of risk were only 8 per cent. of the filed reports.

The hon. Gentleman will also notice that, in the area to which he referred, the number of air misses notified has declined in each of the past three years. I hope that the decline will continue. I can give the hon. Gentleman further assurance that, in the light of the points that he has raised during the debate, I shall look more closely at them, and particularly at the reports on the six cases which have occurred in the area.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at thirteen minutes past Three o' clock.