HC Deb 31 March 1983 vol 40 cc500-7

1 pm

Mr. Ian Lloyd (Havant and Waterloo)

I notice from the attendance in the House that this will perhaps be a quadrilogue, but I assume that quality will compensate for quantity.

There are five reasons why I have sought to raise these issues and I shall try to put them in what I believe to be their order of importance. First and foremost, if we look at the factors on which the future of the West will depend, we see that there is the current issue of the nuclear balance, because if that is lost, who knows what is lost. Next, there is the cohesion of Western Europe. In my humble opinion, if that cohesion is not maintained our enemies and opponents will once again achieve their objectives, without the need to do very much else.

Southern Africa and the relationship of the West with it I place third in this order of priority. This must be put ahead of the middle east, and I have considered that judgment carefully, because whereas the dependence of the West on oil, though great, will diminish, the dependence of the Western world on the minerals of southern Africa is great and will increase.

Unfortunately, for many reasons, which we understand, this third issue is seldom discussed, but if we lose southern Africa we shall lose the game. The Under-Secretary of State in the United States with responsibility for Africa said in a recent speech that southern Africa was a crucial area for determining the rules of international conduct in the decade ahead. I believe that to be absolutely true.

If we want endorsement from the other side, we need only turn to the late Mr. Brezhnev, who said in Prague not many years ago: Our intention is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the West depends—the energy of the Persian Gulf and the minerals of central and southern Africa. The second reason for raising this matter is the publication of the United States Senate report—a remarkable document—on the role of the Soviet Union, Cuba and East Germany in fomenting terrorism in southern Africa. I have had the volumes of evidence for some time, but I received the final report from the United States embassy literally this morning.

I share wholly the conclusion of the chairman of that report that this evidence is at once shocking and familiar"— familiar to those who have experience of the attempts of Moscow and its agents to infiltrate and manipulate the so-called national liberation movements in south-east Asia, Latin America and Africa, and shocking to all who prize liberty, democratic values and human rights. The evidence is overwhelming and powerful, and anyone who chooses to comment on this part of the world or these problems should not do so before he has read, quoted and understood what has been said.

I put merely one major conclusion of the report before the House: The evidence received by the subcommittee is deeply disturbing. It suggests strongly that the original purposes of the ANC and SWAPO have been subverted, and that the Soviets and their allies have achieved alarmingly effective control over them. The demonstrated activities of these organisations, moreover, cannot easily be reconciled with the goal of liberation or the promotion of freedom. The evidence has thus served to illustrate once again the Soviet Union's support for terrorism under the guise of aiding struggles for national liberation. It is past time to bring these facts to the attention of our policymakers, the American people, and the world at large. I share that judgment and shall do my best to bring it to the attention of the British people.

My third reason for raising this issue is the publication of the Labour party's policy proposals on southern Africa. I have read them carefully, and they are unconvincing, prejudiced, unrealistic, dangerous and damaging to the United Kingdom. Indeed, had Mr. Andropov himself been asked to draft a document that was likely to achieve the purposes of his country in southern Africa, he could not have done better.

My fourth reason for raising this subject is the Gleneagles agreement. This issue arouses great controversy in the House, and unfortunately it has not been debated at length. It raises issues that are fundamental to the future of the Commonwealth and which, in my humble judgment, should be discussed at greater length than is possible today. The Commonwealth was, like the League of Nations before it, the brainchild—which is quickly and easily forgotten today—of General Smuts. I should like to think that had he been standing where I am today and in a position to make comments, they would have been devastating on the impact and philosophy of the Gleneagles agreement in relation to the whole philosophy and purpose of the Commonwealth.

My fifth and final reason is personal. I recently had an opportunity to visit South Africa again after many years. My visit demonstrated to me the extent of the gulf between the perception of reality and the reality in that part of the world. Unfortunately, time does not permit me to give specific and interesting examples. However, I have sent many of them to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and as a result we have had some very interesting correspondence.

I am encouraged by several of the Foreign Secretary's conclusions. In his letter to me of 19 January 1983 he wrote: The Government's policy towards South Africa is based on its perception of our very real interest in encouraging peaceful change there, both for its own sake and to safeguard our and wider western interests. I wholly endorse that.

The policy is also derived from I believe a full and proper appreciation of the complexities of South African society and of the political and economic currents now flowing through it. That, too, is excellent. However, whether it is full enough may be another question. Later, he wrote: But I must note that the current process of constitutional reform does not at present offer a role for the largest population group in South Africa. Following an exchange on that subject, the Foreign Secretary wrote a subsequent letter, which concluded as follows: I cannot help reflecting that the many millions of black people in South Africa have not been asked for their views on how they would like to be governed nor been given any significant role in determining the decisions arrived at by the South African Government. That is the nub of the issue. It is certainly a nub of a very important issue, but of course there are many other nubs. When I read that, one of my immediate thoughts was that Great Britain, the home of democracy, took approximately one century to move from the democracy of early Victorian England—extremely limited as it was—to the universal suffrage of today. In addition, we did not have to deal with any issue of race or with any of the other great complications that apply to South Africa.

I come to some of the major policy considerations to which I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will address himself. The United States Senate report produces disturbing evidence of the Soviet domination of national liberation movements in southern Africa. Evidence was presented to the United States Senate on the pre-positioning of heavy weapons by the Soviets and their allies in southern Africa. The following figures were given: 191 Migs, 663 heavy tanks, 734 armoured cars, 878 armoured personnel carriers and 932 pieces of medium artillery. We know that when the operation known as Protea was launched and successfully carried out, about 4,000 tonnes of arms were captured, including 34 T34 tanks and Sam 7 missiles.

We know from evidence given by Mr. Chester Crocker that SWAPO has received 90 per cent. of its military support and 60 per cent. of its overall support from the Communist world. The House should recognise and take note of that.

With regard to diplomatic support, the report reaches a most significant conclusion. It is that the Soviet outposts in southern Africa in the 1980s and the African bureaucracies in Moscow are now manned by experienced specialists of a calibre that did not even exist during Russia's first major foray into Africa 20 years ago. I should like to know whether the Minister thinks that we should take the most serious note of that conclusion.

The United Nations' aid to guerrilla movements, as we know, is not authorised by the United Nations charter. Yet, according to evidence presented to the Senate Committee, $9 million has been allocated by the United Nations to the African National Congress and the Pan-African Congress, and since 1975 $110 million of United Nations funds has been allocated to national liberation movements. It is interesting that it is never allocated to pro-Western national liberation movements.

Between 1977 and 1981, $40 million of United Nations money was allocated direct to SWAPO, and the evidence is contained in the report to which I have referred. UNIDO and UNCTAD—United Nations organisations, one would have thought, with no need in any sense whatever to demonstrate support in this way—have put forward funding proposals for $17 million to SWAPO and other national liberation movements.

The United Nations has granted SWAPO permanent observer status. It has granted SWAPO the right to use the United Nations propaganda machine. Worst of all, it has conferred on SWAPO and others international political legitimacy which I doubt very much whether any of those organisations deserve.

Within the last 18 months the United States Congress has cut off $900,000 from its funding of the United Nations Vote. It has also called for a full investigation of the allocation of United Nations funds to organisations such as I have mentioned. I have no evidence that we necessarily support that line of action or that, having discovered what is taking place, we intend to withdraw our funds. I ask the Minister whether we intend to fund further support to the United Nations for the use of terrorist movements and, if so, why.

With regard to the supply of arms to the so-called frontline states, those are mostly bankrupt, mostly Marxist, mostly anti-Western, and anti-capitalist. Why are we supplying them? Who is paying, since they are bankrupt? Have we assessed the probable direction of the use of the major weapon systems that they are seeking to acquire? Finally, have we almost gone out of our minds?

With regard to the Gleneagles agreement, why do we not recognise progress in South Africa? What standing have South Africa's principal critics? I have the benefit of the Freedom House analysis of the so-called front-line states. They are rated on a scale from 1 to 7, 1 being a perfectly free society, such as the United States, Norway or the United Kingdom, and 7 being countries such as Cambodia or the USSR. None of the front-line states scores 1, one of them scores 2, and three of them score less than Cambodia or the USSR. By what right do countries with such records come to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference and lay down criteria by which sporting relations with South Africa should be judged?

With regard to destabilisation, who is destabilising whom in South Africa? Which power, in obvious terms of political advantage, has the greater interest in the destabilisation of southern Africa—South Africa or the Soviet Union? Common sense alone does not dictate the answer. Do the Government believe that the Soviet's thrust in southern Africa, which is so serious, and which is documented dramatically in the report, would be abandoned if South Africa, tomorrow, were to introduce a system that satisfied all Western democratic criteria? If the Government believe that, they will believe anything. Has the West time to organise the defence of this vital part of the Western world? Will we start now to counter the massive propaganda campaign documented so fully in this report, which has caused such damage, not just to our interests, but to our judgment?

Will we put Gleneagles on the table at the earliest opportunity so that it can be discussed, and will we discuss it in the House? Will we encourage success as well as criticise failure in South Africa? I do not ask for any condonation of failure. Where there is failure, that is it. It is not redeemed by pointing to failures elsewhere. That South Africa is the only country whose political balance sheet is never given a credit column is something that should offend every sense of equity in a democratic society. Here, surely, is the classic illustration of the parable of the mote and the beam.

I shall conclude by quoting from evidence given a few months ago by a defected Mozambique Mig pilot who trained in the Soviet Union, flew in Mozambique and finally had enough. He said to the United States Senate Committee, and it is the appeal upon which I should like to end: Therefore, I appeal to those who have a say and an active role in international affairs, particularly those pertaining to the free world, to take a more realistic look at Africa and not to place Africans in general in specific categories without being fully aware of what is in fact taking place on our continent. Foreign forces totally alien to us are taking over our states and reducing us to a miserable state. So miserable is the situation in black Africa that developed countries should shudder at this sight. I believe that that is the fairest comment that anyone can make of the position north of the Limpopo. These issues are of such fundamental importance that it is a great pity that we discuss them so seldom and that when we do we have such limited opportunities for dialogue across the Floor.

1.17 pm
The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Cranley Onslow)

I welcome this opportunity to discuss the important subject of British policy towards southern Africa. I echo the closing remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Havant and Waterloo (Mr. Lloyd). It is neither his nor my fault that there are so few of us here today or that we have so little lime for debate. I am grateful for the first chance that I have had since taking on my present responsibility nearly a year ago to talk to the House on this important subject. I shall respond, as far as I can, to the speech that my hon. Friend has made in as constructive a way as he opened the argument.

Southern Africa is a region with which we as a country have deep-rooted historical connections. Our links go back a long way and remain close and strong through settlement, trade, investment, aid and many varied personal and individual bonds. I welcome the fact that many countries in the region are members of the Commonwealth, and we should not undervalue their contribution.

I cannot debate now whether my hon. Friend is right in his assessment that the region is more important than the middle east. Certainly it is an important part of the world and we have contributions to make there. We properly took on, and successfully discharged, the responsibility for bringing Zimbabwe to independence, and it is right that we should be closely involved in the search for a settlement in Namibia. Many countries in the region look first to us for help and advice and many people in this country and elsewhere regard us as having a special role to play in southern Africa.

I assure my hon. Friend that I share his anxiety about the reports that he quoted of Soviet or Soviet bloc involvement in, if not domination of, independence movements in Africa and elsewhere. I am not sure that that is a new situation. I remember a pamphlet produced by, I think, the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies nearly 30 years ago entitled "Defence and the Cold War", which defined Soviet objectives as being all mischiefs short of war. There is scope for the Soviets to make mischief in southern Africa, and it is in the nature of things that they should seek to take advantage of the situation.

That makes it all the more important that our policies and responses should be right and related to the prevailing circumstances. With respect to my hon. Friend, I am not sure that he covered all the considerations.

Southern Africa is an important part of the world in which we have substantial interests. The commercial figures speak for themselves. South Africa is our twelfth largest export market and took nearly £1,200 million of our exports in 1981. About 7 per cent. of our overseas investment is in South Africa. Of course, trade is not the only consideration; there are strategic considerations. The importance of the Cape route is well known, as is the importance of the mineral resources in southern Africa to which my hon. Friend referred. There are also family ties.

However, we cannot consider those aspects in isolation and ignore the realities of international politics. There is no getting away from the fact that South Africa's racial policies are a continuing barrier to a closer relationship. We know how complex they are, but the House knows the Government's view on apartheid. It was expressed by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in July 1979: The policy of apartheid, with its emphasis on separating peoples rather than bringing them together, and all the harshness required to impose it on the South African population is wholly unacceptable."—[Official Report, 25 July 1979; Vol. 971, c. 629.] I wonder whether my hon. Friend gave all the weight that he would have liked to give to that factor. We cannot escape it. Apartheid is deeply morally repugnant to many people in this country and throughout the world. We must accept that fact and I do not take a different view about its moral repugnance.

Mr. Ian Lloyd

Does my hon. Friend agree that in the past two or three years there has been a considerable, contrived and perhaps tortuous attempt to retreat from apartheid? I believe that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary of South Africa have condemned apartheid and, although condemnation is not the same as abolishing the system, should not we encourage the process of retreat from a doctrine which I also wholly deplore?

Mr. Onslow

We should certainly do that. It is one of the objectives of our policy, and I shall deal later with how we should assess the development of the internal politics of South Africa. I am glad to have my hon. Friend's agreement to the proposition that we must balance the factors.

We must also take account of the future. Only last week President Kaunda of Zambia forecast an explosion of violence in South Africa within the next four years that, he claimed, would make the French revolution seem like a children's Sunday morning picnic. We have to prove President Kaunda wrong. I am sure that he has no wish to see it happen. I hope and believe that the Government of South Africa have no wish to see it happen. Part of our policy objective has to be to try to move events forward in a way which makes it unthinkable that this should happen.

It is not for us to dictate to the Government of South Africa how they should resolve all their difficulties by internal political change. It must be for the South African people and for their Government. I am not pretending that I can see any quick or easy solutions to the problems. But, as my hon. Friend said, South Africa is not a static country. The political situation is a developing one, as is the economic situation. Observers agree that economic growth over recent years has brought great social changes. The question is whether it has also brought the necessary political changes. It cannot be said that it has brought the political rights to which the black community aspires and is entitled to aspire.

There have been proposals for constitutional change which the South African Government have put forward. These affect the Indian and coloured communities especially. I do not discount them, but the standard by which these proposals must be judged is the extent to which they meet the wishes of the people of South Africa as a whole. So I cannot give them an unqualified welcome.

I have to choose my words with care born of experience, because I know how quick some journalists in South Africa are to quote selectively or misleadingly. My hon. Friend understands that.

We cannot avoid noting that the process of constitutional reform does not at present offer any role for the largest population group in South Africa, the black community. In that situation, the House will know that we feel it right to apply certain limitations to our contacts with South Africa, as do a great many other countries. We are not alone in our attitude. Sporting contacts was one aspect mentioned by my hon. Friend, and I emphasise our continuing support for the Gleneagles agreement. My hon. Friend may feel that the House should debate it. It is a subject which may be considered in other fora in the country in coming months. But the Government believe that it is the right policy to adopt, just as we believe that it is right to restrict our nuclear and military collaboration with South Africa in the ways with which my hon. Friend will be familiar. As I have said, this is also the view of the international community.

We also believe that the best way to promote change in South Africa is by maintaining and fostering our other existing links. Our commercial interests with that country play a role here. As the House knows, the Government encourage British companies to comply fully with the European Community code of conduct which lays stress on improving the wage levels and training of black employees and especially on the development of representational rights for black workers through organisations of their own choice. We believe that the code has been a successful instrument in the improvement of working conditions for black employees of British companies in Africa, and I am glad to be able to tell my hon. Friend that my hon. and learned Friend the Minister for Trade will be answering a parliamentary question on that subject today so that there is an up-to-date statement available to the House of the way in which the Government see the code working.

I am conscious that in the time available I can cover very little of what is a very large subject. However, I wish to say a little about Zimbabwe, if my hon. Friend will allow me. It is an important part of southern Africa, and we cannot ignore it. We have been greatly concerned about the reports of excesses committed by the Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwe army in Matabeleland, and the Government of Zimbabwe are well aware of our concern.

The Zimbabwe Government have a serious security problem. When I was in Harare in January, I heard about it, about the kidnappings of tourists, about the attacks on whites and blacks, about the ambushing of white farmers and their black employees and about the general state of dissidence which had built up in Matabeleland and which the Government could not ignore.

Exactly what has happened is still not clear, but the Government welcome the assurance which President Mugabe has given the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace that there will be an investigation into reported cases of abuse on the part of the army.

I should have liked to discuss other aspects of southern Africa. I am conscious that I have not dealt with Namibia. That is an important issue. We are doing our utmost to help events forward. The momentum is slow, but I believe that progress can be made and that there is still a prospect of a peaceful solution to that difficult and long-standing problem. We seek a peaceful evolution. Our policy towards South Africa and the rest of southern Africa involves peaceful settlements and the use of peaceful means to resolve the difficult problems. In that I am sure that our policy is right, and I hope that my hon. Friend will give it his full support.