HC Deb 01 March 1983 vol 38 cc217-24

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Major.]

10 pm

Mr. Alan Clark (Plymouth, Sutton)

May I first suggest to the Minister that in discussing this subject we agree on a moratorium, or perhaps I could say a zero option, in the deployment of phrases about NATO solidarity, the Soviet threat, the free world, the SS20 and so on?

As my hon. Friend the Minister knows full well, I am fully committed to the principle of the deterrent. I accept the self-evident fact that the Soviet Union will negotiate in a significant manner only when it is confronted by strength and resolution and that the best chance of forcing a reduction in Soviet theatre nuclear weapons is represented by a counter deployment, or a threat of so doing, by the West of an equivalent system.

I do have very grave reservations about the desirability of cruise as a weapons system for a number of reasons which, being technical, are not relevant to our debate this evening, but I accept the fact that in spite of its obvious defects the system does seem to be having the desired result of making the Soviet Union more amenable to concession. So my purpose this evening is simply to elicit for the House of Commons and the country as a whole a clearer understanding of what exactly are the existing arrangements that govern the use of foreign bases in this country in order that an informed judgment can be made as regards their effectiveness.

First I draw the attention of the House to the use of this curious word "arrangement". "Arrangement" is a very imprecise term. It appears in the original communiqué of 1952 and has been used often by the Secretary of State and my hon. Friend in his answers to questions in this place. The term "arrangement" is usually used to cover a situation where procedures and identities are not clearly laid down or set out. My hon. Friend, with his long experience of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, will be aware of this, as he will of the distinction between an "arrangement" or a treaty or protocol. In a treaty the relevant provisions are set out in detail after much discussion, preliminary scrutiny, rejection and acceptance of differing drafts. A treaty is signed by a Head of Government or his appropriate departmental colleague and binds the country concerned until it has either expired or been revoked.

An "arrangement", on the other hand, if it is a recognisable term in the vocabulary of diplomacy at all, is something very much more obscure. The term "arrangement" was used for example by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence on 1 February 1983 in successive answers to the hon. Member for Truro (Mr. Penhaligon), my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Renton) and myself. Although these arrangements have existed for over 30 years, as my right hon. Friend said to the hon. Member for Truro, there is virtually no substance to which one can refer in attempting to analyse them other than the celebrated communiqué that was issued in January 1952. That reads: Under 'arrangements' made for the common defence, the United States has the use of certain bases in the United Kingdom. We reaffirm the understanding that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of circumstances at the time. It is hard to understand from this almost minimal text of the communiqué which is the actual governing term, whether it is an arrangement or whether it is the understanding that is referred to. I am sure my right hon. Friend would agree that neither of these terms, "arrangement" or "understanding", is in any sense precise and that both are capable of differing interpretations by different parties who might at a moment of crisis choose to put differing interpretations upon them.

Here straight away we are faced with the principal objection to an arrangement—namely, that it is imprecise and therefore can be misinterpreted or, rather, subject to differing interpretations by the two parties to it. For example, in the interests of the common defence of the West, the United States has the use of certain bases in the United Kingdom. So far, so good, But reference is then made to the understanding that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision. I take this to mean that under normal conditions the use of the bases takes place not so much as of right as under the tacit agreements latent in the arrangement.

An emergency, as those who drafted the communiqué plainly understood, could lead to such a use having very far-reaching results. For that reason, it would have to be a matter of joint decision by the two Governments. In answer to me today the Minister of State has said that no such emergency situation within the framework of that communiqué has arisen. In answer to a supplementary on 1 February, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State referred to experience of the arrangements … over a significant period of time and under Governments of both parties".—[Official Report, 1 February 1983; Vol. 36, c. 133.] I hope that my hon. Friend will be able to tell the House of what this experience consists if it has not ever extended to being the sort of experience under which these arrangements might have to be invoked. It is not clear whether my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State was referring to the normal arrangements which have been in existence for over 30 years or whether there have from time to time been circumstances—I am thinking, for example, of the Cuban missile crisis or the threat by Mr. Bulganin in 1956 to deploy rockets against this country—of such a critical nature that the higher level of joint decision ought, one might think, to have been invoked.

In the communiqué there is nothing to indicate that nuclear bases are any different in quality from any other kind of bases, such as those dealing with supply, communications or restricted to the use of conventional arms. This is another and disquieting example of the very imprecise nature of the arrangements. This may be explained by the unsatisfactory and, indeed, subservient nature of the United Kingdom's relationship to the United States, which has deteriorated steadily since 1943 when the first of the arrangements relating to atomic weapons was concluded between Churchill and Roosevelt.

At that time there was an assumption that the atom bomb, which was a joint venture between the two countries, would be available to the armoury of both powers. Both powers agreed that it would not be used against third parties without each other's consent. However, the United States Congress, which is consistently suspicious and hostile to Britain, unlike United States Presidents whose attitude varies with their personality and the domestic political pressures that lie upon them, passed the McMahon Act prohibiting the disclosure of atomic energy to the United Kingdom, effectively revoking the presidential undertakings or arrangements that were concluded at Quebec. In 1948 Mr. Attlee surrendered the right of veto formally in return for an American promise to drop a clause in the Quebec agreement which had effectively given the United States control over the development of Great Britain's nuclear industry.

In fact, the United States never honoured this part of the deal properly and, as Professor Margaret Gowing, who is a pre-eminent historian of the arrangements, has written: The deal was scarcely a fair one. In 1948 Attlee's negotiations were concluded in the form of a modus vivendi. It is another word which one might suggest is something slightly stronger than "arrangement" because it has some text to which reference can be made, but not so strong or binding as a formal treaty. However, in 1948 that was also overtaken by events—the decision by a small group of Labour Ministers to allow United States bombers to be based in Great Britain during the Berlin crisis of that year.

Apparently, the United States ambassador in London told the Foreign Secretary, orally, that the British would be consulted about any plans for the use of those bombers. There is no contemporary evidence that such an assurance was made, and three years later Herbert Morrison, who succeeded Bevin as Foreign Secretary, said in Washington that when Great Britain had agreed to provide the bomber bases at Upper Heyford the United States ambassador had said that we would be consulted about the use of the weapons. The House may feel that this is all very feeble and a long way from the equality of status that Churchill secured in 1943 but on which the Americans reneged after he ceased to be Prime Minister.

When Churchill was Prime Minister again and ready to visit Washington in January 1952, these oral assurances that were allegedly made by the United States ambassador in London were not even included in his brief of the subject by his permanent officials before he went to Washington. When Churchill was in Washington this communiqué on which we still rely as a sole source of textual data on this subject, was agreed. The communiqué, at all events, represented an improvement on the total absence of even a consultative veto to which the previous Labour Government had acceeded. Doubtless Churchill and his colleagues recalled the manner in which British bomber aircraft had been prevented by the French from taking off from French aerodromes in June 1940 by the gendarmerie and local infantry.

By now, the number of United States aerodromes in the United Kingdom had risen to three, but the problem of interdicting their use, had Her Majesty's Government felt this to be appropriate, was not insurmountable. However, by now we were moving into the missile age. In particular, there was looming the danger of Soviet nuclear ballistic missiles whose very high yield and explosive effect would compensate for their, at that time, limited accuracy. The prospects were bleaker, the dangers greater and the need to exclude uncertainty very much more imperative.

Mr. Macmillan was questioned in the House by both the Leader of the Labour party and the Leader of the Liberal party about the use of United States bases in Great Britain. Here it may be noted that the user which was causing the House anxiety was not by nuclear-carrying aircraft but by high-flying U2 reconnaissance aircraft. Macmillan in his reply said the he did not think that it was a question of "a written formal agreement". Here, in other words, was an admission that there is no secret protocol with clear areas of understanding that lies behind the somewhat mincated and imprecise text of the Churchill-Truman communiqué of 1952.

To his credit, Mr. Macmillan realised that the new generation of missiles, the Thor, presented a completely different kind of inventory, with different problems of control than the bombers with their freefall bombs and long runway requirements that had been accommodated for the previous decade. Consequently, Mr. Macmillan negotiated a proper dual key arrangement to cover the use of Thor.

Thor has now gone, and it was naturally hoped by the majority of people, and assumed by some optimists, that equivalent arrangements would be promulgated when a successor system was installed. However, the Government appear to have reverted to the text of the old Churchill-Truman communiqué, which was agreed in circumstances very different, and covered military equipment that is not in any way comparable.

In his answer to me on 1 February, the Secretary of State said: the arrangements governing the use of the bases would come into effect much sooner than the decisions to use the weapons … The decisions to use the bases would be at a much earlier and therefore much more important stage of the process".—[Official Report, 1 February 1983; Vol. 36, c. 134.] My hon. Friend is shaking his head for some reason, but this is a matter of record. It is in my right hon. Friend's answer, given to me on 1 February.

I can see that it is possible to obstruct the bases where cruise missiles are stored in the same way that it was theoretically possible to block the runways at Upper Heyford, but surely, if cruise is to play its part in the deterrent role, dispersal from these bases at an early stage in a crisis is essential. Periods of crisis and tension can subsist for many days and even weeks, and once the missiles have left their bases and been dispersed, arrangements to use those bases are no longer relevant, and what we are talking about is the decision as to whether or not the missile should be fired.

On television, the Secretary of State attempted to allay fears on this subject by stating that the missiles would be accompanied by British personnel wherever they go. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and I had a further exchange of views on this subject this afternoon. My own feeling remains that this was a bit of an improvisation by the Secretary of State. My right hon. Friend said that British service men would be there to protect the missiles, but in the circumstances under which this admission was extracted from him, it was plain that the intention of the Secretary of State was that the service men would offer an additional guarantee against the missiles being used without the consent of the British Government.

The House may think that the fact that these missiles are to be accompanied by British service men is itself a form of admission that the British Government are not certain in their conviction that these arrangements will be properly honoured. Whether or not this is the case, to accompany 160 missiles with a contingent of British service men adequate to guarantee that in no circumstances would they be detonated without the consent of the British Government is a tall order. It is possible, but the minimum strength would have to be at least one section per missile, which is effectively a deployment of at least a brigade in strength in a dispersed condition, with all its supporting arms. The House may feel that if this is the direction in which the Government are moving it would be much more effectively and economically achieved by the installation of a dual key system.

If any thought had been given as to how the missiles are controlled once they have been dispersed, I suspect that that it is to rely on the same kind of imprecise arrangement that governs the use of the bases and requires a joint decision. I particularly ask my hon. Friend, what is there to stop the President of the United States rescinding these arrangements at any time after the dispersal of the missiles?

It is my belief that it is perfectly legitimate where national interests are involved, that is to say interests at a level affecting the life and death of enormous numbers of one's own people, to revoke treaties. However, there would be no need for the United States President to go that far. All that he would need to do is serve formal notice—or even informal; that is, over the hot-line telephone—that the background to these arrangements concluded 30 years ago has altered so drastically and urgently that he no longer regards them as binding.

I must say, in all candour, that I do not believe that there is any reason to credit the United States with a level of altruism that exceeds, or would militate against, the interests of its own people. I remind the House that when President Truman authorised the use of the atom bomb against the Japanese, one of his stated excuses was to save lives—but he meant American lives, not Japanese lives. Those considerations applied also to the defoliation of enormous tracts of neutral Cambodia, and the repeated use of napalm against predominantly civilian targets in Vietnam. I make no moral judgment: I simply assert its validity as an inescapable fact of realpolitik.

I shall not discomfit my hon. Friend by reminding him of the occasions since the second world war when the United States acted against narrow British national interests, or of the problems that he and his hon. Friend are facing in equipment co-operation and release of data, or of the manner in which Congress can overturn decisions of the Executive.

My purpose is simply to elicit a more precise definition of how exactly Her Majesty's Government propose to control the use of 150 separate nuclear missiles, located on our sovereign territory, but manned by and answerable to the command centres of a foreign power.

10.21 pm
The Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. Peter Blaker)

My hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Clark) has raised an important issue, and it is a matter of regret to me that I do not have sufficient time in which to deal with his questions as I should have liked. I have only eight minutes left in which to speak.

My hon. Friend gave us an interesting and learned dissertation about the history of arrangements between the United States and the United Kingdom in connection with the use of bases in this country. If I may say so, he inclined to be rather legalistic at times. To answer one of his questions directly, the word "arrangements" is not intended as a description of an inter-governmental agreement. Rather, it refers to the understanding between the two Governments that has been reaffirmed by each Administration ever since the original understanding was made. As we have said before, each head of Government on each side has examined the understanding and arrangements flowing from it, and has been satisfied ever since 1951.

The consequence of the arrangement enshrined in the communiqué means that the bases cannot be used in an emergency, except on the basis of a joint decision by both Governments. That, I think, answers many of the questions that my hon. Friend asked. The firing of cruise missiles in this country could result from nothing less than a deliberate political decision at the very highest level.

The missiles will remain at all times under total political control. That is why the Government believe, as successive Governments of both parties have believed in the past, that, whatever the practical arrangements for military command and control, it is essential to provide for joint decision between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States upon the use in an emergency of bases for United States' nuclear forces in the United Kingdom. That understanding on joint decision, which is summarised in the communiqué of 9 January 1952, applies today with the same force as it did when it was first concluded. I should stress that the understanding means exactly what it says—the use of bases in an emergency embraces any such use. As my right hon. Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary made clear in the House on 9 February: It is not possible for these weapons to be used without the agreement of both the Prime Minister and the President. That is what the joint decision means."—[Official Report, 9 February 1983; Vol. 36, c. 992.] I should also make it clear that in the case of a system such as the cruise missile which is dispersed away from its main operating base in time of tension or war, the same understanding would apply. A joint decision would still be required. That arrangement has been reaffirmed as recently as two years ago.

I urge hon. Members to be cautious in attaching too much credence to statements that have appeared recently in the press which attempt to discredit the joint decision understanding. That applies in particular to a letter in The Guardian some 10 days ago when the vice-chairman of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament quoted from what he said was a report to the United States Senate. However, that did not have the status that he claimed.

I remind my hon. Friend that our right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has carefully reviewed the arrangements for joint decision and reaffirmed their effectiveness. She has dealt with this on several occasions in the House. Most recently, on 25 January, she stated: I am aware that concern has been expressed about the effectiveness of the arrangements and I have satisfied myself that they are effective."—[Official Report, 25 January 1983; Vol. 35, c. 789.] I am sure that my hon. Friend does not doubt the value that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister places on the preservation of our national security and our sovereignty, nor question her judgment of the effectiveness of the current arrangements.

My hon. Friend and others have asked why we have not sought a form of physical control mechanism on the operation of cruise missile systems. I have explained that whatever the arrangements for military command and control the Government, like successive Governments, have regarded the provision of the joint decision understanding between Governments as being of primary importance if our national interests are to be safeguarded. The Government have made it clear that there is no point of principle here as far as military command and control are concerned. However, there has been no case in which a dual key has existed except where the country allied to the United States has owned and paid for the launcher. We could have chosen to acquire the cruise missile system, with the exception of the warheads, and operated it ourselves. That method of dual key control is employed for the Lance missile and the nuclear-capable artillery deployed with the British Army of the Rhine.

The arrangements under the 1952 communiqué are for dual control. The cost to the United Kingdom of providing a force of 160 ground launch cruise missiles over a period of 10 years under a dual key system is estimated to be about £1 billion, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence told the House today. We decided not to choose that system since, because of our confidence in the dual control arrangements, such expenditure did not seem to be a sensible use of limited defence resources and service manpower. Our allies in other countries who are due to provide bases for cruise or Pershing II missiles reached a similar conclusion.

NATO's strategy of deterrence has ensured more than 30 years of peace in Europe. If there is a threat to peace in Europe I need not remind my hon. Friend where it comes from. In the catastrophic event of a major nuclear confrontation, the United Kingdom and the United States would, as befits powerful allies in a relationship of friendship and mutual trust, consult closely before any use of nuclear weapons anywhere. In the context of British bases to which United States nuclear forces are and will be deployed, that trust is embodied in an unequivocal agreement on the joint control of the relevant systems. Cruise missiles will be deployed to two Royal Air Force bases, each with a senior RAF commander and guarded by Ministry of Defence police. The security force that will accompany the missiles both on and off the base will be a fully integrated force of United States and British service personnel.

Given the history of our relationship, especially hi defence, given that we have had nuclear-capable United States forces in Britain for several decades perfectly satisfactorily, given the physical arrangements that I have described and given that the United States cruise missiles will be coming here at our request if there is no satisfactory agreement with the Russians, I find wholly unconvincing any suggestion that the United States might attempt to use the bases in a manner contrary to the arrangements for joint decision that have lasted for so many years and that have been so often renewed after careful consideration.

If there is one lesson to be drawn from the current debate on dual control it is that the United Kingdom and the United States share an identity of interest for the defence of freedom. My hon. Friend has sought an assurance that the United States forces would be based in Britain only under conditions where our supreme national interests and sovereignty are protected and I am pleased to give him that assurance.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at half-past Ten o'clock.