§ Dr. David Owen (Plymouth, Devonport)I beg to ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House, under Standing Order No. 10, for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter that should have urgent consideration, namely,
the need for an urgent debate on the desirability of a dual key control mechanism for cruise missiles".You have heard already, Mr. Speaker, in the discussions today anxiety expressed at the absence of a debate on defence and disarmament, and you will know that this discussion has been going on at Business Questions ever since December. It is not just the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) who has alleged that there is an inability to bring this forward. Anxiety has been expressed on the Conservative Benches that there will not be an opportunity for a specific debate on a motion relating to the control of cruise missiles.The matter is urgent in another respect. It has been openly stated by the Prime Minister that she will consider whether to hold a general election after she has had four years in office. It is now openly suggested that an election might well be announced on 9 May. My submission to you, Mr. Speaker, is that if that were the case this House would not have an opportunity of discussing this most urgent issue, particularly in view of the fact that the Prime Minister is due, we are told, to discuss this at the Williamsburg summit. It is also widely alleged at the moment that the British Government, in the past few weeks, have entered into detailed discussions with the United States Administration about a dual key mechanism.
I do not think that I have to prove to you, Mr. Speaker, the importance of this matter, but there is a specific matter that I feel I must bring to the attention of the House, because I do not believe that this issue should be discussed in the newspapers first. It should be presented to Members of this House so that they can make their own evaluation of its importance and of the need for an urgent debate.
The Prime Minister has now confirmed to me details of a serious incident involving four missiles in 1962, which was not reported at the time to the Government of the day and has only recently come to light. It has, I believe, direct relevance to the debate in the House about the control of cruise missiles were they to be deployed in this country. It demonstrates that it is not sufficient to have confidence in the joint decision-making of a President and a Prime Minister. It is also necessary for this House to have confidence in the actual launch control mechanism for missiles based in this country—a point that was well understood by the then Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Macmillan, when he insisted on dual control.
In 1962 an RAF technician discovered during routine servicing of an inert missile that a British key turned the United States air force lock. A comprehensive check of the other missiles revealed that this was also the case for one other USAF lock. All the locks were immediately changed as a result.
What is more important, of course, in relation to what would be discussed in this House were you to feel it necessary, Mr. Speaker, to have a debate, is that the engagement of the keys was only one element in a complex missile-launching procedure, in the early stages of which it was necessary for an RAF technician, located on the 1016 actual launch site some 150 to 200 yards from the trailer, manually to operate valves and switches to allow the automatic launch sequence to supply the missile with fuel, liquid oxygen and electrical and hydraulic power. British control was therefore guaranteed at all times and at no time, fortunately, although the United States and United Kingdom keys were interchangeable, could one person gain control of the system.
Not only did the launch countdown require the use of both keys to complete the launch sequence, but the United Kingdom key that had begun the process of activating the missile had to remain in place as the United States key was inserted some minutes later to begin the activation of the warhead. Further, the key holders—the United States authentication officer and the RAF launch control officer —were never alone in the control trailer when a live missile was on standby. The standard complement in the trailer was five—four from the RAF and one from the USAF.
That was a serious incident. It is my submission to you, Mr. Speaker, that the House should be able to debate it. The danger of the continued postponement of this debate and the inability to bring a motion to the Floor of the House for the collective judgment and wisdom of the House of Commons—particularly if we are to have an election meanwhile—demands that this debate be given urgent priority over business.
§ Mr. SpeakerThe right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) gave me notice before 12 noon today that he would ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House, under Standing Order No. 10, for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter that he thinks should have urgent consideration, namely,
the need for an urgent debate on the desirability of a dual key control mechanism for cruise missiles.
§ Mr. Dennis Skinner (Bolsover)And dual leadership.
§ Mr. SpeakerOrder. The hon. Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner) will remain quiet while I am speaking.
The right hon. Gentleman has drawn our attention to a very serious matter, which the House will take seriously. I listened very carefully to what the right hon. Gentleman said. The House knows that under Standing Order No. 10 I am directed to take into account the several factors set out in the Order, but to give no reasons for my decision.
Despite the importance of what the right hon. Gentleman has said, I must rule that his submission does not fall within the provisions of the Standing Order, and therefore I cannot submit his application to the House.