HOSTAGE TAKING

HC Deb 11 June 1982 vol 25 cc565-76

12.8 pm

Mr. Clinton Davis (Hackney, Central)

I beg to move amendment No. 1, in page 1, line 7, after '(a)', insert 'seizes or'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Ernest Armstrong)

With this it will be convenient to take amendment No. 2, in page 1, line 7, after 'detains' insert 'or makes a threat with the purpose of detaining'.

Mr. Davis

I am glad that we can discuss amendment No. 2 with amendment No. 1. I am indebted to my hon. Friend the Member for Hamilton (Mr. Robertson) for having dealt with the Bill hitherto. However, he is helping to win a by-election in Scotland, which will be a nice experience. I intend not to undermine the purposes of the Bill, but to try to strengthen its purposes and to support the ratification of the convention by the Government.

In moving amendment No. 1, I wish to ascertain why the Government departed from the terminology of the international convention against the taking of hostages, which defines hostage-taking as whenever a person seizes or detains and threatens to kill, injure or continue to detain a person in order to obtain something from someone. The words that I stress are "seizes or" which are contained in amendment No. 1.

The Government consider rightly that in approaching an international convention by wishing to legislate for it we need not use the exact phraseology of the convention provided that the legislation embodies its purpose and spirit. Therefore, the Government would argue that it is not incumbent on them to adopt the word "seizes" if it is tautologous bearing in mind the presence of the word "detains". If that is the correct assumption, was that point taken by British representatives who participated in the drafting? Secondly, did they argue at that or at any other time that the term "seizes or" was tautologous? Thirdly, is there any room for doubt in the interpretation of clause 1?

Evidently, the international draftsmen considered that they needed to include the words "seizes or" and if there is the remotest doubt that the word "detains" does not incorporate that meaning, would it not be wiser to adhere to the terminology of the convention?

I readily admit that the words of amendment No. 2 go outside the terms of the convention. If the Government tried to advance that argument, they would be estopped from doing so because I should claim that the words do not represent a departure from the spirit or the real terminology of the convention. The Government were propared to depart from that terminology in. the previous amendment. Until persuaded that they were wrong in Committee, they also wished to import the words "without lawful excuse", which were not within the convention.

I pay tribute to the Minister for being flexible and for changing the Government's mind.

12.15 pm

My amendment is designed to define more clearly the word "detains". Whether it achieves that is another matter, but I do not wish to discuss the difficulties of drafting, even on small issue; of draftsmanship such as this, because the Government could show possible errors in this drafting.

Does the use of the word "detains" catch the case of what I call constructive detention? I wish to assess whether the Government's phraseology includes terrorists who are not in direct physical contact with a hostage but who issue threats from afar that if he moves from a place something evil will befall him. In an age of modern technology, apparatus and sophisticated machines, threats such as those in my example can be uttered easily with dire consequences similar to those contemplated in Committee and those that have formed a large part of the international activity of terrorists in recent years.

Was there any discussion of that point when the convention was drafted? It was not discussed in Committee. If there is room for the slightest doubt, would it not be better to err on the side of tautology rather than to risk the escape from punishment, through a technical fault, of someone who has been found guilty of such obscene behaviour?

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Malcolm Rifkind)

I am pleased to be able to reply to the hon. Member for Hackney, Central (Mr. Davis) and deal with the two amendments that he has introduced. The first amendment seeks to include the word "seizes" as well as "detains". The hon. Gentleman relies on the wording of the international convention in putting forward that suggestion. The purpose of legislation following an international convention is not necessarily to reproduce in exactly the same words, the new statutory provisions. Legislation is required only when the consequences of an international convention affect British law and some legislative changes flow from it. When we are dealing with specific statute law, much greater attention is paid to the drafting details as well as to the policy implications of the provisions.

There is no difference between the policy implications of the convention and the Bill. The simple question is, from a legislative point of view, what is more appropriate for the drafting? The word "seizes" adds nothing to the word "detains" in the context of the Bill and given the purpose for which it is drafted. The offence of hostage-taking, which is created by the Bill, has two elements. The first is the original detention of the hostage and the second is the threat to do something to him if another person does not act in a certain way.

If the person who has been defined as the hostage has not been detained, the offence cannot have been committed. Other offences might have been committed, but not hostage-taking. Therefore, either the seizure of the hostage amounts to detention, in which case we need only the word "detain", or it does not fulfil the requirements of detention, in which case whatever other offences might have been committed it would not constitute hostage-taking, nor should it.

Mr. Clinton Davis

I agree with the Minister. I was anxious to obtain his thinking about it. If he has the knowledge available, could he explain how it came about that this form of tautology was incorporated? Did the international draftsman think that there was a distinction between "seizing' and "detaining"? What was the rationale?

Mr. Rifkind

I cannot give an immediate answer about the thinking of the international draftsman. An international convention appears in numerous languages. Language is often used to ensure that the policy of the United Nations, or whatever organisation is involved, is fully understood and comprehended.

It is not intended to be a document in the sense of an Act of Parliament. Therefore, wording which may be more flexible in an international convention would not be appropriate in a statute. There may be some unnecessary duplication of language in an international convention that would not be appropriate in legislation. We are always conscious—although perhaps not all legislatures are—that if one word is sufficient, one word should be used, and unless a second word adds to the policy objectives of the legislation it would not be appropriate to put it in for appearance's sake.

An international convention does not contain an article full of definitions of the meanings of individual terms, unlike our own legislation which almost always contains such a provision defining the specific terms in order to give greater precision to its interpretation.

The second amendment seeks to introduce the words or makes a threat with the purpose of detaining". What concerns the hon. Gentleman is what he has correctly chosen to describe as "constructive detention"—detention which comes about not because of a physical restraint on the hostage but because of certain threats, the accumulative effect of which might in practice lead to the individual concerned being detained. The hon. Gentleman wishes to know whether the offence would have been committed.

I would make two points to the hon. Gentleman. First, detention, which is the matter that has to be satisfied, is a question of fact rather than a question of law. If the matter were in dispute it would surely be for the court to determine whether the facts and the circumstances amount to detention of the person concerned. If they do amount to detention, it should not matter one whit whether the detention has come about through physical restraint or because of threats or other actions which in practice have removed the voluntary element from the action taken by the individual described as the hostage, and which have led to his remaining in a place in which he would not otherwise have chosen to remain but for the action of the accused person. If those conditions have been fulfilled, detention will have taken place and "detains" is sufficient.

There is another reason why the hon. Gentleman's amendment is not appropriate. His amendment seeks to insert or makes a threat with the purpose of detaining". That purpose might or might not be achieved. Clearly, those words could envisage circumstances where, although the threat had been made, the purpose was not achieved and the person was not detained. If that happened, the offence of hostage-taking would not have been committed because the offence, to be committed, requires both elements to be fulfilled. There may still be an attempted crime but that is a separate matter and would not be directly relevant to the hon. Gentleman's purpose.

Mr. Clinton Davis

Would that inchoate offence still be caught by the Bill? I suspect that the answer is "No". Presumably, therefore, unless a person is amenable to our criminal law in one way or another, such an inchoate offence could not result in the sanctions envisaged by the Bill. Is that correct?

Mr. Rifkind

Not entirely. Under section 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 the attempt to commit the crime of hostage-taking would itself be an offence.

Mr. Clinton Davis

The Bill ranges far wider than the normal jurisdictional authority that is provided by our criminal law. If an offence is committed outside this jurisdiction, or by somebody other than a British national—I am talking now of an inchoate offence—it appears that they would not be amenable to British criminal law. Is that right?

Mr. Rifkind

The accused would come within the jurisdiction of the British courts because of the provisions of the Taking of Hostages Act, in which event the actual offence and the attempt to commit the offence would be equally possible as a consequence of the Act. If the act of hostage-taking did not fall within the jurisdiction of the British courts, the attempt to commit such an act would fail to follow. The two go together. I cannot imagine circumstances in which one would apply but not the other.

In a sense, this consideration is incidental to the main purpose of the amendment. The hon. Gentleman's main concern and the main assurance that he sought was that in circumstances which he described as constructive, detention would result in the offence being committed. I can give him the categoric assurance that that would be so. That is my view in terms of interpreting the legal basis of the clause and it is consistent with common sense. If detention, which is a matter of fact, has taken place, the relevant consideration is not whether it comes about because of physical restraint, or the threat to use restraint, but whether detention has happened, and has been followed by threats in relation to the other part of the offence. In those circumstances, the offence will have been committed. I hope that with that assurance the hon. Gentleman will feel that it is not necessary to press the amendment.

Mr. Edward Lyons (Bradford, West)

Am I right in thinking that the Bill catches hijacking wherever it occurs, even when there is no nexus with Britain, provided that the person involved in the hijacking comes to Britain? I am speaking of circumstances where there has been a detention of a person on the aeroplane, with a threat of some sort even to the pilot.

Mr. Rifkind

The international convention is concerned basically with a situation where a person may have either fled to or ended up in a particular country. Therefore, it provides two options to the country concerned. It can either prosecute the person concerned within the country, although the offence has been committed elsewhere, or it can extradite the individual to another country where prosecution will presumably follow. If in the action of hijacking the specific requirements in clause 1 were satisfied—detention of individuals followed by specific threats to them—that would constitute the offence of hostage-taking.

Mr. Lyons

Let us suppose that someone hijacks a plane to escape from what we would consider to be tyranny. If that person arrives in Britain at a later stage, perhaps years later, will we have to face the possibility that, as a result of the Bill, a country with which we are not in sympathy might make a demand for extradition, provided that we are in an extradition arrangement with that country? Will we not find ourselves in rather embarrassing situations from time to time?

Mr. Rifkind

That might be a factor in determining whether such a person might be more appropriately prosecuted in this country rather than being returned to the country from which he had fled. If it were thought that because of the political or other nature of the offence which had been committed the individual might suffer undue and unreasonable punishment, that factor might be taken into account.

It is the generally held view of the international community that it is highly desirable that the offence of hostage-taking should be discouraged by all means possible. Therefore, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that where it takes place, even if there are background circumstances that mitigate the offence, it should be properly recognised as an offence. Given circumstances of the sort to which the hon. and learned Member for Bradford, West (Mr. Lyons) has drawn attention, these are factors that might be taken into account when determining whether extradition would be appropriate as opposed to other options that would be available under the convention and this proposed legislation.

Mr. Clinton Davis

Am I not right in thinking that article 9 of the convention specifically deals with the point raised by the hon. and learned Member for Bradford, West (Mr. Lyons)? The article says that it is not incumbent upon States to extradite where there is a possibility of some harassment or unreasonable penal measures being taken by reason of a person's beliefs, ethnic origins, or a whole host of other matters.

Mr. Rifkind

Yes, in the sense that article 9 of the convention deals with the possibility that extradition might be for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion, or that the person's position may be prejudiced for any of the reasons mentioned in the rest of the article. There are circumstances in which the political nature of the offence might be taken into account.

That relates to the request for the extradition of the alleged offender. I must again point out that there is, in any event, an alternative available to the State concerned, which is to prosecute within the country of the alleged offender for the action that he has taken.

Mr. Clinton Davis

The Minister has given a convincing explanation as to why the amendments are superfluous. I hope that he is right, and the courts uphold his judgment.

Mr. Rifkind

So do I.

Mr. Davis

As what the Minister has to say is not read in the courts, he will not be subject to any great criticism. I am not quite as happy about the Minister's explanation of the question of the attempted offence, but that is not within the scope of the amendment. Having regard to the Minister's explanation. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

2.32 pm

Mr. Rifkind

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

As the House will be aware, the Bill is the legislative consequence of the decision by the United Kingdom to ratify the international convention against the taking of hostages. As I mentioned earlier, the offence of hostage-taking is defined as involving two elements—the detention of a person, followed by a specific threat as to certain action that will follow if third parties do not perform in a way acceptable to the person responsible for the taking of a hostage.

Clearly this is a matter that the international community as a whole has been concerned about for some years. This convention, following as it does on other conventions relating to other forms of international terrorism or other undesirable forms of activity, is one to which the House will no doubt wish, to give its support.

Although the primary purpose of the convention is to deal with the possible taking of hostages in political or international acts of terrorism, the wording of both the convention and the legislation is not restricted to political or international acts of this kind. It also envisages the possibility that hostages may be taken for the purpose of private gain. There may be no political or international implications, but a person might detain another person and threaten to take certain action unless certain demands were met. That is also something that must be guarded against, and it is appropriate that it should be covered by the legislation.

The Bill has already been welcomed by both sides of the House, and it is on that basis that I commend it to the House.

12.34 pm

Mr. Davis

As one who has come recently to the Bill, I am perhaps permitted to range a little more widely than has the Minister. In so doing, I wish to give an unqualified welcome to the Bill, as did my hon. Friend the Member for Hamilton (Mr. Robertson) in earlier debates.

There can be no doubt that the taking of hostages, 'with the concurrent threat to the safety or lives of those held hostage for the purpose of bargaining for some, often dubious, political advantage, is an obscene crime that in recent years has multiplied far beyond what would have been considered possible some years ago. Taking hostages is a cancerous tactic engaged in by gangster elements. It represents a dagger thrust against the heart of democratic societies and orderly, civilised international relationships. It is on the same level as the murder, or attempted murder, of diplomats, as regrettably we witnessed on the streets of this very city only days ago in the attempted assassination of a distinguished diplomat, Mr. Shlomo Argov, who happens to be a friend of mine.

The tragedy is that thousands of people are trained and educated as merchants of terror. They are armed for that purpose with the most sophisticated weapons and techniques, notably in the Soviet Union and its satellites, in Syria, Libya and many other places. It is no less a tragedy that many tyrannies of the Left and the Right hold whole communities hostage. They, of course, cannot be dealt with by a convention. However, the inability to deal legislatively with that behaviour cannot justify a refusal to take the limited action prescribed by the convention and the Bill.

The further tragedy is that so many countries are prepared to aid and abet such forms of crime by the provision of safe havens for the perpetrators, or by weakness in the face of threats. Such conduct is an incentive for further criminality. There can be no doubt that such crimes are highly infectious.

I regret that Britain itself has not always been strong and resolute in dealing with such crimes. While the Iranian embassy siege was a supreme example of courage by our police and Armed Forces, which must have inspired confidence in counter-terrorist activities throughout the world, I hope that never again will we be guilty of the cowardice depicted by the way in which we treated the case of Leila Khaled in the autumn of 1970. Having clearly been involved in an outrageous crime, she was released and sought refuge in an Arab country. She never suffered at all for having been involved in an appalling offence. We have learnt a lot since then. The seige of the Iranian embassy—and there are other examples—has made up for the weakness to which I have referred.

I compliment the Minister on the way in which he has taken the Bill through the House. I have not had an opportunity to compliment him publicly, although I have done so privately, on his move to the Foreign Office. My hon. Friend the Member for Hamilton was astonished that an appointment to the Foreign Office should be regarded as a promotion from the Scottish Office, but that is the way of things. I am sure that the Minister will be a distinguished member of the Foreign Office team, although I hope not for too long.

The Minister rightly said that the Bill is not confined to political acts of terrorism and that the taking of hostages for extortion for private gain or other purposes will also be caught by the Bill's provisions. That is as it should be. The other great benefit of the Bill is that it enables us to try and, if they are convicted, punish persons, regardless of nationality for such offences committed here or elsewhere.

That is important for the reasons that the Minister stressed in answer to the hon. and learned Member for Bradford, West (Mr. Lyons), because there is no certainty in all cases that extradition is the appropriate way to deal with the matter. Where the result of extradition would be to punish or harass a person because of his religious, political or other beliefs mentioned by the Minister, it would be highly improper to extradite. It would be equally improper when there is a reasonable belief that a trial would not take place.

For instance, an Arab country might be prepared to harbour members of the PLO carrying out such offences. I do not confine my remarks to the PLO; there are many others involved in this merciless activity. In those circumstances, it is absolutely right for us to reserve the right to try such persons. The House will hope that international society would recognise that that form of offence has to be properly and effectively dealt with by a fair trial.

My sadness about the Bill is similar to that reflected by my hon. Friend the Member for Hamilton in the Second Reading Committee on the length of the time that it had taken for the Bill to be considered by the House. Regrettably, we are not alone in that dilatory action. Many other countries that ought to have ratified by now have not done so. Only 22 nations are required to ratify to bring the convention into effect. I believe that only 17 have done so. Belatedly, progress is now being made which would suggest that ratification is not far removed.

However, I find the Minister's explanation for the delay less than convincing. He stated: He"— my hon. Friend the Member for Hamilton— will of course be aware that there has been a heavy legislative timetable over the past couple of years, and the Bill must be considered in this context. The position of the United Kingdom is favourable in relation to the international community."—[Official Report, Second Reading Committee, 28 April 1982, c. 11.] The Minister sought to put the matter into perspective.

I find it unacceptable that in more than three years legislation of that kind cannot be brought forward because of other legislative demands. It is not a politically contentious Bill. It has taken up little time in Committee and in the House. Everybody who has spoken has tried to improve and strengthen the Bill. The Minister has played a noble part in answering those debates and putting forward convincing explanations. We have to find a better way to ensure that this type of legislation is brought forward far more rapidly so that the country can exemplify a will to proceed expeditiously. Unless we are prepared to provide that example, others will be only too happy to follow on far behind and, as a result, the implementation and enforcement of the convention will be deferred. If we deal with such matters in the future, I hope that the Government recognise that it is the will of the House to ensure that consideration of the legislation is expedited.

I am glad that the Bill is proceeding to its conclusion. It is an important part of the apparatus to deal with the problem of international terrorism. I end by quoting the words of the Nobel prize winner Andrei Sakharov in 1980. He was interviewed by the Washington Post soon after he had been compelled to go into exile. He spoke of to deteriorating terrorist phenomenon, and stated: Among the problems which trouble me is the irrationality of international terrorism. No matter how high the aims predicated by terrorists (and often there are no such justifications), their activities are always criminal, always destructive, throwing humankind back to a time of lawlessness and chaos, provoking (perhaps with the help of the secret services of foreign governments) internal and international complications, contradicting the goals of peace and progress. I unreservedly condemn the terror of the 'Red Brigades', the Basque and Irish nationalists, the Palestinian, Jewish and Ukranian extremists, the Moslem Brotherhood, the Armenian 'avengers of the genocide of 1915, and all other terrorists. I hope that people all over the world will understand the deadly nature of terrorism whatever its goals and will deprive them of any kind of support, even the most passive, and surround them with a wall of condemnation. I believe that through the passage of this Bill we are doing our part to translate those memorable words into effect.

12.46 pm

Mr. Edward Lyons

The Social Democratic and Liberal Parties have welcomed the Bill throughout. Any measure that adds to the flexibility of the international community to deal with terrorism should be welcomed.

With modern travel, the world is contracting rapidly. We can no longer view matters, including the enforcement of international law, in an insular way. The principle has always been that a British court could not prosecute an offender if the crime had no contact with Britain. But with international terrorist networks, the growth of terrorism, the ruthless methods of operation and the fact that terrorists have several passports and can move rapidly from one country to another, any country that has within it a terrorist who is alleged to have committed crimes should be able to arrest and try him.

The convention that the Government seek to implement allows prosecution only for taking hostages. In some ways that is artificial. If the crime were committed in Britain, a range of charges could be brought, such as carrying firearms or murder. Had the crime taken place in Britain, the prosecuting authorities doubtless would not use this legislation, as a range of other charges could be brought. If they did use the legislation, they would use it in addition to the range of other available charges.

Where offences are committed abroad and the trial takes place here, since the charge of carrying firearms or murder cannot be brought, because the offences had no nexus with this country, a judge would be driven to sentence for those offences not because they have been charged, but because they emerged during the trial as having taken place. That is not an entirely desirable way of sentencing people, because it is sentencing them for doing things with which they are not charged. None the less, despite that drawback, the convention represents a step forward. It means that we are marking in an international convention, enforced in a number of countries, our disapproval of and distaste for international terrorism.

I am a little worried that some of the examples of the ways in which this convention will work in due course will turn out to be rather surprising, in a way that we do not like. Suppose, for example, that we want to extradite a person, who has committed a crime in Britain, who is in the territory of another signatory to the convention which has introduced legislation similar to the legislation that we have introduced to implement the convention. That country could say "Sorry, you cannot have this man back. We intend to charge him under our domestic legislation implementing that convention for taking hostages." We may know that the intention is either to ensure that that man does not get a fair trial or, as is more likely, to ensure that he gets off lightly.

Mr. Clinton Davis

That situation could almost certainly arise outside the scope of the convention. It could be argued that the person would not get a fair trial here. If a Government were to act with such mala fides, they could invent arguments of that nature to justify a refusal to allow extradition, and perhaps such an argument could be entertained. In my opinion, that is not a very convincing argument.

Mr. Lyons

I thank the hon. Member for Hackney, Central (Mr. Davis) for those comments. I agree that for most of the time what he says will be correct, but there could be circumstances in which a court in such a country, listening to an application for extradition on behalf of the Government, might say "The Government of this country"—that is, the Government of the country where the application is being heard—"now have power to opt for a different course which involves justice"—apparently—"being done." It could, therefore, refuse the application for extradition in cases where, but for a similar Act in that country, it would have to say, "We must accede to this application by the British Government for extradition because we have no right to try it in our country." I hope that one day there will be a convention to deal specifically with murder in a similar way to what is proposed in the Bill.

The hon. Member for Hackney, Central complained about the delay in making progress on the Bill. He should also consider, as I am sure he does, the delay in implementing the European Convention on Human Rights. That convention has been in existence for a long time, but no British Government have yet decided to introduce domestic legislation to enforce it.

None the less, the Bill is a step forward in the protection of human rights. Therefore, it is to be supported and welcomed. We hope that it will assist in the drive to deal strongly with international terrorism. I concur with the remarks that have been made about the increasingly strong way in which the British Government are dealing with terrorism. It contrasts sharply with the treatment of terrorists years ago. It is obvious that one encourages terrorism unless one deals with it totally. There is no alternative but to deal with it in a principled and firm way, and the Bill will help in that regard.

12.50 pm

Mr. Rifkind

With the leave of the House, Mr. Deputy Speaker, may I say that I thank hon. Members for the warm welcome that they have given to the Bill and associate myself with their strong condemnation of all kinds of terrorism, whatever form it might take. I agree with the comment of the hon. Member for Hackney, Central (Mr. Davis) about the attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador. That is a good example of the behaviour that we must all unite to try to prevent wherever possible.

The hon. Member for Hackney, Central suggested that there had been undue delay in bringing forward the legislation. I do not think that that is an entirely reasonable point to make in the circumstances. In the ratification of international conventions, two years is not considered significantly long by most standards. Of the 40 countries that signed the convention now under discussion, only 11 have completed the process of ratification. A further five among those that (lid not sign the convention have acceded to it.

Even if the Government had brought forward the legislation earlier, it would not have made any difference. Until 22 countries have ratified, the convention does not take effect. I am not suggesting that this in itself is an argument for delay. The more countries that bring forward legislation at an early stage and ratify at an early stage, the sooner the convention will come into force. I am merely indicating a simple fact that the enactment of the legislation will not produce any significant changes until the twenty-second State has ratified and the convention comes into force.

Mr. Davis

I accept what the Minister says. I believe, however, that this country should be eager to lead the way. I do not discern that eagerness in this instance. Such eagerness would encourage other nations to do likewise. I do not understand why we have deferred taking action up to the present time. If there are the legislative difficulties to which the Minister has alluded, I am certain that the Opposition would wish in the future to do everything possible to assist the Government to ensure the speedy legislation of this form of Bill.

Mr. Rifkind

The hon. Gentleman will acknowledge that, over the last couple of years, the House has not been exactly short of legislation. Inevitably, it was legislation that had greater priority in terms of its passage through the House. On the matter of setting an example, I would point out that, of the 40 signatories of the convention, only 11 have ratified. The United Kingdom is therefore in the forefront of countries completing the process of ratification.

The hon. and learned Member for Bradford, West (Mr. Lyons) was concerned that, because the question of jurisdiction for offences related only to offences under the Bill in respect of actions that take place in other parts of the world, this might result in people being sentenced for things that did not come under the crime with which they had been charged. Under the terms of the Bill, the maximum penalty for the crime of hostage-taking is life imprisonment. There is nothing undesirable in principle in a court, when determining what should be the appropriate penalty for one convicted of this crime, looking into the circumstances of the crime and the consequences of the crime. If a person had lost his life as a consequence, that itself would be sufficient ground for imposing a sentence of life imprisonment.

The implication of the hon. and learned Gentleman's remarks was that there is some technical way of imposing life imprisonment even though a person cannot be charged with murder. It does not matter in this context whether he can be charged with murder. The crime of hostage-taking, if it was to result in the death of a person, would be sufficiently serious to justify life imprisonment in certain circumstances.

Mr. Edward Lyons

I agree entirely with the Minister except to say that, if one concludes that killing a number of hostages is more important than the taking of the hostages and one charges only the lesser offence, and than the judge sentences really for the more serious matter because life imprisonment is the maximum sentence, there is no alternative but to do that. That is the limit of the convention. None the less, it is an undesirable principle to punish people by a side wind for more serious offences when they have been charged with lesser offences. A man may have massive evidence against him for hostage-taking but possibly has some defence never fully adduced on a charge for one or more of the killings. The court might say that that is not the charge, although at the end of the day, if the judge came to the conclusion that the man was responsible for the killing, the judge would ensure that he got life imprisonment, whereas otherwise he might get only 12 years. I am saying not that there is any way out of that, in view of the convention, but that on the whole it is undesirable that men should be sentenced for one offence when charged with a different one.

Mr. Rifkind

The hon. Gentleman says that that is what is likely to happen. I agree with him. I do not think the man would be sentenced for an offence that he had not been charged with. He would be sentenced for an offence for which he had been charged and convicted. If that offence were hostage-taking and if the hostage-taking involved loss of life, it would be a sufficiently serious example of hostage-taking to justify a life sentence. It would be wrong to create the impression that judges would have the opportunity to impose sentences for crimes with which a person had not been charged.

The fact that the House has agreed and the convention anticipates that the maximum penalty for the crime of hostage-taking should be heavy, which in United Kingdom law means life imprisonment, is justifiable. There are manifold circumstances, not necessarily involving just loss of life, where a heavy sentence would be appropriate.

It is on that basis that I say that the wording is appropriate and that the concern expressed by the hon. Gentleman, although I understand his reasons for it, need not be maintained for any period. I accordingly commend the Bill to the House and thank the House for its support.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill read the Third time and passed.