HC Deb 09 July 1982 vol 27 cc583-6

Lords amendment: No. 5, leave out clause 2.

Mr. Abse

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

With this we may discuss Lords amendment No. 6.

Mr. Abse

Lords amendment No. 5 rids the Bill of its original clause 2, which sought to enable a widow who, by her own act, caused her widowhood in some cases nevertheless to obtain national insurance benefits which otherwise would be barred to her by the forfeiture rule. Lords amendment No. 6 puts this intention into effect in a much more sophisticated manner. Although the clause is complex, as appears to be the inevitable wont of laws dealing with social security matters, the prime aim is to provide that in all circumstances where it can be envisaged that the application of the forfeiture rule arises in relation to entitlements to a State benefit, the issue shall be determined by a commissioner rather than starting at the bottom of the adjudicating ladder.

Those who have trade union experience, like my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr. Homewood), will especially appreciate the readiness on the part of the commissioners to place no obstacle in the way of the intention expressed in Lords amendment No. 6. The commissioners have intimated informally their readiness to take aboard the handful of cases that may arise each year. These cases will be adjudicated by them at the highest level. I am sure that the House will agree that it would be inappropriate for such cases to appear before local tribunals or to be subject to the inevitably prolonged appellant procedures that normally apply. We are pleased that the commissioners have agreed to take these cases. The commissioners have made it clear that the Department will give its assistance in these rather complex issues and will implement the intention that is set out in the amendments.

The Solicitor-General (Sir Ian Percival)

I was rather surprised that there was no debate on the first group of amendments, and I was rather slow in not rising to make a contribution at the conclusion of the remarks of the hon. Member for Pontypool (Mr. Abse). I thought that other hon. Members would want to contribute to a discussion on the first group of amendments. However, I am not too late to thank the hon. Gentleman for his kind observations about me and to disclaim most of them. The assistance to which he referred was given almost entirely by my officials and the draftsmen. However, I am sure that the thanks that he expressed will be much appreciated by them.

11.45 am

Without going right out of order, I shall make one or two observations that I intended to make when the first group of amendments was before the House by drawing a distinction between that group and the present group. We are making a different provision from that which was made in the first group of amendments. The effect of the first group is to preserve the manner in which it is decided whether the forfeiture rule, whatever that rule may be, shall apply. That issue is still to be decided by the courts according to the common law rule. By choosing to deal with the matter in that way it has been possible to avoid the difference of opinion which undoubtedly exists on the exact nature of the rule—whether it is a rule which operates as a matter of law to deprive someone of a legal interest at the moment of killing, or whether it is a practice, that is followed by the courts, of declining to allow the courts to be used to enforce an interest that has been acquired.

Happily, it has not been necessary to pursue that difference of opinion to a conclusion. As the hon. Member for Pontypool has said, the sophisticated formula that has been chosen avoids that necessity and leaves it to the courts to decide according to the law as it stands whether the forfeiture rule, whatever it means, is to apply. If they decide that it does not apply, that is the end of the issue because there is no loss of rights. Where the courts decide, following the existing law and practice, that the forfeiture rule, whatever it means precisely, is to apply and that the person concerned, but for the Bill, is to be deprived of all rights, the courts will have a discretion under the Bill to award to such person some but not all of those rights by applying the tests to which the hon. Gentleman has referred. It is on that basis that the Government feel able to maintain a neutrality. At an earlier stage the Government adopted that position and it has been accepted by the sponsors. It has been implemented by the amendments and the complications to which I have referred have been avoided.

The House should know that there is no question of any court being allowed to award half a pension or a fraction of a pension. The sponsors have been good enough to accede to the arguments that it would be impracticable to do so. Although that cannot be done, I hope that the House will agree that the provisions before it are an improvement. Broadly speaking, they ensure that any issue concerning whether the forfeiture rule should apply to social security benefits will be heard in the first instance at commissioner level.

I have given a brief and sketchy description of a complicated procedure. There are so many benefits and so many different ways in which entitlement to them can be decided that any simplification is bound to dispense with some accuracy. The Government's view is that an improvement has been made. Although these issues do not arise very often they are enormously important both to those concerned and to the State. Happily, the number of occasions on which this may arise is small and the Government believe that the procedure for dealing with claims for social security benefits which will be substituted for the existing arrangements will be an improvement.

I hope that I have given sufficient indication of the Government's view. It is one of neutrality on the first part and perhaps a little more than that—a benevolent neutrality—on the clause before us today, which we regard as a distinct improvement.

Mr. Peter Archer (Warley West)

I shall be brief. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypool (Mr. Abse) on the success of the course on which he embarked so many months ago. It is a classic example of the way in which a narrow, undramatic but quite important matter of law reform can reach the statute book. My hon. Friend, with his experience of these matters, recognised a problem in which there was injustice from time to time and persuaded my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr. Homewood), who had drawn a favourable position in the ballot, to espouse the Bill.

The first attempt to solve the problem clearly presented difficulties. As the Solicitor-General has fairly said, there were differences of opinion, first, as to the precise state of the law, and secondly, on policy—how far we should go in certain directions. Those difficulties were resolved away from the Chamber and the House was not troubled with the technical discussions. A great part of a politician's life consists of unexciting technical discussions which take place away from the limelight and are never reported in the media. Those discussions took place with good will all round and we are grateful to the Government for making available so much official expertise. Those who will have to administer the legislation when it reaches the statute book, particularly the commissioner's office, were more than helpful.

All that now remains is to congratulate both my hon. Friends. At a much earlier stage in our deliberations I ventured to predict that future generations would speak of the Homewood Act as they speak of Fox's libel legislation and other Acts of that kind. I believe that my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypool is in the process of steering towards the statute book the ninth measure of this kind with which he has been associated. In this context, I add my recognition of the very helpful way in which the Solicitor-General has approached these matters. It is a matter for rejoicing that a measure of law reform of this nature can make the progress that has been made in this instance.

Mr. Neil Thorne (Ilford, South)

I participated in the last debate on this matter in the House and I have read the proposed amendments with interest. I readily accept what has been said by the hon. Member for Pontypool (Mr. Abse) and my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General about the improvements effected in another place.

When I spoke on the last occasion, I asked for an assurance that this measure would not materially add to the cost of legal aid because I feared that a person who had been sentenced for an act covered by the Bill might spend a considerable time when serving the sentence in fighting an issue under the Bill at public expense. I felt that that would be wrong.

I therefore inquire now whether the Lords amendments are likely to affect that previous undertaking to any material extent. Although I previously viewed some aspects of the Bill with some misgivings, I was assured that issues such as euthanasia which might arise out of the Bill were amply covered in the provisions for the consideration of individual cases. Nevertheless, after the comments of the Lord Chancellor about the enormous escalation in the legal aid bill—I believe that it has increased from about £½ million a few years ago to about £112 million now—it still troubles me that this may be yet another case in which an additional burden will be placed upon the taxpayer. It is an important consideration and we have the right to know whether that is the case. I should be grateful for an answer on that point.

The Solicitor-General

With the leave of the House, I will comment on that point. I cannot say that this will not add anything to the legal aid bill, as there may be cases in which an application comes before the court with the assistance of legal aid. I have no qualms, however, in saying that I cannot imagine it adding any significant amount to the legal aid bill because, although unlawful killing is a matter of great importance and seriousness, the number of people who commit such acts is, happily, small and the number who would have a claim against an estate would be only a fraction of the total. Indeed, I suppose that the question would arise only if there were assets worth going to law about. Moreover, it by no means follows that every person who had such a claim would need legal aid as there might be assets out of which the costs would be paid.

I cannot say that there will not be some cases in which there would be some additional requirement for legal aid, but I do not think that my hon. Friend need fear that it would make any real inroad into the amount of money available. Indeed, if I thought that it might, I would share my hon. Friend's misgivings. I have a dozen priorities for every extra penny to be spent on legal aid and if I felt that I was to be thwarted in any of those extensions I should certainly share my hon. Friend's concern. However, I do not believe that that is the case. I hope that that will set my hon. Friend's mind at rest.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendments Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9 agreed to.

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