The Army

HC Deb 08 July 1982 vol 27 cc509-56

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn. — [Mr. Goodlad.]

6.58 pm

The Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. Peter Blaker)

The Army has made great progress in the last three years. At the beginning of 1979, just before we came into office, the Army was not in the best of health. Pay was between 16 and 26 per cent. behind comparable jobs in civilian life. The Regular Army was nearly 10 per cent. short of its requirement for trained men, with a voluntary discharge rate running at about 5 per cent. Recruiting and discharge rates were getting worse. In Northern Ireland we had seven roulement major units, four of them from BAOR. Only two of the 14 infantry battalions in BAOR were able to man their establishment of four rifle companies. The Territorial Army was 19 per cent. under establishment. On the equipment side the 1st British Corps compared very badly with other corps in Germany, and no new tank was due until the end of the 1980s, if then. We were short of medium artillery. The Army was overstretched, undermanned, underpaid and badly equipped.

I am glad to report that the patient is now making good progress. Today the Army is fully manned and the TA is less than 2 per cent. below its establishment. Pay is fully comparable. The number of men leaving voluntarily is insignificant. In Northern Ireland we have only three roulement battalions.

In Germany we are now manning a full front-line tank strength; and the number of manned tanks has now increased by over 120, or more than 25 per cent., compared with three years ago; we have formed a ninth armoured regiment. We have trebled the number of medium guns in BAOR, and we already have the FH70 towed medium gun in service. We have increased the number of Rapier air defence equipments in Germany and the capability of our armed helicopter fleet has been improved by the introduction of Lynx with its full quota of Tow missiles.

The outlook is that the Army will continue to gain strength. However, before I go into the ways that that will be achieved, I should like to deal with the case for our retaining a substantial Army in Germany. That case was called in question during the past week's defence debates. In doing so I am not taking sides or joining any lobby; I am simply stating the facts of life that confront any Government who address the subject.

I want to make five brief points. First, the central front, where BAOR is situated, is the heartland of Western Europe. BAOR occupies a key sector of that front. If that front collapsed in a war the Russians could be at the Channel. It would be a very different matter having the Russians there, with all their numbers and all their armaments, even from having Hitler at the Channel ports in 1940, and that took long enough to put right. In saying that, I do not intend to belittle the importance of other parts of the NATO front. I simply state a fact of geography.

Secondly, there is no substitute for in-place forces. My hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Mr. Critchley) made that point very effectively in his speech on the Defence Estimates. We cannot be sure how much warning we would get. The Territorial Army has a vital role to play in the defence of the Continent, and it would do it well, but my hon. Friend drew attention to examples of surprise attack, and even if the British Government of the day acted with the utmost resolution and dispatch at the first sign of danger it would take a while to get the reinforcements to Germany.

Thirdly, I ask the House to consider the possible effect if we were to reduce BAOR below the figure of 55,000 which our treaty commitment requires. It would be bound to affect the lessons which the Soviet Union would draw about our political will, despite events in Afghanistan and Poland, and in advance of any MBFR agreement. Even more serious could be the effect on our Allies.

My hon. Friend the Member for East Grinstead (Sir G. Johnson Smith), whose comments are all the more valuable, given the benefit of his experience and contacts through the NATO Assembly, is absolutely right to say that it would have a catastrophic effect on our Allies if we were seriously to entertain withdrawing BAOR. He got to the heart of the matter when he said that it would not add up in political, let alone defence, terms for us to argue that it is vital for the defence of the United States to station about 300,000 of its men in Europe but that it was not vital to station 55,000 of our Army on the Continent.

Mr. Keith Best (Anglesey)

On the second day of the defence debate the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), and perhaps one or two others, postulated the idea that our treaty commitment to station troops in BAOR could be satisfied with reservists rather than with the Regular Army.

Mr. Blaker

If that is what the right hon. Gentleman said, I do not agree.

The Belgians, Canadians and Dutch between them contribute 80,000 Army personnel to the central front. The French also maintain about 46,000 men in West Germany under bilateral agreements with the West Germans. What would be the effect of our example on them? In that context, one of my hon. Friends has said that a gap is always filled. That is not so. History is full of examples of peaceful States neglecting their defences through loss of will or wishful thinking and tempting acquisitive powers into attack. Any serious step by us to reduce BAOR could be the start of a process of unravelling NATO's main land defences.

Fourthly, we must consider the financial factors. It would cost us far more to bring back our forces than to keep them in West Germany. We simply could not house or train them without a massive new infrastructure programme. We are talking about a possible bill for total withdrawal of about £1,000 million for barrack accommodation alone. On top there would be many other costs. Just how that proposal is supposed to produce resources for allocation elsewhere escapes me.

This year British Forces Germany will cost under 9 per cent. of the defence budget compared with over 11 per cent. in 1979. Bearing in mind that British Forces Germany accounts for about 30 per cent. of the total Army and RAF strengths, that underlines the real value for money of its contribution to forward defence and to our overall defence effort and collective security.

Fifthly, it has been argued by some hon. Members that the very stability of the central front, and the fact that it has lasted for 30 years, means that we can safely make big reductions there. That is to stand common sense on its head. The stability results from the joint resolve of the NATO countries to keep a strong military presence on the ground on the central front. The success of a policy is not a reason for abandoning it.

I turn to our plans for the Army. By the middle of next year the reorganisation of 1(BR)Corps into three larger and more powerful in-place divisions than the previous four will have been completed. That will allow the corps commander to maintain two strong forward divisions and a division to give the corps more depth. It will provide him with the flexibility and balance necessary to fight the immediate tactical battle, if necessary on short warning, and to provide a credible corps reserve.

Grouping in peacetime will reflect grouping for war more closely than at present, and much of the confusion that could arise under our present reinforcement plans will be eliminated, particularly in the forward area, where the most critical battle is likely to occur. A fourth infantry division, consisting largely of existing TA units, will be located in the United Kingdom in peacetime with its headquarters at York, and will move to BAOR on mobilisation with responsibility for securing the corps rear area.

The new structure will also help us to maintain the size of BAOR, after some reduction, at 55,000 men, the Brussels Treaty level. I make it clear to my hon. Friend the Member for Anglesey (Mr. Best) that the treaty is talking about men present on the Continent and not about reserves. We shall do that by making savings in infrastructure and support, but in areas that should not affect front line operational capability. The command structure in BAOR is being streamlined and administrative staff cut. All Headquarters are being reduced in size and unit establishments pruned.

We shall be creating headroom within the 55,000 level for key improvements. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State mentioned that the planned buy of sufficient Challenger tanks to equip four armoured regiments will enable us to form two additional armoured regiments in Germany in the mid-1980s, the 10th and 11th, and to provide a full war maintenance reserve of Chieftains. Together with other planned enhancements in the logistic, engineer and communications areas, and the continuing major re-equipment programme announced last year, the net result will be a major improvement in 1 (BR) Corps' fighting capability and staying power.

Let me now turn to the details of the major re-equipment programme over the rest of the decade, a programme that is already well under way. We are placing high priority on improving our armour and anti-armour capability. In addition to the purchase of Challenger, we plan to introduce thermal imaging sights, for both new and existing tanks, and new 120 mm high pressure gun; and a new generation of anti-tank ammunition. There will be further improvements to fire control systems and to automotive components.

We plan to double the number of Milan firing posts and to triple our missile holdings by the late 1980s. Over the next few years we shall be introducing a new night sight for both Milan and Swingfire—our longer range anti-tank system—which will enable our troops to detect and engage enemy armour in darkness and in poor visibility. Improved warheads will also be introduced for both missiles. By the middle of the decade LAW 80, the new light anti-armour weapon, will have entered service. It will be issued in large numbers throughout the Army.

When the deployment of Lynx helicopters armed with the TOW anti-tank system is complete we will have doubled the number of helicopter-borne systems in service and increased our helicopter-launched missile holdings sixfold. Improved warheads should also be fitted to our TOW missiles, enabling them to engage the latest Warsaw Pact armour. The introduction of a series of improved fuses will enable Barmine, our current anti-tank mine, to increase its effectiveness against enemy armour.

Another key area is air defence. We announced last June that we had placed an order for the self-propelled variant of the Rapier, the air defence missile system. By the mid-1980s tracked Rapier will equip three air defence batteries in BAOR, and will bring greater speed, mobility and flexibility to air defence in forward areas.

The artillery will receive the self-propelled—SP70—field howitzer in the later part of the decade. This is the self-propelled version of the in-service FH70. Another major improvement in firepower will be the introduction of the multiple launch rocket system planned for the middle of the 1980s. The delivery of the 69 extra M109 announced in last year's White Paper is now complete. In addition, the battlefield artillery target engagement system—BATES—has entered full development.

BATES is a "force multiplier" designed to enable us to make more effective use of current and future guns. We plan to introduce BATES in the latter part of the decade along with other equipment designed to enhance our command and control. This includes the Wavell automated system for the rapid handling of tactical data, which is currently being evaluated in 1(BR)Corps, and the Ptarmigan trunk communications network is also being developed for introduction in the same timescale.

We have another major programme under way to modernise the equipment and capability of our infantry. We plan to improve its mobility by providing more vehicles for both mechanised and non-mechanised units, with consequent benefits in flexibility and protection. We have let the development contract for a new mechanised combat vehicle MCV 80, and we are now developing plans for the best mix of vehicles required for infantry mobility in the 1990s.

Soldiers will start to receive the new small arms in the NATO standard calibre of 5.56 mm from the middle of the decade. Two weapons will be entering service, the individual weapon and the light support weapon, which will simplify the logistic and support problems associated with the larger number of types of weapon that they will replace. Nuclear, biological and chemical defence will be further enhanced by the introduction of the NAIAD chemical attack detector, production of which has already started.

Finally, I have already alluded to the emphasis that we place on raising the level of our war stocks. Plans are in hand to give effect to this. In addition, we will establish a special stockpile of items to support operations outside the NATO area.

In general, although the Army will lose about 7,000 personnel, it will be better able to fight and therefore to deter aggression.

Still in the front of our minds is the magnificent role played by the Army in the Falklands. But, as the House knows, other men and women in the Army are making a valuable contribution to our defence in several other parts of the world, including the United Kingdom. Not least, our men and women are still fulfilling a task in Northern Ireland which is as vital as ever, and the House, I know, would want to pay them a special tribute. My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, if he catches your eye later in the debate, Mr. Deputy Speaker, will expand on the role of these forces.

Mr. Bob Cryer (Keighley)

The Government have set up a fund for the relatives of the Service men killed in the Falklands. Does the Minister feel that many of the relatives of soldiers killed in Northern Ireland may feel badly dealt with in comparison?

Mr. Blaker

Existing funds care for the relatives of those killed in Northern Ireland. The Army benevolent fund, for example, has funds for that purpose. The fact that the South Atlantic fund will be available specifically for the relatives of those who suffered in the South Atlantic will release the other funds of the Army benevolent fund for other purposes including Northern Ireland.

Returning to the Army's role in the Falklands, I focus attention on one or two specific aspects of the land campaign and pay tribute to the professionalism and courage of the corps and units represented in the military forces under the command of Admiral Fieldhouse.

Before I start I should like to express my deepest sympathy to the next of kin of those, especially in the Army, who gave their lives in the campaign. I also extend my sympathy to those who have been wounded or injured. The House knows that the Army's casualties were higher than those of any other Service.

The breakout from San Carlos beachhead, to which I referred on Tuesday, began on 26 May. 45 Commando, Royal Marines moved on the northern route to Salvador settlement while the 3rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment advanced on a central axis towards Teal Inlet. The 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment was given the task of securing the heavily defended area of Darwin and Goose Green. I want to say a little more about their achievements.

The House will, I know, appreciate that full details of this epic battle have still to emerge. However, we do know that all members of that gallant battalion, reinforced by a company of 42 Commando, conducted themselves with superb courage and resolution. The narrowness of the isthmus separating Goose Green from Darwin denied them room to manoeuvre and obliged them to advance directly on the enemy across open ground. Bad weather deprived them of close air support, although they were able to rely upon the magnificent assistance of the gunners, one of whose batteries fired more than 1,000 rounds during the battle. Even so the battalion had to fight its way through about three miles of well dug-in enemy positions amply provided with mortars, 105 mm pack howitzers and anti-aircraft guns. As we know, it lost its commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones, early in the action, while he was, with great courage, leading an assault party against two heavy machine gun posts.

When the guns finally fell silent, a single battalion group had overcome an enemy force nearly three times its size. One thousand four hundred prisoners had been taken for the loss of 16 dead and 34 wounded. I believe that military historians will look back on the seizure of the Argentine positions at Darwin and Goose Green as a battalion action as brilliant as any in our military history.

The 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment scarcely had time to draw breath before its leading elements were rushed forward to secure Fitzroy Settlement and Bluff Cove, both of which had been left unoccupied by the Argentines. It then became a race to reinforce the position before the enemy could counterattack to prevent the complete encirclement of Port Stanley. Fortunately, by this time 5 Infantry Brigade, with the Scots and Welsh Guards and 1st/7th Gurkha Rifles, had been safely put ashore at San Carlos. As all available helicopters were needed for other vital tasks, these units had to deploy by sea. Regrettably, on the last day the cloud lifted and the final elements, about to disembark from two landing ships logistic, were hit by an air strike which inflicted heavy casualties and caused both ships to be abandoned.

Nevertheless, the position was secured and the way was open for the final attack on Port Stanley. After overcoming stiff opposition 3 Commando Brigade secured positions on three key mountains. Two nights later it was 5 Brigade's turn. While the 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment took Wireless Ridge, the Scots Guards attacked and overran the Argentine positions on Tumbledown Mountain. The Gurkhas then pushed on and took Mount William and the Welsh Guards moved on Sapper Hill as all units prepared to exploit the situation and advance on the town itself. However, by then it was obvious that the Argentines had little stomach left for a fight and the white flags began to appear over their positions. Just after midnight, London time, on the night of 14–15 June, General Menendez formally surrendered all Argentine forces on the Falkland Islands to General Moore.

Mr. Jim Spicer (Dorset, West)

The Parachute Regiment will be grateful for the kind words that my hon. Friend has used about a regiment that was merely doing its duty. It would be unfair if at the same time he did not make special mention of the 3rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment and its assault on Mount Longdon, where its casualties were more severe than those sustained by the 2nd Battalion. That was the most outstanding feat of the campaign, although it was overshadowed by the fall of Port Stanley. Perhaps my hon. Friend will confirm that the 3rd Battalion suffered heavier casualties.

Mr. Blaker

I agree with my hon. Friend about the remarkable achievement of the 3rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment on Mount Longdon. I was unable to mention that in my remarks, because I had to be selective. In fact, every battalion that took part in the ground action distinguished itself. However, I am conscious that many other hon. Members wish to participate in the debate.

On Tuesday I referred to the role of the Special Forces in the campaign, which was carried out with all their customary skill and daring. During the years since Korea we have had little need to call upon the Royal Regiment of Artillery to fulfil the roles for which it is trained and equipped, yet its air defence batteries were given plenty of opportunity by the Argentine air force to prove that all those years of training had been put to good use. As I have said, Rapier and Blowpipe achieved significant successes.

The men who manned the Rapier system deserve the fullest praise. Throughout the daylight hours they could never relax and never take their eyes off their radar screens, yet despite the appalling weather conditions they maintained the highest possible state of vigilance. Equipped with the British-designed and manufactured light gun, which more than proved its worth during the campaign, the men of the five field batteries responded magnificently to all that was asked of them. Keeping them supplied with ammunition presented a major logistic challenge, which, I need hardly add, was successfully mastered.

Indeed, the mounting and maintenance of "Operation Corporate" produced the most intense activity in logistics for decades. The lines of communication stretched back more than 8,000 miles, with the only possible forward base—Ascension Island—about 4,000 miles from the United Kingdom.

In addition to the routine support of the Field Army, Army logistic units provide a considerable measure of direct support to the other Services and to the Royal Marines in particular. For example, the bulk of the Royal Marines assault packs of ammunition and general stores are held and accounted for in Royal Army Ordnance Corps depots.

The stores outloaded during the operation amounted to many thousands of tons, the majority of which were moved to the ports within 48 hours of the issue of the task force's sailing orders. Of course, the flow of stores to the South Atlantic still continues.

Very detailed logistic staff-work has been necessary to ensure the continued maintenance of the force. I congratulate all those staff officers in the Ministry of Defence, at Northwood and at headquarters United Kingdom land forces, whose many hours of detailed planning on both a single and tri-service basis ensured the smooth running of the operations. I also pay tribute to the work of all members of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, who worked so hard to issue and to account for stores, both at home and in the field, and to their civilian colleagues in the depots.

The movement of stores on land is, of course, the responsibility of the Royal Corps of Transport, whose members played a major part in the organisation and supervision of ship loading programmes. Many of them also accompanied the stores into the operational area to arrange their offloading. The military-manned port at Marchwood has been in almost constant use, and, in addition to Regular Army involvement, about 2,000 task vehicles were provided by the Territorial Army units of the RCT during the initial stages of outloading.

Not all stores travelled by sea. Men of 47 Air Dispatch Squadron RCT spent many hours in the back of Hercules aircraft delivering urgently needed items and mail to ships of the task force. That even more stores and equipment were not needed is a tribute to the skill of the craftsmen of the Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, who worked so hard in the miserable conditions to maintain vehicles, helicopters, weapon systems and radios. I salute them all and gratefully acknowledge the full co-operation of industry in fulfilling many of our urgent and outstanding orders and in speeding up some of the contract repair and construction work.

The care of human beings is, of course, of greater importance than even the care of material and no Service in the Army can have enhanced its reputation more during the Falklands campaign than the Royal Army Medical Corps. The field dressing station of the Commando Logistic Regiment, which was manned by both naval and military surgeons, tended more than 500 wounded, many of whom were Argentine, and performed more than 150 major operations in far-from-ideal conditions in makeshift accommodation. They cart justifiably take great pride in the fact that every man who entered that operating theatre alive left it alive.

None of this would have been possible without the courage and skill of the medical orderlies from the RAMC and the individual units who rescued the casualties and rendered immediate first-aid without regard to the dangers to themselves.

Tragically, the danger to life and limb is by no means over, because of the Argentines' practice of sowing mines over large areas of the Falkland Islands in an indiscriminate way, without keeping the appropriate records. This is a clear breach of the generally accepted principles of mine warfare. Clearing these mines is a dangerous task, made more difficult by the fact that the majority of the mines sown are in plastic cases. Unfortunately, the science of mine detection has failed to keep up with the development of new mines and it is likely that it will be many months before this task is complete.

Mr. Julian Critchley (Aldershot)

Why did we seem to be surprised by the fact that Argentine mines were made of plastic? Does not the Soviet Union have similar mines?

Mr. Blaker

Many countries produce plastic-covered mines. This is both a problem of terrain and the indiscriminate way in which the Argentines distributed the mines. The conventions of war require that minefields should be recorded.

Mr. John Browne (Winchester)

A particular question has cropped up many times in my constituency mail. Given that the Argentines broke the conventions of war on three counts—first, indiscriminate laying; secondly, the fact that they did not label the minefields; and, thirdly, that the mines were covered in plastic—why should British soldiers risk their lives picking up the mines? Why do we not use the Argentine prisoners, just as we used German prisoners in the Second World War, to lift their own minefields?

Mr. Blaker

To oblige the Argentine prisoners to do so would be contrary to the Geneva convention.

Mr. Browne

We did it in the Second World War.

Mr. Blaker

I believe that the Geneva convention to which I am referring was not then in force. Thirty-five Argentine soldiers have volunteered to help us remove the mines, and I am sorry to say that one has been severely injured.

We are sparing no effort in our attempts to find new solutions to the problem of mine clearance in the extremely difficult terrain and conditions of the Falkland Islands. I know that all hon. Members will share my admiration for the skill and dedication of the Royal Engineers who are now carrying out this work.

Many of them have already made a major contribution to the successful campaign by removing obstacles from the path of our advancing troops and by constructing a host of installations, ranging from a Harrier operating base to emergency refueling points. Of course, their skills are now in greater demand than ever before as they work in Port Stanley and the outlying settlements to repair the damage inflicted on private homes and public utilities.

Sadly, I must record that three Royal Engineers have been seriously injured while trying to make the Falkland Islands a safe place in which to live again. In addition, tragically, a Gurkha has been killed while clearing ammunition.

Apart from the problem of mines, in Stanley itself the town water and electrical supplies were badly damaged during the fighting. The Royal Engineers have restored the water supply. In the power station, two of the three generators have been repaired by the Royal Engineers and the public works department working together. The Royal Engineers are engaged in many other tasks to restore Port Stanley to normal. The House may like to know that the Armed Forces are co-operating with the civilians in Port Stanley and elsewhere in a number of ways. They have provided an officer to teach in the Port Stanley school while a teacher is absent on leave. Another Army officer is assistant organist at the Port Stanley cathedral. The Army is helping to produce the local newspaper and to run the radio station for the time being.

I find it difficult to overstate the achievements of the British Army during the past three months. I have tried to draw the House's attention to the more notable aspects, but I am fully conscious that I have been unable to do full justice to them. I have not mentioned the contribution of the men of the Household Cavalry, who took maximum advantage of the mobility of their Scorpions and Scimitars to fulfil their roles of reconnaissance and flank protection. Time prevents me from doing more than mention the other corps and services that took part in the campaign.

Dr. Alan Glyn (Windsor and Maidenhead)

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for mentioning the Household Cavalry. Does he agree that the role that it performed was unusual and unprecedented?

Mr. Blaker

My hon. Friend is correct. Among other things, the terrain was extremely difficult for it.

The other corps involved in the Falklands campaign were the Royal Signals, the Army Air Corps, the Royal Army Chaplains' Department, the Corps of Military Police, the Royal Army Pay Corps, the Intelligence Corps, the Army Physical Training Corps and the Army Catering Corps. They, too, can take pride in the way in which their members discharged their duties.

Many of the Army Department civilians willingly worked long hours to ensure that the supplies needed by the task force were available. Others had vital roles in the casualty reporting and welfare systems. Theirs is not a glamorous task and it is right that I record here their devotion to duty and their important contribution to the success of the whole enterprise.

In short, the recovery of the Falkland Islands showed that the British Army is, as we all believed it to be, well trained, well led and equipped with some of the finest weapon systems available. Above all, it is manned by what I believe to be the finest professional soldiers in the world, resourceful and resilient people who will endure any hardship and overcome any discomfort to perform their duty regardless of the odds against them. It is an honour to be associated with them.

7.32 pm

Dr. Oonagh McDonald (Thurrock)

I hope that the House will give me leave, should I catch Mr. Speaker's eye, to speak again later.

Before I turn to what I should like to say, I extend the apologies of my right hon. Friend the Member for Deptford (Mr. Silkin) for his absence. He expected the debate to take place earlier and, regrettably, made other arrangements.

Mr. Best

Has he taken the whole of the Opposition with him?

Dr. McDonald

The hon. Gentleman seems a little surprised that one Labour Member can take on the whole of the Government single handed, but I am sure that I shall find that possible.

I thank the Minister for the detailed picture that he has given us of the role of every aspect of the Army in the Falklands campaign. The Opposition appreciate that picture, and we were impressed with the skill with which the Army carried out a difficult job in the Falklands and the success of the operation. The Opposition express their sympathy to the relatives of those in the Army who were killed and to those who were injured during the course of the campaign and those who have sadly been injured during the mine-clearing operation. I thank the Minister for referring to the mine-clearing operation, as I had intended to ask him a question about that.

As the Minister rightly pointed out, the Army was not only engaged in the recent Falklands campaign, but for too long now has been engaged in difficult and dangerous operations in Northern Ireland. The Opposition pay tribute to the work that the Army does there.

The Minister spent much of his time commenting on the White Paper and, in particular, on defending the role that is still given in the Government's planning to the defence of the central front, the stationing there of 55,000 troops, and to the operations of the British Army of the Rhine. I wish to deal with some of the points that the Minister made.

In the White Paper of 1981—and the White Paper of 1982 is simply a continuation of that—we were promised a radical review of our defence expenditure and planning. However, there has been little change. A substantial part of the defence budget—both this year and last year—is spent on the central front. The Minister said that the BAOR takes up 9 per cent. of the defence budget.

If we examine the subject in another way and attribute planned expenditure to the principal roles, we find that total defence spending, directly or indirectly attributed to Britain's contribution to the NATO forces for land and air warfare in the European theatre, constitutes just over 40 per cent. of the defence budget. That is the estimate provided, although the Minister may wish to give a different version later.

If we examine the subject in that way, we find that there is still a substantial amount of money going to the BAOR, but, as we know from the many voices raised in protest in last year's and this year's defence debate, that has been at the expense of the nation. The Government felt that they could not cut this part of the budget because there were political and military obstacles in the way of doing so.

The military obstacle lies in the NATO belief that the major threat comes on the central front. The NATO forces are organised to fight in layer cake distributions on the central front, and as long as NATO takes that view and the Government do not question that view there are military objections to any reduction of the BAOR and its supporting units.

The political objections were mentioned by the Minister, and I shall return to them later. However, if we examine the whole thrust of our defence policy and are prepared to question some of the shibboleths that underlie NATO's thinking on the third world war and the Soviet threat, we reach rather different conclusions. Perhaps the burden of the adjustment has fallen on the British forces in Germany—the Rhine Army and RAF Germany. For this reason, what Britain does in the Eastern Atlantic is unique.

It is inconceivable that any other European member of NATO would or could make good the deficiencies that the Government would bring about if Britain's contribution to NATO's defence of the Eastern Atlantic and to her sea lanes and interests in other parts of the world were changed. The Government's problem with planning is that the plan may work for a few years but in the years to come we may regret the decisions taken in 1981, which are merely being followed through in 1982. We have not yet heard of any new thinking that might be done after the review of the Falklands campaign has been completed.

We may regret the decisions in future years because the maritime capacities that are being cut away cannot be rapidly restored. A commitment to a labour-intensive standing Army means that it will continue to be expensive in future and will make us vulnerable to foreign exchange changes, as it has done in the past. It is unlikely to change in the future. The new model force structure that the Secretary of State introduced last year may be difficult to support in German marks in the future and at that time, when the unemployment position may ultimately have changed and recruitment to the Army may not be as easy as it has been over the past year or so.

There is no radical change in the Secretary of State's thinking. He merely accepts NATO's assessment of the threat. He merely continues the whole commitment. There is a small reduction in the Army, but in general the principle remains the same. We maintain the largest standing Army in Europe, as the Minister made plain, apart from America.

Mr. Blaker

Will the hon. Lady repeat what she said? Did she say that we maintain the largest standing Army in Europe?

Dr. McDonald

Yes—in the West, apart from America's standing Army, because our contribution is higher than that of others. If I am wrong about that, I apologise. At any rate, we maintain a large standing Army in Europe.

We also pay the largest proportion of our defence budget to NATO. We pay NATO more than 90 per cent. of our defence budget, which is a higher proportion of defence budget than America or any other NATO ally pays. We are the paymasters of Europe in terms of the percentage of our defence budget that goes to NATO defences, in spite of the fact that, measured in terms of average income per head, we are one of the poorest countries in NATO. Only Turkey, Italy and Portugal are poorer than the United Kingdom, and yet we pay one of the highest proportions of our GNP in terms of defence budget, and of that we pay the largest proportion of our defence budget to NATO.

We should therefore bargain from a position of strength. We should say to our NATO partners "It is time that you shared some of the costs. It is time that we had a fairer distribution of the burden of NATO defence and, in particular, a fairer distribution of the burden of maintaining forces in Europe."

The political obstacles that the Minister sees can be overcome. I accept that they are serious difficulties, but negotiations could take place about the costs of maintaining BAOR and RAF Germany over a period so as to phase down our contribution and allow others to take greater resposibility for maintaining their standing armies. That is perhaps cheaper for them, as they have conscript armies, not a professional Army like ours, which inevitably is more expensive. The political obstacles are not insuperable. The Minister and the Government use them as excuses for refusing to reconsider the costs of BAOR and how they might better be shared among other NATO countries.

The Minister told us about the costs of bringing the Army back home. He said that the Army would have to be rehoused, that, inevitably, that would be expensive, and that there would be no saving in public spending. I was impressed by that argument, until I looked at the report of the Defence Select Committee for 1981–82 on the allied forces in Germany. It showed that the British section of the allied forces in Germany has undertaken a barracks improvement programme. It began in 1974, and it is expected to continue until 1990. The cost of the improvement and maintenance programme is undertaken by us. The construction of any new barracks is done by the Germans.

I should like to know how much the programme will cost. My hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) said in his evidence that the Committee was concerned with the social welfare of soldiers. He said that they looked at a number of barracks of the 32nd Armed Infantry Brigade and at the American accommodation. The American accommodation looked like four-star hotels. He said that ours was not as bad as the Salvation Army, but that he had seen better Salvation Array accommodation.

I am sorry that the British Army apparently has such poor accommodation, and I do not suggest that the accommodation should not be improved, but I wonder how much that improvement will cost. The programme is only 48 per cent. complete—at least, that was true in autumn 1981. Clearly that will be an expensive programme. What will the cost be? Who is carrying out the work? I assume bat German construction workers are doing that improvement work.

There is empty Ministry of Defence accommodation in this country, and I am sure that some of it needs improvement. Could not that impovement work be undertaken? Could not the soldiers be housed there? Would that not be a sensible use of resources? I do not say that it would save resources, but if the troops were brought back and if barracks had to be provided and modernised for them, at least public money would be spent in this country, and we should be providing jobs. After all, about half a million construction workers are out of work in this country. Surely the money would be better spent here.

Some of the acommodation appears to require the purchase of land, and that is a time-consuming procedure in Germany. Clearly takes time, money and effort. We should consider not only the costs of providing housing here, but the economic impact of doing that. If troops were brought home, the local economy and community in parts of the country would benefit. All these factors should be taken into account in assessing the costs of bringing the troops home. So the Minister's claim that it would simply be more expensive to do so needs close examination.

Other aspects of the support that is required for the British Army of the Rhine need to be considered. It is not just a matter of providing accommodation. We must also provide airfields, ammunition storage and so on. That process is continuing until 1990. The Minister mentioned it this evening, and spoke of the need to speed up the programme and the Government's plans in that regard. What progress has been made in obtaining new grants from NATO's infrastructure fund for the new storage that has to be provided? How soon will it be before we have all the storage that is necessary to provide sufficient conventional ammunition should there be a third world war, and should Europe be the theatre that is immediately involved?

That is an extremely important question in view of the recommendation that was made in the first report from the Defence Committee in 1979–80. It points out that if there were insufficient ammunition, storage, and means of distributing ammunition efficiently, the commander would have to plan for a period of conventional warfare no longer than that able to be sustained by the corps with the lowest level of supplies. He might therefore be forced to recommend the premature introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into the battle.

That is an alarming prospect. Although tactical nuclear weapons sound innocent enough, as though they might be merely restricted to the clash between armed forces, they are far more dangerous than that. The average size of such a weapon is four kilotons. That is greater than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

If the worst happens and conventional ammunition runs out forcing the Army to use the so-called tactical nuclear weapons, we should be rushing headlong into a nuclear exchange. Many commentators agree that it would be far too difficult to confine that simply to a clash between armed forces. Nearby cities would soon be involved and the war would rapidly escalate.

The Minister should provide further information about the progress of ammunition supply and storage space. He must assure us that sufficient quantities of conventional ammunition will quickly be available so that such a risk will be eliminated. It is a risk which must alarm him as much as it alarms the rest of us.

Those are the kinds of question upon which I wish to press the Minister. He should consider the costs of the whole programme and the speed at which aspects of it are taking place. He should also reconsider his claim that the costs of bringing the Army home would far outweigh the costs of maintaining it there.

We are told that the Secretary of State cast his merchant banker's eye over defence spending last year when he took up his post in January 1981. We were told that he was considering in great detail every aspect of the defence budget and looking sensibly for proper savings. His eye seems to have failed to fall on one aspect that is mentioned in the first report from the Defence Committee on the allied forces in Germany. It talks about the estimate of costs being complicated by variations in the exchange rate between the deutschemark and the pound. It says: A variation of a single pfennig could represent more than £1 million in the cost of pay and allowance". That is a high cost indeed.

That is not an unfamiliar problem, but it is one that the Secretary of State appears to have overlooked. If one looks back over the history of the Government, it appears that that issue was raised in 1979, shortly after the Government took office. We were told in The Times on 27 November that London was preparing for a battle with Bonn over the cost of BAOR. We have heard little about that battle since.

Have the Government given any further consideration to the foreign exchange costs of maintaining BAOR? Will they do battle with Bonn over those costs? Will they obtain an improvement on the agreement that was signed in 1977—regrettably—by the Labour Government which involved the Germans finally agreeing to pay £125 million over three years? I say "regrettably", because the Bonn Government insisted on £125 million worth of building for British troops, whose barracks have long been in need of modernisation, which not only benefited the German economy but added to its real estate since the barracks remain in its possession. Has any more thought been given to that? We cannot sustain such heavy foreign exchange losses. I am not suggesting that there should necessarily be an alteration to the defence budget, but it does require urgent investigation. What plans do the Government have to cope with that?

In his opening remarks the Minister spoke about weapons and armaments. Has he given any more thought to the Government's decision to note the Select Committee's report in which the lack of anti-helicopter weapons was pointed out? I noted the cost of the improvement programme for the main battle tanks, which now includes thermal imaging, at a cost of £450 million. That involves partly modernising the Chieftain tanks and partly producing the Challenger tank, at a cost of about £1.5 million.

I cannot help but ask whether this is the best expenditure. I know that NATO claims that there cannot be tank parity between Warsaw Pact countries and NATO forces. I merely ask whether that is something that we should try to do. Perhaps we should concentrate our expenditure and effort on anti-tank weapons, bearing in mind that the tanks that are produced by the Russians tend to become obsolete more quickly because the Russians and Eastern European countries generally tend to go in for longer runs of the production of a particular tank than does the West. No doubt they have their own reasons for doing that. However, is this the best use of resources? Should we turn away from equipping the Army to such a large extent with tanks? Should we spend £440 million, perhaps partly on anti-tank weapons and partly on some other weapons systems? Roughly three to four tanks would cover the cost of a Harrier.

I know that this is a matter of dispute and that there is a pro-tank and anti-tank lobby. However, if one looks at more recent wars, such as the Egypt-Israeli war, one wonders about the usefulness of such heavy equipment.

I have listened carefully to the debates and discussions on the Falklands and about all that has been provided by the Army, Navy, Air Force and by back-up organisations of various kinds. There has been one startling omission. There has been no mention of the Royal ordnance factories where many workers work overtime during their Easter holiday to provide much-needed ammunition for the Falklands conflict. In general, the Royal ordnance factories have provided a stable capability for the Army, providing about one-sixth of the arms equipment and in some case constituting the only British source of supply. I am surprised that the Royal ordnance factories and their workers have not been mentioned. Some of them were badly treated—

The Under-Secretary of State for Defence Procurement (Mr. Geoffrey Pattie)

I am grateful for the opportunity to remind the hon. Lady that I mentioned them fulsomely in my speech the other evening.

Dr. McDonald

I do not recall a detailed and lengthy reference to them. I note, however, and I stress, that workers in the Royal ordnance factories in Chester-le-Street and Blackburn, for example, were badly treated during the campaign. Numbers of them received redundancy notices having worked overtime presumably to provide ammunition for the Falklands campaign. The Royal ordnance factories provided stable employment under the Labour Government. Under the present Government, in spite of alleged increases in Government spending on defence, the factories have faced redundancies together with a long period of uncertainty while the Government decided on their privatisation plans.

The general response of the Government to the study undertaken at the end of 1980 has now been announced. The Government are waiting to bring forward legislation to privatise the Royal ordnance factories. These plans, which bring fear and anxiety to the workers in the factories, should be abandoned. The factories should continue to fulfil the same role that they have always occupied. The Government should recognise the stability of provision for the Army by dropping the plans once and for all.

I turn now to the question of personnel. The White Paper describes the Army as now being fully manned and says that fewer trained personnel are leaving the Army than at any time since the ending of conscription. However, the target for the Army is a reduction of 7,000 by 1986. I should like to know what progress has been achieved in reducing the size of the Army through natural wastage. If the Army is at present fully manned and if fewer people, at a time of high unemployment, are inclined to leave, how confident are the Government that they can bring about a reduction in that way? Does the Minister expect redundancies? If so, what arrangements have been made for such redundancies? I should be grateful for answers. I hope, however, that any reductions planned by the Government will be brought about by natural wastage and that redundancies, with the consequent problems that they cause for the individuals concerned, will not be necessary.

I still do not believe that the Government have presented an adequate case for their refusal to alter the size of BAOR. They have failed to provide strong arguments for suggesting that the Army should not, at least in part, return home. I look forward to the Minister's response to some of the questions that I have asked.

8.3 pm

Mr. Jim Spicer (Dorset, West)

If falls to me to follow the hon. Member for Thurrock (Dr. McDonald), who spoke for the Opposition. I sympathise with her. For a large part of her speech, she has been the only Labour Member present. That must be a difficult burden to bear when she has to deal with a subject of such complexity. The hon. Lady talked about the strength of our forces in the Rhine Army. I would advise her, at some point, to talk to Army commanders in the field, who have to face the problems caused by armies around them that are continually looking for reasons for reducing their strength on the ground.

The Danes and the Dutch are longing for the moment when we reduce oar forces in the field. They will see it as an excuse to do likewise. Many people in Europe and within European armies still look to us, not to the Americans. They take a line from what we do. That is a factor that the hon. Lady and the Labour Party should remember.

This is a timely debate. This week sees the arrival home of key elements of our task force. No one will mind if I mention the fact that the Royal Marines arrive back on Sunday morning in the "Canberra". It is hoped that they will pass through the towns of Dorchester and Bridport where people are making great efforts to get the pubs open early in the morning and the flags out to receive them. I should also like to mention my own regiment, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions the Parachute Regiment, which has already arrived home and whose members are enjoying a well-deserved short leave.

My hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, who opened the debate, covered a tremendous amount of ground in talking about the re-equipment programme. I hope that he will not mind if I concentrate on the Falklands campaign. It is vividly in our minds. There is much to be learnt from the campaign. Soon after the 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment, with its supporting arms and services, occupied Goose Green and Darwin, an early-day motion, supported by hon. Members from every party in the House, was tabled. It stated: That this House congratulates the 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment on its magnificent achievements at Goose Green and Darwin which were in accord with the traditional standards of the regiment, whilst at the same time mourning with them the loss of their commanding officer and others serving with, or in support of, the battalion on this occasion. There was a remarkable degree of support for the motion. That first major ground engagement set the pattern for what followed. I am certain that it undermined the ability and the will of the Argentine forces to resist in any great strength. At that time the 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment was very much in the public eye. On other occasions, both before and after, many acts of heroism showed the calibre of all members of our Armed Forces engaged in the Falklands campaign.

I have already intervened to mention the fierce and bloody battle fought by the 3rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment for Mount Longden two days before the final capitulation of the Argentine forces. That was a magnificent feat of arms and deserves special mention. The 3rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment was up against the crack forces of the Argentines on the island. It suffered heavy casualties in a bloody engagement.

I have spoken of the two battalions of my own regiment. However, as hon. Members know, honour and casualties were shared equally among the Armed Services in that short and memorable campaign. While paying tribute to those involved in the campaign in the Falklands, it is also necessary to recall that our forces have spent long, dreary and bloody years in Northern Ireland. One recalls the full horror of Warrenpoint and other places, but much more the events that have occurred in the back streets of Belfast and Londonderry. The calibre of Armed Forces, especially the Army, has been demonstrated in a way that no other Army ever could demonstrate. Above all, the self-restraint of our troops in Northern Ireland was the marker that showed exactly what they would do when they embarked on the Falklands campaign.

I return to the Falklands campaign. Earlier this week, Sir Edwin Bramall, the chief of the General Staff, talked to men of the Parachute Regiment on board the ferry "Norland" near Ascension Island. In his address he said: You will be able to say, as they said after Agincourt, after Alamein and Arnhem, 'I marched, and fought, and won in the Falklands and showed the world the incomparable quality of the British Army'. Sir Edwin Bramall spoke for almost every British citizen.

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State was right to say that the lessons of the Falklands campaign had yet to be digested. Chief among the lessons that we have already learnt is the incredible ability of all our Armed Forces to improvise when the need arises. Improvisation is a wonderful thing. We all use it in our lives from time to time, but one would not wish to rely totally upon improvisation and say that things will always come out right in the end. They do not. We should avoid improvisation, if possible, and instead have what is needed on the ground at the right time.

I turn to two matters about the Parachute Regiment, to which I hope my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will address himself. Not too many years ago we disbanded the Parachute Regiment's field force formation headquarters. Our experience in the Falklands has shown that it might have been much better to keep that small headquarters, at what would have been a very small cost. I ask my right hon. Friend, when examining the lessons of the campaign during the next few months, to pay special attention to that small, but vital, element.

With the vast increase in range afforded to our C130s by in-flight refueling—we have seen only the tip of the iceberg on this development—is there not a strong argument for developing more positively the parachuting capability of a reformed Parachute Brigade? Who knows when we may yet again wish to move forces over a long range with their parachuting capability ready for use?

I have been unashamedly banging a drum for my own regiment today, but it is a proud week for all those who have served at any time in the Parachute Regiment.

Mr. Best

I hope my hon. Friend realises that many hon. Members in the House endorse his remarks.

Mr. Spicer

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his comment.

I turn to the back-up stocks about which the Minister of State spoke. Earlier one heard some rumours about the panic stations caused by the need to raid our first line stocks at short notice. It is clear from the Falklands campaign that we cannot fight a modern war without sufficient supplies and back-up stores ready on the ground. If I agreed with anything that the hon. Member for Thurrock said, it was her brief mention of the need to have stocks ready to hand. I hope that during the next few years we shall learn the lesson of the Falklands. Those lessons have been hard-learned, but if they are taken to heart they will not only serve to make our forces more efficient, especially the Army, but save many lives in future incidents that will inevitably face our Armed Forces.

8.14 pm

Mr. Clement Freud (Isle of Ely)

I listened with care to the Minister's speech. The whole House was proud of the courage, skill and bravery of our soldiers in the South Atlantic and we extend our sympathy to those who could not go there. Their bravery and skill is no less for being in Northern Ireland or at some other base. The protection of what we have is more satisfactory and cost-effective than the recapture of what we have lost. The fact that we recaptured what we lost with some brilliance does not exonerate the Government. War is brought about by the failure of politics.

The defence correspondent of The Economist some years ago wrote: Navies and airforces are machines manned by men and armies are men with guns. During this debate we can pay tribute to our soldiers and perhaps examine their role a little more carefully. The defence correspondent also said that our Army is the worst equipped Army on the Rhine. He called our soldiers first-class men using second-class equipment". I am pleased that steps are being taken to ensure that first-class men will soon have the equipment that they deserve.

I wish to talk not about the military role of the Army, but about its social side. I accept that the Army's role is to prepare soldiers to fight, not to ensure their comfort or that of their families. Housing is one of the most important and most ignored aspects. A soldier who joins at 18 and leaves the Army 22 years later invariably does not have a home to go to. The Army does nothing to facilitate the purchase of houses for men who have given the 22 best years of their lives to their country. I know of soldiers who cannot put down deposits on homes when they leave the Army. I know that housing lists are often long, but, even if proper notice is given to a local authority, it is difficult to find a house for someone who has been demobilised after serving his full term. Some local authorities do not accept them because they live outside the area. Some military families have no right to council housing in any area because of the peripatetic nature of their lives.

The remit of Sir Derek Rayner was to look for financial savings, but I wonder whether the social cost has ever been studied. In the city of Ely, which I have the honour to represent, we have an Air Force hospital. After the Rayner report, the cleaners from the city of Ely who took pride in working in the RAF hospital were made redundant. The cleaning is now carried out by contractors. There is no longer a genuine connection between the Air Force and those who work in the hospital.

Mr. Best

I have the same problem in my constituency with RAF Valley. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will be pleased to hear about the great efforts made by the Ministry of Defence to ensure that the contractors reengage those who were made redundant. The system has worked well in my constituency.

Mr. Freud

In my constituency the contractors have re-engaged many workers, but they are no longer under the auspices of the RAF and do not have a gentleman officer to whom they may bring their grievances. They now have the telephone number of the head office, which is about 50 miles away. I deplore the lack of connection.

In my opinion it is better to pay more to local people for the sake of good will. The hon. Member for Anglesey (Mr. Best) will accept that if the contractors employ the same people, and since the whole point of the exercise is to save money, it is unlikely that they will be paid as much. They will in fact be paid less, work harder and have fewer nice people with whom to deal. That has been the substance of the complaint that I have received.

I am a great believer in military establishments playing their part in the community and I wonder whether enough thought has been given to that. I should like to see adjutants sitting on parish councils of the villages in which their barracks are situated. I should like members of regiments to become governors of colleges of further education and polytechnics. I know that they are sent away, but they are replaced by others. It is essential that the Army, which provides full and now well-paid employment, should play its part in the community by providing the occasional service—allowing, if security will permit, its sports grounds to be used by local citizens who have no football field and behaving like the good and rich neighbour.

In a previous debate the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Clark) pleaded that, when widows were told of the deaths of their husbands, the sad information should be brought to the house by an officer. I know that the Secretary of State gave an assurance that that would happen and it is enormously to be welcomed.

There are Service families overseas who have much to complain about and no one to hear their complaints. There are those who are not covered by the DHSS in the same way as those serving in Britain, despite the fact that they pay taxes to the United Kingdom. Non-contributory invalidity pensions are not available to Service wives who return from living abroad until they have established residence here. Child benefit is paid to a husband in Germany, and when he is sent to Northern Ireland he still receives the child benefit while his wife is in Germany looking after the children. Many of us have had to deal with such cases. A little more concern for the Army would eliminate such complaints.

The Royal Medical Corps prepared soldiers to fight, so it cannot spend as much time as perhaps it should on women's and children's health. In Germany there are no smear clinics and few facilities for public health. There are lower standards of health care and higher infant mortality in German bases than anywhere else. I should like the Minister to look into that matter.

Great Britain already has the highest infant mortality in Europe. In Germany, in the Army of the Rhine, it is even higher, and this is largely due to stress during pregnancy. The other problems in the Army of the Rhine include a substantial divorce rate, a high rate of non-accidental injuries and a very high rate of delinquency. There is now a new standing civilian court with a United Kingdom magistrate and a probation officer.

Women's rights in the Army are virtually ignored. A woman cannot choose where she wants to live; she is given a house. An Army wife cannot choose the decor; it is chosen for her. She has no say in running the community because, despite the loud words of feminism in the civilian sector, in the Army a woman is still "an Army wife" with no rights. Such wives follow the flag loyally. It seems a mindless waste of resources, especially given the cost of and limits on staff officer provision, not to cater for such women properly, caringly, and compassionately.

One currently remembers Kipling, now that the nation welcomes home the Army and speaks so highly of soldiers. Kipling wrote: Oh, it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' 'Tommy, go away'; But it's 'Thank you, Mister Atkins', when the band begins to play. We forgot about the Army until we welcomed our Service men back to this country as heroes. It would not be a bad idea for the Minister to look into the provision of No. 2 dress uniform. I do not know of soldiers who have complained about their battle dress and I know that SCREDE has looked into hats and boots, but the No. 2 dress uniform, which the soldiers wear with pride when they go out into the community, is a uniform on which little work has been done. There is not as much pride as there was when I was in the Army and I had my smart uniform apart from my ordinary uniform.

Mr. John Browne

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it is ridiculous that the No. 2 uniform is still khaki, which is made for camouflage in the field? Does he agree that there is a great opportunity for the Army to design a new No. 2 uniform in a more attractive colour than khaki? The combat kit is camouflaged, but the No. 2 uniform should be for parades and home service.

Mr. Freud

I thought that I had said that. I was unhappy about the humdrum nature of the No. 2 uniform. I should explain that the No. 2 uniform is what used to be the No. 1 uniform, which has gone. It would be nice if there were something a little more charismatic. Perhaps that could be looked into.

We have opinion polls on so many pointless subjects. We now find out how popular the Prime Minister is or who is the best dressed leader of which party. It is high time that the Army found out how unhappy are the Army wives and families. To have a competent and contented soldier, one needs some assurance that he will have an infrastructure in which his family can be reasonably happy and his children receive a decent education; I have looked at the Defence Estimates carefully. The Government do not publish anything remotely satisfactory about the health and welfare of dependants, of whom there are 100,000 in Germany. The House would like to know why people leave the Army. They no longer leave the Army because they are ill-paid. That has been seen to. However, too many highly trained people are still leaving the Army—men who have cost the country a great deal of money in training. We can read how many there are, but we do not learn the reasons why.

Finally, it would be a good idea to give military dependants some rights, rights that they do not now have. There should be someone to whom they can appeal for redress without it harming their husbands or whoever is their relation in the Army. The Government tend to concentrate on what soldiers do for us. It is time that we concentrated on what we can do for them—and their families.

8.28 pm

Mr. Keith Best (Anglesey)

I agree with the hon. Member for Isle of Ely (Mr. Freud), who is concerned about the ability of soldiers, particularly Army officers, to purchase property. My hon. Friend the Minister has been considering that matter for some time. It is an area of concern that cannot be satisfied by the gratuity as presently constituted. That is why so many soldiers and Army officers who purchase property during their Service lives have the difficulty of maintaining it while they are many thousands of miles away serving overseas.

The hon. Gentleman will forgive me if I do not follow him down the road of the argument about No. 1 or No. 2 dress. My No. 1 dress has been hanging in my cupboard for many years. It has not been used. Therefore, perhaps I can give it to the hon. Gentleman and he can decide what best to do with it.

As a Territorial gunner having served with both airborne forces and Commando forces, I was pleased when my hon. Friend the Minister spoke so highly of the role of those forces in the Falklands campaign. Hardly any hon. Member has not referred and will not refer to the Falklands campaign. It is absolutely right that it should be mentioned time and again.

I also pay tribute to the Service men who went there. I am sure that the House will understand if I mention two of my constituents. The late Welsh Guardsman, David Williams, from Holyhead, was killed on an assault landing ship at Bluff Cove. Another Welsh Guardsman, David Grimshaw, from Valley, has had a leg amputated and suffered severe burns. He was married only in January this year. When hon. Members learn about constituents who were killed or severely injured, it brings home the tragedy of war and the need for the House to avert it in so far as we can. I hope that that thought is never far from hon. Members' minds.

Although we may have been fortunate not to lose more Service men and ships—luck plays its part in any military venture—because the campaign was successful it seems rather strange that some hon. Members now want completely to disorientate our defence strategy and the way in which our forces had been deployed in the past, just because of that one campaign.

Surely the very success of the campaign demonstrates our forces' ability to meet such a challenge when it presents itself while they continue to be prepared to meet the underlying threat that undoubtedly comes in central Europe from the forces that are ranged against us in the Warsaw Pact. I do not wish to dwell on the matter. The Government will draw conclusions later this year as a result of the analysis of the Falklands campaign. That will be the time to make speeches on the matter.

The present debate, just like the debates on the Defence Estimates, is essentially about financial resources. In his statement that accompanied the publication of the White Paper my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence said: We can only enhance one capability at the expense of another—unless, of course, the nation decides to devote more than the 3 per cent. rate of growth to defence. He reiterated that view at the beginning of the debate on the Defence Estimates.

I listened with great care to the speech of the hon. Member for Thurrock (Dr. McDonald). She did it with great charm. She was on a lonely promontory for much of her speech. It must have been a formidable task when she saw ranged on the Government Front Bench not only my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence, but the rest of the Defence team—my hon. Friends the Members for Blackpool, South (Mr. Blaker), Chertsey and Walton (Mr. Pattie) and Weston-super-Mare (Mr. Wiggin).

Mr. Freud

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that she received 100 per cent. reinforcements halfway through her speech?

Mr. Best

The hon. Gentleman may not be too sure of that. No doubt he knows the story of the Trojan horse. The hon. Member for Thurrock may discover that one has marched into her own camp. We must wait to hear what the hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Cryer) says before we know.

As I understand it, it has always been the view of the Opposition in these debates that savings must be made in defence. That seems to be their central theme. In a way, it coincides with what my right hon. Friend has said—that if we are to seek to expand any element of our defence forces, savings will have to be made in some other element.

If that is so, wherein are the savings to be made? I do not think that anybody would argue that savings should be made in the Royal Navy. Certainly that is not the view of the Opposition. They take the view that the Navy is essential to preserve our independence, our lines of communication and, most importantly, our lines of supply. Nor are savings to be found in the defence of the home base by the RAF. I remember hearing, and I believe that it is still true, that the RAF intercepts more Soviet reconnaissance aircraft in a year than all the other NATO air forces put together. Clearly, savings cannot be made there.

That leaves only two areas in which savings could be made—the nuclear deterrent, that is to say, Trident, and the Army. I shall not dwell at length on whether savings could be made on the nuclear deterrent, although it is right that I should deal with it now that I have mentioned it. The Opposition accept the concept of deterrence, as is clear from the speeches of their Front Bench spokesmen. It seems strange, if not disingenuous, to argue that one believes in the concept of deterrence and then to say that one does not believe in the concept of nuclear deterrence. The whole point about deterrence is to meet strength with strength and to make the military adventure of the potential aggressor such a costly exercise to contemplate that he will desist from ever embarking upon it. That is just as true of the nuclear deterrent as it is of conventional weapons.

In this context, I refer to a paper published in May 1981 by the Fabian Society, to which I am sure the hon. Lady will pay particular heed, entitled "A British Approach to Peace" and written by Professor Neville Brown. It states: A unilateral departure by Britain would heighten by perhaps a factor of ten the near-term danger of nuclear war, especially if she renounced the Rome Treaty at about the same time. Yet that is precisely the policy of the Opposition—unilateral disarmament and withdrawal from the Treaty of Rome. I hope that Labour Members will weigh carefully the words of Professor Brown and consider carefully whether their policies might not bring this country much closer to the brink of war than those currently being followed by the Government.

In a recent analytical article, two Soviet policy-makers wrote that the Soviet Union cannot undertake the unilateral destruction of its nuclear weapons (and indeed has no right to do so, as it is responsible to the peoples of the whole world for peace and progress). To do so would mean disarming in the face of the forces of war and reaction. What, then, is the benefit of unilateral disarmament? Clearly it will not encourage the Soviet Union to follow suit, let alone ensure that it will do so. In my judgment, therefore, it is not a valid option to save money. It does not follow, as some Opposition Members suggest, that because other NATO countries do not have the nuclear deterrent they are defective or that we are in some way immoral to retain it.

That flies in the face of logic. We have a nuclear deterrent. If we were to dispossess ourselves of it, that would dramatically alter the concept of deterrence. It cannot be put forward as a serious proposition that, because other NATO countries do not have a nuclear deterrent, we can dispossess ourselves of it.

One is left to consider whether savings can be made in the Army. It appears that they can be made in no other area of our defence commitment. The argument about the nuclear deterrent cannot be whether we have one; it can only be whether we have Trident. If the Minister is correct when he says that Trident is still the cheapest and most effective nuclear deterrent, we should maintain that rather than anything else.

Savings in the Army appear to be the only option. Surely those savings cannot be made in equipment. The tenor of the remarks of the hon. Member for Thurrock, in which she was joined by the spokesman for the Liberal Party, the hon. Member for Isle of Ely, seemed to be that our equipment is not good enough. One cannot make savings there.

I welcome the announcement of the advent of the multiple launched rocket system. One has become increasingly worried about the effectiveness of the Soviet BM21 and the damage that it can wreak, as shown on training films and during exercises. It would be a lacuna for us not to have a multi-barrelled rocket launcher system. I am glad that that will now be remedied and that we shall have new small arms by the mid-1980s. It will undoubtedly simplify logistics not to have 7.62 mm ball and 9 mm ball within the same small unit.

I am pleased that the Territorial Army is being expanded and that more man-training days will be made available. Those of us still in the Territorial Army realise how valuable man-training days are and have fought hard to have them increased. It cannot be suggested that we can turn completely from a professional to a citizen army. I welcome the expansion of the Territorial Army. It is a cost-effective complement to, but it cannot be a substitute for, the Regular Army.

The Territorial Army is only one aspect of the reserve. There are the Regular Army reserves. When I was on Exercise Crusader in BAOR, I talked to men in the units who told me that they had never seen the Regular Army reservists who would come to them at basic section level as top-up troops. They have never trained with those troops. What are the Government doing to ensure that that situation is remedied?

The Opposition seem to be putting forward the argument that savings can be made in the numbers of the British Army of the Rhine. That point was postulated by the former Prime Minister the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), but perhaps he has not looked carefully at the Brussels Treaty. I am pleased that the Minister replied to the point that I put to him. He will not be surprised to know that I suspected what the answer would be. We should have to rip up the Brussels Treaty if we were to substitute reservists for our 55,000 regular troops in BAOR. Our NATO Allies would not allow that; nor would it be advisable.

In the second day's debate on the Defence Estimates the right hon. Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies) became more and more coy the more that I pressed him. He said that what was proposed would be very difficult. I agree. It hardly sounds a firm foundation on which the Opposition can base savings to enable them to put all their eggs into one basket, namely, a massive increase in the Royal Navy. What about Northern Ireland or any other situation that would require the commitment of British forces? We cannot be certain that it would be only a naval conflict. We must keep a broad base to cover our commitments and not significantly diminish any one of our major capabilities. If we diminish on BAOR, provided that we could get the agreement of our NATO Allies, where would the troops in substitution for them come from?

The hon. Member for Thurrock accepts that she made a mistake. Not only the Americans keep more ground forces in West Germany than Britain. The Germans have 155,000 regular troops and a further 180,000 conscripts. We are the next largest contingent. The French have 46,000. Is the hon. Lady suggesting that the shortfall in British troops could be made up by the Federal Republic of Germany? From visits to Germany, I know that West German politicians do not want that. In addition, to increase German forces would be a major provocation to the Soviet Union and would be highly destabilising.

The only effective way to make significant savings is to proceed along the slow but vital path of negotiated disarmament. I was pleased that my hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces devoted a large part of his speech to the issue the other day. We need greater publicity for what the Government are doing towards disarmament. People want to know what is being done. When talking about the need for Trident and defence forces, we sometimes fall into the error of not specifying why we need them. We need them for greater security and so that we can proceed along the path of negotiated disarmament. That is the only way towards greater global security.

The McCloy-Zorin agreement, the Joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations", was signed in September 1961 between the Soviet Union and the United States and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. It is sad that it has fallen by the wayside. Can we not get back to that sort of agreement?

The first section states: The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure: That disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and That such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The agreement talks about the creation of a standing United Nations peacekeeping force. The greatest tragedy of the Falkland Islands dispute is that a British task force was dispatched to do the work that a United Nations force should have done. That is what we must work towards. The problems of disarmament will not go away. Public opinion is geared firmly to that and demands action from the Government on disarmament. That is illustrated by the growth of the peace movement. Many people in that movement are misguided in the way that they seek to achieve disarmament, but the desire for disarmament is there.

Perhaps the greatest telling aspect is the terror—I do not believe that I use a euphemistic word—of the super powers that a third world war will occur not between them, but will start in the third world over which they have no control. Proliferation poses the greatest threat to the security of the world. I hope that my right hon. and hon. Friends will continue to speak in public and press through those long hard negotiations the very raison d'etre for the retention of forces—ultimately to achieve disarmament.

8.50 pm

Mr. Bob Cryer (Keighley)

It is inevitable that most speeches will start with comments about the Falkland Islands. Those who went there were brave. They did not run when presented with the threat of immediate death or destruction. They carried out their business effectively, and I recognise that. We must extend our sympathy to those who will be returning blind, paralysed, scarred or limbless and to the families of those who will not return. More than 1,000 lives were lost in the Falklands.

A fair proportion of the families who suffered losses will want to believe that the sacrifices were made for something permanent, but the likelihood is that over the next few years a move will be made to transfer sovereignty over the Falklands. Such a move was being negotiated before the act of war. The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, discussed the possibility of a transfer of sovereignty with the Falkland Islanders.

The task force was not necessary. The Argentines could have been forced to give guarantees, if necessary, by the use of economic sanctions. Argentina is in a very difficult and dangerous economic situation. I regret that in applying the sanctions the banks were not as comprehensive in their support as they might have been. The banks got off comparatively lightly. The people, as always, took the brunt. They deserve the credit. The decision to send a task force was wrong, but there is no discredit on the people who undertook that difficult and dangerous task.

The cost has been enormous, not only in life and limb but in money—between £1 billion and £2 billion. The Government are coy about the expenditure involved.

I suppose we must be grateful that the Russians did not invade while a considerable part of our Army and two-thirds of our Navy were in the South Atlantic. The Secretary of State has from time to time pointed out that the real threat comes from the Soviet Union. I want to deal with that myth so sedulously perpetrated by the Government.

The White Paper, in page 25, states: The Warsaw Pact has a substantial advantage over NATO in almost every respect. That is not true according to the Institute of Strategic Studies, which in page 111 of its 1981 publication on the East-West theatre balance in Europe says that NATO has 2,860,000 troops and the Warsaw Pact 2,612,000. It points out that the Soviet Union has a large number of its divisions and men on the Chinese border, which indicates that they are not available for what is euphamistically called the European theatre, which comprises countries where people actually live.

The 1982 annual report of the American Defence Department states: while the era of US superiority is long past, parity—not US inferiority—has replaced it and the United States and the Soviet Union are roughly equal in strategic nuclear power. According to that statement, there is a balance of conventional forces and strategic nuclear power, not an inferiority.

The position on tactical nuclear weapons, which are under the control of the Army, is obscure. I do not suppose for a moment that in this apothesis of democracy the Minister will enlighten us and tell the citizens who pay for defence expenditure where the money is going. It is generally believed that about 3,500 tactical nuclear weapons are in the hands of the Warsaw Pact, but, according to the Stockholm Peace Research Institute, NATO has 7,000.

It was said in 1978 by the Pentagon—and it has not been contradicted since—that the Soviet inventory of tactical nuclear weapons "was probably much smaller." If, in respect of strategic nuclear weapons, and conventional forces and there is a balance in theatre nuclear forces, including Poseidon, the balance is only marginally in favour of the Soviets—as it is—and we embark on Trident, cruise and Tornado, which will have a nuclear weapon carrying capacity, the balance will swing markedly to the side of NATO and the West. No doubt the Soviet Union will immediately try to restore the balance and we shall again have notched up the nuclear escalation.

The difference between tactical, theatre and strategic nuclear weapons is purely arbitrary. Lord Mountbatten warned against the illusions that can be generated by nuclear weapons when he said that there is no possible use for nuclear weapons. There is no distinction between tactical, on which the Army depends so much, and the rest of the nuclear armoury that each side possesses in such abundance.

Mr. Best

I have Lord Mountbatten's speech. In it, he says: To begin with we are most likely to preserve the peace if there is a military balance of strength between East and West." Does the hon. Gentleman also subscribe to that view?

Mr. Cryer

That is exactly what I have just pointed out. There is a military balance, but the Government and NATO say that there is not. They argue that there is an imbalance. The late Lord Mountbatten was therefore supporting the view that I have put forward.

The introduction of Trident, with its massive escalation of nuclear fire power, cruise missiles and Tornado will produce an imbalance that will continue the arms race.

Lord Mountbatten's speech has not been repudiated, although the Secretary of State used to say that he had had a chat with Lord Mountbatten who felt differently about it. That is not evidence that we can take into account because Lord Mountbatten unfortunately is no longer with us to comment.

The other myth on which I shall comment was neatly demolished by the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Clark), who is the vice-chairman of the Conservative parliamentary defence committee. I have quoted this before, but it is worth quoting again. The hon. Gentleman said: If one measures the extent by which the strength of the Soviet Union has been eroded in central Europe by defections of one kind or another since that high point at the time of the Berlin airlift, one sees that effectively, it has lost Austria, half of which it occupied, and Finland over which it exercised almost total dominance. It has lost, irreparably, Yugoslavia. It has lost Rumania in all but name. In Hungary, the regime has become more relaxed and more inimical to Soviet influence. Finally, there are threatening developments for the Soviet Union in Poland. Seen from the Soviet side, this shows a steady pattern of retreat and disintegration."—[Official Report, 3 March 1981; Vol. 999, c. 193.] That is not my view. It shows the Soviet Union not as a strong and burgeoning force, but as one in "retreat and disintegration".

Then there is the cost. The defence statement says that the Soviet Union is not prepared to enter into meaningful discussions about cost. Translated into ordinary language, that means that the Government call the Soviet Union a liar. They say that they do not believe the Soviet figures on expenditure and the Soviet Union is not reasonably prepared to defend itself. No member of the Government, if I called him a liar, would allow the start of any discussion or meaningful conference on such a basis.

The Secretary of State admitted to me: Since the Soviet figures are so unreliable we have to make our own estimates of its expenditure and this is done in great detail every year by assessing the cost to the Soviet Union of all known items of spending and aggregating them for purposes of comparison according to the NATO definition of defence expenditure. That was endorsed by Senator Nino Pasti of Italy in 1979. He wrote: The truth is that NATO forces, both conventional and nuclear, are stronger than those of the Warsaw Pact countries. During the last ten years the Soviet Military budget has remained stable. My colleagues were unhappy about this situation, because they could not justify increases in their own expenditure. So they invented a 'pricing' system. It is easy to see how the figures were inflated to show higher Soviet expenditure". Senator Nino Pasti is one of the generals who wrote a memorandum by the group, Generals for Peace and Disarmament, which was submitted to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It says: During the first few years of its existence, NATO had no need of nuclear weapons in Europe. At the time, the Soviet Union did not use its conventional superiority as a threat against the politically and militarily weak Western European states. All the more, a military approach in the present time would not promise the Soviet Union any reasonable political, economic and military gains. On the contrary, this would be the first step to a nuclear holocaust. The Soviet leaders are well aware of that. Thus, they are serious about their will to negotiate and they can be taken by their word. There is a chance for the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. That statement and many others making positive suggestions for a reduction in the level of nuclear weaponry was signed by the following retired generals—Gert Bastian of the Federal Republic of Germany, Johan Christie of Norway, Francisco da Costa Gomes of Portugal, who is a retired former President of the Republic of Portugal, Georgios Koumanakos of Greece, H. M. von Meyenfeldt of the Netherlands, Nino Pasti, whom I have mentioned, Antoine Sanguinetti of France and Michael Harbottle of the United Kingdom. Just because they are generals, it does not mean that they are authoritative, but it is a view that we cannot ignore. There is therefore an ex-military view that we must reduce expenditure on conventional and, particularly, nuclear weapons.

Mr. Blaker

Does the hon. Gentleman support the proposal of the United States for a one-third reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, as opposed to the Soviet position, which is for a freeze?

Mr. Cryer

It is important not to take an absolute position and say that either the United States or the Soviet Union has the sole solution. What is important, and it has been brought about by pressure not from Governments but from the people, is that both sides should put forward a point of view. In negotiations, neither side will be proved absolutely right. Compromise is needed. Compromise can lead to an acceptance of reductions in nuclear levels The statements made by the Soviet Union and the United States have been the result, not of internal initiatives from the Government, but of the pressure of external events.

As I was saying, a massive cost is involved at a time when local authority services and central Government services are being cut. This defence statement gives an increase, for example, of £280 million in Army equipment alone, from £1,053 million in 1981–82 to £1,332 million in 1982–83. That is for land equipment which, presumably, is largely, if not wholly, for the Army. That is a massive escalation in equipment. I am sure that there are better alternative uses for that money. Last night, for instance, the House discussed two orders for the African Development Fund, in which about £24 million was to be allocated. It was a limited increase and, as several of my hon. Friends said, that was due to the limitation on funds allocated to the Ministry of Overseas Development.

Almost £2 billion goes to research and development for the Armed Forces. The hungry nations of the world do not need new means of extermination. They need water pumps, means of irrigation, and the basic means of producing and increasing the amount of food for their people who, by and large, go hungry each night.

We should compare ourselves with Japan. That country has renounced the use and deployment of nuclear weapons. Instead, it has put its research and development largely into peaceful purposes, with the results that we know so well. As a manufacturing nation, Japan is supremely well equipped and able to produce the goods and services that the nations of the world need.

The second statement says that exports of defence equipment have amounted to £537 million. We should think about this miserable international trade in arms. It is an affront to us and to the families of those who died in the Falklands war to realise that some of that equipment was sold by this country, under both Governments. The majority of the small arms equipment came from this Government. This Government's hands are by no means as clean as they would lead us to believe. It was only in August 1980 that the Minister for Trade, now the chairman of the Conservative Party, went on a mission to Argentina, which was then under military rule, under a junta, which our Government discovered was a Fascist military junta when it suited their convenience. However, at that time, the Minister for Trade wanted to encourage trade links, and at that time they were involved in selling arms.

A principle is involved here. We should be trying to diminish our dependence on arms sales. Instead, we should shift those resources towards the production of materials for peaceful purposes. We can do that if there is a political will. I know that there are 3 million people unemployed as a result of Government policies that are unlikely to change. However, if there is a political will there will be a way out of this wretched trade.

The results of the trade were apparent in the Falklands war. I viewed with contempt a representative of British Aerospace who on BBC television smugly said that the Sea Harrier would sell well after its performance in the Falkland Islands. We must beware of falling into the horrible trap of selling equipment on the basis that it has been Falklands tested. If that were to be done, it would be selling equipment on the blood of those young men who fell during that tragic time.

Mr. Best

Would not the hon. Gentleman's efforts be better directed to seeking a treaty to ensure that there are no arms sales throughout the Western world, or even in the Soviet Union? Surely all he is advocating is that Britain should not sell arms, which simply means that our competitors will get there first.

Mr. Cryer

There is certainly an element of justification in what the hon. Gentleman says and I shall come to that point later.

I turn now to the United Nations second special session on disarmament. Out of the many pages of detailed accounts in the statement on the Defence Estimates there is only one page—page 25—on disarmament. The Government should place greater emphasis on disarmament.

I tabled two questions about two proposals that have been made at the United Nations second special session on disarmament. First, there was a proposal that there should be a world disarmament campaign. The Government have said that they will support such a campaign, and I welcome that. I hope that they will give it substantial financial support and facilities, although I suspect that they will not.

Secondly, there was a proposal that there should be a world disarmament conference. A conference is clearly different because there would be treaties that would be binding on the participating nations. The Government have said that they are not particularly keen on that idea. They are opposed to a conference because they prefer individual arrangements between countries—bilateral arrangements or other relatively narrow arms limitation treaties.

I support all attempts to reduce nuclear and other weapons. However, this United Nations proposal would do just what the hon. Member for Anglesey (Mr. Best) suggested in his intervention. It would establish a conference to enable nations to talk about world disarmament. The limitation of British arms sales would then be set in the context of discussions with other nations. Surely that is what the Government should be supporting and welcoming. A world disarmament conference could negotiate a reduction in both nuclear arms and the miserable sale of death in which too many nations participate with such tragic results.

Not only the Labour Party but countries throughout the world are pressing for such a conference, representatives of which were at the United Nations second special session on disarmament. Non-aligned countries told nuclear powers that they would be affected by a nuclear war. There were speeches on comments such as that of General Haig that a warning nuclear shot could be used in Europe. However, nuclear war would affect the non-aligned countries because the level of radioactivity would drift around the world breeding death and destruction wherever it went.

The non-aligned countries are saying that the nuclear powers should move down the road of disarmament. So, too, are the people. There is a large and growing peace movement. I was fortunate that the Keighley campaign for nuclear disarmament collected money to help towards my fare to attend the special session of the United Nations as representative of a non-governmental organisation. I took part in a march of 1 million people from the United Nations building to Central Park. I was enormously inspired to see Americans from all parts of the United States taking part in that protest for peace.

On the previous Sunday 250,000 people had demonstrated in London for peace. They were saying that Governments must take action to stop the escalation in nuclear arms. It is a process in which this Government participate by accepting cruise missiles and by embarking on expenditure of £10 million on Trident. People will not accept it any longer. That is why the peace movement is growing apace.

About 2,000 people last Sunday took part in a demonstration near Harrogate, the Tory spa town with effete and gentle achitecture of a typical spa nature. On the moors above Harrogate there is a strange development called Menwith Hill. It was started by the United States army security agency and is now apparently run by the United States national security agency. It has never received explicit authority or approval from this Parliament. It is an area that comes under executive action. No one knows exactly what it is. Some people claim that it is an interception base to obtain information for the United States European operations. Others say it is the European communications centre of the United States army. It would be a prime target in any conflict in Europe.

If it is an interception base and if it is interfering in our telephone network—there is a GPO microwave tower nearby with a massive cable link from the tower to the base—it is an absolute disgrace and an outrage that it should continue to operate without any discussion or decision by Parliament. Those 2,000 people clearly wished to express the view that the base should be closed as part of the closure of United States bases in this country. They want to get rid of cruise missiles, the F-111s that carry nuclear weapons into and out of this country on a regular basis and also this base that exists without the authority of Parliament. Within our wonderful democratic system which is so widely praised that we sent an armada to the Falklands and also have nuclear weapons to protect it, I wish to know who is responsible for the base. Is it the Army? Or do I have to raise the matter on the Navy Estimates or the Air Force Estimates?

Is it perhaps one of those areas where no one says anything? If an hon. Member puts down a question there is a blocking answer that stops the elected representative from tabling questions in the Vote Office. It is known that this sort of thing goes on. Ministers raise their eybrows in a mock way, apparently surprised that anyone should actually question what is happening. I question it because people want to know what is going on. They want to know what is being done in their name. It is part of the pressure brought by people who wish to say "No" to nuclear weapons and to communications linked to the deployment of such weapons. They want the Government to make a positive move towards disarmament.

At the United Nations, the Japanese Prime Minister made an impressive speech. He concluded by saying that as a young man he had been a seaman. On board ship he had stared at the millions of stars in the night sky. Whatever one feels about a starlit sky, whether one takes the view that it is part of God's pattern or simply a mystery that one cannot understand, the Japanese Prime Minister said that, as far as we know, we are the only planet with life on it and yet we are trying our best to produce weapons to destroy that life. He said that from that time he was a devoted supporter of peace and disarmament. My purpose is to persuade the Government to adopt the same role. By buying Trident and supporting cruise, their actions are directly opposed to the wishes of the people, who desire peace.

9.20 pm

Sir Nicholas Bonsor (Nantwich)

As most of what must be said has already been said, I shall not detain the House for long. I associate myself with almost all of what my hon. Friend the Member for Anglesey (Mr. Best) said in his excellent speech. I differ from him only on his interpretation of the merits of the British forces rather than a United Nations force going to the Falkland Islands. It was better that British forces carried out that task.

I especially associate myself with what all hon. Members have said about those who have suffered because of the conflict. I disagree wholly with the hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Cryer) on whether those lives were spent in a worthwhile cause. The fight for the Falkland Islands has immeasurably assisted the search for world peace and European security. The stand that Britain took to ensure that our sovereign territory could not be attacked with impunity will help to guarantee our future safety.

A substantive matter that was not dealt with today was a home defence force. I raise the matter because of the deep fear and concern that I feel and wish to share with the House. There are many ways in which we may be threatened in the future, especially by the Soviet Union, and no Government and no defence of which we are capable can consider all possibilities, but I ask the House to consider the following scene.

Let us suppose that, instead of having in the United States an Administration who are dedicated to peace and security in Europe, that country has an Administration who are isolationists, who believe that America can survive without a free, independent Western Europe, and who would not contemplate or command its people to make the sacrifice that America would be called upon to make to save Europe from Soviet attack.

If that were to happen, Europe would have to rely upon two back-up forces. First, there would be the conventional forces that we have in Europe, leaving aside American intervention. Secondly, there would be the deterrent value of our Trident missiles. If the Trident missiles failed to deter and Russia walked into Western Europe, how could we defend our shores?

My right hon. and hon. Friends know as well as I do the balance of conventional forces in Europe. I do not believe that in a conventional war Europe could hope to stop the Soviet Union reaching the Channel within a week; nor could we stop Soviet forces from crossing the Channel and invading our country. In the event of such a conflict, almost all of our forces would be committed to going overseas and fighting for the integrity of Europe on the German war front. Some divisions would remain in Britain, but not enough to make a significant impact on a full-scale Soviet invasion by sea and air.

The Soviets have the great advantage in Europe that they can and will attack without warning. If they do, our only hope would be a substantial home defence force which the Soviet Union was aware would fight to the last man in every town, village and street. That would be a much more effective deterrent than a nuclear weapon, which we could not use in those circumstances. It is right to have a nuclear deterrent, because it is an additional factor that the Soviet Union must take into account, but we must bear in mind the defence that the Soviets are building against nuclear attacks. Vast works are going on to safeguard the civilian population against nuclear attacks. We must compare the steps taken by our potential enemies with the steps that we are taking, which are almost non-existent.

I do not wish to enter into a debate about whether civil defence should be controlled by the Home Office or by the Ministry of Defence, as I would wish, but I am certain that if we have a nuclear weapon against which the Soviet Union has taken steps to safeguard its people, and if it has a weapon that can do equal or greater damage and we have taken no steps to counter it, the deterrent factor of the likelihood of Britain firing its weapon must be undermined. It would be different if, to ensure that they could stamp out the freedom that they so dislike and fear on their borders, the Russians had to kill every man in Britain.

We should start to build a home defence force along the lines of the Home Guard, with a defensive commitment to individual communities or families. The advantages of local knowledge against an invading force are enormous. Such a force could De created at little cost and the deterrent value of our forces would be immeasurably and disproportionately increased as against the cost to the Exchequer.

My hon. Friend the Member for Anglesey mentioned the options open to the Government. He pointed out that we can make no savings in the Royal Air Force. I am sure that during our debate on the. Navy next week there will be widespread agreement on the Conservative Benches that we need a more efficient, better equipped and more expensive Navy than the present one. We cannot make any cuts in the Army. Even the hon. Member for Thurrock (Dr. McDonald) failed to make out a case for saving by bringing back any part of the Army of the Rhine. She was probably right to say that unemployment would be improved if some troops were brought back from Europe, but the overall saving would be insignificant, because it will cost a great deal to increase the power of our Navy.

However, my hon. Friend the Member for Anglesey did not draw the only possible conclusion, which is that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State must be given more funds by the Treasury. We must make it clear in the House that we are prepared to pay the price, whether by increased taxation or borrowing. We must put defence needs first and find the assets with which to back them later. It is no good having two-thirds of the defence force that we need if the two-thirds are inadequate for the task ahead. I ant sure that my right hon. Friend will do everything that he can to persuade my right hon. and learned Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer to give him the necessary money. I congratulate my right hon. Friend on the excellent way in which he tried to increase the capacity of our three Services and the substantial success that he has had within narrow financial constraints.

The conclusion that should be drawn from the debate is that the extra finances must be found to increase the capability of the Navy and that the Army and the Air Force must be left at least as powerful as they now are.

9.30 pm

Mr. John Cartwright (Woolwich, East)

Like almost every other hon. Member, I should like to endorse what the Minister said about the performance of our forces in the Falklands. It is understandable that much of the comment has concentrated on the skill and courage of our fighting men. I was glad that the Minister did not forget the achievements of those who tackled the appalling logistic problems to ensure that everything that was needed was in the right place at the right time. There can have been few military operations in which the teeth owed so much to the tail—it was an incredibly long tail. It was a successful feat of organisation which has been praised throughout the world and is something of which the people of Britain can rightly be proud.

I should like to refer to one problem that arises out of the Falklands campaign that I have raised with the private office of the Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces. The problem concerns some Falklands casualties in the Queen Elizabeth military hospital in Woolwich who had considerable difficulty in telephoning their families, some of them a long way away in Wales. They were having to share one pay telephone. I have persuaded British Telecom to make good the deficiencies of the equipment, but the problem now is that the soldiers concerned are facing substantial costs in telephoning their families. From a parliamentary answer, I understand that they are entitled only to one free telephone call. Many of them are making calls to their families in Wales, many of whom are suffering from unemployment. Therefore, I hope that something can be done to assist those soldiers to keep in regular contact with their families.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. Jerry Wiggin)

I well understand the problem that the hon. Gentleman has mentioned. We have given some attention to it. If the hon. Gentleman has specific cases, I know that many welfare organisations will be happy to help out. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will draw my attention to any correspondence.

Mr. Cartwright

I am grateful to the Minister. I shall certainly follow up the matter.

I should like to concentrate on what the Minister said in the first part of his speech. I very much welcomed the details of improvements to our conventional capability in the central front in Europe. Unlike the hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Cryer), who has departed so rapidly after his speech, I believe that the most obvious danger of a Soviet attack exists in the central front in Europe because that is where there are major imbalances, certainly in conventional capability.

The hon. Gentleman claimed only on the basis of troops under arms that there was a conventional balance in Europe. It would be difficult to discover any authority which would suggest that there was a balance in terms of battle tanks, artillery or tactical aircraft. Every statistic that I have seen indicates clearly that the Soviet Union has a major superiority in those important areas. That superiority makes us vulnerable to the possibility of a rapid smash-and-grab thrust which exploits Soviet conventional superiority. In such a scenario, NATO would be forced to respond with tactical nuclear weapons or capitulate.

There are inherent dangers in relying so heavily on battlefield nuclear systems. Short-range arsenals have grown considerably since 1954 when NATO first introduced them. The defence White Paper lists short-range systems in the overall theatre balance. The NATO 1982 force comparison sets out in more detail the balance of short-range nuclear systems. It shows that NATO has about 1,000 nuclear capable artillery systems and about 100 Lance and Honest John missile launchers, whereas the Warsaw Pact has 300 artillery systems and 650 Frog and SS21 missile launchers. That shows a numerical superiority in NATO's favour, but it could easily be argued that the Warsaw Pact advantage of range and survivability in land-based missiles rules out that numerical superiority.

It is also true that there are short-range nuclear capable aircraft in Europe, atomic mines and all the rest of the paraphernalia of battlefield nuclear systems. There are about 7,000 systems on the NATO side, 5,000 of which are in the Federal Republic of Germany. There is always the spectre looming of the enhanced radiation warhead.

Is it likely that the short-range nuclear systems will be used? I have heard the NATO supreme commander, General Rogers, say clearly on a number of occasions that to resort to tactical nuclear weapons would lead inevitably to the use of strategic nuclear forces. Admiral Lord Hill-Norton, the former chairman of the NATO energy committee, made the same point in a statement in The Times on 18 August 1980, when he said: once you cross the nuclear threshold you have taken an irreversible step which is almost bound to lead to a strategic nuclear exchange, which in turn is almost bound to lead to the end of civilisation. That cold, realistic military assessment of the risk of escalation that flows from the use of short-range nuclear systems must raise some questions about our willingness to use them if the situation so requires.

There has been concern about political control over battlefield systems and a feeling that in the pressure of a battle, under threat from the Soviet Union, commanders might use the systems first and seek political assurance afterwards. We have been assured regularly that that could not happen, that there is full political control and that there would be consultation between the Allies before a decision was taken to use short-range battlefield systems. That is a little hard to understand or to believe. It would be an extremely time-consuming operation. To visualise the Heads of State and Foreign Ministers in the European capitals, where evacuation would probably be taking place, discussing whether they could take such a decision is a little hard. In the real world there is a strong risk that the decision would be postponed, or, because of concern about rapid escalation of nuclear warfare, it is likely that the short-range systems would not be used.

There is growing concern in Europe about the dependence on short-range nuclear systems. There is a desire to rethink the doctrine of flexible response. That doctrine grew out of a conventional inferiority. There is some debate on whether the weapons systems were produced to fit the needs of the doctrine or whether the doctrine was designed to suit the existence of weapon systems that were becoming available. There is lack of clarity about the circumstances in which battlefield nuclear systems would be used.

It was originally hoped that those systems would be a warning to the Soviet Union that NATO was determined to use the full range of nuclear weapons, but that was in the days when NATO had strategic nuclear superiority. That is a much less likely event today simply because the use of short-range systems on the NATO side will produce a similar response, with all the risks of escalation that I have mentioned. The use of short-range systems could not bring military success and the Soviet Union would not be faced with unacceptable damage.

We should improve our conventional effectiveness and reduce our reliance on short-range tactical nuclear systems. That does not mean that we have to match the Soviet Union tank for tank, gun for gun or plane for plane. I agree with the hon. Member for Thurrock (Dr. McDonald) that there is a feeling that tank commanders hanker after tank battles, as happened in cavalry battles in the past. They sometimes give the impression of regarding modern anti-tank weapons as unfair and unsporting. We should aim at building up our defensive capability to such an extent that we could hold a Soviet conventional attack at least in the early days. That does not always mean dramatic new weapons systems.

I shall quote one example from my experience on the Select Committee on Defence. The first matter that we considered was ammunition storage on the central front. We were not very happy about what we discovered. We were concerned about the delay in construction of forward storage sites. We were not happy about the arrangements for transporting ammunition from the rear zones. We drew attention to the differential levels of supplies of ammunition that appeared to be available to different national forces. We said in the report that, as a result of those differentials in ammunition resources the Commander … would have to plan for a period of conventional warfare no longer than that able to be sustained by the Corps with the lowest level of supplies. He might therefore, be forced to recommend the premature introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into the battle". We strongly recommend that steps should be taken to achieve NATO-wide agreement on calculations of ammunition expenditure rates and stock levels. The response from the Ministry of Defence was not encouraging. It said: In the end stock levels are a matter for individual nations to decide upon". It is extraordinary that our strategy might, in some circumstances, depend on something as basic as ammunition storage and availability.

It should be admitted immediately that greater concentration on conventional capability, as opposed to nuclear capability, is not a cheaper option. The White Paper makes that clear. That is why I and my party support the 3 per cent. target, despite the difficulties that are involved in meeting it. We want that growth to go into conventional improvements rather than being siphoned off into super-sophisticated de luxe strategic nuclear systems that the country cannot afford.

It is not fair to suggest, as is sometimes argued by the nuclear disarmers, that conventional war is an easy option. We have seen recently that high technology modern weapons systems can have a devastating effect on the combatants, as was the case in the Falklands, or on infrastructure and population, as is the case in the Lebanon. An all-out conventional war over the Federal Republic of Germany is not an appealing prospect.

We are more likely to deter a potential aggressor if we make it clear that we have a powerful conventional strength than if we rely on nuclear weapons systems which are not credible in the last analysis.

That is why the Government and NATO should give high priority to a battlefield nuclear weapon free zone in Europe. That is just as urgent and as important as the START negotiations for strategic weapons and the INF negotiations for theatre weapons. It could help to unstick some of the MBER negotiations. A battlefield nuclear weapon free zone, accompanied by a balance in conventional nuclear forces, would do much more to secure peace in Europe than the great gestures of unilateral disarmament that are now the policy of the official Opposition.

9.42 pm

Mr. John Browne (Winchester)

I congratulate the task force. It was an epic victory and was of historic consequence. The conduct of these amphibious operations more than 8,000 miles from a home base and more than 4,000 miles from any base must be one of the most outstanding feats of arms in history.

I also congratulate and thank the people at home who supported the campaign. They are the people who worked on the ships, supplied the goods and organised the task force from its bases. I would also like to mention an element that has not been emphasised sufficiently—the role of leadership in the success of the task force. Great endeavours are not usually successful against such odds without determined and good leadership. From the Prime Minister to the commanders within the task force, the leadership was of outstanding quality.

I extend my sympathies to the families of the soldiers, sailors, airmen and merchant mariners who were killed, and to those who were severely wounded.

I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State on getting the best out of our Armed Forces within the cash limits that have, in my view, been wrongly imposed on them. He has made the very best of the resources made available to him. Secondly, I am glad that he succeeded in preventing the incremental cost of the Falklands incident from falling on the normal defence budget.

The Army is just one part of our integrated Armed Forces. We must therefore view it in relation to our total Armed Forces.

As I have said before, I believe that defence is the prime duty of the Government. Ideally, defence expenditure should be based upon needs rather than cash limits, as I am sure many of my hon. Friends and certainly my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will agree. The reality is, however, that cash limits have been imposed upon us. Therefore, although I heartily support my hon. Friend the Member for Nantwich (Sir N. Bonsor) in urging that we should fight for more cash resources for the Armed Forces, we must plan today on the basis of the resources that we actually have and adapt these resources to meet the threats that face us.

Three key internal political factors must be taken into account in developing any defensive plan. The quantity of total financial resources available for defence depends on two elements—first, our economic ability to generate the wealth and, secondly, our political will to spend a sufficient percentage of it on defence. The Ministry of Defence must decide what systems should be developed and how they should be deployed, but defence is only part of our total foreign relations. Indeed, defence is generally used only when diplomacy breaks down, as in the Falklands incident. Foreign policy must dictate where our defence resources should be deployed.

I believe that we face a major threat at this time. Finance and foreign policy must join and co-operate with defence to plan and balance our defence resources with our defence needs. As I have said, we must work within the present limited financial resources. Moreover, the outlook for the American economy and interest rates there make it unlikely that, despite the pressure that I and my hon. Friends seek to exert, much more will be spent on defence in the short term.

It is true that defence spending has been increased by 3 per cent. in real terms. I congratulate not only the Government on maintaining that increase, despite adverse economic conditions, but the last Labour Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) on accepting it. It was absolutely right. Nevertheless, although 3 per cent. in real terms accounts for inflation, it does not cover what I would describe as technical escalation.

To maintain our defence ability, we must maintain the technical capability in terms of "technological escalation". It is like buying a car. In defence terms, it is no good just trading in one Marina and buying another if everyone else has gone on to a Jaguar. It is a matter not just of fighting inflation, but of the technological advance in weapons systems. That is why I believe that we must spend much more than 3 per cent. in real terms. Unless we do that, we shall not be able to keep up, and if we cannot keep up, effectively and relative to other major powers, we must accept effective cuts.

Where are the cuts to be made? Are they to be made in pay, in ammunition or in weapons systems? Are they to be made across the board in a general, quiet way, or will they be specific cuts in specific areas? I believe that we are already experiencing cuts in our relative military effectiveness, despite the increased expenditure in real terms. We must therefore reappraise our priorities in our defensive plan against what we as a nation are likely to be able to afford in relation to the threats that we face. Our defence priorities are the defence of the United Kingdom by both nuclear and conventional means within NATO. We make a major contribution to NATO with our Army on the ground. We have three armoured divisions and a committed Territorial Army division. We have a maritime role in the eastern Atlantic and commandos on the northern flank. In principle, I support all of this.

I believe that it is right to improve and maintain our independent nuclear deterrent, which I see as part of a modern integrated defence system. But I do have reservations about the balance between our armoured land forces on the Continent and our maritime role.

The defence of the United Kingdom is based upon NATO, and I agree with that. We should look at where the threats to NATO lie. I see three direct, internal threats and one external. First, there is the threat of a direct Warsaw Pact assault on the central European front. Then there is internal subversion and the Russian use of the peace offensive which is focused upon organisations such as the CND and the talk about nuclear-free zones. Hiroshima was an atomic-free zone, but that did not prevent the Americans from dropping an atomic bomb on it. Internal subversion is also aimed at creating divisions between the Governments of NATO by fostering mutual suspicion and mistrust. However, I believe that the external threat is more active and serious because NATO has vital interests outside its land mass. An example of that is the Gulf whence Europe's oil lifeblood comes.

Although a direct assault across the land mass of central Europe is a threat, I believe that it is one of the less serious threats. The Russians are cautious and would be most unlikely to attack a defended Europe, even if NATO's forces were not as sophisticated or numerous as their own. The Russians would not be likely to attack a Europe that was defended by both nuclear and conventional means.

Although central Europe is the least of our priorities, it draws most of our defence resources and the bulk of our Army. The external threat, on the other hand, is more serious. Yet NATO is neither prepared nor equipped to meet it. That is a serious fault, and it is our duty to ensure that it is corrected. The Foreign Office must help by bringing diplomatic pressure to bear so that NATO reassesses its resources and the threat that it faces. NATO should reallocate its forces to meet today's threats rather than those of the 1950s.

NATO must decide which nations are prepared and best equipped to accept a role external to NATO to meet the external threat. Great Britain is a prize contender for that role. Our history and present capabilities show that we are, if not the largest, the finest maritime nation. But even the battles of Crecy and of Agincourt, Marlborough's campaigns, the Napoleonic wars and the Second World War, continuing to Malaya and Borneo, and then to the Falkland Islands, show that we have never had a successful large Continental Army. When we tried to fight as a large, Continental Army in the First World War and in the Crimean war, we were relatively unsuccessful. The greatest strength of our Army lies in its infantry and its special forces under British command. Indeed, even our cavalry and more recently our armour have never been outstanding when measured against those of other major military nations. Yet the bulk of our Regular Army is deployed as a major Continental land force of three armoured divisions and we even thought of disbanding the commandos and the Parachute Regiment.

In addition, the bulk of our Army is deployed to meet the least likely threat to NATO on the central European front.

There is another problem—that of local NATO strategy. It is a strategy of forward defence. For political reasons, it is too far forward. The West Germans find it hard to accept the yielding of land in central Europe as a method of absorbing a Russian attack. I understand their feelings, but I do not accept the error that it causes in our defence strategy. First, it means that our forces are deployed so close to the East German border that we are within initial gun range of the Warsaw Pact. It does not have to move massive stocks of ammunition to its gun sites. It is already there, and we are within its range.

Secondly, we do not have the ability to manoeuvre to absorb the shock of a Warsaw Pact attack, to channel the attacking forces and to deliver a counter-stroke. An indirect approach in the defensive battle is denied by the very far forward defensive strategy. It renders our expensive armoured forces unnecessarily vulnerable to a Warsaw Pact attack. We must bring political pressure to bear on NATO to accept a more flexible land battle strategy.

Would it be possible to concentrate more on developing and building-up an effective battlefield strength in infantry-launched anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapon systems? We could avoid much of the massive expenditure on tanks by doing that. If, with reasonable accuracy, an infantryman could knock out an enemy tank at 1,000 metres to 2,000 metres we could reduce the number of tanks. We could reduce one of the prime reasons for having such a massive weight of tanks relative to our land forces.

We should match our resources to the true needs of NATO. I agree with our basic defence strategy and that it should be based on NATO. Keeping a British force in Europe is vital to NATO's morale, but does it need to be an armoured force? If we concentrated on more sophisticated infantry weapons, we could divert the force from being effectively armoured and have one armoured division, two mechanised divisions and a TA division, with considerable cost savings.

I am totally opposed to withdrawing the Army from Europe. As I said, that would have a devastating effect on NATO morale and the cost saving per soldier would not be much. But converting from armour to an enhanced mechanised infantry capability would save money that could be used to meet an external NATO threat.

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. John Nott)

My hon. Friend makes an interesting point with which I partly agree, but at present there is no better anti-tank weapon than the tank. In 10 to 20 years' time we may have invented new missiles that can penetrate the Russian armour that is being introduced, but it is a technological gap that we are at present trying to fill.

The weight of fire power that could come down upon the infantry from the current generation of weapons is so huge compared with anything we may remember in the Second World War that it is difficult to conceive how to protect it unless it has armour to cover it and it is mobile on the battlefield. The point was made earlier about being tied into the fever at the front, but it is too involved a subject to deal with now.

Mr. Browne

I accept that, but surely we should be concentrating our minds more upon research and development. We should be developing infantry-launched missiles instead of concentrating solely on an updated tank. More resources and energy should go into the development of an infantry-launched system.

I accept my right hon. Friend's views on mobility and protection, but the modern armoured personnel carrier is a sophisticated vehicle and, at present costs, is a relative luxury. I believe that it can be slimmed down considerably and still give acceptable protection.

We should work much harder towards a NATO standard weapons system, especially in aircraft and tanks. If each nation wants to build its own equipment, why not have an agreement whereby weapons accepted by NATO can be built by each country to the appropriate specification and be interchangeable? The R and D costs could be paid back under a licence agreement, either to the country that carried out the research or to the multinational company concerned.

Ammunition and logistics should be set in supply for more than a short battle. It would be devastating to have an enormous expenditure on armoured equipment and armoured divisions in Germany only to find that there is only one week's supply of ammunition.

More use should be made of the Territorial Army. It is a highly efficient and cost-effective organisation. Its members have outstanding morale and dedication. In some senses they are more used to exercises than certain elements of the Regular Army. More attention should be paid to recruitment in the Territorial Army. I know that it is up to establishment, but this is an area that would give a good return on increased expenditure.

As its cost is so high the Regular Army should be an elitist force. The officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers must all be made aware that they are the elite on the positive and on the cost side. Each individual in the Army should be made aware of how much it costs to put him in uniform and into an armoured personnel carrier, and of the value of the kit entrusted to him. This is done in civilian life. Men and women are made to realise what everything costs. That would be beneficial in the Armed Forces, too.

I urge increased expenditure on defence. However, in the absence of increased resources, we should amend our present plan in central Europe and concentrate more on the external threat to NATO. I see that threat as much more sinister and active than on the central front. At all costs, we must maintain our independent nuclear deterrent and our civil defence.

I wish my right hon. and hon. Friends good luck in fighting these battles at home.

10.3 pm

Dr. McDonald

By leave of the House, I should like to comment on some of the interesting speeches that have been made during the debate.

I note with interest the remarks of the hon. Member for Winchester (Mr. Browne). I note that his views are shared on both sides of the House. Those views were also expressed by the hon. Member for Plymouth, Drake (Miss Fookes), the vice-chairman of the Conservative Defence Committee. They believe that, of the so-called threats facing NATO, access across the central front is the least likely.

Mr. John Browne

The hon. Lady should not misunderstand what I was saying. I was saying that the least likely threat is against a defended Europe, but we must still defend the central front.

Dr. McDonald

The Opposition Front Bench have never suggested that there should be an undefended Europe, still less an undefended United Kingdom. I underline that point, because it is important for consumption not only in the House but outside. The Labour Party is certainly not a pacifist party. It has stressed the need for adequate conventional defences. It is on that basis that we are examining the most effective deployment of the conventional forces that are available.

We believe that it is misplaced to emphasise the central front. The hon. Gentleman rightly pointed out that that is the least likely of the threats. In the debate on the defence White Paper hon. Members insisted that there are problems and conflicts in which we may have an interest and there are Third world countries that it may be necessary to defend because of their past associations with us. Therefore, events and conflicts outside the NATO area are also important. It is therefore vital that the forces at our disposal should be sufficiently flexible to meet any such problems as and when they arise.

Other hon. Members have rightly drawn attention to the fact that faced with a defended Europe and the problems within its own empire Russia is unlikely to embark on an adventure into Germany and to advance west. After all, Russia has problems holding Poland and Romania, and belatedly it has tried to influence Yugoslavia, which it has already lost.

The central front is the least likely threat, and it is for that reason that in his radical review we wished that the Secretary of State had given more attention to that fact. He should have questioned the underlying presupposition of NATO's organisation of its defence forces. All that the Government have done in these debates has been to reiterate the threat to the central front. There has been no analysis—political, economic or military—of how that threat may have changed and developed, as we believe it has since the Second World War.

Mr. Nott

It is the one area in the world where we are most heavily outnumbered by the conventional forces of the Soviet Union. We are outnumbered 3 to 1 in armour, 3 to 1 in aircraft and 5 to 1 in missiles. It may be the least likely threat, but it is the one place in the world where we face ready forces that hugely outnumber our own.

Dr. McDonald

That poses two questions. First, there should be a proper assessment of the imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The right hon. Gentleman is aware that there is more than one assessment of the relative balance between the two. I shall not develop that argument now, but what he says is open to question.

Secondly, the conflicts that have arisen since the Second World War, of which there have been more than 140, have occurred outside the central areas. Many experts believe that a third world war is more likely to occur by the involvement of the great Powers in a conflict, very likely outside, or on the border of the NATO area. Some of us have argued from the Opposition Front Bench that the borders of Turkey are perhaps more vulnerable, bearing in mind the conflict between Iran and Iraq, Israel and the Lebanon, and so on. There are serious problems in that area. The great Powers have been drawn into conflicts, directly or indirectly, in those Third world areas. Such a conflict could lead to world war three, and that is the area of greatest concern. So the Government would have done well to present a more up-to-date analysis of the threat on the central front, in spite of what the Secretary of State has just said.

In my opening remarks I referred to the possibility of withdrawing the British Army of the Rhine. I want to point out that I was, of course, referring to the non-German standing armies. We come second in line to America in having the largest standing Army there. I think that there was some misunderstanding earlier in that regard.

It was suggested by the hon. Member for Dorset, West (Mr. Spicer) that our NATO Allies were waiting for us to withdraw our troops from the Rhine so that they could reduce their troops. I remind the hon. Gentleman that we make the greatest contribution from our defence budget to NATO, and that we are therefore in a position of some strength in negotiations with our NATO Allies. I said that this would have to be a matter of negotiation. One could not simply withdraw troops and leave a vacuum. There would have to be agreement with other member countries of NATO to fill the vacuum, thus distributing the burden more fairly. When one is the paymaster, one can lean on people.

Mr. Jim Spicer

How does one lean on people? What does one do when one is up against some of these countries? It is perhaps not fair to mention them by name, but they are already welshing on their existing commitments. They are already pulling back. If the hon. Lady believes that we have the wherewithal to lean on them, that we are the paymaster, she lives in cloud-cuckoo-land.

Dr. McDonald

The hon. Gentleman should consider the facts, and the facts are that our contribution to NATO from our own defence budget is over 90 per cent. We pay the highest proportion of our budget to NATO. There would have to be a discussion, and we should have to point out that we were reducing, or further reducing, or withdrawing our troops. If people in NATO were worried about a possible gap on the central front, some arrangement would have to be made, some compromise would have to be reached over a fairer distribution of the expenditure.

The hon. Member for Anglesey (Mr. Best) asked whether we envisaged replacement by German troops. I entirely appreciate the political problems that are involved here. Such a move would be provocative not only to Russia, but to the countries of Eastern Europe, whose memories of the Second World War remain strong. Plainly, that would not be the way to approach the matter. One would have to look to other Continental countries which were perhaps in a better position to perform that task more cheaply.

In the course of the debate hon. Members have rightly expressed their concern about nuclear weapons. There was concern about the use of nuclear weapons by the armed forces on the central front. That was related to the need for adequate supplies of ammunition and conventional weapons there. That concern underlines the need to maintain adequate conventional forces, any reduction of which greatly increases the nuclear threat by lowering the nuclear threshold. The Opposition believe that strong conventional forces should be maintained to ensure that the nuclear option is not one which anyone would wish to exercise in the event of a major confrontation.

Mr. John Browne

The hon. Lady raises an interesting point, but by how much would our conventional forces have to be increased to equal our nuclear deterrent?

Dr. Mcdonald

Trident is not an independent nuclear deterrent. We could not use it on our own against Russia. It could not be accepted as a serious deterrent by Russia because a threat would invite annihilation by the Russians. It is unbelievable that the Russians could take up a threat by us alone—if that were possible—to use a weapon such as Trident.

Each Government must examine its needs for conventional weapons according to the nature of the threat and determine expenditure accordingly. That is why we have expressed our policy in the way that we have.

I want to reiterate some of the important questions that I raised in my opening remarks. What will be the cost of maintaining the British Army of the Rhine, of German civilian support, of variations in the exchange rate, of the need to modernise barracks, and of providing ourselves with adequate ammunition, storage and so on? We should like to have the details of those costs.

We are also concerned about equipment. There was an interesting exchange on one of my points about tank warfare. The Minister referred to the Rapier missile and he is aware that concern has been expressed about the Army and the RAF having different specifications for that weapon? We must ensure that the Services have compatible systems.

The Royal ordnance factories merited one sentence and a list of the ammunition that was provided during the Falklands campaign. That was a passing reference which hardly compensated for the redundancies that were announced during the Falklands campaign and the resulting continuing uncertainty. The Government announced on 20 May that they plan to go ahead with privatisation in the future, which does nothing to allay the fears and anxieties of workers in those factories. They do not know that that will ensure the stability that they have enjoyed as a separate trading company for the Ministry of Defence in which capacity they have succeeded in faithfully meeting the Army's needs for such a long time. I hope that even at this late stage the Government will reconsider those plans.

I trust that in his reply the Minister will be able to answer some of the questions that have been raised, and tell us that the Government are now prepared to reconsider their overriding commitment, and the importance that they give to BAOR, and to look again at the view expressed by both sides of the House about the possibility of further reductions. Perhaps they should even consider ultimate withdrawal.

10.20 pm

The Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. Jerry Wiggin)

In the course of today's debate, and during the course of the debates that we have recently had on the White Paper, our Service men in Germany and our NATO allies on the central front have, I am sure, been listening carefully as various hon. Members have sought to place in their minds a new threat. I do not mean the threat from the Soviet Union, which having occupied Afghanistan now supports the martial law subjugating the people in Poland and sits on NATO's eastern borders with its Warsaw Pact allies, outnumbering NATO by between two and five to one in tanks, artillery and aircraft. I am referring to the calls for massive cuts in BAOR, which must sap the spirit and confidence of our troops in Germany, and delight those in the East who wish to see this country's defence policy again characterised by cuts, cancellations and indecision, generated by an inability to decide what jobs we are to do properly with our finite resources.

We should be delighted if the Opposition Front Bench could explain how, with their massive cuts in defence spending, they could meet the extra commitments that they seem intent on advocating. Let us be in no doubt that their levels of defence spending would leave us not only without Trident but without an Army as well.

Therefore, I wish to make it clear that we shall not be reconsidering the option of withdrawing BAOR. The presence of our Army in Germany is vital for the political and military cohesion of the Alliance. That visible commitment to forward collective defence cannot be forgone.

The hon. Member for Thurrock (Dr. McDonald) discussed the question of the costs of the British forces in Germany. They come to about £1,200 million, excluding equipment costs. As has been said on many occasions, this is 9 per cent. of our defence budget. Therefore, I am puzzled as to where the hon. Lady obtained the figure of 40 per cent. It could be that she is referring to the total cost of European theatre ground forces, including those in this country, and all our air forces, and this strikes me as being a different figure from the cost of our forces in Germany.

Dr. McDonald

I made it clear that I was referring to precisely that. The 40 per cent. refers to the division of defence expenditure in terms of its principal roles. Defence of the central front, which obviously involves forces here as well, can be viewed as one of the principal roles. It was in those terms that I expressed the figure.

Mr. Wiggin

It is a fairly confused line of argument. At the end of the day, we are interested in the defence of the United Kingdom, and we believe that the greatest threat to us lies principally on the central front, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said in his intervention.

The hon. Lady asked me many detailed questions. It is not appropriate to discuss the Select Committee report tonight, but I can tell her that the cost of the barracks programme is about £90 million and that we do not have massive quantities of empty accommodation. I have been discussing that matter this morning. We have adequate storage for our ammunition in Germany, although some of it is not located quite where it ought to be. Therefore—we hope with some NATO infrastructure help—to be relocating some of our ammunition storage.

The question of the Royal ordnance factories is a semantic one. However, I believe that everybody has been thanked. If anybody, by some mishap, has not been spelt out, I cannot comprehend that people do not realise the gratitude that the Government have for all sections of the community and the vast numbers of people involved in all aspects of this operation.

I assure the House that it is not only in Germany where we are striving to keep our support organisation as lean as possible. We have reduced our costs there from about 11 per cent. to 9 per cent. We are doing this everywhere to enable us to invest our resources to the greatest extent possible in the teeth arms. We intend to avoid wasting resources on duplicating those support functions that the civil sector can provide. This is reflected in our White Paper, which this year includes an essay on the use of national resources in defence designed to stimulate thinking about how we should plan to harness the whole of our national resources to defend ourselves. The Times called this the most important section of an attractively presented defence White Paper. One way in which the military and civilians come together is in the Territorial Army. This makes one of the most cost-effective contributions to our defence. The Government are determined that this contribution should be increased. The measures that my right hon. Friend announced earlier in the year are intended to achieve this aim.

My hon. Friend the Member for Anglesey (Mr. Best) raised the question of regular reserves. It is a fact that those who have most recently retired from active service are the most likely to be able to return to active service. We have therefore established the individual reinforcement plan whereby, for some years, those who have recently retired will report annually. We keep their addresses. We can get to them quickly. They have some uniform and equipment and we pay them a bounty. Of course, we should like to be able to send them to Germany, but there has to be some limit on expenditure in this area. Their role in war will be as casualty replacements. It is therefore not always possible to see a way of training them in the precise regiment in which they will serve or in the precise role that they will have to carry out in wartime.

My hon. Friend the Member for Nantwich (Sir N. Bonsor) mentioned the reserve commitment. I join him in saying that we in this country understand the requirement for the average citizen to contribute something in time of war. We saw this national virtue during the Falklands crisis. I hope that we are taking the necessary staeps to channel that virtue in the event of war.

The hon. Member for Isle of Ely (Mr. Freud) cast some unhappy aspersions on various aspects of the welfare of our forces. I accept that there can be improvement in community relations and domestic welfare. I am, however, happy that the Services work enormously hard on these aspects. I refer not only to the Army. All three Services go out of their way to mix with the community, to make their contribution and to be good neighbours. The hon. Gentleman said that they should be rich good neighbours. I am not sure about that. At least, they work hard at being good neighbours.

An enormous amount of time and trouble is spent on welfare. This is not always easy. There are problems. In all the organisations with which I have been connected, I do not believe that the Services can be surpassed in this matter. The hon. Gentleman's final contribution related to Number 2 dress. He recommended that the Army should make it more charismatic. This remark shows an element of ignorance about what happens in the services. There is to be a modified Number 2 dress. I was at the stores and clothing research and development establishment yesterday. It has done a large amount of work. An experiment has been carried out on this.

My hon. Friend the Member for Anglesey, in an excellent philosophical speech, mentioned a number of points on disarmement and gave an analysis that I would commend to those who did not hear it. He talked in a learned manner about the regular reserves.

My hon. Friend the Member for Nantwich also mentioned defending the home base. United Kingdom Land Forces recently did a study on that matter. We are basing our current plans on the assumption that, taking into account the Regular Forces stationed in the United Kingdom, plus the Reserves that will be allocated to UKLF, we shall have more than 80,000 troops equipped, trained and ready to go at the outbreak of war. I hope that that goes some way towards answering his point.

My hon. Friend the Member for Dorset, West (Mr. Spicer) asked me about parachuting. I have heard him ask that question before. He will find that the White Paper, in page 19, deals with the fact that we shall install the radar that is necessary for that capability. He rightly paid tribute to his regiment, and I join him. The Parachute Regiment was wonderfully brave and did a terrific job.

My hon. Friend also mentioned Northern Ireland. I went into more detailed comment on the Northern Ireland operations last week, so I shall not dwell on them now, but I should say that while the spotlight has been focussed elsewhere recently, our Forces in Northern Ireland have continued to carry out their duties in support of the Royal Ulster Constabulary—duties which are often every bit as dangerous and difficult as those undertaken in the South Atlantic—with their customary gallantry and dedication. I know that the House will wish to join me in reassuring them of our continuing gratitude and support.

The security forces continue to achieve notable successes and there have been some good finds of arms and ammunition on both sides of the border, while a welcome development in the campaign to bring men of violence to justice through the courts has been the successful prosecution in the Republic of Ireland of terrorists for offences committed in Northern Ireland.

The hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Cryer) mentioned his concern for the widows of Service men killed in Northern Ireland in the light of the success of the South Atlantic fund, which has now reached about £5 million. Separate charitable arrangements exist through the Army benevolent fund for troops in Northern Ireland and their dependants. The fact that the South Atlantic fund will remove the burden on those Service charities means that those who serve in Northern Ireland and their dependants will receive the same as or rather more than those who serve elsewhere.

The Army Dependants Assurance Trust provides funds for the dependants of those who are killed, and about 50 per cent. of the Army personnel killed in the falklands were members of that trust. The Army Board negotiated the scheme in 1972. It provides a tax-free benefit to dependants of soldiers who die, regardless of the cause, whether on or off duty. Over £10 million will be paid during the next 30 years to dependants of those who died in the Falklands who were members of the voluntary scheme.

The payments are in addition to the benefits payable under the Armed Forces pension scheme, which is the occupational scheme for all the Armed Forces. It provides pensions and lump sum grants for those who retire or who are invalided from the Services. In the case of widows, it provides for the continuation of the husband's full pay for three months from his death, if there are no children, after which the widow receives a pension from the Ministry of Defence and a war widow's pension from the DHSS, both tax-free and index-linked. In addition, she would be paid a substantial lump sum by the Ministry of Defence.

In cash terms the benefits payable under the Armed Forces pension scheme will vary according to individual circumstances, but, for example, a sergeant's widow with two children would receive a pension totalling more than £8,000 and a lump sum of more than £10,000. The details have now been put before the House, and there should be no criticism of the way in which we treat the bereaved.

I have picked up as many points as I can in this good debate, although the hon. Member for Keighley seemed to stray into the wider areas of disarmament and nuclear weapons, with which my hon. Friend the Minister of State dealt extremely well last week. While I share the hon. Gentleman's desire for peace, we differ in the method of obtaining it. I believe that strength and deterrence is the way to peace, but he believes that total disarmament is the way to it. History shows that in an ideal world he could perhaps obtain what he wants, but, sadly, we do not live in an ideal world. We both seek peace, and I acknowledge that.

Mr. Cryer

I do not seek total disarmament. I recognise the need for a conventional Army, Navy and Air Force. Will the Minister answer my question about Menwith Hill? Is his section of the Ministry responsible, or is it the responsibility of the Navy or the Air Force?

Mr. Wiggin

While the hon. Gentleman was talking about Menwith Hill, he had the courtesy to admit that it was unlikely that he would obtain an answer. He will not obtain an answer from me now.

We have said much about the role of the Army and its equipment during the debate, but I should like to conclude by paying tribute to that most valuable and vital resource—our Service men and women. Their high standards of training, expertise and morale are the envy of other nations. We intend to ensure that none of those attributes is undermined.

Mr. Allen McKay (Penistone)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.