Nuclear Weapons (Zero Option)

HC Deb 23 February 1982 vol 18 cc731-2

1. Mr. Norman Atkinson

asked the Secretary of State for Defence which of the British nuclear weapons systems would have to be eliminated if the zero option proposed by President Reagan were to be agreed.

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. John Nott)

None, Sir.

Mr. Atkinson

That is not a very encouraging reply, given that we are perhaps now poised on the verge of meaningful discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Will the Secretary of State give a commitment that Britain intends to encourage whatever signs there are of Europe moving towards establishing a nuclear-free zone, at least for medium-range weapons? If the Soviet Union is arguing that SS20s are being introduced as a replacement for out-of-date SS4s and SS5s, that surely makes sense of what is now being said by President Reagan, that not only will the United States eliminate its own weapons—

Mr. Speaker

Order. The hon. Gentleman is putting an argument instead of asking a question.

Mr. Nott

The zero option requires the elimination of all land-based intermediate range nuclear missiles of the United States and the Soviet Union. We do not have any land-based intermediate range missiles. What the hon. Gentleman said about a European nuclear-free zone makes no sense, because SS20s can be moved to the other side of the Urals and still hit the targets at which they are now aimed. We need a multilaterally organised and verifiable global agreement, not one that is isolated to the European theatre.

Mr. Frank Allaun

Does the Secretary of State see any hope in this proposal, because the Fl1ls, Polaris, the American nuclear bases, and the Tornados would remain as they are? Secondly, the Secretary of State talks about multilateralism, and yet he believes that the bomb has maintained peace. Does he really believe in multilateral disarmament?

Mr. Nott

The hon. Gentleman will know that in nuclear capable aircraft—he mentioned some himself—the Soviets have a superiority over NATO of 6 to 1, and that in theatre nuclear missiles their superiority is 4 to 1. We want to negotiate an arrangement whereby the zero option proposal is a start, and the best way to progress—the hon. Gentleman may not believe me. but I am as passionately interested in progress as he is—is to narrow the area for discussion in the initial stage of negotiation. That is what the zero option proposal was intended to do. We can then broaden the area for discussion, if it is successful.