House of Lords (Elections) (Hansard, 12 May 1981)

§ Sir Brandon Rhys Williams

I beg to move, That leave be given to bring in a Bill to provide for the election by proportional representation of certain members of the House of Lords; to provide that only the members so elected shall be qualified to take place at intervals of five years; to make other provisions for the elections; and for connected purposes. The public are uneasy about the present state of the British Constitution. It is obvious that there is difficulty for both Houses in providing an effective check on the growing power of the Executive. I think it is also clear that the change in the nature of the party structure has brought to the fore a feature of the electoral system, which is the difficulty for minorities of getting a fair measure of representation in the House of Commons. This has led to a feeling of frustration among many electors and to pressure for a change in the electoral system. I think, too, that we must all be aware of the slow decline which has been taking place in this century in the status of the House of Lords, which barely has the confidence now to exercise the limited powers it still has.

There are many possible ways of reforming the Upper House and there are many possible ways of introducing proportional representation. In fact, there are too many. Of course, the strength of our constitution is that it has grown organically. The public are suspicious of experiments, so there has been much discussion about the reforms that are needed in our constitution, but we are making little or no progress in matching the mood of the electors with practical plans for reform. My Bill is an attempt to make proposals which are quite specific, which would be effective, but which would involve the absolute minimum of change.

Obviously the Lords contains a strong hereditary element. What weakens it as a legislative body for many people is the continued right to vote of the peers by succession, particularly those who do not regularly attend. I do not deny the value of the hereditary principle: it would be as foolish as to say that a man can no longer learn anything from his father. The system of primogeniture used to give a man who inherited his father's estates real power which the Crown had to attend to, but that is no longer the case. The public does not accept that succession to a peerage automatically gives a man the right to challenge an elected Government, based on a majority in the Commons, even if it was only elected by a minority of the voters.

Then there is the nominated element, that is to say, the life peers, the judges, the bishops. Of course they include many people of distinction and influence. It is right that our constitution should provide them with a forum. In an earlier Bill I made the suggestion that only the life peers should in future be allowed to vote, so that in effect the power of the Second Chamber to challenge legislation would lie with the nominated Members only. Some Members, I know, favour the idea of a nominated Upper House, but I am convinced it would be ineffectual and unrepresentative. We have to base the power of a reformed House of Lords on election, like the Senate in the United States and in the majority of other democratic countries.

To abolish the present House and to set up an elected senate instead would, in my opinion, be too drastic a change. We do not want to lose the contributions of the Members of the present House who have something of 629 significance to say, and it is extremely important in our constitutional reform that we should safeguard continuity. I am therefore recommending that we should introduce into the present House of Lords an elected element without excluding those who do not choose to stand, or perhaps do not get elected.

Some years ago Lord Home's committee suggested that a minority of the House should be drawn from the existing Members by some system of selection and that they should then have equal rights with an elected majority. This proposal has the advantage that it does not create two classes of Members, but in my view it has the fatal flaw that the voting pattern in the Upper House would be decided by the selection process and not by the election process.

It so happens that Lords have themselves evolved procedures which accept the principle that there should be two classes of Member—that there should be voting and non-voting Members in certain activities of the House. I could point obviously to the fact that only the Law Lords participate in matters which directly concern the activities of the Courts. Even to the end of the nineteenth century that was not invariably the case, but it has certainly become the rule now. So in matters of law the Lords themselves have evolved the principle that there should be two classes of Member.

I understand also that on the Select Committees of the Lords it is the custom that anyone may speak who chooses to do so, but that only certain nominated Members are entitled to exercise a vote. In proposing, therefore, that the right to vote on questions of legislation should be limited to the elected Members, which is the principal element in my Bill, I am not suggesting an altogether new departure. I am not, of course, recommending any change in the powers of the Lords, which in effect are to hold up legislation for about six months and so to force the Government of the day to think again.

As to the elections themselves, I suggest that the term of election should be fixed for five years. I do not think that we should allow the Lords to be dissolved at the discretion of the Prime Minister of the day. I suggest that there should he not more than about 250 elected Members. We do not want to swamp the existing House. I also envisage that, in the first instance, the majority of the candidates who get selected for the winnable seats would be Members who are known to have been active and successful Members of the existing House, so that one would not be adding as many as 250 completely fresh faces. One would really be giving the power to vote on legislation to those Members who are already known to be most active and respected in the existing House.

I also recommend that the election should be by a system of proportional representation, although I recognise that that is not an essential element in the proposal. I think that it would have the distinct advantage that the composition of the upper House might well be different—and probably would, in present circumstances, be different—from that of the Commons. We do not want to make the House of Lords into an echo-chamber of the Commons, on the lines of the disastrous Crossman proposals which this House rightly rejected some 10 years ago.

I also recommend that there should be about 80 constituencies, with three Members in each. As I understand it, the single transferable vote system gives 630 reasonable proportionality, with three-Member constituencies, without giving the party machines too much power to exclude people of independent mind, as the party list system would tend to do. Yet it would not open up the possibility of a chaotic party structure emerging in the House of Lords, including perhaps freak or anti-democratic elements.

I know that some people in this country are nervous of proportional representation because they think that it would allow extremists, of Right or Left to gain a foothold in one or other House. But as I understand it, in three-Member constituencies candidates would have to score at least 25 per cent. to be elected. It might well be convenient to use the constituency boundaries already drawn up by the Boundary Commissions for the European elections.

My Bill has been drafted with the help of experts on the workings of the Lords and on electoral reform. It would strengthen the Lords without making decisive government impracticable. It would introduce proportional representation without interfering with the tradition that the Government is founded on a majority in this House, elected in the usual way.

I believe that it would help to focus the debate on constitutional reform inside and outside this House if there were in print a specific recommendation on this subject. I realise that there must be much more debate, but at least I hope that the House will give me leave to introduce my Bill this Session.

§ Mr. Ivor Stanbrook (Orpington)

I desire to oppose the motion, Mr. Speaker.

There is a case for the reform of the House of Lords, but the reform proposed would be disastrous. My hon. Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir B. Rhys Williams), in his well-meaning and somewhat unworldly way, is leading us on to the path towards the destruction of this ancient institution of ours. He perceives that this ancient institution is somewhat unwell and his treatment for it is a dose of medicine to which it is unaccustomed—namely, democracy—and which is likely to kill the patient.

This honourable House of ours has, for more than 700 years, been the only elected Chamber of this Parliament. Indeed, the history of our democratic government has been the story of the evolution of this place to its present position of predominance in our constitution.

We are elected from our 635 constituencies at frequent intervals. We try to be in close touch with all our constituents. We reflect the contemporary need and the popular will.

The House of Lords, however, is none of these things, nor should it be. That is not its function. We owe it a tremendous debt for the magnificent way in which it has served our country over the centuries. It has brought to bear on great broad issues a cool, dispassionate examination. It has brought to bear upon our legislation detailed, expert and experienced consideration. It serves this country well.

But none of those attributes is due to the Lords being elected. None of them is due to any democratic nonsense. Its very strength is its independence. Its members are not beholden to anyone. They can disregard the public 631 clamour. They can consult only the public will. The Lords can, in a more unprejudiced fashion, away from the public clamour, assess the public good.

It is true that there is a need for some reform, but the introduction of politicians into the other place in recent years has not noticeably improved its quality. It is true that the numbers of those who attend may need pruning. Many are not interested in, and do not understand, its proceedings, nor do they desire to take part in them.

Equally, we need to bring into the other place, at least for the time that they hold office, the great leaders of our modern corporations, including the trade unions and the unestablished Churches, so that they can play their part in the deliberations of the upper House in the way that our best judges do. But none of those people would be brought in if they had to participate in elections like squabbling politicians. Yet we need them.

Clearly, we need a House of Lords. We need a revising Chamber. The present one does that job very well and should only be improved, but it cannot be improved by vulgarising it.

For those reasons, I ask the house to reject the motion.

Division 178]	[4.27 pm
AYES
Alton, David	Miscampbell, Norman
Ancram, Michael	Morrison, Hon C. (Devizes)
Atkins, Robert(Preston N)	Myles, David
Baker, Nicholas (N Dorset)	Needham, Richard
Benyon, Thomas (A'don)	Owen, Rt Hon Dr David
Benyon, W. (Buckingham)	Parris, Matthew
Best, Keith	Patten, Christopher (Bath)
Blackburn, John	Prentice, Rt Hon Reg
Bottomley, Peter (W'wich W)	Price, Sir David (Eastleigh)
Bradley, Tom	Rathbone, Tim
Brocklebank-Fowler, C.	Roper, John
Colvin, Michael	St. John-Stevas, Rt Hon N.
Crouch, David	Sandelson, Neville
Dempsey, James	Shersby, Michael
Dorrell, Stephen	Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)
Ellis, Tom (Wrexham)	Squire, Robin
Fisher, Sir Nigel	Steel, Rt Hon David
Fletcher-Cooke, Sir Charles	Temple-Morris, Peter
Fox, Marcus	Thornton, Malcolm
Freud, Clement	Viggers, Peter
Grimond, Rt Hon J.	Wainwright, R.(Colne V)
Heddle, John	Waldegrave, Hon William
Howells, Geraint	Watson, John
Hunt, John (Ravensbourne)	Weetch, Ken
Johnston, Russell (Inverness)	Wigley, Dafydd
Kilfedder, James A.	Wilkinson, John
Kimball, Marcus	Wilson, Gordon (Dundee E)
Knox, David	Wolfson, Mark
Lennox-Boyd, Hon Mark
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)	Tellers for the Ayes:
Lyell, Nicholas	Mr. Tim Renton and Sir Brandon Rhys Williams.
Lyons, Edward (Bradfd W)
Maclennan, Robert