HC Deb 23 March 1981 vol 1 cc780-8

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Lord James Douglas-Hamilton.]

2.17 am
Mr. D. A. Trippier (Rossendale)

Almost three years ago the House was presented with arguments in favour of a drive towards the interoperability and standardisation of NATO weaponry. A similar call has echoed through the parliamentary halls and military ranks of many other nations in the Alliance for a generation. A number of successes have been achieved, but for the most part the call has remained unanswered.

It has been the policy of our nation for years to support any initiatives towards the goals of interoperability and standardisation taken by the Alliance as a whole or by individual members of the Alliance. I feel that the time has come for the Government actively to step up every possible initiative, for the problem is too great for passive solution.

The importance of such an effort and the immediacy of the problem that it attempts to correct is evidenced by a glance at the current state of affairs in Central Europe. Hon. Members will recall the latest statement on the Defence Estimates presented to the House by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence in which the grave imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact conventional forces was outlined. The Warsaw Pact forces enjoy a 2.8:1 superiority over NATO forces in artillery and in main battle tanks, and a 2.3:1 superiority in fixed-wing tactical aircraft. The state of affairs in the Eastern Atlantic is equally unacceptable, with NATO submarines and surface ships outnumbered by a ratio of 1.5:1. Certainly military advantage cannot be measured purely in terms of armaments, but the preponderance of Warsaw Pact strength in these two crucial area cannot be taken lightly.

Supplementing NATO's conventional forces are her theatre and strategic nuclear forces, almost all of which are supplied by the United States. The disparity in strength between the Warsaw Pact's theatre nuclear forces and those of the Alliance is even more critical than that in conventional forces, although steps have been taken very recently by the Allies to correct the problem by the proposed deployment of 464 ground-launched cruise missiles and 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles in Western European countries.

The strategic nuclear force balance is more even at present, with the forces of the United States and the Soviet Union being roughly equivalent. We must keep in mind at all times, however, that the Alliance's nuclear forces exist primarily as a deterrent and that every conceivable effort must be made to maintain their strength at a sufficient level to prevent their use.

The strengthening of NATO's conventional forces is also a fundamental goal, and this strengthening must be achieved in two ways: both by a great acceleration in the development and procurement of armaments, and by a commensurate increase in the efficiency and effectiveness of present forces. A numerical parity with the Warsaw Pact nations in conventional forces is both unfeasible and undesirable. The vast majority of the pact's armaments are supplied by the Soviet Union, whose centrally controlled economy allows her to channel resources and manpower into the defence sector in a fashion and magnitude which is unacceptable in the competitive free economic systems of the West.

It is necessary, therefore, that we should also strive to improve the effectiveness of our present forces, specifically by ensuring that the forces of the different nations in the Alliance will be able to work together as a unified whole in the face of an enemy attack. It is in this sense that interoperability of NATO weaponry is a pressing need.

Interoperability has been defined by NATO as The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to, and accept services from, other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate efficiently together. Four major problem areas can be identified: the interfacing of communication and other electronic equipment; the interchangeability of munitions; the cross-servicing of aircraft; and the interchangeability of components and spare parts. The House will surely realise the importance of these concepts to the effective collaboration of NATO forces in the defence of the West. Intercommunication between allied forces is critical in a coalition effort, and the increased sophistication of communication equipment in recent years has multiplied the problems of interfacing between different systems. The ability to interchange ammunition in each class is important both at distribution points and on the battlefield. Aircraft must be able to land at the nearest allied base in time of war for refuelling, rearming and minor repairs.

The importance of the interoperability of NATO weaponry was emphasised in 1979 when the United States conducted a paper exercise, code-named "Nifty Nugget", simulating NATO involvement in an all-out conventional war. The generals found that the intense concentration in the last decade on the production of nuclear weapons had led to a scarcity of conventional bullets and bombs.

Many sources of these types of basic ammunition had dried up, and most of the remainder had become outmoded. In this simulation American forces found themselves in the embarrassing situation of having guns without bullets. If it were not simply a paper exercise but real war, the safety of the Alliance would depend on the capability of American forces to use ammunition produced in other NATO nations such as ours. That is but one illustration of the dangers of a lack of interoperability in the allied forces.

In spite of the evident danger, an incredible array of difficulties still exist. Recent surveys list 50 different types of ammunition, 36 different types of fire control radar, 16 different types of auxiliary fuel tanks at least 36 different fuel nozzles and at least 28 different power units. In joint manoeuvres several years ago, the Belgian and West German armies found that the fuel pipes and gauges of the two forces' vehicles would not work together, even though they used the same fuel. They further found that West German stretchers would not fit on the racks of Belgian army ambulances.

Some problems are more pressing than others, of course, but the fact remains that a plethora of major difficulties would ensue in wartime and there is no doubt that countless problems have yet to be discovered.

A variety of successes in the attempt to increase interoperability of NATO weapons have already been realised. The most recent and most important was the decision last year to use the same bullet, Belgian 5.56 mm round called the SS109, for all the Alliance's rifles and light machine guns. That change will save Her Majesty's Armed Forces approximately £5 million. I cannot resist the temptation to point out to the Minister that the saving of £5 million would adequately cover the cost of retaining 41 Commando Royal Marines. My hon. Friend will be aware that its planned disappearance is not only a blow to me and, I believe, the country as a whole but a significant blow to the finest corps that God ever gave to man.

Tests concluded in 1979 showed that the portable laser target marker and ranger developed by our Armed Forces is interoperable with the United States' army's precision guided munition which homes on to a target marked by a laser system. A joint tactical information distribution system is presently under development by our nation in co-operation with America, France and the Federal Republic of Germany to provide means of interconnecting critical communications between tactical forces. More modest advances include standard containers and pallets which are interoperable with all mechanical handling equipment. Nevertheless, these advances have been few when compared with the work which remains to be done.

Before proposing a fresh solution to the problem, let us consider the past solutions that have met with limited success. In 1975 the North Atlantic Council formed an ad hoc committee on equipment interoperability. That has since been succeeded by an armaments standardisation and interoperability division under NATO's military committee. In 1976, the United States Congress passed an Act requiring that any equipment procured for American NATO forces must by interoperable with the equipment of other NATO nations. A House of Representatives sub-committee hearing a year later revealed that some slow progress had been made.

In Britain, responsible Government spokesmen have for years endorsed interoperability as a worthwhile and necessary goal. It is evident that these proclamations and actions by NATO and individual Governments have been on too small a scale to be effective to any great extent. For a problem of such importance nothing short of a concerted effort among all NATO member nations will suffice. The discussion of such an effort must inevitably include the problem of standardisation, to which I now turn.

Standardisation, as the Minister knows well, is the use of identical or nearly identical armaments by all members of the Alliance. The case for standardisation is both economic and military. The defence sector of industry in the European Community receives armament orders in excess of £13 billion a year while in the United States the figure is in excess of £15 billion. The redundance of much of this expenditure is evident when it is realised that the Alliance has at present 100 different types of ships, 23 different families of tactical combat aircraft, seven different main battle tanks, 100 different types of tactical missiles and 31 different types of anti-tank weapons.

Armaments collaboration by NATO member States can save billions of pounds annually in research and development costs by eliminating duplication of effort and in procurement costs by taking advantage of longer production runs. These cost savings would allow the Alliance to purchase more weapons, this decreasing the numerical imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces without distorting the economies of the Western nations. On the military side, former NATO Commander Andrew Goodpaster has estimated that at no extra cost military effectiveness could be increased by at least 30 per cent. overall and by as much as 300 per cent. in some tactical air units as a result of standardisation.

As in the case of interoperability, our Governmant have long encouraged standardisation through collaboration with other countries in weapon development. Many of our major new weapon systems of the past decade have been developed either bilaterally with France or trilaterally with Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, including the Jaguar and MRCA aircraft, the Martel air-to-surface missile and the 155 mm artillery system. Other important NATO collaborations include the Roland short-range air-defence system, developed jointly by France and West Germany and produced with the United States, the United States developed the F-16 fighter aircraft, procured by a five-member NATO consortium, and the Boeing E-3A aircraft funded by a group of 13 NATO nations, which, along with our own Nimrod surveillance aircraft, will form the basis of the airborne early warning and control system.

Attempts have been made to improve inter-European weapons collaboration by the formation of various organisations, including the West European Union, FINABEL and the Independent European Programme Group, none of which is directly connected with NATO. Of these, the IEPG is presently the most effective, not least because it enables France to participate. The group initiated by the NATO Defence Ministers seeks to harmonise national weapon development and procurement programmes in order to avoid duplication of effort. The planning committee is under British chairmanship. It also attempts to iron out the political and economic difficulties of collaboration and to maintain a transatlantic dialogue with the United States—the two-way street to which I intend to refer. In spite of the group's continued support at ministerial level in all the countries involved, however, it has no power to make and enforce decisions of its own, but can only organise and identify possible programmes of co-operation.

All hon. Members, I am sure, are aware of the main barriers to international collaboration on a NATO-wide scale. The first is the right of the sovereign and free member States to determine their own defence policies. France is the most extreme, but not by any means the sole, example. The second and more troublesome is the competition and interests of rival industries in the free Western economy and the capability of these industries to affect the political decision-making process in their respective nations. Governments and industries often fear that collaboration will jeopardise technological development and reduce industrial output in the nation's own defence sector.

Another barrier has tended to be a lack of coincidence in the timing of requirements. Economic barriers are heightened when transatlantic collaboration is the issue. The proverbial two-way street in trade and procurement between Europe and North America is still decidedly one-sided, with east-bound traffic far surpassing west-bound traffic in volume. Economic deadlocks have suppressed the flow of traffic and caused many head-on collisions. In the eyes of many NATO experts, it is the Europeans who are driving on the wrong side of the road.

For decades the United States invested little in the European arms market. In the past four years, however, President Carter and the Pentagon publicly and strongly advocated American purchase of European armaments, and took steps, such as repealing the buy-American provisions, to facilitate these purchases. It is widely agreed on both sides of the Atlantic that these initiatives cannot succeed unless the European nations act collectively. The United States does not always find it cost-beneficial to deal bilaterally with individual European nations, and many European Governments shy away from such arrangements for fear that their industries will become mere sub-contractors to giant American corporations.

Only when Europe presents a unified economic front will traffic flow freely on both sides of the street, and only when she presents a unified military front will this traffic result in an increase in interoperability and standardisation. The principal organ for discussing and striving for interoperability and standardisation is NATO's European group.

The military decisions themselves, in terms of outlining armaments requirements of the Alliance and how they are to be met, must be made within the NATO structure. In order to ensure that the needs of the European nations are best met, however, both for the sake of the individual nations and of the Alliance as a whole, Europe must once again act on a unified basis.

Although the concepts of interoperability and standardisation are obviously related, and though the advantages ensuing from both are similar, the goals are not irrevocably linked. Disagreement over the optimal amount of standardisation and over the methods of achieving it, both of which are quite creditable, need not and must not affect the continuation and intensification of the drive towards interoperability. Interoperability of present weaponry is a topic that must be approached by nations both individually and in groups, each examining its own armaments and making any changes necessary to make them compatible with similar armaments of other NATO member nations. Interoperability of future systems need not even involve collaboration in development of procurement, as long as it is established through NATO's Conference of National Armament Directors or the IEPG that the systems being introduced are fully compatible with similar systems being planned by other nations.

Standardisation is a necessary but ultimate goal. Some may say that it is utopian. The economic and political problems accompanying it are much more complex than those associtated with interoperability. Serious discussions and planning of a standardisation structure along the lines that I have described must be concurrent with an immediate application of effort to the problem of interoperability.

The Government must now take the lead in ensuring full co-operation among European nations in pursuit of these vital objectives. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister should now call upon President Reagan and his newly appointed Secretary of Defence to take the lead in conducting a clear transatlantic dialogue of ideas and action to reach goals, especially as her recent American trip was so successful. This dialogue between our two countries has been strengthened as a result.

2.40 am
The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force (Mr. Geoffrey Pattie)

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Rossendale (Mr. Trippier) on so comprehensively and convincingly setting out his case.

Clearly, with the seriousness of the threat facing us, to which my hon. Friend has drawn attention, we must ensure that the resources at our disposal are used in the most effective and efficient way. But, however attractive in concept, that does not mean that the separate nations in the Alliance should all use the same equipment. That would be to deny the individual character of the countries in the Alliance, and to fail to recognise real and genuine differences—differences in geography, in tactical concepts, in economic and technical background, in conscript and professional forces. I do not seek to emphasise these differences. Indeed the record of the allies in working together within the NATO framework shows that they are not a barrier to success. But the policies we adopt must be in accord with realities of the situation. And, indeed, within reason a variety of weaponry provides some strengths—a wider spectrum of capability against which an enemy must provide and a greater flexibility in the use of NATO forces.

The key to our approach has therefore been to recognise the value of maintaining an alliance within which 15 sovereign nations freely choose to work and to concentrate on encouraging collaboration and improving interoperability between the various armed forces and between their equipments. My hon. Friend rightly stresses this aspect. The case is accepted by the allies and it is accepted by Britain.

Standardisation does not require identical equipment. Considerable effort is devoted to the agreement of standards which ensure the necessary degree of interoperability. These, for instance, cover procedures for refuelling or rearming. Standards for the sort of grass root matters referred to are not neglected and cover, for example, electrical connectors or couplings which enable trucks of one country to tow trailers from another. There are many such examples. There are, as one instance, over 55 priority 1 STANAGS dealing with the standardisation and interoperability of components and spare parts. With such agreed standards nations are prepared to set about the task of adapting current stocks; but, perhaps more important, they become the design criteria for the next generations of main equipments. The results of this substantial effort are not eye catching but they represent solid and essential progress.

More obvious examples such as the strategic communications, command and control, air defence and early warning systems require a very high degree of standardisation. This essential need can best be met through provision of equipment built to common design specifications. In these areas a common approach is being successfully developed, and much of the procurement of the equipment required will be through contracts supported by the common infrastructure fund.

Optimising the combined effort of the different national forces involves examining any differences in procedure, tactics, command and control and equipment. All these methods have to be devised to avoid the creation of weak spots that could be exploited by an enemy. This means adopting commonly agreed standards but not necessarily identical equipment, a distinction already drawn by my hon. Friend.

Typical areas identified in the long-term defence programme are command, control and communications; cross-servicing of aircraft, so that one nation can, for example, refuel and rearm the aircraft of another; and components and spare parts. High priority areas of this nature have received immediate attention. For instance, British aircraft committed to NATO are, or will be, equipped with standard NATO interfaces or will carry adaptors. Material standardisation is being brought into line with standardisation agreements. And there are, in addition to the recent agreement on rifle ammunition which was referred to, important agreements on the interchangeability of future 155mm ammunition. The planning procedures now being introduced as a direct result of the LTDP provide specifically for the major NATO commanders to highlight their priorities for interoperability, and so we can be sure that these will continue to be identified and acted upon.

Impressive figures have been quoted for the number of different weapon systems available to the members of the Alliance. Indeed, the variety is probably greater than it should be. However, it must be clear that we cannot talk in terms of just a few basic weapons to do the job. A whole range of systems is required to undertake the various military tasks. In one area—anti-tank weapons—quite separate missiles are required for the short, medium and long ranges, with further equipment for helicopter-launched weapons. Taking into account quite normal overlaps in the generations of equipment in service and some degree of variation between different users, perhaps 20 anti-tank missiles in service might be taken as a minimum figure to which we might aspire. A not dissimilar pattern might be found in other areas. Figures quoted simply by themselves can therefore be misleading.

I should like to take up particularly the point raised about national industrial interests. These of course represent a very considerable factor in negotiations toward greater equipment standardisation and collaboration. It is, I think, important to recognise the effect that the expenditure on defence developments, concentrated as it often is on high technology areas, can have by stimulating innovation and raising the competence of the industrial base. In many NATO countries, too, the defence industry plays a direct and important part in the economy. This needs to be very much borne in mind when standardisation is being canvassed, because the strength of the Alliance depends as much and more on the health of the economies of its members as on their armed preparedness. Additionally, I believe that a strong European defence industrial base and an ability to manufacture its own weapon systems is vital to a European sense of involvement in the fortunes of the Alliance and in its own security. If to achieve this we must pay a price in some duplication of weapon systems, that may be a price that we should be willing to pay.

America provides a major and essential contribution to the Alliance. Its position and economic and industrial strength has, not surprisingly, resulted in an historical imbalance in the arms trade between the United States and Europe. However, the willingness of the Carter Administration to improve the degree of real transatlantic co-operation has been endorsed by the new Administration in Washington. Secretary Weinberger was receptive to the argument of both the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence during their recent visits that it was in the interests of the Alliance as a whole that a greater balance of the two-way-street should be achieved.

However, Europe must work to ensure that opportunities are realised. It has the equipment to meet American requirements, as the sale of the Rapier and Roland systems has shown. The IEPG is bringing together European views within a transatlantic dialogue, covering many of the issues raised by my hon. Friend, including dual production arrangements on a series of projects, development of the families of weapons concept and European Systems, all of attraction to the United States.

NATO is well provided with the machinery to meet the needs that we have been debating. That is not to say that the machinery may not from time to time need examination to ensure that it is efficient and well directed. Britain is keen to play its full part in this constructive examination, especially against the background of the long-term defence programme, one part of which, titled "Rationalisation", was dedicated to identifying ways of getting better value from what NATO spends on equipment.

The record is not as good as it should be, but it is improving. Apart from the immediate advantages such collaborative activity brings to improved standardisation and interoperability, I see it contributing through bringing the services and industrialists in the different nations closer together. The habits of working together are bound to lead forward towards a greater degree of common thinking and specification, which is at the heart of improved standardisation.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at thirteen minutes to Three o'clock am.