HC Deb 15 December 1981 vol 15 cc280-6

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Mather.]

1.8 am

Mr. Richard Needham (Chippenham)

I always follow debates on Northern Ireland with some trepidation, and also some nostalgia as my ancestors represented South Down for four generations without ceasing. I am now of course, only too happy to represent Chippenham, about which I shall speak today.

I am sorry to keep my hon. Friend the Minister so late into the night to discuss the proposed closure of RAF Kemble, particularly as only half of it is in my constituency. Nevertheless, it is an important half, as there are 400 people on the base who unfortunately seem more than likely to lose their jobs. Half of them live within my constituency, in villages where there is most unlikely to be any form of alternative employment. I am therefore sure that my hon. Friend will not mind my asking the questions that I wish to ask to ensure that the reasons behind the Government's decision can stand up to the full light of day and are valid.

I accept at once that where the tail of the RAF can be cut back at the expense of the teeth it is vital that that should be done. Equally, there is an obligation on the Government to show that they have considered properly and openly the alternatives and have explained them to the people involved.

The timing of these announcements has not been particularly helpful. I realise that the defence review took place in July and that the timing of this closure at the end of July was perhaps fortuitous, but it did not help when large numbers of people about to go on holiday were told about the proposed closure and it was impossible to contact any Minister about it until my hon. Friend was appointed in October. That meant that two and a half months had gone by. Obviously people spent a miserable summer wondering, fearing and doubting about their future without knowing exactly what would happen.

My hon. Friend has been extremely helpful in speeding up the review, and he announced a feasibility study at the beginning of this month, but we are approaching Christmas; the next holiday period is now upon us. I believe that my hon. Friend has asked for answers to his consultation document by the beginning of January. Once again, time is short. I ask him as passionately as I am able at this late hour to extend that consultation period so that all involved have a chance of putting their views.

The feasibility study is the key issue. While my constituents understand the need to consider cuts in the maintenance of the RAF, they have been given no reasons or figures to show why it should be Kemble as opposed to anywhere else. The proposal is that much of the work now carried out at Kemble, particularly the servicing element, should be moved to Abingdon. Why should the work be transferred to Abingdon? Why cannot the work be transferred from Abingdon to Kemble?

The reason given by my hon. Friend in the feasibility study is a wonderful piece of convoluted English: RAF Abingdon has a war role as a Collocated Operating Base". I can only say that the word "collocated" is not often used in the pubs around my part of the world. If my hon. Friend wants to use such words in a feasibility study, it would be enormously helpful to my constituents if it could be explained to them as well as to their simple-minded Member of Parliament what they mean.

Mr. Nicholas Baker (Dorset, North)

Hear, hear.

Mr. Needham

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that sedentary intervention. In his rustic way he obviously does not know what "collocated" means either.

The study goes on to say: RAF Kemble on the other hand has no war role and no permanent commitment to the servicing of any of the RAF's long-term front line aircraft". What is that war role? I do not want to be brushed off with the secrecies of war roles. Why cannot it be distributed equally advantageously to Kemble? It would be of enormous help if my hon. Friend would tell the House, and particularly those involved, why these services cannot be committed to Kemble rather than Abingdon. If it is for housing reasons, there are many empty RAF houses at Lyneham and Hullavington and there are Army bases at South Cerney which are not used. Why cannot the base be moved to Kemble rather than Abingdon and the housing that is required for the Service personnel be provided there? There is plenty of it and it is not being used. What are the costs involved in moving it?

In the feasibility study there is a vague allowance of £3 million for the RAF base if at some stage it is sold. What about the houses in Abingdon? Could not they be sold? Abingdon is not as rural or as remote as the areas around Kemble. Is it not possible that the amount of money that the RAF would gain from selling Abingdon would be greater than it could get from selling Kemble? We do not know. Nothing is put forward in the feasibility study except those two convoluted sentences—which mean very little—on why Kemble should have been chosen rather than Abingdon.

It is suggested by the Government that the reason for the move is that there are large numbers of RAF personnel who can undertake the work that is currently done by the civilian staff. If that is true, what on earth are those RAF personnel doing now? If they are under-employed, why are they under-employed? According to the figures put out by the Ministry, on which the civilian work force at Kemble have calculated their figures, it would require an additional 208 Service men to undertake the task currently done at Kemble. Are there 208 people now sitting around at Abingdon waiting to undertake this work? If they are overseas and they are to be brought back to Abingdon to do the work, what will happen in the event of war'? Will they then be sent back to the bases where the servicing arrangements for the aircraft will have to be carried out? Then who will do the work if the civilians are no longer capable of doing it? Those are perfectly reasonable questions, and I ask my hon. Friend to reply to them.

The feasibility study suggests that the storage task put forward could be done either at St. Athan, where there are six hangars, or at Shawbury, providing the temperature there does not drop as it did during the last week. There are apparently six hangars that are currently unused at St. Athan, although my intelligence tells me that five of them are full of "green godesses", Canberras and bulk storage. It is not clear how the storage will be able to be maintained at St. Athan, It is also worth pointing out that about 5 per cent. of the space used at Kemble is used on behalf of Abingdon. I ask my hon. Friend to say whether there is now space at Abingdon that can take up the 5 per cent. at Kimble.

The storage use at Kemble is based upon the immediate readiness reserve, which is what the civilian staff at Kemble have to undertake to get the aeroplanes ready for use. The immediate readiness reserve is three days, and the short-term reserve storage is one month. The people employed at Kemble have the job of getting those planes ready. There is no mention of that in the feasibility study. When those planes are stored at St. Athan or Shawbury, what will happen to the immediate readiness reserve. Will the planes be left there? Who will do the job?

The feasibility study states that £250,000 will be required at Shawbury to get the hangars there up to standard. Where does that figure come from? Is it plucked out of the air? How is it made up? It is a nice rounded figure. Does it include the three-phase electrical requirements and the other electrical installations that will be needed there? Can the Minister show how the figure is made up and how it has been arrived at?

With regard to the surface finishing task which is done at Kemble and which it is proposed to move to St. Athan, the feasibility study says that the cost of doing this would be £30,000. How is that figure made up? New drains will need to be established at the hangar which is to undertake the task. There will need to be showers. All sorts of alterations will need to be made. Where did the figure of £30,000 come from?

What about the work loading that is put forward in the feasibility study? Apparently the hangar which is to undertake this important job is so narrow that it is not possible to have the aeroplanes that are to be finished there other than in line, so that if there are five aeroplanes and one in the middle needs to be moved the others will have to be moved. Figures are put forward in the feasibility study for the number of hours that it will take and the improvements that will come about in productivity through having a two-shift system, but there seems to have been no consideration of the problem of the movement of aircraft in and out of the hangars.

The feasibility study also shows that the additional establishment necessary at St. Athan would broadly be in a line with the reduction at RAF Kemble if it were to lose the surface finish task, and that the present RAF capacity for surface finishing could therefore be retained and even enhanced. Even if one accepts that contentionm, there are 50 technical, unskilled or semi-skilled people at Kemble involved in the task. Are they to be offered jobs at St. Athan? Are they to be moved? At least that would be 50 off the redundancies. I should be grateful if my hon. Friend would reply to that question.

With regard to the Red Arrows and their movement, there are some suggestions that they would be sent to Lincolnshire. Are their costs included in the distances that they will now have to fly? The majority of their displays are conducted in the South of England. Therefore, they will require additional petrol, additional fuel, in order to get to their displays. Has that been taken into consideration? If not, how much would it cost?

I hope that my hon. Friend will not feel that those involved in this little rural area—which relies almost entirely for its survival on the base—are critical of the way in which the feasibility study has been laid out.

I ask my hon. Friend to consider the cost of the annexes, because this is an important point. In annex B, the amount laid down for the saving of MT fuel is put at £31,000 per year. The amount that is being spent on that fuel at the moment is £27,000. In annex B, the amount laid down for the saving of heating fuel is £284,000, but that includes the heating costs of the Red Arrows. There will be the heating costs of the officers and the men concerned, wherever they go. If we take No. 5 maintenance unit, the figure is £248,000, so that the figure of £284,000 is wrong. Much more importantly, the saving figure in respect of works under annex B is given as £449,000. The actual saving in closing down the maintenance unit, I suggest to my hon. Friend, is £306,000, because the £449,000 includes the Red Arrows' married quarters, the RAF station cost, and RAF officers' married quarters. Those are not costs borne by No. 5 maintenance unit. They would obviously have to be added to the costs that the Red Arrows will incur wherever they go. It is a substantial sum and if those figures, the only ones that it has been possible to check, are wrong, the other figures may not be right.

The annex also states that there will be a saving in civilian costs through employees being made redundant or moved elsewhere, but it adds to that figure the number of civilian posts that will be re-established elsewhere and assumes a total of 15 civilian posts.

The feasibility study says that 50 additional people will be required to undertake the finishing costs at St. Athan. Why have they not been included? Why is there a reference to 15 in one column and 50 in another? Why is my hon. Friend certain that the additional costs will amount to only £2½ million against savings of£3½million?

That worry and the figure of £1 million that is put forward for moving costs are causing great concern and doubt. It is up to Parliament to check whether the savings are made, and when the livelihood of people are being put at risk we must make sure that costs are worked out carefully and sensibly so that the proposed savings occur and we do not end up with additional costs being greater than expected.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for putting forward the final plan, and all local people would welcome the Americans taking over the base. Many American bases in the area have been enormously successful, but my constituents want an assurance that, if the Americans take over the base, jobs will be provided for local people and the local community will be helped with its desperate problem of 400 job losses, which could result in enormous hardship in certain villages near the base that can offer little chance of people who have given enormous service to the RAF ever being able to find work again.

1.27 am
The Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces (Mr. Jerry Wiggin)

I fully appreciate the concern that my hon. Friend the Member for Chippenham (Mr. Needham) expressed about the possible impact on employment prospects in his constituency—a concern that is, of course, shared by my hon. Friend the Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. Ridley)—if RAF Kemble were to close. I emphasise "if', because, as my hon. Friend knows, we have not taken the decision to close Kemble and will not do so until the consultative process with the trade unions, which is now in train, has been completed and we have had a chance to consider their views. That will be early in the new year. It is very important to stress that point right at the start.

If I may pick up one point that my hon. Friend made, the word "collocate" is self-explanatory if pronounced properly. If my hon. Friend had pronounced it correctly he would have understood its meaning.

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said in July that the unions and the work force would be fully consulted before decisions were taken. We are doing that now. While my hon. Friend's points are well taken, therefore, he is perhaps premature in making them.

Soon after my arrival at the Ministry, I discussed fully with my hon. Friend the Member for Chippenham the reasons for setting up the studies into the future of RAF Kemble. I have since kept him and my hon. Friend the Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury fully informed about every aspect of the possible way ahead. My hon. Friend the Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury apologises for not being present. Many of his constituents work at RAF Kemble and he has taken a consistent and persistent interest in the matter.

It would be helpful if the House was aware of the background to the proposals. RAF Kemble is the home of the RAF aerobatic display team, the Red Arrows, and No. 5 maintenance unit. The station and the maintenance unit have had a long and honourable history in the service of the RAF for over 40 years. I endorse entirely my hon. Friend's sentiments expressed in the closing moments of his speech. Whatever the final outcome about the future of RAF Kemble, I wish to place on record the Royal Air Force's indebtedness to the skill and dedication of the loyal work force of No. 5 maintenance unit over many years.

The problems that we confront today, however, arise primarily from the need to ensure that the Royal Air Force, both in its front line forces and in the support area, is as efficient as possible and is giving value for money. Following the Government's statement last June, which was outlined in Cmnd. 8288, it became evident that the aircraft servicing work load for RAF Support Command could no longer justify or sustain three aircraft servicing and storage depots and their airfields at RAF St. Athan, RAF Abingdon and RAF Kemble. It was clear that spare capacity would exist and that it would be wasteful of resources not to find ways of instituting economies. Studies were therefore set in hand to determine how the exising facilities could best be rationalised.

Of the three aircraft servicng and storage depots, RAF St. Athan is being developed as the major servicing base for Tornadoes, and it also has a large training commitment. RAF Abingdon has a well-found airfield that is the home of two university air squadrons and has a war role as a collocated operating base. RAF Kemble, on the other hand, has no war role and no permanent commitment to the servicing of any of the RAF's long-term front line aircraft. Our most substantial investments, therefore, are at St. Athan and Abingdon, which service primarily operational aircraft, rather than at Kemble, which deals with training and support aircraft.

Furthermore, the minimum establishment of Service men in engineering trades is determined by the need for RAF Support Command to provide reinforcements in war to operational units. There is consequently a core of Service-manned engineering posts, whose number is dictated by the current war role, which it would not be possible to reduce without serious operational penalties. We therefore have to bear in mind that for important operational reasons we have to retain a basic level of Service manning.

Thus, our studies have concentrated mainly on the work undertaken by RAF Kemble by No. 5 maintenance unit, because this is the station where the civilians are employed, as my hon. Friend understands, although we have inevitably also looked at the work of all three aircraft servicing and storage depots.

My hon. Friend knows the work carried out at RAF Kemble. I shall not go into too much detail, as time is limited. My hon. Friend asked the reason for the changes in capacity at RAF Abingdon. He will know that the Jaguar force is running down and that there will be a consequent reduction in the Jaguar major servicing task. RAF Abingdon is already carrying out a Hawk modification programme and is planning to start major servicing on Hawks assigned to NATO roles in 1982. Collocation—if I dare say that word again—of these servicing commitments at RAF Abingdon would therefore seem to be a sensible and realistic step towards rationalisation of this task and the most economic allocation of resources.

As to the aircraft storage tasks, RAF Kemble currently provides 70 per cent. of the capacity required for RAF Support Command's fixed-wing aircraft storage for all three Services. Storage tasks require small numbers of personnel for the preparation and anti-deterioration servicing of the aircraft, but tend to make relatively heavy short-term demands on labour for recovery tasks. On past experience, these peak loads are infrequent and are therefore most cost effectively met by transferring manpower from other tasks on a temporary basis.

The overriding criterion for deciding the relocation of the storage tasks is, therefore, dictated not by manpower requirements but by the hangar floor area required. Our studies indicate that it would be possible to make use of six aircraft storage hangars at RAF St. Athan and the additional four hangars required to make up the deficit could be provided at some additional works costs at RAF Shawbury. RAF Shawbury already has a resident civilian contractor undertaking other aircraft servicing work and it might be feasible for that firm to undertake all or part of the storage commitment.

RAF Kemble currently contains a high-grade aircraft surface finish facility. RAF St. Athan provides most of the balance of the total Royal Air Force requirement for surface finishing. By a slight adjustment of resources at St. Athan and an increase in the establishment to cover two-shift working, throughput there could be increased to meet the present RAF capacity for surface finishing and even to enhance it.

The House will note, therefore, that our studies have shown that it would be feasible to relocate the engineering tasks currently carried out at Kemble. The majority of Kemble's engineering tasks could be transferred to RAF Abingdon, where the rundown in the Jaguar servicing task would release manpower and facilities to accept the new tasks. An expanded surface finish facility at RAF St. Athan could absorb the current total Support Command surface finish task, and the additional aircraft storage required could be found by bringing into use four hangars at RAF Shawbury.

As to the future location of the Red Arrows—which are, of course, totally Service-manned—we have carried out a review of those airfields which might provide a suitable base for them. Their future location is, however, linked to the wider assessment of redeployment of frontline units in the wake of the defence programme review. Nevertheless, our studies have concluded that an alternative location could be found for them. It would seem feasible to deploy them to a new station at little additional cost.

I said at the beginning that one of the prime reasons for these studies was the need for the Royal Air Force to be as cost-effective as possible. If the rationalisation of tasks at RAF Kemble were carried out on the lines that I have just set forth we would achieve considerable manpower and financial savings. I do not have to remind my hon. Friend of the Government's general policy in this area.

To achieve these goals, we have to be—and we are—more cost-conscious than in the past. We must achieve value for money through greater efficiency. The feasibility studies that I have just described seem to indicate that the tasks now carried out by three RAF maintenance units could in future be carried out in the main by only two.

On a very conservative estimate, the net running cost savings that could be achieved through the reallocation of tasks would be around £1.5 million, building up in the longer term to about £2 million per annum. These savings would seem to indicate that there would be considerable cost benefits in reducing overheads in the Royal Air Force support area.

There are arguments that some staff will be lost through natural wastage and others may be found alternative employment in the Civil Service. I cannot accept some of the arguments that have been put about concerning the relative economies of closing RAF Kemble and paying unemployment benefit.

I reiterate that the decision on this matter has finally to be made by my right hon. Friend. This has been a useful debate. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for bringing the matter forward.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-two minutes to Two o' clock.