HC Deb 27 April 1981 vol 3 cc626-32

Motion made and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Thompson].

11.33 pm
Mr. Wm. Ross (Londonderry)

I welcome this opportunity to discuss the difference which has arisen in compensation law between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The House will be aware that the compensation law in Northern Ireland is very different from that which prevails in Great Britain. There is now available in Great Britain and to the citizens who live in that part of the United Kingdom, the possibility of returning for a reassessment over a period which can go back for many years if a mistake has been made in the amount of compensation that has been allowed.

One is always pleased to have an opportunity to discuss compensation law, especially as in Northern Ireland there is such a large body and such a long tradition of law governing compensation of various kinds. The law is generous to the sufferer in Northern Ireland, but I feel that it would be wrong to leave the matter as it stands.

In Northern Ireland, compensation for damage to property, for instance, can be given on the Chief Constable's certificate. In Great Britain, similar compensation would be paid only if the damage was caused in a riot—such as the riots at Bristol or Brixton during the last 12 months.

This is a departure for Northern Ireland in that the amount of compensation paid is very much larger, the number of violent incidents its very much greater and a completely different body of law to deal with the situation has grown up there. In Northern Ireland, there is a statutory right to compensation for personal injuries. In Great Britain, the right to compensation is based on an exgratia payment that is made by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board—a very different kettle of fish.

In general, however, for all compensation for criminal injuries, whether to the person or to property, the end result throughout the United Kingdom is that the sufferer gets paid for the material or personal injury that has actually been suffered out of moneys that are voted by this House or perhaps come out of the rates in Great Britain.

The point at issue lies in the ability of the Great Britain citizen to go back to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for a reassessment up to three years after the first finding, which would normally be the final payment. That is apparently a matter of absolute right. After three years, an appeal can be allowed only by the chairman of the board. As such a right is denied to the Northern Ireland citizen, I think that we cannot leave the matter there, for reasons that I shall state.

In a letter dated 6 March of this year to my hon. Friend the Member for Antrim, South (Mr. Molyneaux), my party leader, the Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office, whom I am pleased to see here after the travel difficulties that existed between London and Belfast for most of the day, set out most of the differences that exist between these two parts of the United Kingdom.

Under the system that has operated in Great Britain since 1979, the injured party is protected in a way that the citizen of Northern Ireland is not, and it is the change that came about in 1979 that is the point at issue. The citizen is protected if his condition deteriorates as a result of the original injury or if he dies. This has a wider application than might appear to be the case at first sight, because it affects the financial position of the victim's dependants.

In Northern Ireland, the common law practice is followed and the lump sum is final, whenever that decision is reached. No account can be taken subsequently of any unforeseen consequences that might result in the longer term. It is important to realise that in both Northern Ireland and Great Britain the final determination may be delayed for a long time and that interim payments may be made. Those of us who have to deal with this matter as part of our constituency duties at regular intervals are aware of that and are grateful for the way in which the courts normally deal with this issue. We are grateful also to the Minister's Department for what it does in this matter.

It is also important to note that the grounds for reassessment after three years are fairly limited. But it would be of real value in the small number of cases in which the facility would be needed in Northern Ireland, where the real seriousness of the injuries is not recognised. We know that doctors quite often make mistakes. We have all heard the old story that doctors differ and patients die. In this case, doctors may differ or make mistakes and the unfortunate individual may suffer grievously as a result when compensation is assessed.

Unfortunately, while I should like to be able to give the House examples of the hardship that may be caused, it is simply not possible to do so. I have spoken to one or two lawyers in Northern Ireland about this. They pointed out to me that if an individual came to them and said that his condition had seriously deteriorated and he should have had more money, they would have to advise him that the case was closed and there was no way to go back over old ground. There is, therefore, no way of knowing how many people might otherwise have applied for further compensation.

I draw attention, however, to what I think is the closest parallel—namely, pensions paid in respect of those injured as a result of service in the Armed Forces. In that instance, it has always—or certainly for a very long time—been possible to get reassessment of disabilities resulting from military service at any time after the event if it could be proved that the disability or the increase in disability was due to the military service concerned.

In Northern Ireland, the period between the injury and the claim and the final sum being offered is often extended under the Northern Ireland compensation order 1977 by simply delaying a final assessment. As the Minister pointed out in his letter of 6 March, there is also the possibility of appeal to the higher courts. Under paragraph 4(2) of the 1977 order, extra time is allowed specifically for the case of an unborn child. Even after the child is born, it is possible to delay the final assessment of compensation for a good many years.

The delay method normally practised can be of very long duration. The outstanding case in Northern Ireland—certainly the outstanding case in my constituency—is probably that of a child who was shot by the Army after the mother inadvertently drove through an Army road block in the city in the early 1970s. As I recall it, the child was 2 or 3 years of age at the time. She is now about 13 years old. I do not think that the final sum of compensation has yet been assessed or paid. Only interim payments have been made to the family. I assume that this delaying tactic is also employed in Great Britain. It would be very strange if it were not employed in some circumstances.

In Northern Ireland, there is the added complication that cases may be heard before a jury, which takes longer than the system in Great Britain, especially when coupled with the various appeals to the higher courts.

Although I think that it is praiseworthy that the system of delay is practised, because it definitely helps the individual where the long-term result of the injury is not immediately apparent, I do not think that it is the best way to deal with the problem.

I believe that it would be far better to be able to assure the injured party that the door has not been slammed shut but is always left ajar for further reassessment. If that were done, the victim or, perhaps more importantly, the parents of an injured child—would know that a certain sum was available at the present apparent level of injury but that long-term plans could be made with the assurance that if the condition became worse the whole case could be reopened and reassessed.

As I said earlier, the grounds for reassessment on this side of the Irish Sea are relatively narrow. I quote the relevant paragraph from the revised criminal injuries compensation scheme effective from 1 October 1979: Although the Board's decisions in a case will normally be final, they will have discretion to reconsider a case after a final award of compensation has been accepted where there has been such a serious change in the applicant's medical condition that injustice would occur if the original assessment of compensation were allowed to stand, or where the victim has since died as a result of his injuries. A case will not be re-opened more than three years after the date of the final award unless the Board are satisfied, on the basis of evidence presented with the application for re-opening the case, that the renewed application can be considered without a need for extensive inquiries. I assume that that means that only medical opinion will be taken into account.

A decision by the Chairman that a case may not be re-opened will be final. However, the letter of 6 March states that a claimant has no right of appeal to the courts against an award.

There seems to be some confusion. Court procedures in Northern Ireland are being mixed with board procedures in Great Britain. The protection might be needed in only a few cases when the victim's condition becomes worse or unforeseen complications arise. If Northern Ireland were brought into line with Great Britain, such victims would be helped.

In Great Britain the right to reassessment is based on the decision of the chairman of the board. The right to reopen a case in Northern Ireland should rest with the court. That would stop frivolous or baseless claims. Some means must be found to ensure that Northern Ireland citizens are placed on an equal footing with citizens in the rest of the United Kingdom. I urge the Minister to reconsider his refusal to do that. In his letter, he says that he can see no way in which that can be done within present legislation. Will he please take another long, hard look at the problem?

11.47 pm
The Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office (Mr. Michael Alison)

In raising the question of the review of compensation, the hon. Member for Londonderry (Mr. Ross) reminds the House once again of the many individuals—soldiers, members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, prison officers and civilians—who have suffered injury and distress through the sort of criminal acts, alas, now so commonplace in Northern Ireland. He is rightly concerned about the well-being of his constituents and others who are victims of terrorist attack and is anxious to see them adequately recompensed for injury and loss. I think that we are at one in that common objective.

Whilst none of us considers that a financial award compensates adequately for the loss of a limb or the loss or impairment of any other faculty, to say nothing of the pain and suffering endured as a result of criminal violence, the law provides for such awards as a tangible demonstration of society's sympathy and solidarity with the victim of a criminal attack. Few would wish it otherwise. Indeed, an award by the State is often the only form of compensation available to an injured party, since the perpetrators of crime are often men of straw, without the resources or means to compensate the victim.

However, the question so frequently at issue, as it is in this debate, is the amount of compensation that is appropriate and the means by which it is determined.

The assessment of compensation generally follows the rules for the award of common law damages and is paid as a lump sum representing the capitalised value of past and future financial loss, plus, where appropriate, an amount for pain and suffering and loss of amenities. The value of all pensions and benefits paid to an applicant by the State or by an employer is deductible from the compensation. However, discretionary payments may be paid to widows whose compensation would fall below £5,000 if and when such deductions are made.

Where agreement cannot be reached or where the applicant is not satisfied with the amount of compensation offered, he or she has the right of appeal to a county court in the first instance, and further to the High Court. The applicant can produce additional evidence at the court hearings in support of his claim. Pending a final settlement, interim payments may be made. A court may also adjourn the hearing of a claim if final medical reports cannot then be given. If an appeal is successful, the Secretary of State is required to meet the appellant's legal costs. Most cases are dealt with by solicitors appointed by the applicants. The solicitor is paid a fee in successful claims.

This, then, is the Northern Ireland scheme. The hon. Gentleman sketched in some of the details. I have rehearsed it in some detail to demonstrate the comprehensive nature of the provisions, and I think it will be acknowledged that the scheme has served the community in Northern Ireland fairly well over the past number of years. However, it has been represented that the scheme is defective in that it does not provide for the review of compensation awards once they have been determined by the Secretary of State or fixed by the court on appeal. Strictly speaking, I concede that this is technically so, but the scheme in Northern Ireland is not wholly inflexible.

As I have indicated, provision exists for the payment of interim awards. Where a claimant indicates that he or she does not wish to prejudice the claim by reaching an agreed settlement before a medical condition stabilises, the claim can, within a reasonable length of time, be held in abeyance and, pending settlement, interim payments will be made so far as possible. It could be said, therefore, that the facility to make interim payments provides an opportunity to review periodically the condition of an applicant and in the ultimate to award the final, definitive compensation accordingly. However, once a final award is made the matter cannot be reopened. I hope the hon. Gentleman appreciates that it is possible to postpone the final and definitive statement in the way that I have indicated.

Where a claimant's medical condition has not stabilised, the award can take into account his probable long-term condition. There are well-established principles governing the assessment of compensation in such circumstances.

It is, of course, true that interim payments were also possible under the original Great Britain compensation scheme introduced in 1964 and that a review provision, albeit fairly narrowly defined, has since been introduced in 1979. But the fact is that there are other significant differnces between the Great Britain and Northern Ireland schemes. The Great Britain scheme is non-statutory and the amount of compensation is determined by a member or by a panel of the compensation board which administers the scheme. There is no appeal to the courts on the level of award, nor is the board's decision in this respect subject to ministerial review. Put simply, the Great Britain scheme is essentially administrative in character and, with awards being outside the ambit of the courts, lends itself more readily to the sort of review provisions now in operation.

To seek to graft on a review provision to the Northern Ireland scheme would go to the root of the hitherto generally accepted basis of the Northern Ireland scheme involving as it does the judicial oversight of awards. The history of criminal injuries compensation in Northern Ireland is very much court-based. The courts, in settling criminal injury awards, adhere to the common law principles governing damages in civil action as refined by case law—in so far as these are compatible with the term of the existing statutory provision.

It is a cardinal tenet of the common law that damages once awarded cannot be increased by reason of subsequent events. Halsbury's "Laws of England" puts it this way: The plaintiff must sue in one action for all his loss, past, present and future, certain and contingent". That quotation comes from the fourth edition, volume 12, paragraph 1134. To change the present arrangements in Northern Ireland by introducing a review provision would mean setting aside this fundamental principle, which has stood the test of time in the civil courts and by which all those who seek a remedy in damages in those courts are presently bound. This should not be set aside lightly. In this context it must also be said that the courts in Northern Ireland are well versed in the factors to be taken into account in the assessment of compensation and that whilst there will always be some inexactitude in awards based on a forecast of future prospects there is no reason to believe that settlements arrived at with claimants on the basis of common law principles and awards made by the courts are low or unreasonable.

Apart from this question of principle there are compelling practical arguments against the introduction of the review provision. I remind the hon. Gentleman that we have an obligation to the taxpayer when considering the implications of any extension of the current criminal injuries scheme. In addition to the possible increase in awards on review, there would be additional legal fees, the cost of obtaining fresh medical evidence and the associated administrative costs of any review, which would be substantial. We have to strike a balance in such matters, and I believe that under the present scheme claimants are treated sympathetically on behalf of the community.

Finally, we must also consider the possible impact on the courts of any review provision, such as that in force in Great Britain. Written judgments on the initial award would become necessary. This would increase the pressure on judicial time. To be consistent with present arrangements, review decisions would have to be open to appeal. The likelihood is that on review more cases would end up in court. This would mean protracted litigation—with its associated costs—and continued uncertainty on the likely level of final settlement, neither of which, I suggest, would be in the interests of the Northern Ireland community generally.

In other words, there would have to be, on a judicial basis, an appeal against the review. I listened with concern and interest to the hon. Gentleman's case, because I know how much his constituents are affected by the compensation provisions and I know also of the hardships that many of them have suffered as a result of terrorist activities in Londonderry and in the Province. Despite his cogent argument, I am driven to the conclusion that it would not be practical or desirable to make the sort of change suggested by the terms of his debate.

As I said earlier, the use of interim payments should continue to afford the necessary flexibility to allow claims to be settled in the light of changes in the applicant's condition over a reasonable period of time. I am confident that within the parameters of the present legislation the scheme is administered justly and fairly in accordance with well-established principles.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at two minutes to Twelve o' clock.