SUCCESSION TO SECURE TENANCY (Hansard, 11 June 1980)

§ Mr. Rifkind
I beg to move amendment No. 112, in page 16, line 16, after ' agreement ', insert : 'within four weeks of the death of the tenant'. This amendment stipulates the time limit within which agreement of succession to a tenancy must be obtained with the potential successors when there is more than one person with an equal right to that succession. The period provided is four weeks, after which the landlord would obviously have to determine the matter. In its present form, the Bill does not stipulate a period and this could create confusion and uncertainty, which the amendment now seeks to clarify.

§ Mr. Rifkind
I beg to move amendment No. 114, in page 16, line 31 at end add : 'but the provisions of this subsection shall not operate so as to terminate the secure tenancy of any tenant under a joint tenancy created on the death of a tenant where such a joint tenant continues to use the dwelling-house as his only or principal home'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker
With this we may take the following amendments :
No. 111, in page 15, line 36, leave out from ' below ' to end of line 38.
No. 113, in page 16, line 27, leave out subsection (5).

§ Mr. Rifkind
This amendment extends the statutory rights to one succession following a tenant's death in order to allow a further succession where a joint tenancy is created on the death of the original tenant. The Bill provides that where a tenant dies and there are two or more persons living in the house who would qualify to succeed to the tenancy, they may opt for a joint tenancy. This matter was discussed in Committee and it is considered that the present provision in the Bill was inequitable. The amendment provides that the right to occupy the house continues for as long as any of the joint tenants who originally succeeded to it are still living there. I am sure that this will be acceptable to the House.

§ Mr. Millan
The amendment is certainly acceptable because it moves in the 693 direction that we would like the Bill to move. Our amendments, which can be discussed with Government amendment No. 114, would go a lot further. I never understood the need for subsection (5) in this clause. We are providing here for the succession of tenancies. Provided that on the second tenancy—that is, the tenancy that has succeeded at some time in the past—the circumstances are repeated on the death of the second tenant, whoever he may be, a succession should apply as if the tenant had been the first tenant. Why should we not just apply the succession rules again? I do not see why we need subsection (5) at all. On an earlier occasion COSLA took the same view, that there was no reason why there should not be a succession to the succession. The Minister's amendment improves the Bill, but we would prefer that the Government accepted our amendments. Why does not the Minister eliminate subsection (5), and allow successions to take place in the circumstances laid down, even if the tenant who has died succeeded under the terms in the clause?

§ Mr. Rifkind
The clause in its present form provides only for a statutory minimum right of succession. There is nothing to stop a local authority providing for more extended rights of succession if it believes that that is appropriate.
We understand that in COSLA's view, while many local authorities wish to use their discretion in that way, others prefer not to do so. Therefore, a property may not become available for many generations where there are extended families. Local authorities seem to prefer the clause in its present form, allowing for one statutory right, but leaving it to the discretion of the local authority thereafter. On balance, we felt that that was more appropriate.

§ Mr. Millan
That is a reasonable explanation. However, succeeding to a tenancy sometimes gives rise to appalling problems and considerable injustice for members of the family, and I speak as a constituency Member.
I welcome any provision that lays down the circumstances in a convenient way. I should have gone further, but it is a matter of judgment. The clause, as amended, is much better than the situa- 694 tion that exists in some authorities, where members of families are sometimes dealt with pretty shabbily.