Polaris Submarine Fleet (Hansard, 12 June 1979)

§ 10. Mr. Canavan
asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will abandon any plans to replace the Polaris nuclear submarine fleet.

§ 12. Mr. Newens
asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will indicate his policy on the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons to replace Polaris in due course.

§ 13. Mr. Cook
asked the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on whether he intends to replace the Polaris fleet.

§ Mr. Pym
The Government are fully committed to maintain an effective strategic deterrent. We shall, therefore, continue the programme to modernise the present Polaris force so that it remains a deterrent to aggression into the 1990s. We shall also be considering what steps should be taken to maintain that capability thereafter.

§ Mr. Canavan
Since the Polaris fleet has already cost us over £2,000 million and will probably cost over £3,000 million at least to replace, and in view of the Treasury's obsession with the need to cut public expenditure, will the Government make a valuable contribution to the national economy and to the development of international peace by scrapping any plans to replace Polaris with another generation of weapons of mass destruction?

§ Mr. Pym
In view of the role which Polaris has played for our country and our NATO Allies, it was cheap at the price. Unless we are satisfied that our forces and capability, with those of our Allies, are adequate to preserve our security, there will not be any country left to preserve.

§ Mr. Newens
Does not the right hon. Gentleman recognise that the creation of a new generation of nuclear weapons would pre-empt a huge amount of public expenditure at a time when many of us are expecting savage cuts to be made in other spheres concerning education, health and welfare? Ought we not to place a higher priority on the standards of our people at home than on creating a deterrent which in the long run can only make 220 this country more vulnerable to nuclear attack than would otherwise be the case?

§ Mr. Pym
It is difficult to put a price upon the preservation of our freedom and our civilisation, but that is the most important thing. Of course, arms control is an objective of this Government, as of our predecessors, but it must be done on the basis of strength. One of the worries in defence at the moment—in fact, the principal worry—is the massive build-up on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The Warsaw Pact countries spend an enormous sum of money on increasing their arms—far beyond anything necessary for their own defence, I may say—and what we want to see is a willingness on the part of the Warsaw Pact countries to negotiate genuinely for arms control similar to that which prevails on this side of the Iron Curtain. So I must say to the hon. Gentleman that in the meantime, even though it is expensive, and even though obviously no one actually wants to spend money in this way, it is necessary so to do in order to preserve our security and to get us into a position where we can, one hopes, negotiate from strength in the direction which he wants.

§ Mr. Cook
The right hon. Gentleman has referred to arms control. Has he noted that next year will bring the next quinquennial conference reviewing the non-proliferation treaty? Does he expect that there will be the slightest hope of any of the potential nuclear States, such as India and Brazil, paying any attention to anything said by Britain if that conference takes place in the wake of a decision by Britain to cling to its own bankrupting membership of the nuclear club?

§ Mr. Pym
As the hon. Gentleman knows, this Government's predecessors, supported by him, took a view very similar to that which we ourselves take. Obviously, I cannot answer his question in detail about the attitudes which might be taken next year at such a conference, but in our view the position remains that, like it or not, unfortunately it is absolutely essential that we have a nuclear capability at this time.

§ Mr. Biggs-Davison
Is my right hon. Friend giving consideration to collaboration with France in keeping an up-to-date contribution to the Western deterrent on our side of the Atlantic?

§ Mr. Pym
Yes, Sir; I want to see the closest collaboration not only with France but with all our Allies in NATO. I regard this as a most important development and I want to give every impetus that I can to extending it. Certainly that is true with regard to France. I shall be going over fairly soon to Paris for conversations with my opposite number there, and I should certainly like to develop in that direction.

§ Mr. Meacher
Do the Government now propose to build a nuclear cruise missile in this country as a partial replacement of Polaris, and, if so, how can it be an independent deterrent if the microelectronic circuitry work has to be sub-contracted to the Americans?

§ Mr. Pym
All these matters are coming under consideration now, as they would have done under the Labour Government. It is too early to take any decisions, but all the possibilities, options and factors to which the hon. Gentleman refers must be taken into account before any decision of the magnitude we have been talking about could possibly be taken.

§ Mrs. Kellett-Bowman
I welcome my right hon. Friend's assurance that he will go into the question of the capability of the Polaris submarines' successors after 1990. Will he do all in his power to expedite the covered facility at Barrow which would enable Barrow to build the next generation of nuclear submarines, should he so decide, as I hope he will?

§ Mr. Pym
Perhaps my hon. Friend will put down a separate question on the subject of Barrow, when I shall certainly look into it.

§ Mr. Flannery
In view of the massive and increasing nuclear power of the Americans, which, of course, would be a retaliatory power, does not the right hon. Gentleman think that whatever we have is insignificant compared with that, and will he tell us bluntly: who is he expecting to attack us?

§ Mr. Pym
The nuclear strength of the United States—as is our own nuclear strength—is essentially deterrent. It is retaliatory, too, but it is deterrent, and our own nuclear capability is an addition to that deterrent, since without it the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact coun- 222 tries would have to take into account only the United States retaliatory strike capability, whereas, by having it ourselves, we are able to have a second decision-making process for nuclear retaliatory capability. That is undoubtedly an added strength to NATO and is thought to be so by our NATO Allies.