§ Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. John Evans.]
§ 11.3 p.m.
§ Mr. Doug Hoyle (Nelson and Colne)This is a very important debate that I am opening tonight, because it concerns not only the health of people working in laboratories but the risks that emanate from laboratories to all the working people in this country. This arises from the recent smallpox outbreak, which is only the tip of the iceberg—there have been at least three outbreaks associated with smallpox since 1966. Not only that; as research into the health of laboratory staff shows, they suffer from infections and parasitic diseases as a result of their work. Indeed, this is one of the major causes of their absence due to sickness. In addition, they run a very high risk of contracting tuberculosis and hepatitis. The risks are five or six times higher than for the rest of the general population.
Taking into account the high risk level which occurs for medical laboratories and other areas in the National Health Service, it is an absolute disgrace that the NHS—which was, after all, established to prevent sickness in the general population—should fail so lamentably to protect the health of its own staff.
The failure to protect or provide an occupational health service for the people who work in the National Health Service is an absolute disgrace. It was recommended by Tonbridge in 1966 and Harrington in 1975 that an occupational health service be set up. It was rejected on the ground of cost, although health 1827 and safety should be a priority in the NHS.
The Secretary of State recently outlined the steps in relation to the category A pathogens. In addition, the emergency inspections carried out in Birmingham, the closure of part of the Colindale laboratory, and the requirement of Lister laboratory in Elstree to improve its precautions in this direction give rise to concern among the people working there and the public.
Nine category A pathogens are officially listed and defined as organisms, viruses and materials. They are extremely hazardous to laboratory workers and may cause epidemic diseases to spread. Clearly this is a risk to those working in those laboratories and therefore to the community at large.
We are aware of this alarming situation. In view of the public disquiet that has been aroused by the events in Birmingham and the fact that what happened in Birmingham may be happening in other laboratories, there is a need—I stress this—for a full-scale, in-depth public inquiry into the storage, handling, transport, research into and use of dangerous pathogens. Nothing less will satisfy the public in relation to laboratory conditions.
A central register of all medical laboratories handling pathogens should be established. At present we do not know where we are. We have a right to know where dangerous pathogens are located and handled.
There is also a need for new rules to tighten up on the transportation of pathogens coming into and leaving this country. Some of the stories that we read are horrifying. Pathogens have been transported in ordinary civil airliners. We do not know how the pathogens were passed from Paddington to Birmingham. I should like to know how pathogens are transported. We must tighten up the regulations on this matter.
There is another need. The World Health Organisation is involved in this. We should ensure that the work conducted in liaison with the WHO is subject to monitoring and review. We should take a greater interest in what is being done by that body. This matter should be investigated. The public have a right to know about it.
1828 Inadequate safety standards are part and parcel of the problem. It affects not only laboratories handling dangerous pathogens but all medical laboratories. There is a lack of procedure and implementation. We must ensure that there is monitoring and enforcement of adequate safety standards. Lack of Government finance has held back safety measures and prevented them from being the first priority. That has caused much disquiet.
Crown immunity must go in all Government Departments, especially in the Department of Health and Social Security. The Health and Safety Executive was set up as an independent organisation, with powers to issue provisional enforcement notices. The premises at Birmingham happened to belong to the university. If the premises had belonged to the National Health Service, the Health and Safety Executive could not have issued an enforcement order and could not have begun a prosecution. That is a reason for abolishing Crown immunity. Safety cannot be left with employers.
That is not merely my argument. The TUC and the Health and Safety Executive have recommended that the Health and Safety at Work, etc Act 1974 should apply to Crown premises. The introduction of such a provision is long overdue. However, there is still resistance by the Government, especially the DHSS.
When my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State made a statement on the Shooter report, he said that the provisions of the 1974 Act were accepted. If that is so, why do the Government not scrap Crown immunity? By so doing there could be enforcement notices and prosecutions. Until that happens we must continue to wonder why the Government want authority to remain in their hands.
Generally within the DHSS, committees composed of experts examine these matters. They determine what safety precautions should apply and how and when they should be implemented. There is a conspicuous lack of consultation with staff, representatives of trade unions and members of the public. That cannot continue.
The most recent set of microbiological safety standards was drawn up by Sir James Howie in 1977. What did the working party report? It stated that arising from the recommendations would 1829 be a requirement for substantial expenditure on premises to make them safe, on equipment and on additional training. It reported that there would be the need for more safety officers. It made no excuse for reporting in those terms. Its view was that Sir James had made essential recommendations.
It was found that safety arrangements were inadequate but badly designed, and antiquated laboratories are still in use. There has been the type of cover-up that we are led to believe takes place in the DHSS. A working party composed of DHSS officials was set up to advise on implementation. Apparently it regards the Howie recommendations not as essential but as objectives to be reached over three years. That is not good enough. That will not do.
It is also disturbing that no extra money is being made available and that money for safety precautions will have to come from elsewhere. That is not good enough. I would have thought that safety precautions would be considered an absolute priority within the National Health Service, and that they would have set the standards for the rest of the country. But that is not the case.
I have referred to dangerous pathogens, but there are other areas where codes of practice need to be updated or introduced. These include post mortem rooms, medical physics and radiography to counter the risk from chemical, mechanical or electrical hazard in pathology laboratories, as distinct from the disease hazards. The DHSS seems to find itself incapable of dealing with safety matters. I hope that the Minister will consider these matters. I have discussed them with him in the past. I have taken deputations to see him. It is no longer tenable to try to defend Crown immunity. The responsibility for drawing up safety standards should be given to the Health and Safety Executive.
A common code of practice should be drawn up by the Health and Safety Executive that would apply not only to microbiological hazards in the National Health Service but equally to all medical laboratories handling dangerous pathogens. A sound base should be established for enforcing more stringent regulations in relation to all classes to pathogens.
If this work were passed to the Health 1830 and Safety Executive, a new advisory committee might be established to handle dangerous microbiological hazards. I can envisage under that advisory committee three sub-committees to deal with dangerous pathogens category A, dangerous pathogens category B and another dealing with genetic manipulation. New draft regulations should be prepared to cover all three.
I think that the Genetic Manipulation Advisory Group has done a wonderful job in relation to genetic manipulation. It has advanced into a new area based on the principle that scientific developments should be publicly controlled and scrutinised in the interests of health and safety and public accountability. GMAG consists of people other than scientific experts. The role of trade union representatives in relation to GMAG has meant that the public interest has been foremost.
I have shown that there is a greater risk to laboratory staff than to the rest of the public. They have a right, a major interest and a lot of knowledge to impart in relation to the promotion of safety standards in laboratories. There can be no substitute for trade union representatives. We should utilise their knowledge.
I hope that my hon. Friend will take many of these points on board, because it is now, in the light of recent events, that we must make these laboratories as safe as we possibly can. If we are to do that, we cannot leave it to the ordinary scientists. I am not criticising them. I understand that they want to break scientific harriers and see the advancement of scientific research, but that also incurs dangers, not only to the people who work in the laboratories but also to the general public. That has been seen in what has happened in Birmingham and elsewhere.
Indeed, if we do not begin to control what is happening in laboratories, there could be a very serious outbreak which could affect many people in this country. Rather than risk that, let us make sure that safety standards are excellent. That is what we must aim for. I do not think that anything less than that will satisfy the public.
To do that we must involve those who work in the laboratories, and also the trade unions that represent them. We 1831 must base any reform of the Dangerous Pathogens Advisory Group on GMAG and we must also have a public inquiry into the handling of dangerous pathogens.
§ 11.21 p.m.
§ The Under-Secretary of State for Employment (Mr. John Grant)My hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Hoyle) has rightly focused attention on an issue which has aroused considerable public interest and concern of late—the health and safety of laboratory activities. He has spoken graphically and knowledgeably of the risks inherent in much of the work undertaken in hospital clinical laboratories, in laboratories engaged in experimental work in genetic engineering and in work with dangerous pathogens and other dangerous materials. He has highlighted what he sees as serious shortcomings in our existing control arrangements.
Let me say at the outset that there is much common ground between us. The Government and the Health and Safety Commission share many of his concerns. We are jointly seeking to develop an appropriate framework of statutory controls within which laboratory activities can be carried on in a way that will have full regard for the health and safety of both workers and the public, but which will nevertheless afford our research scientists and technicians that degree of freedom so essential if we are to continue to advance our knowledge and understanding of the many problems that confront us today. My hon. Friend recognised that in his remarks.
We must never forget that the scientific breakthrough in the laboratory today may be the forerunner of a development that will bring untold benefits to many workers and the public in the future, and we must be careful not to impose unnecessarily stringent restrictions that might damage our prospects of making these beneficial advances.
I welcome this opportunity to explain what the Government and the Health and Safety Commission are doing to secure improvements in our standards of laboratory health and safety, and I want to show that we are fully alive to many of the problems my hon. Friend has mentioned and are devoting considerable attention and resources to them.
1832 He will not expect me to deal with all his points on the spot, but I ought perhaps to point out that many of the points that he has raised bear very much on the responsibilities of my right hon. Friends the Secretaries of State for Education and Science and, more particularly, Social Services.
First, I should remind the House that with the coming into operation of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act in April 1975, all laboratory workers—scientists, technicians and ancillary staff—were brought within the protection of health and safety legislation. All laboratories, whether in industry, Government, hospitals, universities or research institutes, are now subject to the Act. It gives protection by placing specific responsibilities and duties on all those concerned in the work situation—management, employees, the self-employed and the suppliers of plant, materials and equipment—in fact, everyone with a vital part to play in the elimination or reduction of risks. The Act also placed on the Health and Safety Commission and Executive the overall responsibility for the development and implementation of policies to promote health and safety in all work activities, including laboratory activities.
The range of these activities is very wide—from genetic manipulation to the development of defence weapons—and embraces work concerned with routine testing and analysis, the development of new equipment and new production methods and processes and long-term fundamental research aimed at advancing the frontiers of our scientific knowledge. There is a commensurately wide and varied range of hazards posed by these activities, but we have in the Act the necessary framework for the development of control systems appropriate to the degree of risk involved. No matter how effective our legal systems of control and our arrangements for enforcement, however, it must be recognised that health and safety in the laboratory depend ultimately not on regulations and inspections but on the wholehearted co-operation, commitment and continual vigilance of all those directly involved in the day-to-day activities of the workplace.
One of the principal aims of the Health and Safety Commission and 1833 Executive, therefore, is to foster and encourage, through the provision of relevant information and advice, a thorough appreciation of the nature of the risks involved in particular processes and operations or in the handling of dangerous materials and a fundamental understanding of the essential requirements for a safe and healthy working environment.
My hon. Friend expressed particular misgivings about health and safety standards in hospital clinical laboratories and laboratories engaged in genetic manipulation and work with dangerous pathogens and has called for improvements in the arrangements for providing employees with information about risks associated with this work, for more involvement, and for the training of the staff who work with particularly dangerous materials. I can assure him that the Commission and Executive share many of his concerns and are playing a very active and positive role in current developments in this sphere.
There is, for example, already a very close relationship between the Executive and the Genetic Manipulation Advisory Group which was set up by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Education and Science to advise laboratories on the standard of precautions to be observed in carrying out experiments in genetic manipulation. The Executive's inspectors are now carrying out a programme of inspections of the laboratories concerned. The Commission and GMAG are also keeping under close review the need for further regulatory measures to back up those which are already in force. In such a rapidly developing field, however, the need for such measures must be capable of very clear definition, otherwise controls introduced prematurely might defeat their objective by becoming speedily outdated.
As my hon. Friend will know from the statement on the Shooter report made by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Social Services in the House on 24 January, the Government have accepted the substance of that report. They have agreed that the present voluntary arrangements for the control of work with dangerous pathogens must be substantially strengthened and given legal force to provide the fullest safeguards both for those working in the laboratories and for the public at large. The Health and Safety Commission has agreed to 1834 prepare, in consultation with all interests concerned, proposals for regulations under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act which will require all laboratories working with, or intending to work with category A pathogens to notify details of their proposed work to the Executive and such other bodies and Government Departments as may be appropriate.
The Commission is also discussing with my right hon. Friend and other Ministers concerned the question of its relationship with the Dangerous Pathogens Advisory Group and the composition of that group and the further action that needs to be taken arising from the recommendations in the Shooter report.
Inspectors of the Executive are already engaged on a programme of inspections of all laboratories handling category A pathogens. As a result of one such recent inspection carried out by the Executive's inspectors, in collaboration with the Dangerous Pathogens Advisory Group and officials of Government Departments concerned, the Central Public Health laboratory, Colindale, has undertaken to comply with the terms of Crown prohibition and improvement notices issued by the Executive and has accordingly agreed not to undertake further work with category A pathogens in its existing laboratory without the prior agreement of the Executive and the implementation of further safeguards.
§ Mr. GrantI shall come to that matter very shortly.
As part of its planned programme of inspections of hospitals and universities, the Executive will be paying particular attention to laboratory hazards and seeking to foster the development of systems of work that accord with the best health and safety practices and ensure that all laboratory activities are carried out with due regard to worker and public safety.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Social Services will shortly be issuing the Howie code of practice—my hon. Friend mentioned this point—relating to clinical laboratories and postmortem rooms to the National Health Service with guidance on the timetable for its implementation, and the inspectors will then be looking for improvements 1835 in standards in line with the code's recommendations.
I now come to the matter of Crown immunity. My hon. Friend referred to the fact that most of the laboratory activities which present the highest risks to workers and the public are carried on in NHS and other Crown laboratories and has expressed the view that the Executive is powerless to secure essential improvements in safety precautions in these laboratories because of the Crown's immunity from enforcement and prosecution under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act. As I have emphasised on numerous occasions in the House, however, the specific exclusion of the Crown from the enforcement provisions of the Act does not enable Crown bodies to escape their obligations. The Act is binding on the Crown, and the Crown as employer is subject to the same duties as any other employer.
As my hon. Friend also knows, the Government are currently considering a paper presented by the Health and Safety Commission which has suggested that amending legislation should be introduced to remove the Crown's immunity under the Act. I can assure him that my ministerial colleagues and I are as concerned as the Commission to secure compliance in Crown establishments. How this is best achieved, however, and whether it necessitates a change in the law are matters to which we are still giving thought. In the meantime, the Commission has introduced a special form of Crown notice which the Executive's inspectors are serving on Crown bodies in circumstances where a statutory improvement 1836 or prohibition notice would have been served on an employer in the private sector. As I have said already, the Government are committed to taking whatever action is necessary to secure compliance with the Act. There is no reason, therefore, to assume that notices and recommendations issued by the Executive will not be honoured and observed by all Crown bodies, just as they have been recently by the Central Public Health laboratory at Colindale. Indeed, if my hon. Friend or anyone else has any situation in mind where this does not take place, I shall be only too pleased to look into the matter if he lets me know about it.
I hope that it will be clear from all I have said that the Health and Safety Commission and Executive is fully mindful of the various hazards to which my hon. Friend has drawn attention and is taking positive action, in consultation as necessary with my ministerial colleagues concerned, to ensure that workers and the public are fully safeguarded from the risks involved in laboratory activities and that there is the fullest co-operation between all the various bodies and advisory groups with responsibilities in this sphere. No one involved in this area of activity—and here I echo my hon. Friend—can afford to relax his guard for a moment, and both the Health and Safety Commission and Executive and the Government will do everything possible to underline this necessity.
§ Question put and agreed to.
§ Adjourned accordingly at twenty-nine minutes to Twelve o'clock.