§ Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Bates.]
§ 11.12 p.m.
§ Mr. Patrick Wall (Haltemprice)After what has just happened I imagine that the Government's life is now strictly limited. Be it a question of weeks or even a few months, I hope very much that they will be able to take some positive action about the standardisation of weapon systems.
The Minister of State will know that some time ago the military committee of the North Atlantic Assembly set up a sub-committee to study the problems of interoperability and standardisation among the NATO nations. This subcommittee is now discussing our common problems with the responsible Ministers and chiefs of staff of each of the countries of the Alliance. It now seems clear that progress is being made in interoperability, from the use of common fuel for warships to common types of ammunition and spare parts. Much, however, still remains to be done.
I should like to give one example. In the area of communications, in a number of cases national units in NATO forces cannot directly communicate with the corresponding equipment used by other NATO nations because of differences in frequency, modulation, data ranges and interrogation systems. These drawbacks are at present overcome by interface equipment. But what seems to me to be particularly serious is that seven NATO nations plan to introduce new major tactical communication systems of six different types within the next few years. None of these systems is interoperable with any other or with the NATO integrated communications system. Surely this is a situation which should not be permitted by the Governments concerned.
I want to turn to the burden of what I have to say, and that is the question of standardisation. This, of course, is a much more long-term problem which will in itself, in due course, produce inter-operability. We should remember that while the USSR produces virtually all the military hardware for Warsaw Pact forces, from tanks to aircraft, NATO nations are 939 at present operating seven different types of tank, eight different armoured personnel carriers, 31 different anti-tank weapons, 24 families of combat aircraft and 80 or more tactical missile systems. It is quite clear that the problem of operating this variety of weapons on the battle field, the duplication of research and development and the waste of productive capacity must be enormous.
Going back to the North Atlantic Assembly sub-committee, the Minister will know that discussions now take place regularly each year between this sub-committee and the armed services committees of both the United States House and the Senate. It has been estimated that failure to standardise costs NATO nations some $10 billion to $15 billion a year and a loss of from 30 per cent. to 40 per cent. in combat effectiveness. This surely underlines the importance of the subject.
Many attempts have been made to obtain standardisation on both sides of the Atlantic, and I should like to refer to four of them. First, there is the question of purchase off the shelf. This is done either to save money, such as the British purchase of the F4 Phantoms from the United States, or to acquire new technology, such as the United States purchase of British VSTOL Harrier aircraft. While I am on the question of Harrier aircraft, I wonder whether the Minister could say what progress is being made with the repeat order for Harriers for the US Marine Corps and another possible order to the US Navy.
The second way of obtaining standardisation is by building under licence, such as the United States construction of the Franco-German Roland surface-to-air missile system.
A third is joint production—for example the Tornado by Britain, Germany and Italy, or the US F16 fighter aircraft which is mainly being constructed in the United States but with production lines in Europe for her Dutch, Norwegian, Belgian and Danish partners.
The last method that I refer to is the one that is rather topical today, and that is international competition, between nationally designed prototypes, such as the recent German-US tank competition between the Leopard IIAV and the XM1, followed by similar competitions for a 940 tank gun between the Germans, the Americans and the British.
All these four methods have considerable drawbacks from the national point of view in loss of advanced technology, industrial capacity, or the question of cost, and so on. But international competition, which is favoured by the Americans, is to my mind the most dangerous of all, because it gives rise to all kinds of national pressures, political decisions and consequential bad feeling.
I give one example. In the tank competition, the Germans believed that the Americans altered the rules half-way through the game. The British believed that as an American tank finally was selected, there was a considerable bias in favour of a German gun. In fact, I can speak from experience, because an American official told me before the competition took place that unless the British gun proved to be 20 per cent. more effective than the German one, it had not got a hope. However, some good has come out of this competition, because I understand that the major tank parts for the American and German tanks are likely to be interchangeable.
This is the real point that I want to make. It is my contention that a reasonable degree of standardisation can be obtained only when nations agree to co-operate at the research and design stage of any project—not with the prototypes, as they have done in the past, but right at the very beginning. This is not easy, I agree, because nations have different requirements for their hardware and differing dates for the introduction of new equipment. This, I understand, was the reason for the failure of the Anglo-German main battle tank concept for the 1990s.
I turn to some suggestions about future planning. Now that we have all reached the end of the colonial era, all NATO nations are preparing to fight the same war. What is more, they will fight this war, if it ever happens, which God forbid, with integrated international staffs. I suggest that only when we have international design requirements shall we eliminate national prejudices. My question, therefore, is why cannot the NATO staff—for example, the military committee—be given the responsibility of saying what weapons they will require for the next 941 generation. After all it is they who will have to fight the battle.
I believe that we are moving in this direction through the Eurogroup. But as this did not include France, the independent European programme group had to be set up in 1976. The requirement is twofold: first, to co-ordinate European concepts, requirements and dates for the introduction of new weapon systems; and, second, to conduct a transatlantic dialogue with the United States and Canada. I understand that 11 working groups of IEPG are attempting to co-ordinate European activity in certain areas, for example 105 mm ammunition, tactical combat aircraft, anti-tank weapons, mine-hunters, torpedoes and so on. Progress seems to have been remarkably slow.
At present the "two-way street", as it is called, between the United States and Europe in the supply of military hardware is some 10 to one in favour of the United States. President Carter has agreed that this gap must be closed but only if European equipment is as effective as that produced in the United States, and not too costly. The question of cost is, of course, difficult for the Europeans as the Americans are capable of such large production runs that keep down unit costs. For example, a United States order of well over 600 F16 fighters compares with the four European countries' total order of some 300.
I cannot believe that the IEPG will have much success in presenting the United States and Canadian authorities with a shopping list starting with the Jaguar, Tornado, Alpha Jet and Martel. However, it is hoped that Canada will be attracted to the Tornado as a replacement for her ageing CF 100 Voodoos.
The problem is that these transatlantic discussions will take place at the level of the conference of national armament directors, yet political, economic and industrial issues are bound to be raised which cannot be tackled properly at the level of colonels and their equivalent.
The basic trouble is that they are national armament directors but they must speak in the transatlantic dialogue for Europe, and therefore with one voice. I wonder whether this is possible at present.
942 I also believe that there is very little use in discussing existing systems, such as those that I have mentioned. We need a discussion on the future generation of weapons systems. Could we then agree, for example, that Europe should specialise in certain types of aircraft and missiles which the United States would agree not to duplicate while Europe left other fields to the United States and Canada?
I believe that we now have two glaring examples of developments which run counter to standardisation. The Minister of State will know that the British have a unique anti-missile missile, Sea Wolf, now going into service. The United States has no such system, and yet it is now planning a similar system which will not be operational for at least seven years, when it will be more advanced and have a longer range than Sea Wolf.
During the interim period the United States will rely on the Vulcan Phalanx gun, which has a questionable capability. Surely it would be an advantage to all concerned if Sea Wolf were adopted in the United States for the interim period of seven years.
Similarly, the British are designing a new generation aircraft known as AST 403, which they hope will become a European project, though there is already considerable disagreement about the real requirement—whether it should or should not have short or vertical take-off. This problem is covered very well in the latest edition of the International Defence Review.
In view of the new American F14, F15, F16, F17 and F18 aircraft, is it likely that the United States would be interested in such a project, even for the next generation?
The only sensible answer is to agree, through NATO, on the requirements for the next generation of missiles and aircraft and decide which we should collaboratively produce on either or both sides of the Atlantic. Once the requirement is decided by a non-national body, such as the military committee of NATO, industry can set up the consortia to produce the necessary hardware.
Indeed, industry always makes it clear that once there is agreement on what is wanted it can produce it. What it finds so difficult is the lack of agreement. Once a decision is made, an accounting system giving the correct balance of the 943 "two-way street" between the United States-Canada and Europe may be developed either through the IEPG or CNAD, as is now done between the United States and Canada in a remarkably successful way that means that they are kept in balance over a period of years. I hope that eventually such a system could lead to the development of a European procurement agency, which could be funded in a similar manner to the NATO infrastructure programme, or by each country allocating a certain percentage of its national defence budget.
I suggest strongly that until we are prepared to give up some of our sovereignty to a European Agency we shall never obtain a satisfactory "two-way street". Nor will any of the NATO nations be able to afford adequate defence. The only way of obtaining value for money is by international co-operation, and I do not believe that that is possible until a higher priority is given to this matter by national Governments and a specific Minister is made responsible, as we do in this country. In this sphere the professional military man or the industrialist will never obtain standardisation. That can be achieved only by the politicians, and it will be done only when they understand its importance and give it a much higher priority than it gets today.
Let us hope that one of the task forces set up by the London summit of the summer of 1977 that is considering the whole question of standardisation and interoperability—it is due to report to the Washington Summit at the end of the year—will initiate some positive action to that end.
I summarise the points that I want to make so as to make them as clearly as possible. Standardisation could save NATO nations some 10 billion dollars a year and make the organisation some 30 per cent. more efficient in the battle field.
First, the present methods are not satisfactory. We need collaboration at a much earlier stage—in fact, at the project requirement stage.
Secondly, the requirement should be defined by an international organisation such as the military committee to NATO, or possibly the IEPG if its level can be raised.
944 Thirdly, as for the "two-way street", Europe must speak with one voice as the Americans want to deal with Europe collectively and not bilaterally with industrial nations.
Fourthly, we should concentrate on the next generation of hardware and agree on mutual zones of responsibility.
Fifthly and lastly, the "two-way street" needs an accounting system that might later develop into a European procurement agency.
If we could move along the lines of the five different suggestions that I have made, we should really start towards achieving a positive standardisation of the NATO forces, which is vital from the point of view of saving cost and creating greater efficiency. I believe that the Minister will agree with many of the suggestions that I have made and I hope that I shall be able to carry him with me at least with the five suggestions.
§ 11.29 p.m.
§ The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Dr. John Gilbert)First, I congratulate the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) on his good fortune in getting the Adjournment debate and on his choice of subject. Before paying tribute to his knowledge in this area, I thank him personally for his courtesy in giving me notice of the major points that he would raise.
The hon. Gentleman has taken a considerable interest in these matters in recent years. It is only because he is delivering his speech at this time of night after a certain rather more epic parliamentary occasion has taken place that we do not have more hon. Members in the Chamber to hear him. However, I am sure that his words will be read with close attention and that the House will derive much instruction from them.
I agree with a great deal of what the hon. Gentleman has to say, as I am sure he knows. He has given us some figures of the cost to the Alliance, both in terms of dollars and cents and loss of combat effectiveness, of our failure to develop collaborative projects and standardisation to a far higher degree. I am not in a position to comment in detail on the hon. Gentleman's figures, but if we were to make substantial progress of the sort that should not be beyond our 945 capability in interoperability and standardisation—and I differentiate purposely between the two—we could produce a far greater increase in capability in the Alliance than 3 per cent. per annum over five years would ever do. I am sure that we need to put this at the top of the Alliance's priorities.
Before making some general remarks, I owe it to the hon. Gentleman to try to reply to some of his more detailed points. He asked about the Harrier programme, the AV8B and its subsequent developments for the United States Marines and Navy. The US Marines are very happy with the AV8A which they have and are keen to get in due course the AV8B. Much unfortunate publicity arose in respect of the AV8A last year, largely as a result of misinformation, and the aircraft's temporary bad reputation has been wholly dissipated.
I cannot say how far the United States Administration will go with vertical takeoff aircraft. The US Navy is still interested in getting very large carriers in which fixed-wing aircraft without vertical lift capability would be the main element, but while the US Government are considering the future of the AV8B programme, development funding has been approved for this financial year and the programme is proceeding. We are hope-full that the programme will provide substantial work for British industry—quite apart from the question of standardisation to which the hon. Gentleman refers.
The hon. Gentleman also raised the general proposition that standardisation should start much earlier in the procurement process—right back at the research stage. I agree wholly. This point was put to me by one of my European colleagues, Dr. Schnell, the German State Secretary, who is responsible for these matters, at a conference I attended in Munich earlier this year.
I agree that it is often far too late when one has a completed weapons system to try to sell it off the shelf to another country that is already well down the road to making its own procurement to meet its own peculiar, not to say idiosyncratic, operational requirements.
The hon. Gentleman said that at least we had reached that stage where all NATO nations will be fighting the same war. From where I sit, that is a highly 946 dubious and optimistic proposition. I get the strong impression that we shall all be fighting different wars. In fact, I sometime wonder whether all Her Majesty's Services propose to fight exactly the same war, but when that appears in cold print in Hansard, I shall, no doubt, get into terrible trouble for having said it.
There is still a great range of tactical doctrines within NATO which bring one up to the point that the hon. Gentleman was making about AST 403. He asked whether the United States would be interested in that aircraft. It is too early for me to give an answer to that question, but the European countries—France, Germany and ourselves—are trying to get agreement on a set of operational requirements for the new tactical combat aircraft. However, we come against differing tactical doctrines.
There is even a question within Europe whether we should optimise on the air superiority role or the ground combat role. I am not suggesting that they are mutually exclusive, but if one is to have a multirole aircraft, one optimises on one role, to some extent, at the expense of another. The Royal Air Force is supremely a low-level air force. That is not true of other NATO air forces, certainly not of the United States air force. However, there are signs from the huge development in surface-to-air missile systems near the forward edge of the battle area that other air forces may be coming closer to RAF doctrine as they become aware of the implications for survivability of their machines. This is only one example that I could cull from many where there is a great variation of tactical doctrine across NATO countries.
The hon. Gentleman made some remarks about the NATO military committee. I have a sneaking inclination to share his views on that subject, but I think it is unrealistic to imagine that in the very near future procurement decisions in individual NATO countries will be guided in any serious sense by the deliberations of the NATO military committee.
The hon. Gentleman asked whether Sea Wolf would be sold to the American authorities. I certainly hope so. I have not been lacking, and nor has my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, in drawing the attention of the Americans to the extremely attractive capability of 947 this weapon system which is well ahead of its time in conception and development and embodies substantial technological advances; and there are further technological advances on the road ahead of us. In combination with radar systems which are being developed abroad, we may hope to save a very considerable amount of the weight of this system which will have implications for the type of ship in which it can be installed.
The hon. Gentleman put forward packages of weapons systems as a basis for collaboration. Without necessarily endorsing the specific suggestions he made, I may say that I agree with much of what he said. For example, it is possible for one to come to an agreement that industry in Europe would, say, concentrate on short-range air-to-air missile systems and the United States and the Canadians would concentrate on medium-range air-to-air missile systems. That sort of package, which does not involve too much industrial dislocation, might well light the way ahead for us in this difficult field.
When my right hon. Friend discusses the long-term defence programme proposals, he will find in them quite a lot of very promising material along the lines discussed by the hon. Gentleman. Obviously, I cannot disclose them here, as the hon. Member will appreciate, but some of them will need very careful study because of costing and personnel implications. I give the hon. Gentleman the assurance that the Government's view of the importance of this question is just as strong as his is.
Having said that by way of a paean to the principle of standardisation, I should perhaps sound a note of caution. Standardisation in itself cannot be a panacea for all NATO's difficulties. In fact, in certain areas it could be a disadvantage. It would, for example, be a very considerable disadvantage if we were to standardise solely on one electronic counter-measures system for our aircraft because that would mean that the Warsaw Pact Powers would have to solve only one technical problem to meet the NATO capability.
Therefore, there are various areas, and I could cite others, where clearly variety rather than standardisation produces an operational advantage. It is a question 948 of finding those areas where operational advantage lies with standardisation or failing that, with interoperability and seeing where there are economic benefits to be derived. The procurement of all standardised equipment is attractive because of its potential for reducing the budgetary pressure on individual countries. If a country can share its research and development costs, clearly the total unit system costs, after amortising the R and D will drop. The military case for standardisation rests largely on inter-operability.
There is one final problem about standardising equipment. Many difficulties have to be solved in terms of synchronising replacement cycles, not just the immediate replacement problem but subsequent cycles after that. Further, if a country is to forgo a capacity in a certain area, it will have to be confident that the partner it trades with will also forgo certain capacity because each will be mutually dependent for some subsequent weapons system on the good will of the partner that is providing the capability foresworn.
This is particularly a problem with high technology equipment, where most economic benefits derive from longer unit runs. There is also the difficulty that agreement may not be reached about a subsequent generation of weapons system, even though the initial system was the subject of an agreement. In addition, the cost of spares may rise and a country might encounter difficulties in taking its place in the queue for the purchase of the existing system.
One of the great problems met throughout the Alliance is therefore not on technical questions or on questions of tactical co-operation but over the creation of trust between the countries of the Alliance that they can safely place a portion of their defence capability with another—
§ The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. DEPUTY SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
§ Adjourned at eighteen minutes to Twelve o'clock.