§ Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Graham.]
§ 4.1 p.m.
§ Mr. Alan Haselhurst (Saffron Walden)I am very grateful for the opportunity to discuss the future of Stansted Airport, in my constituency. Without being ungrateful to Lady Luck, who has allowed me this occasion, I think that we would be better off discussing the future of Stansted Airport in a wider debate on the White Paper on airports policy. It is regrettable that the Government have not found time before Easter for a debate, because consultations seem to be going on throughout the country on the implications of the White Paper without this House being consulted.
In any criticisms that I may make of the White Paper, I do not imply any criticism of the existence of Stansted as an airport or its existence at a given capacity of operation. Certainly one can use words about the White Paper which can be misinterpreted as criticism of the use of the airport at all, so that should 1914 be made clear. Such general criticism is not my intention.
I believe that there would be fairly wide acceptance in my constituency and among the local authorities concerned if there were a known limit to the expansion of the usage of the airport. The absence of such a limit gives rise to fears and suspicions of the White Paper's proposals.
There are weaknesses and shortcomings in the White Paper; i which should be exposed to greater scrutiny. These have unfortunate implications in my constituency and for the area around. I am authorised by my hon. Friend the Member for Braintree (Mr. Newton) to say that he wishes to be entirely associated with my remarks.
The White Paper gives forecasts to justify the degree of expansion proposed in the airports in the South-East. I must accept that it is notoriously difficult to forecast what the likely usage of airports will be over a period of 12, 15 or more years. It is clearly difficult, but it is the responsibility of government to try to take decisions which are sensible even if the calculations behind the decisions are necessarily complex.
What is worrying is that there are precise provisions in the White Paper, namely, the statement that it will be sought to achieve a capacity in the South-East airports of 72 million passengers per annum up to 1990. The Government's own forecasts in the White Paper at a low level show a passenger throughput of 65.9 million and at the high level a throughput of 89.4 million. Even at the midpoint of the two forecasts it seems that, given any kind of accuracy in the forecast, there will be an excess of 5.6 million passengers above the 72 million for which the Government are providing. That seems to be a fairly evidence weakness of the strategy set out in the document.
If the forecasts on the high side prove to be the more accurate, there could be, on figures in the White Paper, an excess by 1990 of 17.4 million passengers wishing to use the South-East airports, although the capacity provided at that stage will be only 72 million.
The question in the minds of many people, particularly many people in my constituency and in my local authority 1915 areas, is: what is to happen to any excess over that for which provision is being made at this stage? It must also be said about the forecasts that figures are bandied about of a certain number of passengers being able to use a particular airport, but it will be accepted that it cannot necessarily be the case that a stated figure can always be put through a particular airport, simply because it is not ever possible to direct airlines so precisely that it will be possible to make up the figures to those which are stated in public documents.
For example, I understand that there is a query whether, with a single-runway airport at Gatwick, it will be possible to achieve a throughput of 25 million passengers. Therefore, if that figure cannot be met it throws even further doubt on the White Paper's figures.
The major British airlines are more bullish in their forecasts about passengers than are the Government—witness the figures that they use in the White Paper. I must ask the Secretary of State to tell the House what he knows about the forecasts of British Airways and British Caledonian, and whether these suggest that the increase in passenger usage of our airports is starting to gather pace. There is a possibility that this will be the case. We are on the threshold of what seems to be a price war, and there were headlines in the papers about this matter only recently. I believe that it is likely that an increasing number of people will wish to travel—I suppose mainly for holiday purposes—and that will boost the number of people wishing to use our airports. There must be considerable doubts whether the forecasts given in the White Paper are adequate.
Paragraph 104 of the White Paper states that
Even at the higher passenger forecast, these terminal developments—that is, those proposed up to 1990—should be sufficient to accommodate demand up and beyond the middle of the 1980s and quite possibly"—I emphasise the words "quite possibly"—it could prove adequate up to 1990.So it is only on the strength of a forecast which quite possibly may be right that we are invited to accept the strategy set out in the White Paper.1916 The White Paper says that the capacity being provided may "quite possibly" cope with demand up to 1990, so one has to ask the hon. Gentleman whether it is not fair and reasonable to say that, on the other hand, quite possibly the capacity may be inadequate. That is certainly a question which has to be asked by any Member representing Saffron Walden and by anyone concerned at the effects of growth and expansion of airports, because more room may have to be found than that which is being provided.
The second point about the White Paper to which I want to draw attention is the question of the options laid down after 1990. These are three. There is a further major expansion at Stansted; there is the possible use by conversion of a military airfield; there is the construction of an entirely new airport. The firmness with which the Government have closed the door on Maplin suggests that a wholly new airport site is not something at the forefront of their thinking—I put it no higher than that.
From the questions that have been asked, it would appear that at this stage the Government have really no clear idea of any military airfield that might be drummed into service. Therefore, it appears to me and to many other people that if the forecasts, even the ones in the White Paper, prove right, the extra capacity that will be needed by 1990 will have to be put at Stansted, and that if there is continued growth after 1990 the only option that will be open effectively to the Government, whoever are in power, will be to continue to expand Stansted. That is what I wish particularly to draw the attention of the House towards.
It seems to me to be unreasonable that, whilst approaching the problem on a reasonable basis, with a variety of options, in practice few calculations are on target in terms of the capacity in 1990, and if there is a growth of demand after 1990 the only place that it can go is Stansted. Not to come out plainly with that is, I believe, a grievous fault of the White Paper.
If it is the Government's intention that Stansted should accept that much bigger expansion, it should be plainly laid out so that it can be judged and assessed accordingly. There is the fear that this 1917 is the way that the White Paper intends to go in future, and that much is certainly resented.
Even those who most strongly support the usage of the airport—one can quote the views of the workers there—would not wish to see the airport expanding and expanding. Their concern is, naturally, for their own security and the provision of a reasonable number of jobs and prosperity in the district, but no one wants to see a kind of incremental increase in the usage of the airport. Yet that seems to be the heavy implication of the White Paper.
There are two places in the White Paper where the Government make encouraging noises about the local authorities, and I want to press the hon. Gentleman on them. The Government indicate in paragraphs 79 and 159 that they are prepared to consider amendments to the general development order so that local planning authorities can have some say over what happens within the perimeter of an airport—a say that they do not have at present. May we have an assurance that these amendments will be determined and made before the British Airports Authority brings along its proposals for the first stage increase at Stansted, the proposal that the throughput should be increased from the present limit of capacity of 1 million to 4 million?
Then there is the question of forward planning machinery to deal with the post-1990 situation. This is referred to in paragraphs 39 and 172 of the White Paper. I should like the Under-Secretary of State to comment on how quickly this machinery can be brought into being. I suggest that it can be brought in very quickly, and needs to be. If we wanted to have the option of a new airport to deal with excess capacity in the 1990s, it is clear that, because the lead time for a new airport is about 12 years, the decision would have to be taken very quickly. The Standing Conference on London and South-East Regional Planning seems to me to be the obvious body which should be commissioned to look at the strategy for future airport development in this country. I do not see why there have to be protracted discussions to bring about that very desirable result. I should be very grateful if the Under-Secretary of State would comment on that.
1918 My complaint, in essence, as I said at the beginning, is that there is bad methodology behind what the Government are doing, and this affects my constituents and the area that I represent. They may be forgiven for supposing, as a result of one inquiry after another, that Stansted was not to be considered for the major development of London airport capacity, yet the question has now come up again, and they must be wondering about our governmental process when this can be the case.
If there cannot be absolute certainty about the future, I hope that there can be some clarity, and I think that the Government have that obligation towards my constituents and my county.
§ 4.17 p.m.
§ The Under-Secretary of State for Trade (Mr. Clinton Davis)The hon. Member for Saffron Walden (Mr. Haselhurst) has spoken eloquently about his fears concerning the future of Stansted Airport, but he has failed to give any proper recognition to the considerable effort the Government have deployed to develop sensible and realistic policies which take account of the views of those most concerned with airport development. I heard no word of that in his speech. He has attributed designs to the Government that I reject as being no part of our policy. I hope I shall be able to give him some reassurance on this point.
As to a debate on the White Paper, I would certainly very much welcome that possibility, but the hon. Gentleman knows what the agenda of the House of Commons is before Easter. I do not have to remind him about that. With respect, that was rather a fruitless effort on his part, but if the Opposition feel as devotedly about it as he does, there is the opportunity of a Supply Day. I look forward to seeing whether the Opposition want to take advantage of that.
The White Paper on airports policy is the result of unprecedentedly extensive consultations. We started the process in 1975, when we published the consultative document "Airport Strategy for Great Britain", which sets out in the greatest detail the major issues involved in planning airport development for the future—the need for additional capacity in the London area, the problem of aircraft 1919 noise, the implications for the environment, for surface transport and for employment.
This was backed by an analysis or demand forecasts and by detailed supportive evidence on other technical matters. The Government's intention was to lay the whole problem open to discussion and to involve all those concerned or affected by airport development in the policy-making process. In consequence of that, nearly 1,000 organisations and individuals contributed their views, and many took part in discussions—and in discussions with Ministers. It is from this thorough, painstaking, examination that the Government's policy has emerged.
The Government never expected that its conclusions would be universally accepted. This is just not possible when there are so many conflicting views and interests. What we have sought to do, and I think succeeded in doing—I think this is generally accepted, despite the hon. Gentleman's assertion—is to strike a balance and adopt a sensible, flexible approach to airport development. We have acknowledged that our conclusions, particularly as regards the London area, are based on demand forecasts which are inherently uncertain. Who could have forecast the changing developments which took place between 1970 and the present day?
The hon. Gentleman is inviting ms, in fact, to be more certain in my forecasting over the next 12 years. I cannot do that. But what we have undertaken to do is to keep these forecasts under constant review—another point that he failed to mention —and to lay the methodology of forecasting open to discussion, so that decisions about the future may be taken in full knowledge of the facts and of the uncertainties. I think that that is a particularly reasonable way of going about this matter. It involves open government in this area, and I should have thought that that would be welcome to the hon. Gentleman.
The White Paper is concerned with the 1980s. With regard to the longer term, the Government have undertaken to continue to consult consumers of air services, amenity groups, local authorities and others about the provision of capacity 1920 beyond 1990. There is no question of taking decisions about the longer term by stealth. Any further development must be subject to full and wide-ranging consultations, as I have said on a number of occasions. That is clearly stated in the Government's policy.
I visited Stansted on 13th February to discuss the White Paper with representatives of the various interests concerned. The hon. Gentleman was there. I invited him to attend my discussions. There was nothing furtive about it at all. He will know from his attendance that I totally rejected any suggestions that the Government have a ready-made solution and have already taken a decision to develop Stansted Airport or that there are any ineluctable development. I confirm to the House what I said to the people of Stansted.
As explained in the White Paper, the problem we have to face in the London area is the shortage of airport capacity in relation to the expected growth in demand. The forecasts suggest that demand will range between 66 million and 89 million passengers a year by 1990—as the hon. Gentleman said—compared with a throughput of about 33 million in 1977. However, we have grounds for believing that the top end of the forecast range is too high.
The hon. Gentleman asked me to say something about the methodology of the forecasts and the discussions that took place on the forecasting. There was the most careful consultation between the CAA and the BAA. There was also discussion with British Airways and British Caledonian. Although I cannot tell the House today what their present views about the forecasting may be, they are entitled to have their views. One has to channel those views through the machinery that we are proposing to set up. We see no reason for being tardy or for delaying the establishment of the machinery. We need to do that as rapidly as possible.
Capacity at the four main London Airports—Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted and Luton—will be close to 50 million passengers a year by the end of 1978 when existing development work at Gatwick and Heathrow will have been completed. This should be sufficient to meet demand during the early 1980s, provided that a better distribution of traffic can be achieved between the respective airports.
1921 Beyond that, the White Paper provides for expansion of capacity at the existing airports up to 1990; a fourth terminal at Heathrow, raising capacity to 38 million subject, of course, to the results of the public inquiry but no fifth terminal; a second terminal at Gatwick, raising the capacity from 16 million to 25 million, but no second runway—it is the view of the BAA that there is no need for a second runway—and smaller improvements at Stansted and Luton to enable these airports to handle 4 million and 5 million passengers a year respectively.
The White Paper expressly rules out any further expansion at Heathrow, Gatwick and Luton, but a major expansion at Stansted remains a possibility in the longer term if demand continues to grow. But that stands alongside several other options.
It is this which has led to the hon. Gentleman's unease, because he would like a ceiling to be set on the expansion of Stanstead and he believes—wrongly, as I said earlier—that the decision has already been taken to expand Stansted to an airport o na similar scale to Gatwick.
§ Mr. Haselhurstrose—
§ Mr. DavisI shall not give way because I have rather a lot to say. The developments I have described are all subject to the normal planning procedures and, as appropriate, to a public inquiry, as in the case of the fourth terminal at Heathrow. They would provide a total capacity of 72 million passengers a year at the London airports. We believe that this will be sufficient to accommodate demand up to 1990, depending on the outturn of traffic. As I said earlier, we intend to monitor demand very closely, and to improve our forecasting methods, in order to base longer-term decisions on more accurate data, and to avoid being tempted by costly and grandiose projects which could turn out to be white elephants, as I believe Maplin would most certainly have been.
Some would have preferred the Government to commit more than £1,000 million of taxpayers' money to the building of the first stage of Maplin, with all the necessary road and rail connections. But, 1922 as a responsible Government, we examined the proposition in great detail, in the light of the demand forecasts, and rejected this solution emphatically at the time.
The first stage of Maplin would have provided accommodation for 18 million passengers a year. But the proposals in the White Paper would provide the same level of passenger capacity at Gatwick, Stansted and Luton, at a cost of only £150 million. That is an important figure, an important difference. We believe that it is necessary, particularly in the light of current economic expectations, to continue to restrain public expenditure. We believe that that should be done in practice as well as in theory, although it is the theory which applies mostly to Opposition thinking.
Because of the uncertainty of demand forecasts and of the massive costs involved in airport development, we have decided to adopt a step-by-step approach to the provision of airport capacity. That means that we shall take the necessary decisions at the appropriate time.
As regards Stansted, I am only too well aware of the opposition of local amenity groups to any expansion whatsoever. I was told, when I went to Stansted, that the tom-toms of the natives were beating steadily. There are other views which have been put to me. As a Government we have to take a broad view and seek to balance the conflicting interests, taking a less jaundiced view of what the local interests are than some would have us take.
The aim of our strategy is to meet the expected growth in demand. There is no escaping the fact that 80 per cent, of all passengers using London airports have origins and destinations in the South-East. While the development of tourism in the region and the rationalisation of regional airport capacity should help to divert traffic from London in the longer term, it would be unrealistic to try to compel passengers to use airports remote from their homes or destinations. We have to face the fact that London airports will continue to bear most of the burden.
My right hon. Friend announced on 5th April 1977 that charter traffic would be banned from Heathrow starting on 1923 1st April this year and that the Government and the British Airports Authority would pursue a policy of transferring scheduled traffic to Gatwick, with a view to sharing the load more evenly between these two major airports. We have already made some progress in that direction, and Gatwick is rapidly developing into a major international airport. Part of the Government's policy, as outlined in the White Paper, is to concentrate short-haul charter traffic at Luton, and, over time, long-haul charter traffic at Stansted, which at present is grossly under-utilised, as the hon. Gentleman accepted.
The aircraft noise situation at Stansted is less adverse than that of any other London airport. Moreover, the policy on night jet restrictions will ensure that noise disturbance at night is kept to a minimum, as traffic there develops. I believe that Stansted must play its role in helping to meet the demand during the 1980s. It would be quite inequitable to expect that other airports, which already handle considerable volumes of traffic, and the large number of people living in their vicinity, should accept a greater share to spare the Stansted area.
With regard to the future, I want to make it clear again that the Government do not at present envisage the expansion of Stansted airport beyond a capacity of 4 million passengers a year. In the longer term, beyond 1990, there is likely to be a need for additional capacity in the London area, if demand continues to grow. With the increasing use of larger aircraft, this should not involve the construction of a massive four-runway airport, as envisaged in the earlier proposals for Stansted, Cublington, or Maplin, but a more modest solution. It is that which represents the difference in the parameters of thought between what I am saying and what the hon. Gentleman was seeking to stipulate.
The White Paper sets out the three possibilities, to which he referred. We are prepared to consider these three possible solutions and the other options which might be proposed for meeting the demand. We shall shortly be discussing with local authorities and others 1924 concerned the setting up of a formal structure to advise on longer-term policies.
The Government have no preference for one solution over another. All of the options will be thoroughly examined before any decision is taken. We have given sufficient proof of our determination to continue the process of consultation which has worked well in the working out of the national airport strategy. Our intention now is to take the right decision at the right time.
The hon. Member has poured scorn on some of the propositions in the White Paper. I think that he has been less than fair. He is characteristically a very fair Member, but I understand that his thinking must to some extent be subjective. There are obviously constituency interests which must impinge upon his consideration of these matters. I make no complaints about that. He is here, among other things, to defend his constituency interests. But what I want to establish quite clearly in this debate is that we have no intention of trying to ignore those constituency interests—of developing, as I have said, Stansted by stealth. That would be most unfair.
The hon. Member sought to intervene earlier. I have virtually completed what I want to say. In fairness, I let him intervene now.
§ Mr. HaselhurstI am very grateful to the Minister. It was a question of the constructive intent of the Government rather than the deliberate intent, and if their forecasts are wrong the worry is that the inevitable consequence will be a further expansion at Stansted and that that is being made necessary by the strategy.
§ Mr. DavisI understand the hon. Member's concern, but we have neither an express nor an implicit design to go beyond what we have said in this debate or in the White Paper. I want to be absolutely fair to the people living around Stansted and working around Stansted. They have a right to be consulted. They will be consulted. Also, of course, the local authorities in the whole of the London area have a vested interest in ensuring that the development within the London area is sensible and pays heed to 1925 the various conflicting interests that apply—
§ The Question having been proposed after Four o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. DEPUTY 1926 SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
§ Adjourned at twenty-nine minutes to Five o'clock.