HC Deb 25 July 1978 vol 954 cc1517-28

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Tinn.]

10.30 p.m.

Mr. Peter Emery (Honiton)

The problem of oil pollution at sea is so considerable and is of such concern to hon. Members that this is the second Adjournment debate on the matter in two weeks. I am particularly sorry to see the Under-Secretary of State for Trade on the Government Front Bench. I mean that not as a criticism of him, but he may know that I asked for a Minister from the Department of the Environment to answer the debate. That is a matter for the Government, and they decided that the Under-Secretary of State for Trade should reply.

I apologise to the Under-Secretary but I have no alternative but to attack him, because for overall co-ordination on oil pollution the Department of Trade is the wrong Ministry. It does the wrong job and is most likely to make the wrong decisions. I remind the Minister that I have taken an interest in oil pollution for many years.

Three years before the Under-Secretary entered the House, during the "Torrey Canyon" debate I said: Let us make certain that the file is not closed now, as has so often been the case when we have had debates in the House. Let us make sure that we have learned from the disaster so that, if it occurs again, we shall be able to act slightly more efficiently than happened on this occasion."—[Official Report, 10th April 1967; Vol. 744, c. 890.] I take no pride in the fact that those were the closing sentences of my speech. I repeat them because the action taken and the speed of decision seems slower in the case of the "Eleni V" than it was at the time of the muddle of ministerial action on the "Torrey Canyon" disaster.

At that time ministerial to-ing and froing led to the first Private Notice Question being answered by the Secretary of State for Defence. A statement was made by the then Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Huyton (Sir H. Wilson), who promised a White Paper. The White Paper was produced by the then Home Secretary, Mr. Roy Jenkins, who opened the subsequent debate, which was wound up by Mr. Anthony Greenwood, who was then the Minister for Housing and Local Government.

Mr. Greenwood carried most of the responsibility during the latter part of the disaster. I worked closely with him. I flew over the wreck in a helicopter, which led to the publication of an Osbert Lancaster cartoon on the front page of the Daily Express. It showed two pilots looking down from a helicopter at the oil spill. Underneath were words to the effect "It's No. 10, and he says if it's going anywhere near Honiton to leave it alone."

I was led to believe that the single co-ordinating Ministry would be that dealing with local government. This belief was reinforced by the then Prime Minister on 4th April 1967. Mr. Murray, now Lord Murray, asked him whether the committee that is co-ordinating the efforts to clear the oil will continue in being for some time just in case there are any further disasters of this sort?". The Prime Minister replied: Yes, Sir. The committee—both the headquarters committee and the local organization—are being kept in being. As my hon. Friend knows, the Parliamentary Secretary and the Minister of Housing and Local Government have been assigned particular areas. As soon as danger appears in any of the areas they will immediately take charge of operations".—[Official Report, 4th April 1967; Vol. 744, c. 49.] I should like to know why, in 1969, I believe, the co-ordination was taken away from local government and given to the Department of Trade? Why, when we have the Ministry of Defence, the Prime Minister, the Home Office, the Departments of Environment and of Transport, and certainly the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food—and now, indeed, the Department of Energy—do we find the Department of Trade in this co-ordi-nating position?

The Department of Trade is the Department responsible for shipping and the furtherance of the shipping industry. It is the Department responsible for insurance and the furtherance of the insurance business. These are possibly the only two vested interests in any major oil or shipping disaster at sea.

My contention—it is the major aspect of my speech—is that above all, above every other concern or vested interest, if there is a major disaster at sea which brings oil pollution, the one overriding principle must be to protect the environment. It must be that above all else. The value of the ship, the value of the remaining oil and the claims of the salvage experts are nothing compared with, and must be entirely secondary to, the need to ensure as little environmental damage as possible.

I contend that this is a decision somewhat foreign to the Department of Trade. After all, I think that I can talk with some authority, having been a Minister working with the admirable civil servants of that Department, although in my day none of them claimed to be a great environmental expert.

My second question is this: if the Department of Trade co-ordination is so good, why were the same errors made in the "Eleni V" case as with the "Torrey Canyon" 12 years later? Why was no one able to make quick executive decisions, without further consultation, on the spot? When both ships had to be destroyed—one by bombing and the other by demolition charges—why was it said, in April 1967, that the decision was 11 days or at least nine days too late, and in May 1978—the same criticism—that the "Eleni V" was destroyed 21 days or at least 17 days too late?

Can we never learn? What is the chain of command? Who decides what and where? Why do decisions take so long? Is there not evident proof that the present emergency machinery does not respond adequately or, indeed, even effectively?

I have a major constituency interest in the need for the most effective, the most modern and the most efficient contingency planning and co-ordination for dealing with oil pollution. In Lyme Bay, off Seaton or Beer, Sidmouth or Budleigh Salterton, or off Exmouth or the mouth of the Exe, some of the world's largest supertankers, which are too big to enter most ports in Britain, in official jargon, "lighten their load". This means that they discharge all or part of their cargo of crude oil by ship-to-ship pipeline to a smaller vessel, which then proceeds to unload in any of a number of British ports.

With the massive south-westerly gales that arise on this part of the coast, with the volume of shipping that can be blown off course from the immensely busy shipping lanes in the Channel, or by human error, or because an anchor drags, it is only a matter of time before a major accident occurs.

If a 250,000-ton tanker, fully laden with oil, slices into a much smaller vessel, the pollution will be catastrophic. At that moment the tourist industry in the southwest will face bankruptcy. At that moment the local government agencies will require every possible aid. At that time they will have to look to the Government, and any dilatory decision-making by the Government will only enhance the disaster.

Let me say clearly that I do not consider that the IMCO negotiations should be, or could be, taken away from the Department of Trade, nor, indeed, the control of spillage when out at sea, but I do contend that the overall co-ordination does not rest with the Department of Trade. Does the Department of Trade normally, or ever, deal with other British emergencies? No. That is basically the responsibility of the Department of the Environment. In drought, flood or blizzard, Environment Ministers deal with the mobilisation of local government resources, the co-ordination of military and local government effort, the aid to local authorities, financial or material, training for local government staff and pools of equipment for local government use. None of these is in any way the responsibility of the Department of Trade.

Turning to another aspect, I ask three simple questions. I should, if possible, like an answer tonight. Has the Archer-Berry report, ordered by the Prime Minister, been delivered to No. 10? I believe that it was meant to be there on 1st July. Secondly, when will a statement be made on that report? Thirdly, may we have an assurance that, as with the "Torrey Canyon" inquiry, the Archer-Berry report will be published by the Government as a White Paper? As the inquiry has been carried out by Department of Trade civil servants, if it is not produced as a White Paper it will certainly be branded as a whitewash, which has already been suggested in some quarters.

Again, why have we not advanced in our technique of dispersal of oil at sea? Detergents are still not working really well. The Minister knows that only too well from the criticism of local authorities on the Norfolk coast. The vacuuming of oil spillage is still not operative. Why? The use of transponders is hardly even considered and is certainly nowhere in use. How much money is being spent on research in these areas connected with the problems of oil pollution? What annual sum is being spent? If co-ordination by the Department of Trade is effective, why has there been no updating for the benefit of local district councils? Why was the equipment in use on the east coast so antique? Why, indeed, is there such criticism emerging from local government sources?

With all this, does it really lead to the conclusion that all is going well, or that the Department of Trade should continue to be the co-ordinating Ministry? I contend that this cannot be the case, and that co-ordination must return to local government or to the Department of the Environment.

I end with a quote from The Times of 31st May 1978: A number of conflicting interests have been apparent in the handling of 'Eleni V' as it floundered for 25 days off the coast of East Anglia. The Department of Energy, for example, was worried that the early plan to two the wreck around the north of Scotland ready for sinking in the Atlantic might jeopardise oil rigs in bad weather or, if it sank prematurely, interfere with pipelines beneath the sea. The Department of the Environment was concerned lest a running spillage should pollute long stretches of coastline during the journey which was eventually cancelled. When the plan was altered to a beaching operation on a sandbank another set of conservationist fears arose The quote continues: One school of thought holds that statements by the Department of Trade engendered a spirit of false optimism in the early phase although that is vigorously denied by the department, which points out that it 'moved into the unknown virtually every day'. If that is true, why? If it is a fact, how shocking. If this was what was said by the Department of Trade, the sooner oil pollution matters are co-ordinated by the Department of the Environment the better for everybody.

10.47 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for Trade (Mr. Clinton Davis)

it is a pity that the hon. Member for Honiton (Mr. Emery) did not do more profound research into this matter. His approach was perfunctory, inexact and inaccurate in a number of material particulars, as I shall establish. The hon. Gentleman claimed to have learned much from his term in office, but he has not portrayed that situation tonight.

It might be helpful if I begin by outlining the present ministerial and departmental responsibilities for dealing with oil spills. The basic structure is simple. My Department is the lead Department in the Government on the clearance of oil spills and has executive responsibility for dealing with oil spills at sea. The coastal local authorities—not the Department of the Environment—are responsible for dealing with any oil that comes close inshore or actually comes ashore.

My Department has decentralised responsibility to the principal officers of the nine marine survey districts that cover the United Kingdom coastline. Within a framework of general guidelines each principal officer has drawn up his own contingency plan, which provides for close consultation with the local authorities, local officials of the appropriate fisheries department and local officials of the Nature Conservancy Council and other wild life interests. This local co-ordination is a cardinal feature of the contingency arrangements, and these matters were all brought into play during the "Elani V" incident.

Others, of course, have a part to play. The Department of the Environment, together with the Scottish and Welsh Offices, is responsible at Government level for policy on the protection of beaches and inshore waters. It stands ready to give local authorities assistance and advice when called upon.

The fisheries departments advise on the use of approved low toxicity dispersants and their impact on fisheries. The Nature Conservancy Council is the principal source of advice on wild life interests. Subject to service commitments, the Ministry of Defence provides assistance on request, in the form of aircraft for aerial surveillance and command ships and spraying vessels for anti-pollution operations.

Policy co-ordination among departments, environmental interests and industry is centred on the standing committee on pollution clearance at sea. This committee reports to the Secretary of State for Trade. In addition, departments of the Nature Conservancy Council can be brought together in the clearance advisory panel to advise on the clean-up response to be adopted in certain instances.

The Select Committee on Science and Technology is currently carrying out an inquiry into the handling of the "Eleni V" problem by the Government and other public bodies. On this occasion, therefore, it would not be appropriate for me to dwell on that operation, although I rebut some of the hon. Gentleman's rather more absurd allegations.

The Department of Trade's antipollution organisation responded quickly. On the evidence, there is no doubt about that. The principal officer set up his operational headquarters on the spot at Gorleston coastguard station with great promptness and a fleet of dispersant spraying vessels was mobilised very swiftly. The basic problem was that existing dispersants proved relatively ineffective in dealing with the sort of heavy fuel oil that was carried by the "Eleni V".

It is not true that no one was able to make quick executive decisions on the spot. The hon. Gentleman will have to assess the evidence as a whole. He is seeking to come to a premature judgment before the Select Committee has finalised its deliberations. That is not the way in which anyone approaching evidence should come to a judgment, but the hon. Gentleman has chosen to do so and he is entitled to do that.

The principal officer made executive decisions as emergencies arose. He did not have to refer back to London—nor did he—in order to deal with those emergencies on the spot. That is brought out in the evidence. Decisions were taken promptly, with the object of minimising the risk of further pollution. The execution took time because of the inherent difficulty of dealing with a part of the ship that was upside-down and largely submerged. That was not comparable with the situation 11 years ago in the "Torrey Canyon" episode, or with that in the "Amoco Cadiz" incident.

The machinery of government is based on the organisation of Departments by functions, such as energy, agriculture and trade. Our arrangements in the maritime area are consistent with this general aproach. Accordingly, they rest on the basis that individual Ministers are responsible for the functions of their Department as they apply to the maritime area. It is obvious that many functions of Departments have a maritime dimension, but the Government's view is that, on the whole, it is more important to retain functional links, particularly those of a policy nature. For example, the exploitation of offshore oil and gas has more in common with the development of onshore energy, and fisheries have more in common with agriculture, than each has with the other.

The allocation of ministerial responsibilities is a matter for the Prime Minister, and present arrangements were reviewed in 1975–76. The report of that time confirmed that the basic structure ought to be retained and it recommended a number of detailed changes and improvements. That report was published in September 1976 as pollution paper no. 8, entitled "Accidental Oil Pollution of the Sea", to provide an opportunity for debate and comment. The report was subsequently endorsed by the Government in July 1977. This allocation of responsibilities has important advantages. Oil spillages and pollution can occur at any point around the coast of the United Kingdom and my Department responds through its decentralised marine survey organisation.

By their nature, local authorities are decentralised. Oil spillages and pollution occur infrequently on any particular stretch of coast, so responsibility is placed on organisations that already exist for other purposes, the manpower and resources of which can be diverted when the need arises. The division of responsibility between "at sea" and "on shore" broadly reflects a distinction in the techniques utilised. Apart from naval architects, our marine survey organisation is staffed largely by Merchant Navy deck officers with command experience and engineer officers who are well suited to organising and directing operations essentially based on the use of ships. My Department is also able to utilise the coastguards' communication network.

Added to that, my Department has a wide range of related maritime responsibilities. We survey merchant ships for safety. We deal with traffic separation schemes, navigational aids, the safety of navigation generally, and the coastguard and its responsibilities for co-ordinating maritime search and rescue are all part of my Department's responsibilities. We are also responsible for measures to reduce operational pollution.

The local authorities have substantial resources of men, vehicles and mechanical equipment for their other functions, which can also be used for beach clearance. The assertion by the hon. Gentleman that all this is antiquated is not borne out by the evidence. The authorities have also acquired necessary items of beach-cleaning equipment, and a number of systems for containing and recovering oil mechanically from the sea surface, while generally ineffective in the open sea, can be useful in sheltered or inshore waters. Booms may also be useful in protecting particularly sensitive areas in entrances to harhours and small rivers.

The present allocation of responsibilities has clear advantages. In itself the reallocation of responsibilities does nothing to reduce the incidence of oil pollution or to improve the techniques available to deal with oil pollution. Quite apart from the inquiry by the Select Committee, the Department is engaged in a thorough stocktaking of our contingency arrangements, to which the hon. Gentleman alluded.

We have by no means closed our mind to the possibility of change. The structure of Departments and the responsibilities of Ministers are by no means immutable, but they need to be adapted to changing circumstances. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister keeps this question under review and would not hesitate to make hanges if they seemed necessary.

The hon. Gentleman said that with a major disaster at sea, bringing oil pollution, the main concern must be to protect the environment. I believe that the paramount concern must be the safety of life. To that all else is secondary. That does not mean that pollution is of minor importance.

The hon. Gentleman asked a number of questions, with which I shall try to deal in the short time available. The exercise in which we are engaged is one of Government stocktaking, involving a number of Departments, with important experts. It is chaired by the permanent secretary at the Department of Trade. The report has been delivered to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and I have already given an undertaking that a statement will be made about it. However, since this is a matter for the Prime Minister to determine, I cannot say in what shape that report will be published.

The hon. Member asked how much had been spent on research. I shall let him have the information in due course. A considerable amount has been devoted to this matter, but the weight of the research done by Warren Springs has not been into the type of oil in question, which is not carried in a great proportion of the ships operating around our coasts. The establishment is, however, stepping up its research into this problem.

It is incorrect to say that there has been no updating of contingency plans. The hon. Gentleman claimed that the same errors were made with the "Eleni V" incident as were made with that of the "Torrey Canyon". I have demonstrated—and I think that the evidence before the Select Committee is clear on this point—that the two incidents were different. With the "Torrey Canyon" a large tanker became a wreck. With the "Eleni V" we had to cope with the hulk of what remained of a small tanker. I simply do not believe that it is right to equate the two incidents, although certainly both gave rise to problems.

We do not have the complete answer to this matter. There are no panaceas, but the right way to proceed to save human lives and to try to mitigate these disasters is to take international action. In that respect, the Government have acted and taken initiatives at IMCO. I believe that history will show that we were right. This is an international problem, which can be tackled satisfactorily only on an international basis.

Question put and agree to.

Adjourned accordingly at Eleven o'clock.