HC Deb 19 July 1978 vol 954 cc642-69

Lords amendment: no. 31, in page 8, line 8, leave out ("section 18") and insert ("sections 18 and 22").

9.15 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for Wales (Mr. Alec Jones)

I beg to move, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy Speaker

With this we take Lords amendments nos. 32, 35 and 36.

Mr. Jones

Amendments nos. 32, 35 and 36 are consequential, and similarly I hope that the House will disagree with them.

This group of amendments attempts to ensure that there shall be a party balance in the Executive Committee. As it stands at present, the Bill provides that there shall be a party balance, so far as is practicable, in all other statutory committees of the Assembly. In our view, if we were to seek to secure this party balance in the Executive Committee, it would effectively change the whole structure of the Bill. In setting up the committee structure for the Assembly, the Government have kept two principles in mind—the need for wide participation by Members in the work of the Assembly and the need for a flexible and efficient system of working.

Insistence on party balance in the Executive Committee could result in delay, and indecision at best, and could put the entire structure at risk. The Assembly will inherit a wide range of functions. In the Government's view, it is in the interests of efficient administration to require the Assembly to set up subject Committees to embrace these functions. By providing, as we do in clause 22, for these committees to be balanced so as to reflect the political composition of the Assembly so far as practicable, the Bill ensures that all the parties represented in the Assembly can participate in the Assembly's work.

The situation in relation to the Executive Committee is completely different. It will be essential for the Assembly to be reasonably decisive and generally capable of carrying out its responsibilities. This makes it necessary for the majority party in the Assembly, or a combination of interests, if there is no majority, to be responsible and to be seen to be responsible.

The focus of this responsibility will be the Executive Committee, composed mainly of the leaders of the subject com- mittees. If the strength of will of the Executive Committee is weakened, as it will be if these amendments are carried, there will be very great dangers for the good government of Wales.

If there were to be a party balance on the Executive Committee it could only encourage the majority party or parties to resort to a caucus system of government.

The Bill proposes that the Executive Committee should be made up of the leaders of the subject committees and should include also additional members, up to one-third of the number of those leaders. These extra members could belong to non-majority parties. These are matters for the Assembly itself to determine.

Sir David Renton (Huntingdonshire)

Will the Minister tell us the total number of members of the Executive Committee and what proportion of them will therefore be drawn from the leaders of the subject committees?

Mr. Jones

As the right hon. and learned Member knows, the Assembly will be able to set up committees. Until the Assembly decides how many it will set up no one can say how many leaders there will be. It is written into the Bill that the Executive Committee will consist of the leaders, and there is a fixed percentage of additional members—up to one-third, If there are more leaders on the Executive Committee there will be more additional members. These additional members could be drawn from any party, depending on the views of the Assembly itself.

We believe that the Bill strikes the right balance. On the one hand, the subject committees will be responsible for the exercise of powers relating to certain devolved functions and each committee will act as a check on the authority of its leaders. On the other hand, the Executive Committee will have the responsibility for overall strategy and policy as well as co-ordination and resource allocation. It will have the cohesiveness to work out a combined programme.

To impose a requirement for party balance would be a recipe for conflict and indecisiveness in the Executive Committee, and could lead to weak and inefficient government. Therefore, we believe that the Executive Committee membership should be as laid down in the Bill.

Mr. Leon Brittan (Cleveland and Whitby)

On the face of it, this amendment may seem to be comparatively minor. It is about the structure of the committee system in the Welsh Assembly. But it is very important because it goes to the heart of the whole nature of the scheme of the Assembly, as proposed in the Bill.

If we compare what the Minister has just said with what was said on behalf of the Government in another place, we see that the Government's line has hardened somewhat. Their opposition to the amendment is stronger here than it was elsewhere. I am not suggesting that it was not substantial in another place, but the dire perils that the Minister indicated might flow from support for this amendment were not suggested in such strong terms in another place.

The Government's scheme for devolution in Wales is based on a concept of power-sharing within the Assembly. In making out the case, the Minister failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that that is central to the whole scheme. For that reason I ask my colleagues to take the view that there should be a party balance in all the committees, including the Executive Committee, and not just in the committees other than the Executive Committee.

When we talk of a balance of parties, we are reflecting the language of clause 22, which refers to the obligation to secure that the balance of parties in the Assembly is, so far as practicable, reflected in the membership of the committee. In our view, the concept of power-sharing as being the basis of the Welsh Assembly requires that that philosophy should be extended to the Executive Committee as well. We are talking of a committee system, and as such it requires the balance of parties to be reflected throughout. We are talking about a system in which the subject committees referred to in the Bill are not just consultative committees or select committees. They are themselves executive bodies exercising substantial power.

Therefore, we have a system in which the committees which are required to have a party balance are given consider- able power. It is not right to disregard the totality of the power exercised by the subject committees when we talk about firm government and similar matters. If the subject committees with their party balance are incapable of action, the mere fact that the Executive Committee has not a party balance will not enable the Assembly to work in a firm or resolute way.

The working of the Assembly depends totally on the operation of the subject committees. It is the Government who have decided that this Bill should operate quite unlike the Scotland Bill and that there should be subject committees conducted in an operational way and making real decisions. The Government have decided that that is the right way to operate the Assembly in Wales.

It would have been possible for the Government to say "We want a Cabinet system in the Welsh Assembly as in the Scottish Assembly. That system will work in the same way as it does in this House." In that case the whole concept of party balance and committee structures would not be applicable in the same way. We are saying that one cannot have both. One cannot have a mixture of a Cabinet system and a committee system. One either has the one or the other.

If the Government have plumped for the committee system, this must go right the way through to the Executive Committee as well. There are powerful arguments against having a committee structure at all and against having this system of power-sharing, but there are no powerful arguments in favour of basing the whole structure of the Assembly, which is weighted heavily in the subject committees, on power-sharing and then saying "We shall drop it when we come to the top one—to the Executive Committee itself." There seems to be no justification for such an arrangement.

I can appreciate that if the Government had said "The Executive Committee will be different. There will be no minority members in it at all", it might be possible to graft such an Executive Committee on top of the subject committees. Then one could say "Power sharing is to go so far and no further" and when it came to the Executive Committee the pretence could be dropped and it would be a committee that emanated from the governing party and it would make all the decisions. That might be defensible, although I regard it as curiously incongruous in relation to the basic system of subject committees.

However, this is not what the Government are suggesting. If we examine the provisions of clause 18, we see that it is clearly envisaged that not all the members of the Executive Committee will be from the majority party. It is not expressly set out in clause 18, but we can look at what Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge, the Minister in charge of the Bill, said in another place on 21st June 1978. He then made it clear that he envisaged that the Executive Committee would contain people who were members of the other party. Lord Donaldson said: Turning now to the Executive Committee, the Bill provides in Clause 18 that it shall be composed of the leaders of the subject committees and may include additional members up to one-third of the number of those leaders. So far as that is concerned, therefore, it need not be purely from the one side."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 21st June 1978; Vol. 393, c. 1227.] 9.30 p.m.

We are presented with a picture of the Government seeming to accept that the Assembly will work in this way and that the Executive Committee will also be a bipartisan or multi-partisan body. There is certainly nothing to stop that. If the Minister's argument made any sense, one would expect it to be clear from the language of the Bill and the speech of Lord Donaldson that the Executive Committee, unlike all the other committees, was not to contain anyone except members of the majority party.

If all the talk about firm government, the need to avoid delay and indecision and the danger of putting the whole structure at risk made any sense, the right course would be to make the Executive Committee a genuine Cabinet where everyone was of one mind and not to allow in people from the other parties, but that is not what Lord Donaldson said or what the Bill says. Quite the reverse.

The Government are in a terrible mess. Once one says that the Executive Committee will, might, or should contain members of the other parties, questions of cohesiveness or the secrecy of the Cabinet do not arise. The Executive Committee will be an inter-party body in which matters are discussed. In those circumstances, I do not see how the Government can rationally put forward the argument that if the Executive Committee is required to reflect the balance of the Assembly—and there will plainly be a majority on the Executive Committee for the majority party in the Assembly—that will cause delay and indecision and put the structure of the Assembly at risk, but it is all right merely to prescribe that the Executive Committee shall, or is likely to, contain some members of minority parties, but not a proportionate number.

That is one position which is indefensible. It is defensible not to have a committee structure at all and it is just about defensible to have a system in which all the committees operate on a balance of party representation but the Executive Committee is comprised of solely the Government party. However, it is quite indefensible to say that the Executive Committee should have some members of the Opposition but that it immediately becomes dangerous and will cause delay and indecision if the number of members of the Opposition is that number required to reflect the composition of the Assembly as a whole.

Talk about strength of will and the use of other such heroic terms in this context is language designed to terrorise the House into rejecting the Lords amendment, but it is language which is quite unrelated to what the Bill says and to what Lord Donaldson has said. The Government ought to have the courage of their convictions. If they believe in a power-sharing type of Assembly, they should follow it through to the Executive Committee as well.

The only other argument that has been put forward is the caucus argument—that if the amendment is accepted, decisions will be taken by the majority party in smokefilled rooms and not in the Assembly. That is not a defensible argument in this context. All the subject committees, which will have so much power, will include representatives of the minority parties in proportion to their strength in the Assembly and all the decisions on those committees will be taken in caucuses. The Executive Committee will be no different.

What is more, the Executive Committee, as the Minister says and as envisaged by Lord Donaldson, will contain members of the Opposition. If matters of high policy affecting the future of Wales are required to be considered in secret by the Government party, it will be necessary, even without the amendment, for the caucus to deal with them. There is no legislative way of avoiding a caucus. It is a sinister word for a perfectly natural operation—namely, those of like mind getting together and deciding what to say. To suggest that it is something sinister that will enter the Assembly if the amendment is allowed to stand is not an argument that can be supported on any rational basis.

For those reasons I advise my right hon. and hon. Friends to support the Lords amendment.

Mr. Dalyell

In the absence of the great Welsh pro-devolutionists I suppose that I am entitled to speak.

I refer again to Lord Donaldson's speech on 21st June. I heard the debate in which the noble Lord made that speech. With the exception of Lord McCluskey—incidentally, I do not think that the Bill can be handled other than by criminal lawyers—Lord Donaldson was as confused as Baroness Stedman—and I like them both. Neither of them had a clue what they were on about. They were as confused as anybody else. Never was there such massive confusion within another place.

Lord Donaldson said: The focus of this responsibility will be the Executive Committee, composed mainly of the leaders of the subject committees. What does "mainly" mean? It is the vaguest of terms. The noble Lord continued: If the strength of will of the Executive Committee is weakened, as I think it would be weakened by the adoption of these Amendments, then there are grave dangers for the good government of Wales. —[Official Report, House of Lords, 21st June 1978; Vol. 393, c. 1229.]

I hardly wanted to talk to you, Mr. Speaker, about the good Government of Wales, but I wonder about "grave dangers" in this sense. For instance, it might fall to a majority party to adopt a caucus system. I do not know what "party" is all about. I took part in a meeting this morning of the Parliamentary Labour Party. That is a caucus system. What is so dreadful about that? If anyone has the notion that given the concept of "party" there will not be caucuses—call them private meetings or whatever—that seems completely unreal.

I do not want to take up the time of my Welsh colleagues other than to ask a basic question. It is a question that I put in another form in the previous debate. What exactly will the Executive do? Its laws will be formed for it by another institution. It may be said that the Executive will have a say in the formation of those laws at a pre-legislative stage and that that may be done on an informat basis. If that is done, we shall get into another problem. There will then have to be a whole series, on every occasion, of separate laws for England and separate laws for Wales. Therefore, we return to the same problem.

Let us suppose that there is a Conservative Government in Downing Street and a Welsh Labour Assembly. Does there not have to be separate legislation for Wales if the influence, so called, is to have any effect? If that is not so, we shall have the tail wagging the dog and a Welsh Labour Assembly having an influence over Conservative formulated laws for England. We cannot have it both ways. We return to the unholy muddle that we have seen before. We are dealing with a completely unworkable proposal.

I am not uptight about the Welsh Bill as I was about the Scotland Bill. That is partly because I do not believe that it is a serious proposition that there will be a separate Welsh State as I believe there will be a separate Scottish State, and that we are on the motorway to separation. On the other hand, hon. Members from the rest of the United Kingdom are entitled to speak when they think that there is major confusion for which the House is responsible.

Sir David Renton

The hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell), with the perspicacity to which we have become accustomed, referred to ways of achieving good government in Wales. One way of achieving it is to have this assembly, our Parliament here, presided over by a great Welshman, as happens now. I cannot think of any improvement upon that.

Turning to clause 22, we see the essence of what we are discussing. In specific terms, it provides that In naming people to be members of a committee appointed under section 17, 21 or 53 of this Act, other than the Executive Committee. the effect of one of our amendments will be to leave out those words— the Assembly shall secure that the balance of parties in the Assembly is so far as practicable, reflected in the membership of the committee". I should remind the House of those other committees. They will include all the subject committees under clause 17. There will perhaps be a dozen of those. They will include the very important committee, under clause 21, for the scrutiny of subordinate legislation. Above all, they will include the accounts committee—"the finance committee" it will no doubt come to be called—under clause 53. That is the most important of the committees.

The Government have decided that, in respect of those committees, democracy shall prevail—that there shall be what is called "the balance of parties". But in the most important committee of all, the umbrella committee, the Executive Committee, the committee which, above all, will be representative of the Assembly in its dealings with the outside world, democracy shall not prevail. In other words, the Government take the view that in lesser matters democracy shall prevail but in the one major matter it shall not. I do not see the sense of that.

The Under-Secretary of State said that if these amendments were accepted and the Executive Committee had to become representative of the parties in the Assembly, it would change the whole structure of the Bill. I do not understand how he can say such a thing. At best, it is a simple exaggeration. At worst, it reveals his complete lack of faith in the structure of the Bill, if its success is to depend on political distortion of that kind on the Executive Committee.

We are somewhat handicapped in discussing this matter, because the Under-Secretary of State has not been able to tell us what the size of the Executive Committee will be. He has not been able to tell us how many leaders of other committees will be members of it. Yet, his whole case seems to depend on that. Neither has lie been able to tell us how those leaders will be chosen in each of the various committees which will have the function of electing them.

It seems that, at any rate for the first election in Wales, a particular party—the Labour Party—is likely to have a majority in the Assembly. It is by no mean certain, but it is likely. If so, and if on each of the committees the Labour Party is predominant, it will presumably elect one of its members to be the leader of committee. If that is not to be so, let us be told, because it could help to set our minds at rest. But if the leader of each committee is to come from the majority party on the committee, it follows, as night follows day, that the membership of the Executive Committee will consist of leaders who are members of that one party.

What are we to infer from that? Is this democracy, or is it a sham? What will the people of Wales think about it? Not all the people of Wales are dedicated Socialists. Even some of those who are, as we know from what has been said in the House, are not enamoured of the Bill. We have not heard a satisfactory case in favour of this proposition.

9.45 p.m.

Mr. Dalyell

I have talked to Lord Heycock who, for many years, was chairman of the Glamorgan county council. He asked "What distinguishes this proposed set-up from local government, given the nature of the proposed Executive?"

Sir D. Renton

There is much that underlies that question. I concede the hon. Member's point. I cannot speak for the present set-up of local government in Wales. I do not know enough about it. But in English local government when one party tends to dominate, as I am happy to say happens in my constituency, the main committee of the council—the policy and resources committee—tends to reflect the balance of the parties. It reflects the political representation on the council as a whole. That seems to be right. But that is not the pattern that the Government wish to follow.

With respect to the Under-Secretary of State, I must tell him that so far he has not been of much help to the House. Let us see whether we can derive any help from the Government spokesman in the House of Lords.

Sir Anthony Meyer

My right hon. and learned Friend obviously understands the Bill better than any Government Member, including the Government spokesman. He explained how the chairmen of the committees would be members of the dominant party. I cannot understand how the other one-third of Members will be chosen. Will they be co-opted by the chairmen? If that is to be so, the committees will be one-party committees. What force is there in the suggestion that there should be a power-sharing committee?

Sir D. Renton

I cannot answer that question. Only a Government spokesman can do so. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Flint, West (Sir A. Meyer), because he has added yet another uncertainty to those that I have already mentioned. He has raised a further factor which the House should bear in mind when deciding whether the Government are right or wrong.

In the other place, Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge said: Any delegation of executive powers which the Assembly might decide to adopt is made subject in the Bill to the need for political balance, and hence participation, in the subject committees. So far so good. He went on: These committees are there to keep a check on the actions of the leaders, who will regularly require the approval of the subject committees for their exercise of delegated powers. That sounds good on the surface, until one goes into the matter in more detail. One finds that in the context of party politics, as we know it, it is a meaningless expression of what might happen.

The subject committees will have elected the leaders. The majority party in the Assembly will be the majority party on each committee. Therefore, there will be about as much check on the actions of the leaders as one gets in this House. I say this with deep respect to majority parties of either political complexion. I do not say that people never defy their own Government. I have done so myself in my time—not very often, but when I felt strongly. But the majority party wins the day so long as it has a majority. If it has not, it should go back to the electors. That might be better than foisting this Bill on the people of Wales for a referendum.

Lord Donaldson went on: Furthermore, the Bill makes it possible, though this is a matter for the Assembly, to add some extra, perhaps non-majority Party, members to the Executive Committee. How decent! What a beautiful thought, that perhaps the Assembly would add a few non-majority party members—not, we are told, in order to redress a balance in the Executive when it is unbalanced by leaders of committees—

Sir Raymond Gower

Is not the most important word there "perhaps"?

Sir D. Renton

Being a modest sort of man, I did not emphasise that word too much, but my hon. Friend is absolutely right; the word "perhaps" adds further uncertainty to the uncertainty already expressed about this part of the legislation.

Mr. Cledwyn Hughes (Anglesey)

I may not be following the right hon. and learned Gentleman as clearly as I should, but is not the position safeguarded by clause 22, which says: In naming persons to be members of a committee appointed under section 17, 21 or 53 of this Act, other than the Executive Committee, the Assembly shall secure that the balance of parties in the Assembly is, so far as practicable, reflected in the membership of the committee."? That will apply in the case of the Executive Committee.

Hon. Members

No.

Sir D. Renton

The right hon. Gentleman is one of my old parliamentary friends, although not strictly a political friend, and I have deep respect for him. However, if he had heard me earlier, he would have heard me read out the whole of that clause. Its effect is exactly the opposite of what he has stated. That is why we are trying to put the matter right.

Mr. Brittan

Does my right hon. and learned Friend not agree that, in view of the generous and correct tribute that he has paid to the right hon. Gentleman, he should go further, in view of the right hon. Gentleman's expression of opinion and welcome him as a new and powerful ally to the Opposition side of the debate on this issue?

Sir D. Renton

That is a brilliant suggestion, hut one which would never have occurred to me, because I would never have dared address such an invitation to no less a personage than the Leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party.

Mr. Dalyell

Chairman.

Sir D. Renton

I apologise. It is such a pity that the term "chairman", with which we are so familiar, has not been used in the Bill in this context. That is the reason for my slip of the tongue and I hope that I shall be forgiven.

I hope that it will not weary the House if I conclude by referring again to what was said by Lord Donaldson, because that is the only official guidance that we have been given. We have had no guidance from the Front Bench this evening on this important matter, so we have to resort to words expressed in another place. As I said before, we should be grateful for the opportunities that another place has given us.

Lord Donaldson went on to say: I suggest that we must be careful in seeking to add to or disturb the structure set out in the Bill. That is the same phrase as the Minister used. I do not wish to repeat my comment on that, save to say that if the structure of the Bill really depends upon a scheme of this kind the Bill itself cannot be worth very much.

Mr. Dalyell

Further down Lord Donaldson said: Essentially what the Amendments are aimed at is, as I said before, a form of power-sharing. It will be recollected that Lord Donaldson was a Minister in Northern Ireland. When he refers to power-sharing, we can all guess precisely what he was referring to, and therefore I put it in the form of a question: is this power-sharing along the Northern Ireland lines?

Sir D. Renton

I confess to feeling a difficulty about this expression "power-sharing". I must apologise to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Cleveland and Whitby (Mr. Brittan), with whom I agree on nearly every occasion because I admire his great and clear mind. When he spoke about power-sharing as being a laudable objective in relation to what we are discussing here, I confess that I became a bit confused, because power-sharing in Northern Ireland is not an expression of the balance of parties. It is something to overcome the imbalance of parties which prevails in Northern Ireland. Is that not so?

Mr. Dalyell

That is right.

Sir D. Renton

To use it in this context shows that the noble Lord seems to have misunderstood the situation that he was trying to explain, just as I think the Minister has misunderstood it.

I have one final passage to read, and I apologise for keeping the House for so long, but it is because I have given way so much. Lord Donaldson posed the question: How would elected representatives of the Welsh people be accounted responsible? That is a burning question. The Welsh people will want to know, and the answer that he gives is: The Bill itself provides for a fair belance on the subject committees, but it seems to the Government wholly wrong to force this concept on the Assembly for the Executive Committee as well."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 21st June 1978; Vol. 393, cc. 1228–9.] I do not see how one distinguishes between the Executive Committee and the other committees. What is right for the other committees, including the very important finance committee, must, I should have thought, a fortiori, even the more so, be right for the Executive itself. I trust that I have said enough to make the Government have second thoughts.

Sir Raymond Gower

I, too, should like to press the Minister to consider this again in the light of what has been said. The advantage of having power-sharing, or a fair balance of the parties, was recognised by the Government when the Bill was drafted. I suppose they thought that by putting in this sort of provision they would commend this part of the Bill to people in all parts of the Principality.

There are obvious advantages in having this representation in accordance with the balance of the parties on the subject committees. If the Assembly is considering a particular topic through one of its subject committees, all the parties represented in the Assembly would wish to co-operate and participate in that consideration. What real argument, therefore, can the Government offer in support of applying a different basis to the Executive Committee? My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Huntingdonshire (Sir D. Renton) appears to say that this different basis would not apply to the accounts committee.

Sir David Renton

It is clear in the Bill that the accounts committee will have party representation.

10.0 p.m.

Sir R. Gower

That is the point I want to make. The accounts committee is one of the subject committees. It will be dealing with finance just as all the other committees will be dealing with other subjects. So we can properly describe it as a subject committee. If the Government are prepared to contemplate representation based on and in accordance with the balance of the parties for an important committee such as that, why cannot they take that small extra step and extend to the Executive Committee what they admit to be a beneficial principle? That is all that we ask, and it is all that the other place has put into the Bill. That was a most commendable improvement. Why are the Government now seeking to divorce the committee from this beneficial principle?

The Minister said nothing in opening to explain why this was being done. He said nothing to convince us that this move would be a great advantage. We have been assured that this is not a legislative Assembly dealing with primary legislation. It is purely an executive body and one admirably suited to this kind of representation. There might be obvious objections to this idea in a legislative Assembly, but we are not dealing with such a body and therefore the principle should apply. I hope, therefore, that the Government will change their mind and will declare their change of heart before the end of this debate.

Sir A. Meyer

I am even more lost and confused than any of my hon. Friends about this matter, wandering around on this "darkling plain" with these "ignorant armies" clashing by night. I had hoped for some guidance from my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Huntingdonshire (Sir D. Renton), and I was disappointed that he was unable to enlighten my ignorance. It may be that the Minister will be able to clear up this matter. I am not in the position of my hon. Friend the Member for Barry (Sir R. Gower). I do not demand that the Government should make this or that concession. I just want the Government to explain what this is all about. Let me make the Under-Secretary an offer. If he can explain what this is all about I will consider supporting him in the Lobby. If he can convince me that it will work, I give an absolute pledge to support him. I cannot say fairer than that.

The idea behind this sludgy amalgam is one which could conceivably be made to work only with some kind of proportional representation—and I am sorry to go back to that. That would exert some kind of pressure on the parties in the subject committees to draw together rather than to pull apart. However, that does not apply in any way to the Executive Committee which is what we are principally concerned with tonight.

Mr. Ioan Evans

We all have our views on whether there should be an Assembly, but if there is to be one I think we all agree that we should try to make it work sensibly. In considering the work of the Executive Committee and the question of party balance it is worth drawing parallels with the Cabinet, which makes decisions and recommendations, and the House of Commons. We can think of the party balance in committees as it is in the Standing Committees of the House of Commons, where there is a party balance. There is proportional representation. In fact, depending on the membership of the House, so we get such representation. Whereas originally the Government were recommending that the party balance should not apply to the Executive Committee, the party balance should apply to the subject committees, where, in effect, the hon. Member will have PR, because the membership of the committees will be dependent on the numbers in the parties.

Sir A. Meyer

I am extremely grateful to the hon. Gentleman. He has at least explained how it is meant to work. What he has not done is to convince me that it possibly can work.

However, there is one question to which I sought, in vain, an answer from my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Huntingdonshire. Perhaps I may ask the Under-Secretary if he can explain to me exactly by what mechanism the Assembly will appoint this one-third of additional members of the Executive Committee. As far as I can make out from reading the Bill, it merely says that the Assembly shall appoint these people. By what method?

On the assumption that there is a one-party majority within the Assembly, nothing is said in the Bill about the Executive Committee having to reflect that balance of parties. Are we to take it that the Executive Committee will be a monolithic one-party committee? If that is so, we ought to know it. It may very well be that the Assembly would be much more workable by having a one-party Executive Committee. I do not necessarily take issue with that. But if that is so, it is something very different from that which we have been led to expect up to now. We need an answer to this question in order to know where we are.

Mr. Peter Thomas

I feel that I should apologise because I have intervened on too many occasions this evening. However, I find myself in very good company in as much as I am totally confused.

I was a little concerned about the Executive Committee. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Flint, West (Sir A. Meyer) that if the Executive Committee is, in fact, to be something in the nature of a Cabinet, the head of that committee being something like a Prime Minister, one can understand why the Executive Committee was excluded in clause 22 from having, as far as practicable, its membership reflected by the balance of parties in the Assembly. But that does not appear to be so.

If there is power to appoint about one-third extra to that Executive Committee and if one is to accept what Lord Donaldson said in the other place, which was that the Bill makes it possible—although this is a matter for the Assembly —to add some extra, perhaps non-majority party, members to the Executive Committee, the Executive Committee could not possibly be something of the nature of a Cabinet. It could not possibly be that sort of committee which one could compare with a Cabinet, which inevitably must have members of the same party and a Prime Minister.

Therefore, it is very important that we should get a clear explanation from the Minister as soon as possible about that matter, because it is a little disturbing that it was purposely put into the Bill that, so far as practicable, the balance of parties should be reflected in the subject committees, which include such major committees as that for the scrutiny of subordinate legislation, as well as the accounts committee, which, incidentally, as far as I can understand clause no. 53, is a committee which excludes leaders, members of the Executive Committee, apart from one. Therefore, we obviously wish to exclude members of the Executive Committee from the major committees. This is something that should be explained.

Mr. Brittan

Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that, to make confusion worse confounded, Lord Donaldson also said The Executive Committee is like a Cabinet and the head of that committee is like a Prime Minister …"—[Official Report, House of Lords, 21st June 1978; Vol. 393, c. 1225.]

Mr. Thomas

I am not surprised. I had half-quoted that sentence. Lord Donaldson said: I do not think that this is a very difficult problem. The subject committees are a form of power sharing, which a good many of us who have worked in Northern Ireland in one way and another have always been looking for, and have so far not achieved. The Executive Committee is like a Cabinet and the head of that committee is like a Prime Minister, who is a chairman but political. I believe that this is the intention of the set-up and I think that the clauses as they now stand carry it out accurately. I do not really think that there is anything to worry about here. That I can understand, but I cannot understand what he said later: Furthermore, the Bill makes it possible, though this is a matter for the Assembly, to add some extra, perhaps non-majority Party, members to the Executive Committee."— [Official Report, House of Lords, 21st June 1978; Vol. 393, c. 1925–28.] What form of political Cabinet is that going to be? This is something about which we should be cautious. Some of us are very perplexed about the whole thing.

Mr. Brittan

It is clear that the arrangements contained in the Bill does not commend itself to the House. Not a single voice has been raised to defend it. The only difference has been between those of my hon. Friends who are puzzled and those who are certain that the arrangement is wrong. No one has spoken in favour of it.

The arrangement itself is not unclear, since it clearly envisages the Executive Committee exercising a sort of Cabinet role in that it is making the key decisions. But the subject committees are also involved in the executive role. Therefore, the problem is not that there is no clarity as to what the Bill requires but that there is no logical basis for the distinction between the two.

The hon. Member for Aberdare (Mr. Evans) put an analogy that is simple and reasonable—that the Executive Committee is like a Cabinet and that the subject committees are like standing committees in this House, and therefore it is reasonable that the subject committees should reflect the party balance of the Executive Committee. That analogy is the only possible basis for defending the arrangement, but it is wholly false. As has been pointed out, the Executive Committee, although said by Lord Donaldson to be in some ways like a Cabinet, is also envisaged to include—and may well do so—members of opposition parties. By the same token, the subject committees are not like standing committees because they are to have executive powers themselves. Therefore, all we have is a hybrid arrangement. It is a cross between a Cabinet system and a committee system. That is what is so difficult to defend.

Where I am afraid that I was less than fair and obviously lost my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Huntingdonshire (Sir D. Renton) is in what I said about power-sharing. Seeing so many Northern Ireland Members here, I would not want to be misunderstood on that point. I did not say that I thought that power-sharing was a good thing. I said that the scheme for power-sharing envisaged in the Bill was one alternative to a Cabinet system.

10.15 p.m.

If we are to have a scheme for power-sharing, with all the disadvantages as well as the advantages of a scheme of that kind, we have to be consistent, and to have an arrangement under which the power-sharing carries on to the Executive Committee and is not confined simply to the subject committees, because the work of the Executive Committee is not different in kind from that of the subject committees. Both have an executive role, and in any event the Executive Committee, as envisaged by Lord Donaldson, if not by the Minister here tonight, will certainly contain members of the minority parties.

It may well be that there are people in this House who will say that the whole concept of power-sharing is wrong, that it is unworkable or undemocratic or unfair, and very powerful arguments can be put forward in support of that proposition. But that cannot be the Government's attitude, because the bulk of the arrangements in the Welsh Assembly are in support of a power-sharing arrangement. It is only when we get to the Executive Committee that all the arguments against power-sharing are brought up with great force and trenchancy by the Minister, and yet what he wants is something which itself still contains the residue of a power-sharing arrangement, even at the Executive Committee level, because it is envisaged, at least by Lord Donaldson, that there shall be some members on the Executive Committee from other than the majority party.

It is not, therefore, a problem of being uncertain what the Government want but rather one of seeing what defence there can be for a hybrid arrangement of this kind. The Government have opted for the power-sharing route, and they must have the courage of their convictions. The only alternative is, at the very least, to make it quite clear that the Executive Committee should not have on it any people from the opposition parties, and to resile from Lord Donaldson's proposi- tions, or, alternatively, to drop the whole power-sharing arrangement, which would mean re-structuring the Bill. But it will not do for the Minister to give dire warnings to the House about the delay and the indecision and the putting of the structure at risk, and all the other hazards that he mentioned, when they are created by his own arrangement. They are created by an Executive Committee which will not be like a Cabinet because it will not speak with one voice, because Lord Donaldson himself envisaged that it might contain people from other parties.

The real analogy, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Huntingdonshire pointed out, is with a county council. There we have a committee structure in which the committees are not deliberative committees such as our own Select Committees, nor are they legislative committees, such as the Standing Committees, but they are themselves committees which are exercising executive functions. There the commitees reflect the balance of power on the county council as a whole, but so, usually, does the main committee, call it the finance and general purposes committee or by whatever name the particular county council chooses to give it. By that arrangement the county council is able to operate perfectly well with having minority representation on the main governing committee as well as on the subject committees.

If that can happen with a county council, I do not see why it cannot happen with the Welsh Assembly. I am not trying to decry the Welsh Assembly in any way or to raise the whole question whether it is to be regarded as analogous to a county council or analogous to some other body. But at least in this respect the basic structure of the Assembly is one which is analogous to a county council, and there is absolutely no reason why the government of Wales should grind to a halt if the same arrangements operate in relation to the Executive Committee as operate in the case of most county councils.

I conclude by pointing out the problem that is faced—it was mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Flint, West (Sir A. Meyer), I think—about the Executive Committee's composition as it stands in the Bill. If two-thirds are to be the leaders of the other committees, how are the remainder to be appointed? Lord Donaldson envisaged that those others might not be members of the majority party and might reflect the minority views in the Assembly, but how are they to be appointed?

What I fear is that although Lord Donaldson may make liberal noises about their reflecting the other parties, in the absence of any specific provision such as clause 22 affecting the executive committee there is a real risk that the Assembly simply will not appoint any members of other parties, because there is nothing that requires it to do so. What Lord Donaldson put forward as a hope, no doubt in total sincerity, may turn out not to be a reality.

Therefore, what we are pointing out to the Government is that there is a lack of logic in the arrangements they have proposed and that if they wish to be true to their own system they should accept the amendments made in another place.

Mr. Alec Jones

With the leave of the House, I must say that I share the views expressed by some hon. Members who suggested that they were becoming more confused as the debate went on. I started with a simple understanding of what was meant, but the contributions from many quarters have not added to my understanding. I can well understand the confusion of which the right hon. and learned Member for Hendon, South (Mr. Thomas) spoke. There is a misunderstanding of what we seek to do in the Bill, which is wherever possible to maximise the opportunity for involvement of all Members of the Assembly in decision-making.

I agree with the hon. and learned Member for Cleveland and Whitby (Mr. Brittan) in his use of words to the effect that the Assembly's efficiency will be largely dependent on the working of the subject committees. It was because we felt that those committees were the key committees in many ways, though not completely, that we decided to write into the Bill provisions to ensure that "so far as practicable"—those words are in the Bill—there should be a party balance on them.

I think that both sides of the House agree with that. But it seems to me that we come to the parting of the ways because we do not agree that there is a fundamental difference between the Executive Committee and the subject committees. The majority party in the Assembly will not only have to be the responsible party but will have to exercise that responsibility and be seen to be exercising it. The tool for exercising that responsibility will be the Executive Committee.

It is not true that the Executive Committee is the same as any other committee. It alone will be concerned with the whole overall strategy of the Assembly and the total overall policy implications of decisions. But above all it will be responsible for the allocation of resources between one committee and another. Therefore, we are right to say that it is in a different ball game from the subject committees. If we accept that, we think it right to say that we treat them differently. That is why we have put the provisions in the Bill.

Then we ask "Is it right or reasonable that we should dictate even at this level to the Assembly as to the absolute composition of the Executive Committee?" The Assembly may feel that it would want to increase the membership of the Executive Committee not only to include the leaders of other committees but to have added members up to one-third of the number, and we believe that we should give the Assembly that degree of flexibility to make that choice if it wishes.

That is what I said in opening the debate, and I believe that that is what Lord Donaldson said in another place—that the added members would be there up to one-third of the number. I think that I said that those extra members could belong to the non-majority party. But it would be for the Assembly itself to decide whether it would use the added members and whether it would draw them from the majority or minority parties.

Sir A. Meyer

Nobody doubts the Minister's good faith or good intentions, but what incentive will there be for the majority party in the Assembly, in choosing the additional members for the Executive Committee, to pay any regard to political balance? Should it not at least have been written into the Bill that in choosing the additional members the Assembly should pay some regard to the political composition of the Assembly as a whole?

Mr. Jones

The fundamental point is that the Executive Committee will have the responsibility of ensuring that the system it adopts, and the composition of committees which it draws up, enables the Assembly efficiently and effectively to carry out its work. If the Assembly feels that it can be aided by having an Executive Committee composed not only of leaders of the subject committees but having added to it other members, either from the majority or minority parties, the Assembly will be able to do so. That seems to be a perfectly reasonable and proper attitude to adopt. I accept that some hon. Members do not agree, but it emphasises the difference as we see it between the subject committees and the Executive Committee, and at the same time allows the Assembly the right degree of flexibility.

Mr. Brittan

Would not the Minister agree that if, as he envisages, the Executive Committee includes at the option of the Assembly people from the opposition parties, any analogy between the Executive Committee and a Cabinet must totally disappear? Surely it is not possible, as the Minister has suggested, for the Executive Committee to work like a Cabinet if it chooses to include people from other parties?

Mr. Jones

I have carefully avoided—I trust that when I check in Hansard tomorrow I have lived up to it—using the word Cabinet. The hon. Gentleman suggested that I had used the word. I am merely trying to ensure that I did not put that word on the record, because it was not a word that I wanted to use.

We believe that there is a difference between the nature of the Executive Committee, and its work, and the subject committees. But we also believe that it is right to allow the Assembly this degree of flexibility to add to the Executive Committee. If the Assembly in its wisdom wants to add people from a minority party, then it is perfectly free to do so. I believe that this will provide the right sort of machinery which will enable the Assembly to work sensibly.

Mr. Eddie Loyden (Liverpool, Garston)

Can my hon. Friend assist those of us who will shortly be going into the Lobby? If the Government feel that there has to be a distinction between the Executive Committee and the subject committees, which is understandable, why should powers be given to the Assembly to change that principle if it so desires? That appears to be rather contradictory.

Mr. Jones

The attitude which we have adopted throughout the Bill is that wherever it is possible and reasonable to allow the Assembly to make decisions affecting its own management, we would do so. Therefore, I believe that it is right and proper in this particular instance to give this added flexibility to the Assembly. It is not an insistence that the Assembly does it. But in the light of the experience of its work the Assembly will be able to judge whether it is desirable to use these added members.

Mr. Ioan Evans

One item which is causing confusion is that the Leader of the Assembly will be known as the chief executive. But at present in Wales we have chief executive officers serving on the counties and districts, and they are full-time officials.

Mr. Jones

I am sorry that we shall not get on to the next debate. In fact, we are proposing to agree with the Lords in the amendment about the designation of chief executive, although I must admit that I would never go to the gallows over whatever anyone cared to call him.

Mr. Brittan

The Minister says that the Assembly should be given flexibility and the right to decide wherever possible. Therefore, why is it that the Assembly should be given the right to decide whether to include people from the opposition in the Executive Committee when this House is requiring the Assembly to ensure that the party balance is reflected on the subject committees? Surely we cannot have it both ways. Either the Assembly is to have that flexibility or it is not.

Mr. Jones

There is surely a difference. The composition and make-up of a committee is a management issue—a matter of how the Assembly conducts its affairs. The question of local government reorganisation—

It being half-past Ten o'clock, Mr. SPEAKER proceeded, pursuant to the Order yesterday, to put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair.

Question put, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment:—

The House divided: Ayes 296, Noes 272.

[For Division List No. 291 see c. 735]

Question accordingly agreed to.

Mr. SPEAKER then proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the Business to be concluded at half-past Ten o'clock.

Lords amendments nos. 32, 35 and 36 disagreed to.

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