HC Deb 11 January 1978 vol 941 cc1668-71
Mr. Ridley

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I wish to raise a matter which I consider to be of fundamental importance, and I hope that you will bear with me while I explain why.

I refer to Early-Day Motion No. 155, in the name of the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) and many hon. Members, calling upon the Lord Chancellor to remove from office Judge Neil McKinnon. Indeed, I understand that last night a delegation of hon. Members went to see the Lord Chancellor to supplement that point of view.

I have studied page 368 of "Erskine May" where it is quite clear that hon. Members may criticise a member of the judiciary on a substantive motion. I call attention to the word "conduct", because it is in relation to his conduct that such criticism may be made. We all know that the reason for the ban upon comment upon the decisions of the judiciary is that we in this House do not seek to interfere in judicial judgments or in the operation of the law or of the courts. That rule is a rule to which I think we would all subscribe—

Mr. Skinner

Except when the dockers were got out.

Mr. Ridley

When it is perfectly clear that a substantive motion is put down calling for the dismissal of a judge simply because of a specific judgment, the criticism is not against the conduct of that judge over a period of years but against the specific judgment which he has come to. It is therefore a criticism of the operation of the judiciary, not of the conduct of the judge. If Judge McKinnon had incurred criticism because of his personal or private behaviour over a long period, this would be the proper procedure for the House to adopt. But that is not the case, and it is clear that the motion relates not to the judge's conduct as a whole, but to one specific judgment with which hon. Members do not agree.

I submit that this is an abuse of the procedures of the House. It is a matter of such fundamental importance that it should be referred to the Select Committee on Procedure, because it will be possible to hector, bully, criticise or threaten a judge with dismissal by the means employed on this occasion on any occasion that a judgment of a judge does not meet with the favour of hon. Members in any part of the House.

This leads to an assumption that the House can decide whether the decisions of judges are to hon. Members' liking. This is in fundamental conflict with the doctrine which I enunciated that we should leave to the judiciary the interpretation of the law. I am concerned here not with right or wrong but with the implied criticism of the judge for coming to a certain decision in the race relations case, which is within the memory of the House, when there is no ground whatsoever for us to seek to criticise him.

I understand the need to have a procedure by which judges can be removed from office by this House—

Mr. Speaker

Order. The hon. Gentleman must not make the speech he would make if we entered upon the debate. He is making a point of order, which I believe he is about to conclude, and it is a point of order.

Mr. Ridley

It is a very important and genuine point of order, Mr. Speaker. I ask you to consider what I have said. I am not asking for a ruling at this time, but I hope that you will consider that the matter is worthy of your review, and that you may conclude that it would be wise to refer my complaints to the Select Committee on Procedure, so that full thought may be given to the important constitutional issues involved.

Mr. Alan Clark

Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Would it not be appropriate if someone pointed out to those hon. Members who signed the motion that their problems will be not with the judges but with the juries, who are drawn from the public?

Mr. Speaker

That is not a point of order. It is a point of debate.

I shall give my ruling in reply to the hon. Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. Ridley) and that may—I hope that it will—satisfy the House. Clearly the motion on the Order Paper is entirely within order. Perhaps I should be wise to say no more.

Mr. English

May I support the hon. Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. Ridley) in the sense that it clearly is desirable that some body like the Select Committee on Procedure should consider whether there ought to be the distinction between first-class and second-class—

Mr. Speaker

Order. I have said that it is in order. If the House wishes to refer this sort of thing to the Select Committee on Procedure, it must do so by a motion on the Order Paper and there must be a proper debate to decide the matter. I cannot decide it. Has the hon. Member for Nottingham, West (Mr. English) finished?

Mr. English

I am grateful to you, Mr. Speaker. But, as you well know, some judges are protected because they can be removed only by the decision of this House and the House of Lords. They are what I loosely referred to as first-class judges. There are other judges—JPs and second-class judges generally—who can be removed in other ways. It is foolish, I think, to say that Parliament ever intended to protect them as well as it in-intended to protect others.

Mr. Skinner

Since you have heard, Mr. Speaker, from the hon. Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. Ridley), suggested motives as to why some of us signed that motion, perhaps it is in order for me to explain why I and, perhaps, many others have signed that very respectable motion.

Mr. Speaker

Order. I am afraid that, most unusually, the hon. Gentleman is making a mistake. We are not going to debate the issue now. [Interruption.] Order. I listened very carefully to what the hon. Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. Ridley) said, although I did not allow him to go into all the merits of this case. We cannot discuss the question of the judge this afternoon. Hon. Members are stating reasons why, and it is impossible to do that without getting into a discussion on the judge himself.

Mr. Arthur Lewis

I do not want to discuss the charge or anything on that question. However, on the general question, is it not true that we all know that we have an admirable set of Clerks at the Table who will always advise hon. Members whether a motion is or is not in order? They will even—perhaps outside their normal scope—help and assist hon. Members to get it in order, and very kindly sometimes, again perhaps outside their offices, advise ways and means of doing what we want to do.

Therefore, if, as is the case, the Clerks have accepted any motion, that automatically means that Mr. Speaker has accepted it and it goes on the Order Paper. However, I agree that it may well be that an hon. Member may have objections to its being either in order or not. Is it not true that, in that situation, we have another method—namely, that any hon. Member has the right and the opportunity of going to the Clerk at the Table, discussing the matter with him, and, if need be, having the opportunity of seeing Mr. Speaker privately? If that is not satisfactory, the hon. Member has the opportunity of raising the matter on the Floor of the House.

If that were done on occasions such as this, would it not, perhaps, save embarrassment to you, Mr. Speaker, and, with great respect, to your Clerks, who do an admirable job? I advise all hon. Members to adopt that practice and then we would not have this bother.

Mr. Speaker

I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman.