NAVAL DEFENCE (INQUIRY) (Hansard, 1 February 1978)

§ Mr. John Loveridge (Upminster)

I beg to move, That leave be given to bring in a Bill to require the Secretary of State for Defence to set up an inquiry to examine the prospects for improving defence from potential terrorist attack by the provision of missile and other defence systems for installation on British merchant ships and oil rigs; and for connected purposes. Everyone in this House detests terrorism and its spreading evil. It has struck in the air and in cities, and in time it may strike at sea. There are three reasons why I am bringing forward the Bill calling for a radical inquiry into the defence of merchant ships and oil rigs. Such an inquiry is needed urgently.

The first reason is that the world oil trade around the Cape has risen from 0.8 million barrels a day in 1965 to 18 million barrels a day in 1976—that is more than a 20-fold increase in a decade. It is a greater increase than in any other trade route. Therefore, as a terrorist target it is more inviting than ever before.

Secondly, parts of the African coast have fallen into potentially hostile hands, and more could do so in future. There are numerous inlets along the coast where terrorists could hide out and from which small boats could be launched to carry mines out to sea.

The third reason is that, after a period of phenomenal growth since 1962, the Russian navy already has obsolescent equipment. Some of this could be sold or could fall into the wrong hands. Missile systems such as the SSN2 on OSA class ships are said to be being phased out in favour of improved versions. We have seen Russian arms used world-wide from Vietnam to Ethiopia and there is no reason why their surplus naval arms could not be used by terrorists at sea.

These three factors—the vast increase in oil trade round the Cape, new hideouts along the African coast, and the surplus of naval equipment available—combine to make terrorist action against merchant ships more likely in the future than in the past.

In October 1976 the French Admiral Labrousse said that a total of 665 super tankers sailed the routes away from the 488 oilfields of the Middle East—ships that are too large to use the canal. France alone needs 120 million tonnes of oil a year, three quarters of which comes from the Persian Gulf. Britain's 2,000 merchant ships—the youngest merchant fleet afloat—include the largest number of refrigerated ships and many modern tankers, which could be a prime target.

Any threat to tankers is likely to be associated with a threat to the oil rigs. The Select Committee on Science and Technology commented on this in paragraph 121 in its 1974 report on offshore engineering. It said: Offshore oil and gas installations represent a major defence requirement. It went on: We recommended that Ministers should initiate an inquiry to establish the requirements for the protection of offshore installations. It is not only oil that is carried by ships but food and minerals and the protection of these also deserves an inquiry. Our aim must be to protect not the thousands of miles of sea routes but the ships on them and to find out how this can be done without spending more than we can afford.

The inquiry should consider the economic systems of self-defence for merchant ships; deck fittings for simple helicopters, and the employment of light naval boats or hovercraft for dealing with mines. It could also examine the possibility of using balloons for observation and light defensive missile systems.

Nothing in any of these suggestions is contrary to our traditions in the past. In times of peace throughout the centuries of piracy merchant ships have been equipped to protect themselves. Legal difficulties should not arise. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter enshrines the right of self defence. It says: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defence. The manning of anti-terrorist equipment should not be too difficult. There could be volunteers among the crews under a Reserve officer and training could be given by the Royal Navy. Naturally the patriotic sentiments of the shipping companies would make them wish to help.

This equipment might prove as well to be a source of export sales to our 489 NATO allies if the system proved successful in British merchant ships. This would help to create jobs in the good cause of security.

We should not discredit or fail to examine the re-introduction of old ideas. The self-defence of ships in modem times could gain much from ideas of the past. We cannot forget that in 1917 submarine sinkings had brought us near to defeat and a reversion to the old idea of convoys saved us. That idea was resisted by the Admiralty, backed by wrong statistics to the Cabinet. Old ideas in new forms have saved us before and may do so again. Before the Second World War it was a a widely held view that the submarine menace had been overcome. How wrong that was proved. All fresh ideas must be considered. We must be ready for terrorism to extend to the seas in the same way as we have seen it extend with the Cuban mercenaries across Africa.

Perhaps I may remind the House of an article written by Patrick Beesley in "Navy International" in October 1977, in which he said: As long, however, as our maritime forces remain so shamefully reduced as they are at present, improvisation and ad hoc measures will have to fill the gap at sea, and the enthusiastic amateur may perhaps still be able to put on a show that no professional could provide. The need for a high level inquiry is urgent, and it should include scientists of originality and distinction as well as senior officers of the Armed Services, shipping, oil and other industries involved.

If we strengthen our capacity to meet the threat of terrorism at sea, that terrorism is less likely to arise and the ideal of peaceful trade will be made safer. I am grateful, in asking leave of the House to bring in the Bill, to have the support of distinguished Members who have given much careful thought to the defence problems of our nation.