HC Deb 27 January 1977 vol 924 cc1699-715
Sir M. Havers (by Private Notice)

asked the Attorney-General if he will state his reasons for refusing his consent to the application of Mr. Gouriet to bring relator proceedings for an injunction against the Union of Post Office Workers.

The Attorney-General (Mr. S. C. Silkin)

rose—

Mr. Cormack

Resign.

Mr. Ashton

Let them have it, Sam.

The Attorney-General

Yes, Sir. This morning the Court of Appeal gave judgment in the case of Gouriet against the Union of Post Office Workers and Others, and it also gave leave for me to appeal to the House of Lords on a constitutional issue of great importance. That being so, as I understand the position, the case is not now sub judice, and I am, therefore, free to explain to the House my reasons for refusing Mr. Gouriet's application for consent to bring relator proceedings against the UPW. In order to do so, I must explain to the House the relevant facts so far as they were within my knowledge when I made that decision.

On Tuesday 11th January the union issued a circular to its branches. The circular stated that the TUC, in support of the international trade union movement, had called for a week of action in protest against the increasingly repressive measures taken by the South African authorities against trade unions and unionists. It instanced the suppression of black trade unions, the banning of black trade unionists and the crippling of education and training schemes established with TUC assistance to increase trade union knowledge among black workers. It said that strong protests by the trade union movement here and abroad had failed to stop these repressive measures and that a week of international action had been called for to demonstrate that movement's solidarity with South African trade unionists and give them encouragement and protection.

The circular stated the union's support for the week of action. It instructed its members working in offices where mail was received directly from, or for despatch directly to, South Africa to "black" that mail as from midnight on the Sunday following. It instructed its members not working in those offices to continue normal working.

Telephone calls to South Africa are mostly made via STD. The circular gave instructions that calls routed through an operator and not through STD, which remained available, should be dealt with in accordance with the normal Christmas period provision—that is, that only life-and-death calls should be connected. Cables and telegrams were to be similarly dealt with.

A copy of the circular came to my Department on the afternoon of Thursday 13th January. I learned that the Post Office Board intended displaying notices warning its employees that to obey the instructions would be a criminal offence. I learned also that the Post Office Chairman had written to the union strongly urging it to reconsider its proposed action.

As I informed the House on 13th December last year, it is for the Post Office to take action if it considers this to be necessary and proper under the Post Office Act 1953. Only in the most exceptional circumstances would it be right for the Attorney-General to intervene. I knew of no such exceptional circumstances. I had no reason to believe that my intervention was necessary, nor had it been asked for. In case, however, I should be asked by the Post Office to intervene, I took the opportunity of considering the law with my advisers and also of obtaining such information as I could about the likely consequences of intervention by myself.

On the afternoon of Friday 14th January, I was informed that the solicitor for a Mr. Gouriet, who was unknown to my Department, had made application for my consent to the bringing by him of relator proceedings for an injunction against the union to restrain it from maintaining its instructions, and that he was pressing for a very speedy decision on the ground that he intended to go to the court that same afternoon. His solicitor was asked and stated that he had no special interest beyond that of any other member of the public, and I considered his application on that footing. Before reaching a decision, I asked for inquiries to be made as to whether there had been any fresh developments. Those inquiries produced a negative result.

I called for Treasury Counsel to advise me, and in the light of all the information available and on consideration of that information and of all the advice which I had received I declined to grant consent.

A relator action is one in which I agree to be the nominal plaintiff while the conduct of the action is in the relator's hands, subject to my general control. It had never been doubted that in two sets of circumstances no other way of obtaining an injunction existed in law. One was where the relator had no special interest beyond that of any other member of the public. The other was where the injunction required was to restrain the defendant from committing a criminal offence. Both circumstances were present in this case.

In his decision whether to grant such an application, the Attorney-General is not confined to considering the chances of success. It is his duty also to consider broader issues of public interest and to base his conclusion on where the balance of public interest lies. But if the Attorney-General grants the application, the courts will normally assume that the public interest is in favour of granting relief. That is particularly true where the relator wishes to restrain the commission of a criminal offence. In the ordinary way the criminal law is assumed to provide adequate deterrence, so that an injunction is not needed. Any member of the public, even without a special interest, can normally bring criminal proceedings without my consent.

For that reason the relator procedure had in the past very rarely been invoked, except to restrain the commission of criminal offences and in cases where the criminal law has already been successfully invoked, usually many times, but the penalties are found to be insufficient to deter the offender, or where the threatened injury would not be remediable.

The Solicitor-General in 1960, now Lord Simon of Glaisdale, explained this to the House following the Harris case. The present one was not such a case. The criminal law, which in this case gives an offender against Section 58 of the Post Office Act the safeguard of the right to trial by jury, had not been invoked.

Thus the grant of my consent would amount to a departure from well-established principles applied by all Law Officers of all parties. It would be a departure in favour of a member of the public who, if an offence had been or were to be committed, had the power to invoke the criminal law without my intervention. And as the week of action was not due to start until midnight on the Sunday following, it was not and could not yet be known whether Post Office workers would heed their employer's warning that they would be committing criminal offences if they followed the union's instructions. If on the Monday morning the Post Office took the view that offences were being committed, it would have various ways of bringing the matter before the courts and those methods would not necessarily need my consent.

On the face of information available to me, and in my judgment, the taking of injunction proceedings in my name had the inherent risk, at that early stage, of inflaming the situation before the need for it was demonstrated and might well result in breaches of the law and inconvenience to the public over a much wider area than two sections of Post Office employees affected by the circular.

That possible reaction to court proceedings based on a criminal offence was all the more real in the light of the fact that the Conservative Government, in the Industrial Relations Act 1971, had, for very good reasons which were fully stated by the Solicitor-General of the day, deliberately removed from the criminal law the principal existing provisions making industrial action a crime; and, whether for that reason or not, they had not taken action in the virtually identical circumstances prior to the French nuclear tests in 1973.

Whether the wording of Section 58, the origin of which was in the Act of 1710, was deliberately excluded from the 1971 amendment—and, if so, why—I do not know, but when originally enacted it was certainly not intended to deal with trade union activity in the sphere of industrial relations.

In these circumstances, after giving full weight to the importance of enforcing the law, I concluded—and I am confident that I was right—that the balance of public interest was against giving consent to Mr. Gouriet's application on the Friday to take in my name injunctive proceedings to enforce the criminal law.

Sir M. Havers

Is the Attorney-General aware that a number of the reasons he advanced are irrelevant and that nothing he said will allay suspicions about the political use of his discretion? To use the words of one of the Lords Justices, was it not as clear as a pikestaff that a breach of the criminal law was threatened? Are you aware, when taking your decision not to give your consent to relator decisions—

Mr. Christopher Price

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker—

Mr. Speaker

If the hon. Gentleman merely wishes to draw my attention to the fact that I personally have been brought into this matter accidentally, I assure him that I want to get out of it.

Mr. Christopher Price

Is it in order, Mr. Speaker, to allege political bias against a Law Officer of the Crown who has taken an oath to apply the law impartially?

Mr. Speaker

This is the House of Commons. It is possible for people to make charges against each other as long as they are within the parliamentary rules—and what has been said is within the rules.

Sir M. Havers

When the right hon. and learned Gentleman refused his consent to relator proceedings by Mr. Gouriet, why did he not announce at the same time that, in his view, the proposed action by the Post Office workers was illegal? Why did he not, from the authority and weight of his office, take that course and so make any application to the courts unnecessary? The Attorney-General at all times failed, in this House and elsewhere, to express the view clearly expressed by three Lords Justices today—namely, that the intended action was a breach of the criminal law. It is that confusion and the lack of certainty that made this threatened breach of the law much more likely.

The Attorney-General

I cannot accept either the beginning of the hon. and learned Gentleman's remarks or his concluding comments. What happened was that the Post Office Board sought to make clear that in its view, and indeed in fact, there would be a breach of criminal law if its workers followed instructions. I was approached on the question of whether I would grant the application by Mr. Gouriet, and I decided not to do so. I have no power to deal with the other matter to which the hon. and learned Gentleman referred.

Mr. Jay

If, as appears, there is serious doubt about the legal powers of the Attorney-General in the courts, would it not be common sense for Parliament in due course to legislate to put the matter right?

The Attorney-General

That is not a matter for me, but I agree with my right hon. Friend that the boundaries are far from clear. One of my submissions to the Court of Appeal was aimed at establishing the practice as it existed throughout the time when the hon. and learned Member for Wimbledon (Sir M. Havers) was Solicitor-General and when his right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Epsom and Ewell (Sir P. Rawlinson) was Attorney-General. Throughout all that time the situation had been clearly understood, but the Court of Appeal has thrown the situation in doubt. That is a serious constitutional issue and one which, no doubt, will have to be considered. I wholly agree that it is quite wrong to change the law on the basis of one case instead of examining the situation as a whole.

Sir D. Walker-Smith

Since, in the absence of specific statutory provisions to the contrary, which do not apply in this case, a private citizen can initiate a prosecution when an offence has been committed, would it not be in the public interest, and indeed sensible, to facilitate a move to restrain the commission of such an offence, especially when the commission of that criminal offence involved the consequence of the punishment of the perpetrators?

The Attorney-General

No, I cannot agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman. It is only in the circumstances which I have mentioned that this action is taken. To use the power suggested by the right hon. and learned Gentleman would be a total departure and would not be a way in which the matter has proceeded for many hundreds of years.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon

Although the Court of Appeal said that there was a clear breach of the law, was not that issue argued before the Court as one to be tested in a relator action if and when brought? If the Court of Appeal is right in saying that where a clear breach of the law is established the Attorney-General's fiat should always be issued, what is the point of having a relator action at all?

The Attorney-General

On the question of a breach of the criminal law, that was not part of the case I wanted to put before the Court. I was concerned only with the declaration asked for against me, which was not upheld by the Court of Appeal—namely, that I had acted improperly in refusing consent. The answer to the second question is that there would remain little function indeed for the relator action in the circumstances suggested.

Mr. Ronald Bell

Is it not clear to the Attorney-General that there was no effective sanction against breach of the criminal law in this case except an injunction, because presumably the Post Office would not like to have prosecuted many thousands of its staff for complying with the union's instruction? In those circumstances, is it not clear that his decision was governed by his view that the union would retaliate if he lent his name to the relator action? Is it not a dangerous doctrine on which to apply the law to citizens in a free country—namely, that if people fight back one will not hit them?

The Attorney-General

These are important quesions of constitutional law, and, as I submitted to the Court of Appeal, I do not believe it is right that they should be answered in the context of a particular case. I believe that they should be answered in the context of the general administrative law on which the Law Commission recently published a report.

I do not accept that the only way in which the Post Office could act, if it thought right, would be to prosecute thousands of workers. The hon. and learned Gentleman will know that many Attorneys-General in the past, whether Labour or Conservative, have taken the view that, even where it is absolutely clear that an offence has been committed, it would not be in the public interest to prosecute. That certainly was true of Sir Hartley Shawcross—Lord Shawcross as he now is. It is no doubt the foundation of the basis upon which the right hon. and learned Member for Surrey, East (Sir G. Howe) removed the criminal sanction from industrial relations generally in the 1971 Act. I could quote several cases—that of Leila Khaled for one, and the 1973 case—which were on all fours with this one except that no application was made.

The hon. and learned Member for Wimbledon nods, but he knows perfectly well that the Attorney-General can take proceedings ex officio without the intervention of a private citizen. I would need a great deal of convincing that the Law Officers of the Crown at that time had their heads so buried in the sand that they did not know what was going on around them.

Mr. Christopher Price

Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that it hardly lies in the mouth of a party which invoked the Official Solicitor to accuse him of political partiality in the exercise of his duties, and that the vast majority of citizens are behind him? Is he aware that the judgment of the Appeal Court goes right to the boundaries—the proper boundaries which should exist—between Parliament and the Judiciary? Did he hear Lord Denning today say that these lay in the breasts of the judges? Does my right hon. and learned Friend accept that Labour supporters believe that the proper division between Parliament and the Judiciary should lie in the House of Commons, and will he bring forward legislation?

The Attorney-General

As to partiality, I prefer to say—I hope that I carry the hon. and learned Member for Wimbledon with me—that there have been several cases in recent years, two of which I have instanced, in which the Law Officers from the Conservative Party did exactly as I did in this case, I hope with as much anxious consideration as I have given to this case.

It would not be right for me to criticise the judgment of Lord Denning or any other judgment. I have said that leave to appeal has been granted, and I believe that the House of Lords Judicial Committee is the right forum in which to make criticism.

Mr. Thorpe

As the Post Office Board has power either to initiate criminal prosecutions or, alternatively, to seek an injunction, did the Board consult the right hon. and learned Gentleman as a Law Officer of the Crown on what action it should take? Does the Attorney-General agree that it would have been a wise and proper action to have done so and that he had a duty to provide such advice? If he provided such advice, will he say what it was?

The Attorney-General

The Post Office did not come to me with any proposition either that I should advise it on what it should do or asking for my consent to relator proceedings. Whether it would have been proper for me to give advice to the Post Office as an independent corporation is a matter to which I would have to give great consideration if it arose, but it did not arise in this case.

Mr. George Cunningham

Is it not a serious matter, even on points not subject to statute law, for the courts to go completely contrary to what has previously been accepted by them as the law? Does not that infringe the proper making of law by Parliament? As there has been such confusion in the Press on this issue, will the Attorney-General confirm that there are scores of criminal offences on which no one has a right to get at the courts except with his consent, and that the courts do not say that that is a breach of the fundamental rights of the citizen?

The Attorney-General

The first issue raised by my hon. Friend is a matter for the House of Lords in due course. I must give the judgments a much more thorough reading than I have been able to up to now, but the Court of Appeal certainly appears to take the view that some part of the Attorney-General's function had gone—had become obsolete. How far it went is a matter to which I have to pay close regard.

There are a large number of criminal offences on which my consent is required. On some the requirement is obsolete, but in many where the same sort of public interest considerations exist as exist in a case of this kind my consent is required.

Mrs. Winifred Ewing

Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that, when Parliament and the Justiciary appear to be in conflict, that is not good for any citizen's feeling of well-being? However difficult the decision is, is it not a dangerous precedent when the House of Commons appears to challenge the independence of the Justiciary, as the House of Commons can change the law if it does not like it? Is it not true that, although there may be sympathy with the motivation of someone who is about to commit a criminal offence, the House should not in any way endorse the actual offence?

The Attorney-General

I entirely agree with the hon. Lady that conflict between Parliament or the Executive and the courts—particularly Parliament and the courts—should be avoided as much as possible. I made that comment in the course of my observations to the Court of Appeal in this case. It must not be suggested—I hope that the hon. Lady was not suggesting it—that conflict can arise only through Parliament or the Executive taking action which the courts dislike. The independence of Parliament is as fundamental as is the independence of the courts. That is why I adhere to the position not merely that I would not but that I should not give my reasons to the court in this case but that I was perfectly prepared to give them to Parliament, as I have done.

Dr. M. S. Miller

Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that there is a great deal of confusion in the minds of the public about this matter, arising from the legalese that blinds them to the issues? Does he agree that this is not an academic matter, although right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House put forward legal arguments? Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that in this nation, which believes in freedom—anti-apartheid freedom—if hon. Members had taken as great an interest in these matters in 1036, when the Hitler régime was running the Olympic Games in Berlin, many people would have supported the Government, just as Labour Members have absolute confidence in my right hon. and learned Friend in this instance?

The Attorney-General

Of course, I know that there are the strongest possible feelings on some of the subjects that my hon. Friend mentioned. But in terms of my function in this matter—that of granting consent or not granting it to an application for my name to be used to obtain an injunction—the very strong feelings are, of course, relevant to the public interest about what is likely to happen if consent is granted and whether it causes far more widespread damage to the community than if it is not granted. That is a matter of judgment. [HON. MEMBERS: "You were wrong."] I believe that I was right. That is not a matter to which, apart from that part of my consideration, any Attorney-General ought to have regard.

Where I agree 100 per cent. with my hon. Friend is that there is much confusion—it is not surprising—about the function of the relator action and also, much more important, that we have here a constitutional issue of the highest importance. That constitutional issue is whether the courts deliberately should change the law or whether Parliament should do so.

Mr. Edward Gardner

Whatever the legal niceties involved in this matter, does not the Attorney-General agree that, as a Law Officer of the Crown, he has a clear duty to do all in his power to uphold the law and to assist those who are taking action to support the law? Does he not agree that in this case he failed in that duty?

The Attorney-General

I agree entirely with the first part of what the hon. and learned Gentleman said. I equally strongly disagree with the second part of what he said. The assumption behind the second part is that, once one is aware that there may have been or might in the future be a breach of the criminal law, come what may it is one's duty to take action in the courts. As the hon. and learned Gentleman very well knows, that has never been the attitude of Attorneys-General of any of the parties and certainly it was not the attitude of my predecessor.

Mr. Conlan

As a non-lawyer, Mr. Speaker, I am extremely grateful to be called. Is it not clear that the anachronistic provisions of the law require changing to allow the Union of Post Office Workers to engage in ordinary general industrial action?

The Attorney-General

That is not a matter for me to pronounce upon, although I hope that at some stage the House might in some way be told why, in 1971, when the right hon. and learned Member for Surrey, East was saying in so many words that the whole purpose of Clause 120 of the Industrial Relations Bill—which became Section 133 of the Act—was to reduce as far as possible the impact of the criminal law in industral relations, and when the then Conservative Government were amending other parts of the law to give effect to that, they did not do something about this Act.

Mr. Fletcher-Cooke

The right hon. and learned Gentleman has not said whether he will appeal to the House of Lords. He has not said whether he has any locus standi in this case to appeal to the House of Lords or whether the Union of Post Office Workers is to appeal to the House of Lords. If there is any chance of that happening, is not all this discussion not only rather premature but rather unwise?

The Attorney-General

I have applied for and been granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords. If the hon. and learned Member for Darwen (Mr. Fletcher-Cooke) were in my shoes, I am sure that he would wish to study the judgments before making a decision whether to appeal, and that I propose to do. As for the latter part of his question, I suppose that it might have been open to me to say "I make no statement to the House until after the decision of the House of Lords." I considered that. I thought that it would be totally wrong to take that line and that, if I did, there would be far stronger criticism in the House about my refusal to make a statement of my reasons than any opposition there has been.

Several Hon. Members

rose

Mr. Speaker

We have been on this matter a long time. I propose to take two more questions from each side of the House.

Mr. Pavitt

Does my right hon. and learned Friend recall that this case parallels very closely the one which affected my constituents at Grunwick Processing Laboratories, when the same national association sought an injunction against the Union of Post Office Workers? Is he aware that, after six months, the sweat-shop exploitation still exists there and that it appears to my constituents that law and order is used to protect one section and one political opinion by Right-wing organisations but that, when it comes to the rights of people in Africa or my constituents, law and order is trotted out with the request that it be upheld?

The Attorney-General

Undoubtedly there was a similar situation there. It was similar, but not identical. I was asked questions about it, especially by the hon. Member for Banbury (Mr. Marten). I made it quite clear then that in my view the primary responsibility in relation to the Post Office Act was that of the Post Office Board itself, and that is precisely what I have said in my statement today.

Mr. Maudling

I have listened with great care to the right hon. and learned Gentleman's important statement. Am I right in deducing from it the following facts: first, that a clear breach of the criminal law was threatened; secondly, that an individual tried to get the courts to prevent it; thirdly, that he needed the support of the Attorney-General; and, fourthly, that that support was not forthcoming because the Attorney-General thought that if he gave it the damage wreaked by the Union of Post Office Workers upon the public would have been too severe?

The Attorney-General

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for summarising my statement. I think that it goes a little wider than his four points, but certainly they are part of the essence of it.

Hon. Members

Oh.

Mr. Watkinson

Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that, if the logic of this decision and the views of the Opposition are followed, our courts will be inundated at every level with cases as ordinary citizens pursue the rights which the Court of Appeal has very foolishly defined? Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that all lawyers on the Government Benches accept that he was entirely correct in the course he pursued and that lawyers on the Opposition Benches know it as well? Does he agree that this matter ultimately must be decided by this place and not by the courts? [HON. MEMBERS: "Why not ask a lawyer?"] I am a lawyer.

Mr. Skinner

This has been a lawyers' field-day.

The Attorney-General

It is perfectly correct to say that if the safeguard of the need for the Attorney-General's consent in these matters were simply dispensed with or if he was bound to give it when asked in the circumstances mentioned, it could well be that both he and the courts would be flooded with all kinds of attempts to obtain remedies in the courts. I accept that entirely. But I do not think that the question of administrative convenience is the cardinal factor in all this.

It is of great importance that the Attorney-General should take a view of the public interest in cases of this kind on facts which may not be available to others and which, indeed, in some cases he will not even be able to give to this House, though I hope that if challenged he will always be in that position; but certainly one cannot guarantee that that would always be so. That being the case, until Parliament has worked out—if it is placed before Parliament to do so—the right way in which this public interest sieve can operate without the present antiquated methods of the Attorney-General's fiat, it is right to follow the practice followed again and again by Attorneys-General of both parties.

Mr. Flannery

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I appeal to you to allow discussion of this matter to be extended so that people other than lawyers may give an opinion about what is happening?

Several Hon. Members

rose——

Mr. Speaker

Order. I do not call hon. Members on the basis of their calling, vocation, sex or profession. [Interruption.] Order. I call them on the basis that they are hon. Members.

Mr. Clegg

I am grateful to you, Mr. Speaker, for calling me despite the fact that I am a lawyer. The Attorney-General has made much play in the courts, and in this House, about the fact that he is responsible to Parliament. In that case, can the right hon. and learned Gentleman explain why during the Grunwick debate, in spite of repeated requests, neither he nor the Solicitor-General appeared before the House to explain the legal situation arising out of that case? If the Attorney-General is to be responsible to Parliament, surely he ought to be here in his place to answer Questions which he is asked.

The Attorney-General

I am afraid that Law Officers cannot always anticipate when their help is likely to be asked for. I note what the hon. Gentleman said about the Grunwick debate. I can only say that no such request reached me. I was, however, questioned by the hon. Member for Banbury in the form of both a Written Question and then an Oral Question. There were a number of supplementary questions during which I sought to establish the points that I have established in the course of my statement today.

Mr. Speaker

Business Question. Mrs. Thatcher.

Mr. Atkinson

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I do not wish to detain the House long, but I must raise this point of order because it follows directly from some of the answers that the Attorney-General has given. I wonder, Mr. Speaker, whether you would give a ruling on the fact that by making an application to the House of Lords the Attorney-General is doing so on behalf of the House of Commons. If, in fact, the Attorney-General is to make an application, surely, within the unwritten constitution of this arrangement, he is going there to represent Parliament.

Because many of us believe that to be the case, we would like the Attorney-General to reconsider the statement that he has made to go to the House of Lords before going to the House of Commons. We would prefer the Attorney-General to listen to the point of view, and possibly the judgment, of the House of Commons rather than go to the House of Lords first. Many of us believe that the House of Lords is not competent to deal with this matter.

Is it not the case that the effect of the judgment announced this afternoon is to convert the Judiciary into a political institution? Is it not also a fact that the judges, in saying what they have said, have made law instead of giving a judgment on existing law?

On the basis of your ruling on my point of order, Mr. Speaker, may I ask the Government to take cognisance of the widespread opinion of the incompetence of the House of Lords to come to a decision about this matter? It is therefore right that the House of Commons, as a democratic institution, should come to some understanding about what the Attorney-General called a constitutional issue of the highest order.

My appeal to the Attorney-General is not to make this application to the House of Lords but to come to the House of Commons and allow us to debate the matter and come to a decision on whether judges should be in a position to influence our democratic proceedings in this way.

Several Hon. Members

rose——

Mr. Speaker

Order. The hon. Gentleman has raised an important and serious matter. There are obviously wide issues involved. Equally, I would be very foolish to give a ruling off the cuff on a matter on which I need to tread as delicately as anyone else. Although the House has given me leave of absence for tomorrow, I will see that a statement is read to the House on my behalf.

Mr. Atkinson

Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. If that statement is given on your behalf, could it be made known that——

Several Hon. Members

rose——

Mr. Speaker

Order. The hon. Gentleman is addressing the House on a point of order.

Mr. Atkinson

Could particular attention be paid in that statement to whether the Attorney-General, in making an application to the House of Lords, represents the House of Commons?

Mr. Speaker

I hope that hon. Members are not going to ask me all sorts of difficult questions about the law.

Several Hon. Members

rose——

Mr. Speaker

Order. The House has had three-quarters of an hour on this subject. I believe that it is ready to move on to the next issue. Business Question, Mrs. Thatcher.

Mr. Stokes

Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Is not the hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr. Atkinson) confusing the House of Lords in its judicial capacity with the House of Lords in its legislative capacity? They are two quite separate things.

Mr. Speaker

All I know is that I am in danger of being confused myself.

Mr. English

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Rather than make your statement in absentia tomorrow, when you make a statement personally you can be cross-questioned upon it like anyone else, but if you give it in your absence you cannot. May I therefore offer you the thought that you might care to make your statement a little later in person?

Mr. Speaker

I shall say just one word to the hon. Gentleman. I hope he is not going home labouring under the misapprehension that every time I give a ruling I am open to cross-examination. If so, the hon. Gentleman is under a very mistaken impression. But I am quite prepared to delay any statement until Monday. Mrs. Thatcher, Business Question.