HC Deb 06 December 1977 vol 940 cc1157-84
The Chairman

I understand that the right hon. Member for Cambridgeshire (Mr. Pym) does not intend to move Amendment No. 372.

Mr. Francis Pym (Cambridgeshire)

I propose not to move the amendment in order that we may discuss Clause 23 in the debate on the Question, That the clause stand part of the Bill, and raise all the points that we would wish to raise on that clause in that debate.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Mr. Brittan

We thought that it would be better to arrange our debate and discuss the clause as a whole rather than discuss Amendment No. 372, because the clause deals with two matters, only one of which could have been covered by the amendment.

The first matter is that of powers exercisable without the consent of a Minister of the Crown. The second concerns powers exercisable by a Minister of the Crown—the Secretary of State for Scotland—and by the Scottish Secretary. These matters are dealt with separately by the clause.

First, I come to the powers exercisable without the consent or concurrence of any other Minister of the Crown in the devolved area. In that respect the provision in the clause is that no such consent or concurrence is to be required except in the case of a limited number of enactments. These are listed in Schedule 4.

I do not wish to dwell particularly on that aspect; instead, I will turn my attention directly to subsection (3), which provides that Notwithstanding anything in the preceding provisions of this Act, any power under the enactments listed in Schedule 5 to this Act may be exercised both by the Secretary of State and by a Scottish Secretary. I argue that this provision is a classic case of a provision which appears to be limited in scope, which would no doubt be described by some as trivial, by others as minor, and by others as technical, and yet which goes to the heart of the change in the constitutional arrangements that the Government are seeking to persuade the Committee to embark upon in the Bill.

One of the main criticisms of the Government's devolution proposals has been that the form of arrangement proposed by the Government is redolent of conflict and full of uncertainties. To make that criticism does not mean that one is necessarily opposed to the concept of devolution in the more general sense of the word. It does not necessarily mean that one is in any sense hostile to the idea of a greater say in governmental matters being expressed within Scotland by Scots. But it means that one would be failing in one's parliamentary duty if one allowed a scheme which one regarded as riddled with uncertainties and opportunities for conflict to go through unchallenged.

The provision in subsection (3) is a classic manifestation of exactly that type of provision which is likely to lead to conflict. If the clause is allowed by the Committee to go through unimpaired and unaltered, it will provide an arrangement whereby, within the sphere of nine Acts of Parliament, as specified in Schedule 5, both the Secretary of State and the Scottish Secretary can exercise the powers conferred by those Acts. It is difficult to understand why that should be so, in view of the Acts of Parliament involved. Plainly, if one is giving to separate Governments—and whatever qualifications are made, that is what is being created by the Bill—the power to exercise powers under the same Act, there is every opportunity for conflict, overlapping, ambiguity and uncertainty.

Let us consider some of the Acts of Parliament that provide for powers which, if the clause is unaltered, can be exercised both by the Scottish Secretary and by the Secretary of State. One mentioned in the schedule is the Community Land Act 1975, and Section 18 in particular. That section is entitled Comprehensive acquisition of development land". Under it the Secretary of State is allowed by order to apply this section to all, or any part, of the area of a county … and … designate the descriptions of relevant development as respects which the order is to apply". The effect of that is that when he exercises that power all the authorities whose areas include the land to which the order applies must arrange between themselves for all outstanding material interests in land which is needed for the purposes of designated relevant development to be acquired by one of those authorities.

In other words, it then becomes the duty of the various authorities to ensure that one of those authorities acquires all the land in question. I do not see how it can be other than a source of conflict to allow a power of that kind to be exercised both by the Secretary of State and by the Scottish Secretary.

Suppose that the Scottish Secretary decides to exercise his power in respect of a particular county, and the whole of that county, for the comprehensive acquisition of development land, and suppose that the Secretary of State for Scotland decides that the same procedure should be carried out, but does it in a different way in respect of the county area concerned. What on earth is to happen? Which of the two is to prevail? The Act certainly does not provide an answer to that, and yet I am sure that it is not coincidental that this provision is to be found in Clause 23.

That is an example of what happens when there is a non-federal attempt to devolve powers within a unitary State but where one shies back from fully giving the accretion of power, by, in some cases, reserving powers, in others providing that they must be exercised with consent, and in others by providing that the powers can be exercised concurrently by both the authorities concerned—that is, the Secretary of State and the Scottish Secretary. Then, under subsection (3), the power may be exercised by both the Secretary of State and by a Scottish Secretary, and similar potential difficulties arise there.

5.0 p.m.

When we consider the Local Employment Act 1972 we find that the relevant section, Section 7, is entitled "Improvement of Basic Services". The effect of that section is that Where it appears to the Minister in charge of any government department that adequate provision has not been made for the needs of any development area or intermediate area in respect of a basic service … he may with the consent of the Treasury make grants or loans towards the cost of improving it to such persons and in such manner as appears to him appropriate. The next subsection states that basic service' means the provision of facilities for transport (whether by road, rail, water or air) or of power, lighting, heating, water, or sewage, and sewage disposal facilities, or any other service or facility on which the development of the area in question, and in particular of industrial undertakings therein, depends. That is a tremendously wide power.

Mr. Dalyell

The Civil Aviation Authority, now that it is able to see precisely what is being discussed in the Bill, is becoming exceedingly anxious about it So also are various other transport authorities. Schedule 5 lists the Transport Act 1968, Sections 29(5) and 57, and I gather that this is likely to cause anxiety in various directions. It is very difficult for people who are not as conversant with the Bill as we are supposed to be to tumble to precisely what is happening, when everything is being rushed through.

Mr. Brittan

I could not agree more. It is extremely worrying for bodies of that kind. Directly relating to this particular provision for the operation on a concurrent basis of the powers under the Local Employment Act 1972, it is apparent that some of the outside bodies concerned are worried about the fact that the power is to be transferred to the Scottish Secretary, a member of the devolved Executive. They object to that, and they may have good reason for doing so. But even worse is the fact that, although devolved to a Scottish Secretary, the same power can be exercised by a United Kingdom Minister. In those circumstances, how on earth can an undertaking begin to know what will happen to it?

It may well be that the answer from the Minister of State will be that there will be consultation and that the Secretary of State will intervene only if the Scottish Secretary asks him to do so. But it is very difficult to be confident that that will be the case when we recognise that it is not just a hypothetical possibility but quite likely that the two Administrations, in Scotland and the United Kingdom, will be of different political complexion. If that happens, there is absolutely no reason at all to expect that a power that can be exercised by both the Scottish Administration and the United Kingdom Administration will be concerted or operated in a way that makes any sort of logical sense and avoids conflict. There is every reason to fear that if these powers are in the hands of both the United Kingdom Parliament and the Scottish Assembly they will be exercised concurrently and in a way which at best leads to confusion for outside bodies and the people who suffer from this exercise of power and which at worst leads to very serious conflict.

It will not do, either, for the Minister of State to say, as is another possibility, that the powers will not be exercised in practice. What on earth is the point of making them concurrent unless the assumption is that the Secretary of State for Scotland as well as the Scottish Secretary will want to exercise them?

In the Community Land Act 1975 and the Local Employment Act 1972, therefore, we have two extremely good examples. Another example of where the powers can be exercised concurrently is the Requisitioned Land and War Works Act 1945. It is perhaps a less serious matter. That Act gives power to Ministers to defray the cost of rehabilitation of land in certain circumstances. It is extremely difficult to see why it is necessary that this power should be in the hands of both the United Kingdom Government and a Scottish Secretary.

There are, however, instances where one can see why the powers should be exercised concurrently, and one wants to be fair to the Government on this. In the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1949 and in the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries (Protection) (Scotland) Act 1951, the powers which are exercisable concurrently relate primarily to such matters as the research into causes of delinquency and the treatment of offenders, and the collection of statistics relating to the number of salmon caught in any salmon fishery and matters of that kind.

I suppose that it will not really do a great deal of harm if the Secretary of State and the Scottish Secretary go poking around the salmon and investigating the delinquents. The most that can be said is that it is not so much a question of conflict as of overlap and waste. But, even so, that is the best that can be said for this extraordinary arrangement for having powers which are exercisable by two quite separate Administrations which are quite likely to be in conflict with each other.

In reading through some of the apparently innocuous provisions in the various statutes in respect of which the powers can be exercised concurrently, I sought to give the Government the benefit of the doubt, but some of them turn out to be not quite so innocuous after all. In this context I come next to the Historic Buildings and Ancient Monuments Act 1953, in respect of which certain powers can be exercised concurrently. Section 4 relates to Grants for preservation of historic buildings, their contents and adjoining land. It is no bad thing—except for the unfortunate people who have to foot the Bill—that both the Secretary of State and the Scottish Executive should have power to give grants of that kind, but the next section of that Act, Section 5, in regard to which power is exercisable concurrently by both the Secretary of State and the Scottish Secretary, is entitled Acquisition by the Minister of historic buildings, their contents and adjoining land. The effect of Clause 23(2) of the Bill is that not only can the Minister—the Secretary of State—acquire historic buildings, their contents and adjoining land; unless I have understood it wrongly—I stand ready to be corrected—so can a Scottish Secretary. We therefore have the possibility of a somewhat unedifying scramble for historic buildings, their contents and adjoining land between a United Kingdom Minister and a Member of the Scottish Executive. I cannot imagine that the Government really want that to occur, but under these concurrent provisions it is difficult to imagine that disputes will not arise. That may seem to be looking at the worst side of things, but it illustrates the sort of problem that we get into once there is an arrangement by which powers are exercisable concurrently by two Administrations.

The schedule also lists the Agriculture Act 1947. That is not quite as ominous as might be thought, as the provision again relates to statistics.

The last Act in the list to which I draw attention is the Transport Act 1968, where, in Section 29, there is provision for The transfer of certain property, rights and liabilities between Railways Board and Bus Company or Scottish Group. Under Section 29(5)(a): the Scottish Group and the Railways Board acting jointly may as occasion seems to them to require it make schemese for the transfer from one to another of "— certain property. Under subsection (b): the Minister and the Secretary of State acting jointly may by order make any such provisions". They can transfer property.

This again may sound a comparatively innocuous and minor point, but it illustrates the sort of exercise that we are embarking upon, because the clause refers to the Minister and the Secretary of State "acting jointly". If one substitutes the Scottish Secretary for the Minister in this devolved area it would appear that they have to act jointly to transfer this property. Yet under Clause 23(3): any powers under the enactments listed in Schedule 5 may be exercised both by the Secretary of State and by a Scottish Secretary. Here one has a situation in which the powers can be exercised by both, but, if we actually look at the provision concerned, which I presume is to be the one that prevails, they have to be acting jointly. Perhaps the Minister will tell us that Clause 23(3) amends the Transport Act and means that they can act separately or act jointly. I should like a specific answer.

Mr. Dalyell

Since my constituency party is sponsored by the National Union of Railwaymen, I have in recent months come to know something of the difficulties with regard to railway property in Scotland. Does the hon. Gentleman accept that this is a Byzantine step and that any more complications will just drive lawyers round the bend?

Mr. Brittan

Again I agree with the hon. Gentleman. Unfortunately, I cannot think of an ancient empire more noted for the complexities of its procedure than Byzantine—otherwise I agree that this is a Byzantine arrangement.

The Government have deliberately gone into the practical areas of administration. Very often, particularly when one is fighting for a high constitutional principle and the effect of arranging for the provisions of statutory instruments or Orders in Council to be transferred, it is easy to lose sight of what these powers are about and what is actually happening.

If one looks at the list of Acts of Parliament contained in Schedule 5, one sees the situation that will actually come about if the Bill is passed in its present form. One is therefore entitled to say that in raising these issues on Clause 23—to which we take objection—one is at one and the same time pointing to matters of detail relating to the structure and going to the heart of the whole debate.

I suppose we can have a scheme of government that allows having powers exercisable both by the Secretary of State and by the Scottish Secretary, but it is symbolic that the Government's approach to this matter is a sort of devolution at half-cock. They are not prepared to decide whether they want a very limited scheme or, as one of my hon. Friends said earlier, full-scale Home Rule. Instead, they have a series of provisions of this kind, which can be operated concurrently.

On going through the practical effect of having that, one sees that grouping two Administrations, often of different political complexions, with powers to do the same thing—the first example of the comprehensive acquisition of development land is perhaps the most vivid—one is creating a structure that will not be able to stand long if it is allowed to come into existence in an unamended form.

5.15 p.m.

Mr. Dalyell

With some timidity, because I am not a lawyer, I trespass on the Minister of State's home territory. For the sake of time, I wish to read part of the submission from the Faculty of Advocates published in February of this year.

Page 6 of that submission refers to Clause 18, Clause 18(2) and Clause 19 of the old Scotland and Wales Bill. It says: As these provisions stand there is a risk of very considerable confusion and difficulty, arising from conflict or inconsistency between Assembly Acts and Acts of Parliament. Presumably, in view of Clause 18(2), it is envisaged that express provision will be made when an Assembly Act is designed to repeal a provision in an Act of Parliament, and in that case no problem should arise. It goes on: The difficulty will occur in cases where there are provisions dealing with the same subject matter both in an Assembly Act and an Act of Parliament, That is highly relevant to this Clause. In the view of the Faculty it is necessary to provide some guidance to the Courts as to how such inconsistencies should be dealt with. The simplest method would be to provide that an Assembly Act shall be presumed not to repeal, amend or derogate from any provision in an Act of Parliament unless it does so expressly. Similar provisions are required to clarify the position in cases of conflicts between an Assembly Act and UK subordinate legislation: between Scottish and UK subordinate legislation: and between Scottish Assembly Acts or subordinate legislation and provisions of the Treaty of Rome or of EEC legislation. We shall come to that later. I leave it as the view of the Faculty and I shall be interested in my hon. Friend's comments on it.

I am conscious that the chopper falls at 6 o'clock, but I want to refer to a Second point relating to the criminal law. The Faculty says: It may be suggested that, as with private law, it would be clear and satisfactory simply to describe the devolved subject as ' Criminal law and procedure. Punishment and treatment of offenders'. It is appreciated that it may be necessary to add some particular subjects in order to prevent them from falling within reservation (b) in Group 23—bankruptcy offences are an example. The Group would nevertheless be more clear if the devolved subject was simply 'criminal law', and any necessary additions were made without prejudice to that generality. It may be added that on any view 'criminology' is a branch of knowledge, not a subject of legislation. It goes on—this is relevant and important— The Bill provides that compensation out of public funds to victims of crime should be one of the matters devolved (Clause 25: Schedule 6: Group 4). The Faculty considers that the present system, by which compensation is administered by a single Board for the United Kingdom is satisfactory and should continue, for the following reasons:

  1. (a) The Faculty understands that the Board operates in Scotland, England and Wales in a satisfactory manner. There are four Scottish members in a Board containing thirteen members and this is believed to be a number much higher in proportion than the total number of Scottish applications bears to applications as a whole. This number ensures that there are available sufficient Scottish members to deal with points of difficulty in relation to Scots Law.
  2. (b) The Faculty is unaware of any representation from any quarter in favour of this proposal.
  3. (c) Although the Faculty has no direct information on this question, it seems likely that the information of a separate Board with its own staff would lead to great administrative expense.
  4. (d) Payments made by the Board are an aspect of social security payments. The system of administering social security law is not a devolved matter and there seems no logical reason for making this apparent exception."

Mr. John Smith

Since my hon. Friend is pressed for time, and since this matter comes up under Schedule 10, I suggest that that would be the time to answer these points. If I replied to them now it would be at the expense of other hon. Members.

Mr. Dalyell

In view of the Minister of State's remarks, and having said that I want to save time, I shall sit down straight away.

Mr. David Price

I wish to refer to matters of principle. During the debate on the previous group of amendments I was chided by the Minister for going back to the principle of things. I am unrepentant. This seems an appropriate way to proceed. The Minister will be aware that the greater subsumes the lesser. If the greater is wrong, the lesser is wrong. It is no good getting the lesser right if the greater remains wrong.

I am glad that my right hon. Friends have decided to debate the Question, That the clause stand part of the Bill, because it enables us to range rather wider than the specific amendments on the Amendment Paper would have done.

The key words, I suggest, are "with concurrence" and "concurrently". The administrative power is to be shared in the matters laid down in this clause, and in Schedule 5, between United Kingdom and Scottish Ministers. The question raised by the hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) in a previous debate is relevant here—the question of the Scottish Prime Minister. Perhaps it could be answered now.

The hon. Member for West Lothian spoke about "Byzantine administration" and the labyrinth which he accused Byzantium of creating. I point to the experience of Constantine the Great, where he had the co-dominion of the Eastern and Western Empires running concurrently. This is a cautionary tale when we look at what happened—the demise of the Western empire and the survival of the Eastern empire. Which is the Eastern and which is the Western empire in this case is for hon. Members to decide—Scotland or England?

On Clause 23 I seek my authority not from the good Dr. Gibbon, in his "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire", but from "The Adventures of Dr. Dolittle". I believe that this is a "push-me-pull-you" clause. The "push-me" is coming from the Scottish Ministers and the pull-you "from the United Kingdom Ministers. It is divided responsibility.

Throughout the proceedings on this Bill the Secretary of State and the Minister of State have denied that it has anything to do with sovereignty. I would point out some important lines from the Act of Union which, as far as I know, the Bill does not seek to amend. The lines are: That the United Kingdom of Great Britain be represented by one and the same Parliament to be stiled the Parliament of Great Britain". Therefore, we assume that such is the way in which parliamentary arrangements work that Ministers are uniquely responsible to this House. I cannot see how a subject matter can be one with concurrent responsibility. Presumably the Scottish Executive is responsible to the Scottish Assembly, just as parallel Ministers are responsible to this Parliament. This is a classic case of "divide and rule". Who rules I do not know. Whether it is Parliament or the people, I do not know.

In terms of parliamentary responsibility there is a problem, because this House is very sensitive about Ministers being responsible to it to such an extent that we sometimes put those Ministers in an unfair position. We hold them accountable. On the matters covered by Clause 23 who is responsible to whom? Are United Kingdom Ministers responsible to this Parliament and are members of the Scottish Executive—I forbear to call them Ministers I do not know what they are called, Scottish Secretaries, perhaps—responsible to the Scottish Assembly?

Indeed, as the hon. Member for West Lothian pointed out with great perspicacity, what happens when, in the United Kingdom, there is a Government of a complexion different from that of the Scottish Assembly? What happens to concurrence then? It will be hard enough for Governments of the same political complexion, but if they are of different complexions a collision course is almost inevitable.

I do not apologise for going back to the principle of the Bill. It arises in the very nature of the strategic construction of these arrangements. This is a further reason why the Bill should be withdrawn and re-thought. The fact that it is necessary to have this clause is evidence of the basic nonsense behind the Bill.

Dr. Colin Phipps (Dudley, West)

The hon. Member for Cleveland and Whitby (Mr. Brittan) dealt very effectively, and at length, with the concurrence situation, and the hon. Member for Eastleigh (Mr. Price) has drawn attention to the difficulties that concurrence is likely to raise in the future.

I ask the Minister of State a few questions about the future. The essence of the clause is that it recognises that concurrence exists. This is very important. Schedule 5 recognises that there will be matters of equal importance both for the Scottish Assembly and the United Kingdom Parliament in Westminster. It may be possible for us retroactively in Schedule 5 to state the Bills named in the schedule and to assume that they will be ones to which the concurrent principle applies. But what happens to new Bills that are brought forward in the Scottish Assembly, which the Scottish Assembly decides are not concurrent but the Westminster Parliament decides are concurrent and of interest to both sides?

Is the Scottish Assembly allowed to pass such a Bill, or can it be stopped from passing it? Having passed it, is there any power in Westminster to impose concurrence as we are doing retroactively in Schedule 5?

Schedule 5 applies to Bills already passed. There is no Schedule 5 for Bills which the Scottish Assembly decides should pass in future and which it may pass, irrespective of the will of Westminster. Is there any way by which, if a Bill is passed by the Scottish Assembly, we at Westminster can decide that it should have concurrent powers? Have we any way of ensuring that these concurrent powers can be exercised if the Scottish Assembly passes a Scottish Bill first, which it does not wish us to be part of?

Mr. Ian Gow (Eastbourne)

It would be less than courteous if I did not welcome the Lord Advocate to our proceedings. He has been an intermittent attender at our debates, and if he thinks that he is not welcome he has got it quite wrong. We are delighted to see him, and hope that he will stay, because we are constantly in need of expert guidance.

My hon. Friend the Member for Eastleigh (Mr. Price) referred to two doctors—Dr. Gibbon and Dr. Dolittle. I refer to a third—Dr. Johannes Witteveen. In an extraordinary way it is he who, in a sense, is at the centre of Clause 23.

It is appropriate that we should bring Dr. Witteveen into our debates because Thursday next week is the first anniversary of the famous letter sent to him by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Here, in subsection (1)(b) we have enshrined the whole strategy of the Government as outlined in the letter of 15th December 1976.

Normally I would have a copy of that letter with me. I do not have it with me today, but I wish to refer to a key phrase that is engraved on my heart and, I am sure, on the heart of the Lord Advocate. The Chancellor of the Exchequer wrote: It is an essential element of the Government's economic strategy that there should be a continuing and substantial reduction in the share of resources required for the public sector. I invite the Minister of State to deny the proposition that I have advanced that paragraph (b) of the subsection relates to the expenditure of public money and has been written into this Bill.

I confer unwonted praise upon the Government Front Bench. I do not want to damage the promising career of the Minister of State by congratulating him upon the wording of the paragraph, but I welcome the fact that there is a further ministerial procedure that has to be gone through before there can be the borrowing of money outside the United Kingdom, or in a currency other than sterling. I welcome that provision, because I believe, with others, that the borrowing of money outside the United Kingdom or in a currency other than sterling is one of the principal causes of our discontent.

5.30 p.m.

I want the Minister of State clearly to explain to the Committee, with the expert assistance of his right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Advocate, in what circumstances the powers that are envisaged in subsecion (1)(b) will be exercised otherwise than in the public sector.

Although I praise the Minister of State and the parliamentary draftsmen for including the paragraph, there is the nagging fear at the back of the minds of some of us on the Opposition Benches that the very fact that it has been found necessary to insert it means that the Government have in mind when they go upon a further public spending spree—to use their own words, an expedition that involves the "borrowing of money outside the United Kingdom or in a currency other than sterling"—to qualify their future profligacy by the authority of the paragraph.

Yesterday at Question Time the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster gave the astonishing answer that he could give no assurance that it was still the Government's policy to ensure that the public sector took a smaller share of the country's resources. Can it be that the inclusion of the paragraph is merely a prelude to the Secretary of State for Scotland, the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster telling the House of Commons, if not the Committee, "Ah, but we gave you notice that we were about to embark upon a further spending spree? To qualify that disreputable programme with a semblance of authority we have provided that there must be the consent of a Scottish Secretary or the consent of a Minister of the Crown". Is that what the Minister of State had in mind when he gave instructions to the parliamentary draftsmen? Why do we have to refer to this paragraph? Is it because the Government envisage a further massive programme of borrowing outside the United Kingdom?

Let us consider the whole range of Government borrowing, including their borrowing in a currency other than sterling. Of course, if we borrow in a currency other than sterling when our own rate of inflation is substantially greater than the rates of those from whom we borrow, the cost of repayment will be that much the greater. The policy of borrowing that is envisaged in the Bill is one that should not be merely subject to the consent of a Minister of the Crown; I believe that it should be subject to the approval of the House of Commons. If one thing came out of yesterday's debate it was that there is not nearly enough control by the House of Commons over the Executive.

I should like the clause to provide not that there must be reference to a Minister of the Crown, or the consent or approval of another Minister of the Crown before public agencies can borrow from abroad or in a currency other than sterling, but that consent and approval should first be given by the House of Commons. There are many Labour Members as well as Conservative Members who assent to that proposition. If there is one way in which the House of Commons has again and again betrayed its overriding duty to control the Executive it is in the sphere of public expenditure. Although I welcome the fact that we have at least a referral to another Minister for consent and approval, it does not go nearly far enough.

No doubt the Minister of State and the Lord Advocate were in their constituencies over the weekend. Their pressing duties in the House of Commons do not weigh upon them then. No doubt they listened with the assiduity that they always display to the views of their constituents about the Crown Agents affair. If they listened to their constituents' views upon that subject, and if they have listened to their views over the past decade and more, they will have found that there is one recurring theme, namely, that there needs to be a reassertion of the control of the House of Commans over the spending of public money.

Sadly, the guillotine will fall upon our proceedings, but I hope that some of my hon. Friends will take up the recurring theme in the short time that remains to us. If there was ever a time when we should emphasise again and again the need for a fundamental reform of the procedures of the House of Commons so that it can be an effective brake and an effective scrutineer of the conduct of the Executive, especially on and of the borrowing money from abroad, this is that time.

Borrowing is a comparatively painless process when we start upon that road. One of the complaints that I have against this Administration and others that have borrowed money in the past is that they are inflicting upon the next generation a responsibility to take up the price of the profligacy of the present generation. That is what borrowing does. That is what the Government have done on a massive scale. They have imposed a burden not so much upon us but upon the children of the Minister of State and the children of the Lord Advocate. That is why I am saying that in this clause there should be a provision requiring the consent and approval of the House of Commons, and not merely that of a Minister of the Crown, before there is any borrowing either abroad or in a currency other than sterling.

Mr. W. Benyon (Buckingham)

One would be forgiven for looking around the Committee and not realising that we are discussing one of the most major constitutional measures to come before the House of Commons for some time. By one of the extraordinary lotteries of the guillotine, whereby we have progressed over one-third of the Bill in two weeks, we have landed on a clause that is of great importance. I beg leave to put forward a point of view that these arrangements, taken against the background of the two Assemblies—the Scottish Assembly and the Westminster Assembly—can work only if the individuals have the capacities of the Archangel Gabriel.. They certainly cannot work against the normal cut and thrust of party politics which may be evisaged in a future composition of both Assemblies.

To emphasise this point, I turn to Schedule 5 and look at the limitation on the requirement of consent against the various measures contained therein. In an earlier debate I put forward the view that the biggest source of friction under the arrangements foreshadowed in the Bill would be the operation of the block grant. I suggest that it wil be an inducement to elements in the Scottish Assembly, if they so wish, to make it extremely difficult for the Westminster Parliament to produce a block grant that will satisfy either the Scottish Assembly or the Westminster Parliament. If one did not wish these arrangements to work, and wanted them to lead to independence for Scotland, one would start with the limitations in Schedule 5. There, straightaway, are objects of conflict which cannot be resolved unless there is give and take and, indeed, political association between the responsible individuals in both Assemblies.

Therefore, I again draw the Committee's attention to the fact that the Bill contains causes of friction which cannot be disregarded and swept away, because they will come to the fore again and again if the Bill becomes an Act.

Mr. Ian Sproat (Aberdeen, South)

rose—

Mr. Alexander Fletcher (Edinburgh, North)

rose—

The Second Deputy Chairman (Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine)

Mr. Sproat.

Mr. Sproat

I do not want to keep out my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, North (Mr. Fletcher), but I want to take up a point that was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne (Mr. Gow), who certainly opened my eyes to one aspect that I confess I had not seen.

My hon. Friend introduced his argument by an elegant three-legged—I cannot think of the right grammatical term. However, he talked about three doctors—Dr. Gibbon and Dr. Doolittle, and therefore brought in Dr. Witteveen. In fact, I do not think that Dr. Gibbon got a doctorate. He left Oxford without getting a degree, so that part of my hon. Friend's argument probably falls. But the failure of that part of his argument brings into sharper relief the excellence of the rest of it which was concerned, as so often we are concerned in this Bill, with money.

As I have said before in this Committee—no doubt I shall say it again, because it is very important—one of the main reasons why, at the end of the day, I believe that a referendum in Scotland will throw out this Bill is precisely that the people of Scotland will realise what they are letting themselves in for, in terms of money—endless extra expenses, into which I will not go now, for the extra civil servants, the bureaucracy and all the rest of it.

My hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne pointed out that tucked away in subsection (1) (b) are the words the power relates to the borrowing of money outside the United Kingdom or in a currency other than sterling. That assumes that a Scottish Assembly will not be content with the block grant that it gets from the United Kingdom. We are already saying that it will not be content and that it will have to get its money from elsewhere—possibly by borrowing abroad.

Again, we come to one of the difficulties which arise at every corner of the Bill. Yesterday, in answer to a question, my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Cathcart (Mr. Taylor) elicited that, if the block grant for Scotland is to be given on all fours with the money that is given to other parts of the United Kingdom, Scotland would be £500 million a year worse off as a result of the Bill and the parity of treatment that it would naturally call forth from other parts of the United Kingdom. If the reason and basis for giving this power to Scotland is not because Scotland needs it vis-à-vis other parts of the United Kingdom, but because Scotland has a national identity, then at once out of the window go all the arguments for saying that Scotland should get extra money on the basis not of geography, but of need.

5.45 p.m.

If, on the one hand, we get rid of the argument that Scotland should be considered on the basis of need and accept, as the Government do, that it should be treated on the basis of geography, Scotland will be worse off by the gigantic sum of £500 million a year.

On the other hand, we are now assuming that, because Scotland will be worse off, a Scottish Assembly will want to borrow. What will happen when the Scottish Secretary or the Prime Minister of Scotland, or whatever fancy title we may give him—it is certain that he will be called the Prime Minister of Scotland—goes to the Minister to whom he is obliged to go and asks for more money?

Incidentally, I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne that the power should be vested in the House of Commons. We could hardly have a day more designed to show the benefit of having the House of Commons make the decision than today following yesterday's scandal over the Crown Agents which resulted entirely because Parliament did not exercise enough control.

Even assuming that the Minister says "Yes", and the Scottish Assembly is able to borrow more money, who will finance that debt? It will be taxpayers in other parts of the United Kingdom, who will rightly say "Why, having set up this expensive Scottish bureaucracy, should we be called upon to service a debt which this possibly profligate Scottish Assembly has assumed?"

I know that the hon. Member for Inverness (Mr. Johnston) assumes that financial rectitude and responsibility will be the key words of a Scottish Assembly. I take the opposite view. I think that we would find a Scottish Assembly seeking every possible opportunity to borrow money in this way or harassing the Westminster Government into providing more money through the block grant. We should have a situation in which people in the richer parts of England would have to subsidise people in Scotland, or if the Minister of the Crown who was asked to give his approval said "No, I shall not give my approval", we should be back in the other situation of conflict. There will be borrowing beyond what the Government think is necessary, because they will have decided the block grant, or there will be a refusal.

If the Scottish Assembly said "We have decided to keep down rent and rates in Scotland and to do that we shall need to borrow, because we have spent our block grant", and the Minister of the Crown in the Westminster Parliament refused approval for the money, again there would be discord and disputes. All Members on the Scottish National Party Bench in the Scottish Assembly would be jumping up and down and saying "The vicious, wicked Parliament of the United Kingdom is preventing Scotland from having the money that it needs."

Dr. Phipps

Will the hon. Gentleman take his argument further and admit that the Scottish Assembly will have overwhelming powers to ensure that the House of Commons will always bail it out? Indeed, if the Scottish Assembly borrowed large sums, this House and the country as a whole could not afford to have a bankrupt Scotland. The Assembly would have enormous power to borrow money over our heads and we should have to pay for it.

Mr. Sproat

The hon. Gentleman has made a very good point. Not being content with the British Steel Corporation losing £500 million a year and British Leyland having £250 mill ion chucked into it, we should have Scotland as a bottomless drain for money to be thrown into.

Once again, there is a recipe for disaster everywhere we turn in this Bill. The right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) referred earlier, in one of his less vivid metaphors, to a manhole cover which, if it were lifted up, would reveal a hole which penetrated down to the very heart of the Bill. Once again we are back in the situation in which, in this simple little clause, we discover a guaranteed recipe for conflict over money. There is nothing that more commonly or more easily gets people worked up than conflict over money.

Mr. Gow

Will my hon. Friend follow up the point made by the hon. Member for Dudley, West (Dr. Phipps)? Since, in the last analysis, any indebtedness incurred by the Scottish Executive or approved by the Scottish Assembly will come back to the House of Commons, does not my hon. Friend think that that is another reason for saying that the approval of this borrowing ought to be the approval of the House of Commons?

Mr. Sproat

What my hon. Friend says is quite correct. I think that that is probably what would happen. But there is another option open to a Scottish Assembly, under powers which, unfortunately, were not discussed earlier because of the guillotine. Those are the very important powers concerning the ability of a Scottish Assembly to vary the rate of rates or to superimpose another tax of a nature similar to rates. We were not able to discuss exactly how the Assembly could do it, but I should imagine, for example, that the people of England or this House might say "We shall not bail out this miserable Scottish Assembly which has landed itself with millions of pounds of debts", and the Scottish Asesmbly would be compelled to compel local authorities to vary the rate of rates in order to get the money in Scotland.

Mr. Douglas Crawford

(Perth and East Perthshire): Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Sproat

I shall not give way, because only nine minutes remain for this debate.

We have a situation in which the people of Scotland would find that this Scottish Assembly was putting even greater financial burdens on them.

I close as I started, by saying that the money involved—the expenditure and the necessary taxation—is the main reason why, at the end of the day, the people of Scotland will throw out the Bill.

Mr. Alexander Fletcher

My hon. Friends have expressed deep concern about various aspects of the clause, not least about the fact that Acts previously passed by this House of Commons, which were allowed time for much more careful and detailed consideration than this Bill is receiving, are being reduced in their effectiveness by a Government so absorbed in their election prospects that they care little about the effects of their actions. However, our purpose is to try to persuade Ministers to think again before they lightly set aside the work of this House of Commons in respect of previous enactments.

I hope that the Minister will agree that the House of Commons must have given serious thought to this matter and that there was good reason for this kind of consent or approval between Ministers of the Crown when previous legislation was passed, and, therefore, clearly we cannot disregard it lightly.

I know that the Minister is very worried about the clock, but the guillotine was set by the Government Benches and not by the Opposition.

Mr. John Smith

Will the hon. Gentleman make clear whether I am to be allowed to reply to this debate?

Hon. Members

It is your guillotine.

Mr. Fletcher

I cannot accept the charge of filibustering. We have had about one and half hours for this debate. I know that the Minister thinks that it is a very unimportant clause and matter of technical detail. He certainly thought that about the last clause. We on the Opposition Benches think differently.

I think it is unlikely that Ministers would suggest that the House was overcautious when it considered the previous legislation, so we can hardly dispense with the need for a Minister to seek the consent of another Minister merely because the Government are in a tremendous hurry to force this Bill through the Committee. I am sure that the Government did not intend to set aside this kind of provision when they set out on the devolution trail. It just happened as a consequence of the Government's haste, and obviously it has not been properly thought out.

My hon. Friend the Member for Cleveland and Whitby (Mr. Brittan) dealt specifically with subsection (3) and the exercise of power by the Secretary of State and the Scottish Secretary. He referred to the confusion that would follow this arrangement, for example, in respect of the Community Land Act and the Local Government Act. Schedule 4 lists 23 Acts which contain statutory powers exercisable with the concurrence of a Minister of the Crown. A glance at the schedule reveals that it includes all of the important Scottish legislation passed by the House of Commons during the past decade or so. Therefore, the provisions that these amendments are trying to protect are not something from the past. They are not some piece of old fashioned parliamentary mumbo-jumbo; they are very much a live part of the current parliamentary scene.

One small example of this appears in Schedule 4, on page 44. That is the Roads (Scotland) Act 1970. This requires the Secretary of State and the Minister of Technology, as he then was, to act jointly in the construction of appliances for clearing and repairing roads and footways—a function of local authorities and, as such, a devolved matter. Under this clause, a Scottish Secretary would ignore these provisions and act quite independently. This could have a serious effect on matters of great importance, particularly in rural areas.

I am sorry that the Minister is so agitated about this, but there are points which must be made. This clause reveals yet another embarrassment for the Government, because a Minister of the Crown in a United Kingdom Department in London could not possibly be seen to act or be allowed to act concurrently with the Scottish Secretary. It would put a Scottish Secretary on a par with a Minister of the Crown. That would not be devolution, and in this Bill appearances are everything. Not knowing what else to do, Ministers have simply dropped yet another important legislative principle.

Being a man of an extremely kind disposition and kindly disposed to the rather agitated Minister, I am prepared to bring my remarks to a close now to give him the time that is left to sum up what he has agreed is a very important clause.

Mr. John Smith

The hon. Member for Edinburgh, Pentlands (Mr. Rifkind) knows perfectly well that I hesitated before rising, out of courtesy to him. The effect is that it has left me with three minutes to reply to the debate. I am sorry; I should have said the hon. Member for Edinburgh, North (Mr. Fletcher). I do not think that the hon. Member for Pentlands would behave in that kind of way.

I was asked detailed questions, and we are operating under a guillotine. It has been quite obvious this afternoon that Opposition Members have strayed far and wide from the amendment, making speeches such as that made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Sproat). The point raised on the clause, which was probed by the hon. Member for Cleveland and Whitby (Mr. Brittan), who made a relevant, careful speech, to which I listened with care, was about the precise provisions of Schedule 5. I shall, if I have time, come to the precise points that he raised, but the main purpose of the provision is to give both to the Ministers of the Crown and Scottish Secretaries, in so far as Schedule 5 is concerned, concurrent powers. Obviously, where we have split up responsibility, in that there are devolved matters which will be the responsibility of the Scottish Administration and reserved matters which will remain the responsibility of the United Kingdom Government, there are some Acts of Parliament which are specified in Schedule 5 in which there are powers part of which may deal with reserved matters and part of which may deal with devolved matters, because the statute book up to now has not been designed with devolution in mind. Therefore, we must have a practical working method of dealing with this, and we deal with it in Clause 23.

The powers will be operated by the Scottish Secretaries in respect of devolved matters and operated by the United Kingdom Government in respect of reserved matters, using the same powers, but, of course, seeking a different objective. I am told on all hands that this will be a recipe for conflict and division. I do not believe that. I believe that it is perfectly possible for there to be amicable and sensible workmanlike co-operation between the Scottish Administration and the United Kingdom Government, even if they are of different political complexions.

I am told that there will always be conflict. I do not accept that. I think that in this country we have the capacity for making our constitution work. I believe that this sensible provision in the Bill will work perfectly well in practice, and all the prophecies of the Cassandras opposite will not convince me otherwise. I think that when we reach the stage of having the Assembly working in practice, we shall see the sense of a lot of these provisions and see the purpose behind the clauses in the Bill.

I hope that the Committee will accept this clause, since it is an eminently sensible one, following up the provisions of Clauses 21 and 22 which the Committee has already agreed should stand part of the Bill. I notice that amendments to this clause were tabled by the Opposition Front Bench but that a "stand

part" debate was chosen instead. I do not think that any of the points made by the Opposition exposes any central—

It being Six o'clock, The CHAIRMAN proceeded, pursuant to the Order [16th November] and the Resolution [22nd November], to put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 203 Noes 166.

Division No. 35] AYES [6.0 p.m.
Allaun, Frank Fletcher, Ted (Darlington) Marks, Kenneth
Anderson, Donald Foot, Rt Hon Michael Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)
Archer, Rt Hon Peter Ford, Ben Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)
Armstrong, Ernest Forrester, John Mikardo, Ian
Ashton, Joe Fraser, John (Lambeth N'w'd) Miller, Dr M. S. (E Kilbride)
Atkins, Ronald (Preston N) George, Bruce Molloy, William
Atkinson, Norman Gilbert, Dr John Moonman, Eric
Bagler, Gordon A. T. Golding, John Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)
Bain, Mrs Margaret Gourlay, Harry Moyle, Roland
Barnett, Guy (Greenwich) Grant, George (Morpeth) Murray, Rt Hon Ronald King
Beith, A.J. Grant, John (Islington C) Newens, Stanley
Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N) Grimond, Rt Hon J. Noble, Mike
Bishop, Rt Hon Edward Grocott, Bruce O'Halloran, Michael
Blenkinsop, Arthur Hamilton, James (Bothwell) Orbach, Maurice
Boothroyd, Miss Betty Hardy, Peter Orme, Rt Hon Stanley
Boyden, James (Bish Auck) Harper, Joseph Ovenden, John
Bradley, Tom Harrison, Rt Hon Walter Palmer, Arthur
Bray, Dr Jeremy Hart, Rt Hon Judith Pardoe, John
Brown, Hugh D. (Provan) Hatton, Frank Park, George
Brown, Robert C. (Newcastle W) Hayman, Mrs Helene Parker, John
Buchan, Norman Heffer, Eric S Parry, Robert
Buchanan, Richard Henderson, Douglas Pavitt, Laurie
Callaghan, Jim (Middleton & P) Horam, John Penhaligon, David
Campbell, Ian Howells, Geraint (Cardigan) Perry, Ernest
Canavan, Dennis Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N) Price, William (Rugby)
Carmichael, Neil Hughes, Roy (Newport) Radice, Giles
Carter-Jones, Lewis Hunter, Adam Reid, George
Cartwright, John Irvine, Rt Hon Sir A. (Edge Hill) Richardson, Miss Jo
Clemitson, Ivor Jackson, Colin (Brighouse) Roberts, Albert (Normanton)
Cocks, Rt Hon Michael (Bristol S) Jackson, Miss Margaret (Lincoln) Roderick, Caerwyn
Coleman, Donald Janner, Greville Rooker, J. W.
Cook, Robin F. (Edin C) Jay, Rt Hon Douglas Roper, John
Corbett, Robin Jenkins, Hugh (Putney) Rose, Paul B.
Cox, Thomas (Tooting) John, Brynmor Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)
Craig, Rt Hon W. (Belfast E) Johnson, James (Hull West) Ross, Rt Hon W. (Kilmarnock)
Craigen, Jim (Maryhill) Johnston, Russell (Inverness) Shaw, Arnold (Ilford South)
Crawford, Douglas Jones, Alec (Rhondda) Sheldon, Rt Hon Robert
Crawshaw, Richard Jones, Barry (East Flint) Shore, Rt Hon Peter
Crowther, Stan (Rotherham) Jones, Dan (Burnley) Short, Mrs Renée (Wolv NE)
Cryer, Bob Kerr, Russell Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)
Dalyell, Tam Kilroy-Silk, Robert Sillars, James
Davidson, Arthur Kinnock, Neil Silverman, Julius
Davies, Bryan (Enfield N) Lamborn, Harry Skinner, Dennis
Davies, Ifor (Gower) Lamond, James Small, William
Davis, Clinton (Hackney C) Lee, John Smith, John (N Lanarkshire)
Deakins, Eric Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton & Slough) Snape, Peter
Dean, Joseph (Leeds West) Lewis, Ron (Carlisle) Spearing, Nigel
Dempsey, James Litterick, Tom Spriggs, Leslie
Doig, Peter Luard, Evan Stallard, A. W.
Dormand, J. D. Lyon, Alexander (York) Stewart, Rt Hon Donald
Edge, Geoff Lyons, Edward (Bradford W) Stoddart, David
Edwards, Robert (Wolv SE) Mabon, Rt Hon Dr J. Dickson Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton W)
English, Michael McCartney, Hugh Thomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)
Ennals, Rt Hon David MacCormick, Iain Thomas, Mike (Newcastle E)
Evans, Ioan (Aberdare) McDonald, Dr Oonagh Thomas, Ron (Bristol NW)
Ewing, Harry (Stirling) McElhone, Frank Thompson, George
Ewing, Mrs Winifred (Moray) Mackenzie, Rt Hon Gregor Thorpe, Rt Hon Jeremy (N Devon)
Faulds, Andrew Mackintosh, John P. Tierney, Sydney
Fernyhough, Rt Hon E. Maclennan, Robert Tinn, James
Fitch, Alan (Wigan) McMillan, Tom (Glasgow C) Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne V)
Flannery, Martin
Walker, Harold (Doncaster) Whitehead, Phillip Woodall, Alec
Walker, Terry (Kingswood) Whitlock, William Woof, Robert
Ward, Michael Wigley, Dafydd Wrigglesworth, Ian
Watkinson, John Willey, Rt Hon Frederick Young, David (Bolton E)
Watt, Hamish Williams, Rt Hon Shirley (Hertford)
Weetch, Ken Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton) TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Welsh, Andrew Wilson, Gordon (Dundee E) Mr. Ted Graham and
White, Frank R. (Bury) Wilson, William (Coventry SE) Mr. Alf Bates.
White, James (Pollok) Wise, Mrs Audrey
NOES
Adley, Robert Hampson, Dr Keith Onslow, Cranley
Aitken, Jonathan Harrison, Col Sir Harwood (Eye) Page, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby)
Alison, Michael Haselhurst, Alan Page, Richard (Workington)
Atkins, Rt Hon H. (Spelthorne) Hawkins, Paul Pattie, Geoffrey
Atkinson, David (Bournemouth, East) Hayhoe, Barney Percival, Ian
Awdry, Daniel Hicks, Robert Pink, R. Bonner
Banks, Robert Hodgson, Robin Powell, Rt Hon J. Enoch
Bell, Ronald Holland, Philip Prentice, Rt Hon Reg
Bennett, Dr Reginald (Fareham) Howe, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Price, David (Eastleigh)
Benyon, W. Howell, David (Guildford) Prior, Rt Hon James
Berry, Hon Anthony Hunt, David (Wirral) Pym, Rt Hon Francis
Biffen, John Hunt, John (Ravensbourne) Raison, Timothy
Biggs-Davison, John Hurd, Douglas Rathbone, Tim
Body, Richard James, David Renton, Tim (Mid-Sussex)
Boscawen, Hon Robert Jenkin, Rt Hon P. (Wanst'd&W'df'd) Rhodes James, R.
Braine, Sir Bernard Johnson Smith, G. (E Grinstead) Ridsdale, Julian
Brittan, Leon Jones, Arthur (Daventry) Rifkind, Malcolm
Brocklebank-Fowler, C. Jopling, Michael Ross, William (Londonderry)
Brooke, Peter Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith Sainsbury, Tim
Brown, Sir Edward (Bath) Kaberry, Sir Donald Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)
Buchanan-Smith, Alick Kershaw, Anthony Shelton, William (Streatham)
Buck, Antony Kimball, Marcus Shepherd, Colin
Budgen, Nick King, Evelyn (South Dorset) Silvester, Fred
Bulmer, Esmond King, Tom (Bridgwater) Sims, Roger
Butler, Adam (Bosworth) Kitson, Sir Timothy Sinclair, Sir George
Chalker, Mrs Lynda Knox, David Skeet, T. H. H.
Churchill, W. S. Lamont, Norman Smith, Dudley (Warwick)
Clark, Alan (Plymouth, Sutton) Latham, Michael (Melton) Spence, John
Clark, William (Croydon S) Le Marchant, Spencer Spicer, Michael (S Worcester)
Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe) Lester, Jim (Beeston) Sproat, Iain
Cooke, Robert (Bristol W) Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland) Stainton, Keith
Cope, John Loveridge, John Stanbrook, Ivor
Dean, Paul (N Somerset) Luce, Richard Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)
Dunlop, John Macfarlane, Neil Stradling Thomas, J.
Dykes, Hugh MacGregor, John Tapsell, Peter
Eden, Rt Hon Sir John MacKay, Andrew (Stechford) Taylor, R. (Croydon NW)
Emery, Peter McNair-Wilson, M. (Newbury) Taylor, Teddy (Cathcart)
Fairbairn, Nicholas Marshall, Michael (Arundel) Tebbit, Norman
Fairgrieve, Russell Marten, Neil Temple-Morris, Peter
Farr, John Mather, Carol Townsend, Cyril D.
Finsberg, Geoffrey Maude, Angus Trotter, Neville
Fletcher, Alex (Edinburgh N) Mawby, Ray Vaughan, Dr Gerald
Fookes, Miss Janet Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin Viggers, Peter
Forman, Nigel Meyer, Sir Anthony Wainwright, Richard (Colne V)
Fowler, Norman (Sutton C'f'd) Miller, Hal (Bromsgrove) Walder, David (Clitheroe)
Fry, Peter Mills, Peter Walker, Rt Hon P. (Worcester)
Gardiner, George (Reigate) Mitchell, David (Basingstoke) Wall, Patrick
Glyn, Dr Alan Moate, Roger Warren, Kenneth
Goodhart, Philip Montgomery, Fergus Weatherill, Bernard
Goodhew, Victor More, Jasper (Ludlow) Wells, John
Gow, Ian (Eastbourne) Morgan, Geraint Winterton, Nicholas
Gower, Sir Raymond (Barry) Morrison, Charles (Devizes) Younger, Hon George
Gray, Hamish Morrison, Hon Peter (Chester)
Grist, Ian Mudd, David TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Grylls, Michael Neubert, Michael Mr. Michael Roberts and
Hall, Sir John Newton, Tony Lord James Douglas-Hamilton.
Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury) Nott, John

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

The CHAIRMAN then proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the Business to be concluded at Six o'clock.

Schedules 4 and 5 agreed to.

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