HC Deb 27 October 1976 vol 918 cc521-35

Lords Amendment: No. 2, in page 2, line 16, after "brought" insert "in good faith".

Mr. John

I beg to move, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Mr. Oscar Murton)

With this we may discuss Lords Amendments No. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.

Mr. John

As you have indicated, Mr. Deputy Speaker, we are taking a group of amendments. It might be convenient for me to indicate that I should like to deal with Lords Amendments No. 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8, which are substantially on the same point, and then deal separately with Lords Amendments No. 5 and 7.

In opening this debate I am tempted to say that many of the arguments that will arise during the debate arose in the last debate and were covered by that. However, we are dealing with a different clause, which deals with the question of a person who asserts his right under this legislation. It affords his protection against less favourable treatment on the ground of that assertion of his right.

I hope that it will be commonly agreed that if a person were to take advantage of an Act of Parliament conferring certain rights to test those rights in the courts he should not be victimised by the person against whom he has asserted those rights merely by taking advantage of the Act. To do otherwise would be to countenance a breach in the rule of law, which I am sure no hon. Member would wish to do.

The amendment concerns also the scope of the protection which is afforded. The other place, by the amendment, has considerably narrowed the protection which is given. The main dispute between the Government and those in the other place who inserted the amendment concerns the circumstances in which a claimant should forfeit the protection he has for asserting his rights under the Bill. The Government say that he should forefeit that protection only if he makes allegations falsely and not in good faith.

Hon. Members who are lawyers or who have experience of the law know that many people genuinely, though mistakenly, believe that they have a good defence or a good case to bring to the courts and often they are so advised. The lawyers who advise them are as surprised as they are when the decision goes against them. It would be wholly unacceptable if, by reason only of failure—although the case was brought in good faith—a person should forefeit that protection.

The Government say that to place the burden of proof on the complainant to prove that he is giving true information in good faith places the burden wrongly, because it excludes protection which should not be excluded. I fully agree that a person is entitled to protection against anyone who brings a bad case in bad faith, but I do not believe that a person who is sincere but mistaken as to the effect of the law should be denied protection.

The other place has fallen into the error which I outlined previously, namely, the misleading use of "guilty" when we are talking about a civil not a criminal offence. What was said in the other place gives the impression that the whole burden under the clause falls upon the respondent to disprove. That is not so.

Under the clause three questions have to be decided. First, has the complainant been treated less favourably within Parts II to IV of the Bill? Secondly, is the reason for this that he did something which falls within Clause 2(1)(a) to Clause 2(1)(d)—that is, asserted a right under the Bill? In both those cases, the burden of proof is on the complainant.

Before we get to the third question, whether he brought the action falsely and in bad faith, the complainant has to discharge the very heavy onus of proof that he was victimised under Clause 2. To add to it the further burden of proof that he had given truthful evidence would be unfair, because that is what the court is there to test. Failure to prove truth or accuracy might result in his losing a case in which he might have been sincerely motivated. That would be a severe penalty. The effect would be that a person who, on any normal reading of the situation was victimised by another, would be denied protection because he would be afraid that he could not discharge the burden of proof upon him.

6.15 p.m.

Lords Amendment No. 5 deletes Clause 2(1)(c): otherwise done anything under or by reference to this Act in relation to the discriminator or any other person". The effect of that amendment is to deny protection from victimisation to anyone who had helped the Commission in the course of a formal hearing provided for by the Bill, or who had sought the advice of the Commission or other legal advice. That would be an imposition upon the person concerned. It is to the advantage of good race relations that the complainant should afford help to the Commission in a formal hearing. To be able to victimise him because of that would be a monstrous injustice.

I find Amendment No. 7 totally illogical and indefensible. The effect of the Clause is that a person who knows that another has taken steps under the Bill can nevertheless be guilty of victimisation if he takes a discriminatory act against that other person. There would be no discriminatory act if there were only a suspicion. A person who sacks another because he reported a matter to the Commission could be guilty of victimisation. If the amendment stands, a person who sacks another because of a suspicion that he is the chap who blew the whistle to the Commission could not be said to have been victimised in any circumstance. The normal view would be that that suspicion is the lesser not the greater ground. I suggest that the amendment is wholly illogical and indefensible.

None of us believes that a person should be victimised. If he is victimised because he has taken advantage of the provisions laid down by an Act of Parliament he should be entitled to protection from that victimisation unless he has given false evidence and acted in bad faith.

On that basis, and in the belief that it is for the respondent to prove that the complainant has shown bad faith, I invite the House to disagree with the amendment

Mr. Mark Carlisle (Runcorn)

I think that we would all agree that this is a small point. The Minister of State criticised their Lordships and said they had it wrong because they used terminology which implied that these were criminal and not civil offences, but towards the end of his speech the hon. Gentleman referred to people being found guilty of victimisation. These matters are quasi-criminal, in that they carry with them a degree of moral stigma against the person who is said to be exercising discrimination.

There is little difference between the Minister's approach and my approach. I am sure that we would both agree that a person who exercises rights provided by statute should be entitled to protection from victimisation merely because he exercises those rights. The Minister also said that if a person exercised this right maliciously it was not unreasonable that the protection should be removed. Again I agree with him. In the end we therefore come down to only this narrow difference about whether or not proof of good faith should lie with the defendant or with the plaintiff.

If a person is discriminated against by someone else who has brought proceedings against him it is reasonable that the court or the tribunal before which the issue will appear should be required to satisfy itself that those proceedings were brought sincerely and in good faith. A person may say "I know that I have been discriminated against but, frankly, this was a wholly malicious use of the provisions and rights under the Bill. An attempt is being made to blacken me and put me in a bad position". Once that issue is raised it seems reasonable that the person who makes the complaint that he is being discriminated against, because he has brought the proceedings, should be required to show that he brought those proceedings sincerely and in good faith, to use the words of the Minister, rather than have the burden put on the defendant.

However, as the Minister will agree, it is not an easy matter to prove good faith, because it usually depends on what the intention is in the mind and thinking of the individual. It is, therefore, often difficult to prove that a person acted in good faith. Although I agree with the Minister that this is a small point, it is one on which arguments can be advanced on either side. I believe that, on balance, the other place was right to take the view that it did, and I therefore hope that the House will agree rather than disagree with the Lords in their amendments.

Mr. Dudley Smith

The Minister made great play, as he did in respect of the previous amendment about the question of whether the provisions in the Bill are criminal or civil. I am not a lawyer but I agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle), who made the point that he himself had fallen into the trap with regard to guilty and not guilty. Whatever the technicalities of the situation, the public at large will regard this as a criminal Bill. We all know of the civil law—it is well defined—but in some respects we are breaking new territory here. We are dealing with considerable amounts of money—up to £5,000 in extreme cases— and undoubtedly the public will regard them as fines if they are imposed.

We also heard in an earlier debate that some of the provisions in the Bill, when applied by the courts, could be extremely harsh. The Bill enters into an atmosphere of criminality even though technically it remains a civil matter. I would have thought it sensible for Parliament to pay heed to the amendments which have been written into the Bill by the Lords. They strengthen the Bill in the interest of those who may in due course be accused, by the insertion of the words "in good faith" and by the reference to "accurate" evidence. This will assist the individual who may be placed in a situation where he appears before the Court and has to prove that he is, in fact, not guilty.

We know that over the years a large number of people who will appear before the courts will be innocent, not only innocent in being able to discharge themselves but also innocent in law. What worries me about the Bill—this is why I suggest it is right to have amendments of this kind—is that, whatever view one takes about legislating on race relations, this is an emotive Bill. It must eventually be an emotive Act of Parliament. It is unlike many other aspects of our criminal or civil law. It will be used to a certain extent by extremists. There is no doubt whatever that extremists will take advantage of it and endeavour to bring proceedings against other individuals.

The extremists are always shouting that racial laws should be enacted against those who, often in public life, dare to criticise immigrants or immigration. We may well disagree with the views put forward by certain individuals, but in our kind of society it is right to have all kinds of expression of opinion. There are many extremists, some of whom are engaged in race relations, who at the drop of a hat would say that people, even hon. Members of this House, should be prosecuted and should be taken before the appropriate race relations court. We are in great difficulty because more and more of these people—they are unwise and are reprehensibly motivated—will automatically brand anyone who takes a contrary view to themselves as racialists or suggest that they are racially biased.

We have to guard against such people when we start providing courts and laws to deal with genuine cases. I am aware that many of the proceedings that will come before the appropriate courts in due course will be perfectly genuine. It is right in certain circumstances that those who have been wronged—black people to a large extent, but also other groups—may feel they have been wronged racially and that they should have the right to state their case sensibly. We would be doing a disservice to the country if we did not recognise that there will be extremists who will try to exploit the system and the situation.

That is why I want the Bill to be as strong as possible. In these circumstances, despite what the Minister has said, the words which the other place has written into the Bill would stand future defendants in far better stead than would otherwise be the case.

Mr. Stokes

I wish to make one short point. In England's long history we have had periods of what one can only call mass hysteria. It is therefore most important that even today we should have maximum safeguards to protect individuals against malicious or even frivolous charges, or charges which happen to fit the fashionable vogues of the day.

The period to which I am referring was in the reign of King Charles II at the time of the Popish plot. We all remember the fabrications of one Titus Oates, and one recalls how many innocent people went to their death because of his lying charges. Not even the King himself was able to save those innocent people.

So much feeling is whipped up today in the matter of race relations, in an attempt to make those who protest against immigration feel that they are in some way guilty or morally wrong, that it is important that in public or private life, where we all influence each other, we can speak quite freely. If the provisions in question are brought back into the Bill, they will further restrict free speech and infringe on what a man may say, not only in his club but possibly also in his home.

The House would be most wise, therefore, to make sure that these provisions are not put back into the Bill and that we give every possible safeguard to individuals to speak frankly and freely on vital questions of the hour.

6.30 p.m.

Mr. Mayhew

We are again talking mainly about the burden of proof, and it is not necessary to go over the arguments that we advanced on the last amendment.

As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) said, this is a quasi-criminal statute and the question of burden of proof cannot be lightly passed over. If one accepts the overall scheme of the Bill, it is logical to provide against victimisation of those who use its provisions or who become associated with its procedures. Such victimisation is described as discrimination, and we do not complain about that.

There must, however, be an exception where the provisions of the Bill have not been used by the complainant in good faith. The Bill recognises that idea—for example, where someone persistently alleges that he has been sacked in the past for racial reasons when his real purpose in so doing has been simply to stir up trouble.

If a prospective employer sees someone coming in the front door whom he knows to have been a persistent and malicious pain in the neck to other local employers, he must be entitled to refuse to employ him, notwithstanding that his reason is that that person has brought proceedings against someone else under the legislation in the past. This is recognised in Clause 1(2). However, before their Lordships amended that subsection the burden of proving bad faith was placed on the respondent. We say that that was completely unrealistic.

The Minister placed the greatest weight in his last argument upon the proposition that, where the matter with which the tribunal is concerned lies wholly within the knowledge of the respondent, the respondent should have the burden of proving it. In this case, surely the question of whether there has been bad or good faith must lie wholly within the knowledge of the complainant. If the Minister's argument was sound on the last amendment, how can he oppose this one?

The Lords say that he who says that he was in good faith should prove the matter; no one else can prove that he acted in bad faith. It is quite unrealistic to say that someone may be exempt from this liability provided he can show that the complaint was made in bad faith. It cannot be done. It would be hard enough to do so when the complaint was made against oneself, but where it was made against another person the burden is far too heavy to be justly imposed upon the respondent. It is not unreasonable for someone who claims that he is being victimised in these circumstances to prove that he acted in good faith.

We say that it would be absurd to permit such a person to say that he had made any kind of allegation under the legislation and had subsequently been victimised in consequence and thereby allow him to place upon the respondent the burden of showing not only that the allegation had been rejected by the tribunal which dealt with it but that it was all along made in bad faith. Without the amendments, the respondent would be convicted of victimisation and, therefore, of discrimination when he was innocent.

The Minister said that it would be wrong for a complainant to be penalised through having made a mistake in the law. I did not follow his argument. Whether or not one has made a mistake in the law has nothing to do with whether one acted in good or bad faith.

Mr. John

One of the amendments quoted by the hon. and learned Member for Runcorn (Mr. Carlisle) dealt with accurate evidence.

Mr. Mayhew

That is a different matter. Accurate evidence is distinct from making a mistake in the law, which is what the Minister referred to. Certainly no lawyer would claim that anyone who had made a mistake in the law was ipso facto guilty of bad faith. It is true that Lords Amendment No. 4 relates to accurate evidence. One can be confident that the courts, in construing that, will apply the de minimis rule and will not penalise a complainant who in some tiny and immaterial respect gave evidence which was inaccurate. Courts are capable of a sensible and realistic approach.

We agree also with Lords Amendment No. 5, which deleted paragraph (c). The category of activity which was expressed there is far too vague to be included in a quasi-judicial statute.

Lords Amendment No. 6 has added the words "in good faith" to make paragraph (d) read; alleged in good faith that the discriminator or any other person has committed an act which (whether or not the allegation so states) would amount to a contravention of this Act". We say that that would merely place the burden of proof where it belongs.

Their Lordships were also right to delete the words "or suspects" from line 28. It is impossible to prove whether anyone had acted because he suspected that something might be the case.

But our major argument in support of their Lordships relates to the burden of proof. We do not doubt that the Government's intentions in drafting the Bill were entirely honourable and that they were motivated only by a desire to see that justice was done. We believe, however, that they have got it wrong and that unless they put the burden of proof where it belongs—on the person complaining, to show that he has acted in good faith—they will be letting a genie out of this bottle which they will come dearly to rue. It will not be a benign genie but an oppressive one, capable of wreaking lasting injury on innocent people who will be helpless to prevent it.

Mr. John

With the leave of the House, I should like to reply. This has been an interesting, though short, debate. In answer to the hon. Member for Halesowen and Stourbridge (Mr. Stokes), I must point out that the clause deals not with what a man says but with what he does. It would be as well to remind hon. Gentlemen on the Opposition Benches—this is where I part company with them and believe that they have got it slightly wrong—that this provision arises only after a person has treated someone less favourably.

The initial point is that someone who has brought proceedings under the Act is, in consequence, treated less favourably by another person. It must be much less unacceptable to hon. Members to say that the burden must then be on the person who has done the punishing, in that sense, to prove that the person he has punished had acted in bad faith. If they consider it in that light, hon. Members will see that the punishment has already taken place. It is not a matter of oppression. The person has taken the step and must then prove the bad faith which led him to take the step which has victimised another. That is perfectly permissible and right.

The hon. and learned Member for Royal Tunbridge Wells (Mr. Mayhew) addressed a question to me: how can one prove bad faith? Let us take the hon. and learned Gentleman's own example of a man who goes to a factory for a job and the employer knows that he has maliciously brought prosecutions against other employers. The complainant has knowledge of whether such allegations were made maliciously. Others might have told the employer that allegations were made purely out of spite. That is capable of proof by outside evidence, unlike the example which I gave earlier where an employer seeks to impose a highly complicated condition based on technical knowledge which is out of the ken of the complainant.

Mr. Mayhew

The employer may think that a complaint or action is taken in bad faith but will be unable to prove it. One must distinguish between a complaint that is tried and is failed and a complaint that is failed because of bad faith. How

would the employer be able to say that the complaint was made out of spite? That might be his opinion but it would not be capable of proof.

Mr. John

It is capable of proof because the employer will have discussed it with another employer and will have established the situation on the basis of the evidence.

The hon. Member for Halesowen and Stourbridge complained that I was speaking as a lawyer. Many lawyers have taken part in the debate, and there is a danger because we think that we understand the meaning of "onus of proof". It certainly does not mean that the complainant is free from cross-examination about the good faith or bad faith involved. On the balance of probabilities, the respondent must prove that the complainant acted in bad faith rather than in good faith.

Mr. W. R. Rees-Davies (Thanet, West)

The Minister does not seem to have appreciated two matters: first, that we are worried about professional complainants, those who come from organisations or societies; and, secondly, that these cases will occur after the event. The question of discrimination will arise at a time when no one may know anything about the facts. The employer will not be in a position to prove bad faith, because one cannot rely on tittle-tattle. There will not be a shorthand note of proceedings in the case. Therefore, the employer will never be able to establish bad faith.

Mr. John

If an employer victimises a person, the complainant may assert his rights under the Act, and it is for the employer to prove the bad faith of the complainant rather than the other way round.

Question put, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment: —

The House divided: Ayes 198, Noes 150.

Division No. 345.] AYES [6.44 p.m.
Allaun, Frank Barnett, Guy (Greenwich) Boardman, H.
Anderson, Donald Bates, Alf Bottomley, Rt Hon Arthur
Archer, Peter Beith, A. J. Boyden, James (Bish Auck)
Armstrong, Ernest Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N) Bray, Dr Jeremy
Ashley, Jack Bidwell, Sydney Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)
Atkinson, Norman Bishop, E. S. Buchanan, Richard
Bagier, Gordon A. T. Blenkinsop, Arthur Callaghan, Jim (Middleton & P)
Campbell, Ian Hoyle, Doug (Nelson) Robinson, Geoffrey
Cant, R. B. Hughes, Rt Hon C. (Anglesey) Roderick, Caerwyn
Carmichael, Neil Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N) Rodgers, George (Chorley)
Cartwright, John Hughes, Roy (Newport) Rooker, J. W.
Castle, Rt Hon Barbara Hunter, Adam Roper, John
Clemitson, Ivor Jay, Rt Hon Douglas Rose, Paul B.
Cocks, Rt Hon Michael (Bristol S) Jeger, Mrs Lena Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)
Cohen, Stanley John, Brynmor Ross, Rt Hon W. (Kilmarnock)
Coleman, Donald Johnson, James (Hull West) Rowlands, Ted
Colquhoun, Ms Maureen Johnson, Walter (Derby S) Ryman, John
Conlan, Bernard Jones, Alec (Rhondda) Sandelson, Neville
Corbett, Robin Jones, Barry (East Flint) Sedgemore, Brian
Cox, Thomas (Tooting) Jones, Dan (Burnley) Shore, Rt Hon Peter
Craigen, J. M. (Maryhill) Judd, Frank Short, Mrs Renée (Wolv NE)
Crawshaw, Richard Kaufman, Gerald Silkin, Rt Hon John (Deptford)
Crowther, Stan (Rotherham) Lambie, David Silverman, Julius
Cryer, Bob Lamborn, Harry Skinner, Dennis
Cunningham, G. (Islington S) Lamond, James Small, William
Davies, Bryan (Enfield N) Latham, Arthur (Paddington) Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)
Davis, Clinton (Hackney C) Lee, John Smith, John (N Lanarkshire)
Dean, Joseph (Leeds West) Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton & Slough) Spearing, Nigel
Dempsey, James Luard, Evan Stallard, A. W.
Doig, Peter Lyons, Edward (Bradford W) Steel, David (Roxburgh)
Dormand, J. D. McCartney, Hugh Stewart, Donald (Western Isles)
Douglas-Mann, Bruce McDonald, Dr Oonagh Stott, Roger
Dunnett Jack McElhone, Frank Strauss, Rt Hon G. R.
Eadie, Alex MacFarquhar, Roderick Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley
Edge Geoff McGuire, Michael (Ince) Swain, Thomas
Edwards, Robert (Wolv SE) MacKenzie, Gregor Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton W)
Ellis John (Brigg & Scun) Mackintosh, John P. Thomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)
Evans, Fred (Caerphilly) Maclennan, Robert Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)
Evans, Gwynfor (Carmarthen) McMillan, Tom (Glasgow C) Thomas, Ron (Bristol NW)
Evans, loan (Aberdare) McNamara, Kevin Thompson, George
Filch Alan (Wigan) Magee, Bryan Thorne, Stan (Preston South)
Fitt, Gerard (Belfast W) Mallalieu, J. P. W. Tuck, Raphael
Flannery, Martin Marks, Kenneth Wainwright, Richard (Colne V)
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington) Marquand, David Walden, Brian (B'ham, L'dyw'd)
Ford, Ben Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole) Walker, Terry (Kingswood)
Forrester, John Marshall, Jim (Leicester S) Watkins, David
Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin) Maynard, Miss Joan Watkinson, John
Mellish, Rt Hon Robert Watt, Hamish
Fraser, John (Lambeth, N'w'd) Mikardo, Ian Weetch, Ken
Freud, Clement Millan, Rt Hon Bruce Wellbeloved, James
Garrett, John (Norwich S) Moonman, Eric Welsh, Andrew
Garrett, W. E. (Wallsend) Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw) White, Frank R. (Bury)
Gilbert, Dr John Morris, Rt Hon J. (Aberavon) White, James (Pollock)
Ginsburg, David Moyle, Roland Whitehead, Phillip
Golding, John Mulley, Rt Hon Frederick Whitlock, William
Gourlay, Harry Newens, Stanley Wigley, Dafydd
Grant, George (Morpelh) Oakes, Gordon Willey, Rt Hon Frederick
Grant, John (Islington C) Orme, Rt Hon Stanley Williams, Alan (Swansea W)
Grimond, Rt Hon J. Ovenden, John Williams, Alan Lee (Hornch'ch)
Hamilton, James (Bothwell) Park, George Williams, Sir Thomas (Warrington)
Hardy, Peter Parker, John Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)
Harper, Joseph Parry, Robert Woof, Robert
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield) Perry, Ernest Wrigglesworth, Ian
Hatton, Frank Prentice, Rt Hon Reg Young, David (Bolton E)
Henderson, Douglas Price, C. (Lewisham W)
Hooley, Frank Radice, Giles TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Hooson, Emlyn Rippon, Rt Hon Geoffrey Mr. David Stoddart and
Howells, Geraint (Cardigan) Roberts, Albert (Normanton) Mr. James Tinn.
Adley, Robert Cooke, Robert (Bristol W) Gray, Hamish
Alison, Michael Cope, John Grieve, Percy
Atkins, Rt Hon H. (Spelthorne) Craig, Rt Hon W. (Belfast E) Griffiths, Eldon
Awdry, Daniel Crowder, F. P. Grist, Ian
Bell, Ronald Dodsworth, Geoffrey Hall, Sir John
Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torbay) Drayson, Burnaby Hall-Davis, A. G. F.
Berry, Hon Anthony Durant, Tony Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Biffen, John Eden, Rt Hon Sir John Hampson, Dr Keith
Biggs-Davison, John Elliott, Sir William Havers, Sir Michael
Body, Richard Eyre, Reginald Hawkins, Paul
Boscawen, Hon Robert Fairbairn, Nicholas Hayhoe, Barney
Bottomley, Peter Fairgrieve, Russell Heseltine, Michael
Brittan, Leon Farr, John Hicks, Robert
Brocklebank-Fowler, C. Finsberg, Geoffrey Higgins, Terence L.
Buchanan-Smith, Alick Fookes, Miss Janet Holland, Philip
Budgen, Nick Forman, Nigel Hordern, Peter
Carlisle, Mark Fowler, Norman (Sutton C'f'd) Howe, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey
Channon, Paul Gardner, Edward (S Fylde) Hunt, David (Wirral)
Churchill, W. S. Goodhew, Victor Hunt, John (Bromley)
Clark, Alan (Plymouth, Sutton) Gorst, John Hurd, Douglas
Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe) Gow, Ian (Eastbourne) Hutchison, Michael Clark
Clegg, Walter Grant, Anthony (Harrow C) James, David
Jenkin, Rt Hon P. (Wanst'd & W'df'd) Monro, Hector Speed, Keith
Jessel, Toby Morgan, Geraint Sproat, Iain
Jones, Arthur (Daventry) Mudd, David Stanbrook, Ivor
Jopling, Michael Neave, Airey Stanley, John
Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith Page, John (Harrow West) Steen, Anthony (Wavertree)
Kershaw, Anthony Page, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby) Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)
Kitson, Sir Timothy Paisley, Rev Ian Stokes, John
Lamont, Norman Parkinson, Cecil Stradling Thomas, J.
Latham, Michael (Melton) Percival, Ian Taylor, R. (Croydon NW)
Lawrence, Ivan Price, David (Eastleigh) Taylor, Teddy (Cathcart)
Lawson, Nigel Raison, Timothy Tebbit, Norman
Le Marchant, Spencer Rees-Davies, W. R. Temple-Morris, Peter
Lester, Jim (Beeston) Ridley, Hon Nicholas Townsend, Cyril D.
Lloyd, Ian Nippon, Rt Hon Geoffrey van Straubenzee, W. R.
Loveridge, John Roberts, Michael (Cardiff NW) Vaughan, Dr Gerald
Luce, Richard Roberts, Wyn (Conway) Viggers, Peter
McCrindle, Robert Ross, William (Londonderry) Wakeham, John
Macfarlane, Neil Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey) Wall, Patrick
Macmillan, Rt Hon M. (Farnham) Rost, Peter (SE Derbyshire) Walters, Dennis
Madel, David Royle, Sir Anthony Weatherill, Bernard
Marten, Neil Sainsbury, Tim Wells, John
Mates, Michael Shaw, Giles (Pudsey) Whilelaw, Rt Hon William
Maude, Angus Shelton, William (Streatham) Wiggin, Jerry
Mawby, Ray Shersby, Michael Wood, Rt Hon Richard
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin Silvester, Fred Young, Sir G. (Ealing, Acton)
Mayhew, Patrick Sims, Roger
Meyer, Sir Anthony Sinclair, Sir George TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Miscampbell, Norman Skeet, T. H. H. Mr. W. Benyon and
Moate, Roger Smith, Dudley (Warwick) Mr. John Corrie.
Molyneaux, James

Question accordingly agreed to.

Subsequent Lords Amendments disagreed to.

Back to
Forward to