§ Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Coleman.]
§ 1.7 a.m.
§ Mr. Robert Banks (Harrogate)The object of the debate is to draw attention to the complete lack of information and guidance available to the general public for preparing shelters, and to call on the Government to adopt a policy for protection from nuclear fall-out. The last time a leaflet was available to the general public was in 1963, when its publication was discontinued on the grounds of its cost of some £7,000, and following criticism from the Expenditure Committee.
No guidelines have been issued by the Government either to the general public or to local authorities to specify the construction technique for providing an area within a new building which offers protection from nuclear fall-out. We live in a nuclear age. The sad chances are that, probably in my lifetime, and certainly in my children's lifetime, we shall all be subjected to exposure from nuclear fall-out. There is no satisfactory therapy available for anyone exposed to a lethal dose of radiation. The only chance of survival is adequate shelter protection, preferably underground.
The effects of gamma radiation within two miles of an exploded 5 megaton bomb would wipe out 50 per cent. of those unprotected in its vicinity. I hesitate to imagine such a disaster in London and Leeds and what it would do. Protection against radiation is dependent on the thickness of materials making one's protection.
The fall-out of radioactive nuclear dust, from which we also need vital protection, could travel several hundred miles down wind of the explosion, and is determined by the wind strength and its direction. There are no areas of high or low risk in this country, therefore. While we may not come under nuclear attack in this country, the effects of fallout from a nuclear explosion in, say, Scandinavia, the European mainland or at sea, could have devastating results for us if we do not have adequate shelters for people to go to in our cities, towns and villages.
421 The Home Secretary was asked in February how many shelters against nuclear attack had been built in the last five years. He replied that none had been built at any time.
Government policy has been to rely on sufficient time being available to mount an intensive mass information campaign only when the international situation merits it. This is, as I understand it, an estimated 72 hours before the explosion. How one makes such a critical estimation is unbelievable. A campaign opening with leaflets being showered over the country, films on television and advice on the radio telling people what sort of shelter to build and to lay in food and water supplies for at least two weeks, and possibly more, would not only lead to utter chaos but itself have profound political repercussions.
This could indeed escalate a deteriorating situation and thereby reduce the time scale before attack. Can one imagine the queues of people waiting to obtain sandbags and dealing with the problem of getting in food when everyone was trying to do the same thing?
So for those who prefer to plan well in advance what advice can the Minister offer? What leaflets are available? The report in the Sunday Times of 29th January this year revealed that after 12 years the Central Office of Information was putting finishing touches to a Press campaign to be used in a nuclear emergency. The article expressed concern that the Government's instructions on building shelters and storing food, in a leaflet called "Protect and Survive", would echo the style of the ill-starred previous publication, withdrawn from general publication in 1963.
I was sent a copy of the new leaflet which was hastily recalled by the Central Office of Information. Will the Minister therefore explain what is going on? Is the new leaflet, "Protect and Survive", about to be released? How many copies exist? Where are they? Does the Minister seriously feel that the advice offered in the leaflet is the best that her Department can produce?
Why is there all this secrecy? The leaflet, as the newspaper article illustrated, shows pictures of a young man building an inner refuge using his dining 422 room table, around which is heaped furniture, sandbags and cushions, inside which, presumably, he and his family must remain for at least two weeks—ha!—with their supply of water and provisions, without venturing into the rest of the room.
What the Government must now do without delay is to formulate a sensible policy to provide for shelters and offer sensible advice to the householder for preparing part of his house as an emergency shelter. By that I mean using recommended reinforcements to walls and ceilings in a central space on the ground floor if no cellar exists. The provision of materials for sealing off the space, perhaps under the stairs and part of the hall, should be advised to be kept available.
The preparedness which is being demonstrated in other countries is in stark contrast to the sandbag and last-minute policy of the Government. Only on Sunday the Foreign Secretary was being shown around the newly constructed labyrinth of bomb shelters under Shanghai. These are tunnels and shelters built under 9 ft. of concrete.
In Switzerland every new building has a nuclear basement. Every household is required to build and stock its own shelter. There are village shelters and community shelters, and I understand that it is estimated that by the end of this century the entire Swiss population can be sheltered.
In Sweden certain schools, hospitals and hotels have an obligation to provide shelters. As a rule, flats, offices and business buildings have to be equipped with shelters. When building permits are issued, they carry regulations concerning shelters. Large community shelters can be used as gymnasiums or shooting ranges, or for some other activity.
In this country local authorities should now be directed to review what shelter facilities exist and could be speedily adapted in a crisis, and what steps they could take now in preparation. I refer, for instance, to the installation of steel doors at the entrances to underground car parks and to the strengthening of basement ceilings in blocks of flats, schools, hospitals and offices. The easy provision of water in large containers plumbed to the system for quick and 423 easy filling is another example of foresight. Such information should be available to architects and builders at the Building Centre in London.
All this means survival. I believe that only by instigating a policy for proper shelter arrangements and encouraging house owners and communities to make proper preparations can we achieve survival in the event of nuclear fall-out. Safety and survival against nuclear fallout is early and long-sighted preparation.
I hope that the Minister will now formulate a policy for protection and ensure that full information and guidance are available for people to act on. The Home Department should now provide a list of approved designs for shelters, recommendations for strengthening existing garden shelters left over from the last war and still serviceable, illustrations of indoor shelters inside different types of houses, and the modifications necessary. Those modifications should show the reinforcement to be undertaken now, which should not spoil the appearance of the area, and the final stage of making the refuge on the first alert.
Underground shelters, for which people are prepared to pay, give the greatest protection. The Home Department should encourage the provision of underground shelters, particularly when new houses are being built on estates. I should like to see regulations making such provision obligatory where no facilities exist within a prescribed area. Large council house estates, particularly those with large tower blocks of flats, are examples where shelters should be established in basements, where they can be adapted, or alternatives found.
We have been seriously slow not to have made provision for shelters in new buildings. I hope that from today a realistic approach will be established to the age we live in and the dangers that exist for us all.
§ 1.17 a.m.
The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Dr. Shirley Summer-skill)I am grateful to the hon. Member for Harrogate (Mr. Banks) for initiating this debate on the need for protection against nuclear fall-out. It is a topic on which there is much misunderstanding. However, I hope that, 424 although this is a short debate, I can dispel some of the misconceptions.
I propose to concentrate on one or two aspects. First, it is the Government's view that the need for special protective measures against the effects of radioactive fall-out for the inhabitants of the United Kingdom is likely to arise only in the context of an imminent major war.
Secondly, that need arises irrespective whether this country is a member of NATO. It arises whether or not we have on our soil nuclear weapons of our own or belonging to our Allies. Even neutral non-aligned countries feel obliged to make arrangements for their people, as the hon. Gentleman said. As long as nuclear weapons exist, there is a risk of their being used, with the danger, not just of many deaths from the immediate effects of blast and heat, but of the subsequent casualties from residual gamma radiation. It is this last danger with which this debate is concerned.
The Government do not minimise or conceal these dangers in any way: indeed, quite the contrary. They have published a booklet, which was revised in 1974 and is obtainable direct from the Stationery Office or through booksellers, called "Nuclear Weapons". This describes, with the minimum of technical or scientific jargon, the effects of nuclear explosions and the ways in which these effects would be minimised.
The Government, like their predecessors, accept the need for public protection against fall-out. The argument this evening, as I see it, is mainly about the method and the timing. So perhaps the House will bear with me if I say a little about the existing arrangements, which conveniently fall into three groups.
Because people cannot detect radio-active fall-out by any of the normal senses, the Government maintain a stockpile of special radiac instruments to register its presence and to monitor its rapid decay. These instruments would be issued in a crisis, before hostilities began, to local authorities, the police and other public bodies responsible for essential war-time services. Authorities have been told how many instruments of the different types they would receive from the Government stores, and how they would be collected. County councils in England and Wales, for example, are responsible 425 for subsequent distribution and allocation to local services in the county and for the organisation of local training in the use of these instruments.
Equally important in the detection and monitoring process, is the United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation. The organisation is maintained at a high degree of operational readiness. It is staffed by a few civil servants, some considerable assistance from the police, local volunteers recruited by the police and, of course, the Royal Observer Corps.
I shall spend time describing how this organisation operates. There is in the Library a copy of a recruiting publication called "UKWMO" which sets it all out. The organisation remains a vital part of our civil defence preparations and the Government intend to ensure that its essential functions can be discharged efficiently and at short notice.
This, then, is the first group of measures; the detection and monitoring of fall-out. The second group concerns what people can and should do to protect themselves and their families; what might be termed the mass-information. It was this aspect which the hon. Member clearly had in mind when he asked a Question to which my right hon. Friend replied on 22nd March.
For a number of reasons, over the past three decades, public protection in the United Kingdom has been based on people taking cover mainly in their own homes or exceptionally at their place of work. Therefore, the Government have prepared new material to inform the public about the simple measures, which they should take to improve their homes during a crisis. The information would be issued mainly on television with a minimum of text. These pictures would be backed up by radio broadcasts and by announcements in the papers.
Additionally, material now exists for the printing of a booklet, again with a high visual content, to act as a check-list for the householder, for the action which the TV broadcasts would be advising him to take. This printed material would not be suitable for general issue at the present time, because it is related directly to the TV campaign, which would be started in crisis. Perhaps I should stress that the TV, radio and Press elements could be launched within 24 hours of the Government's decision to do so.
§ Mr. BanksWould the hon. Lady say at what point, before the point of explosion, she would estimate this warning would be given and the leaflets made available?
§ Dr. SummerskillObviously, as soon as it possibly can be given: at the earliest possible moment. As I said, the television, radio and Press campaign could be launched within 24 hours of the Government deciding to do so.
Finally, there is a third group of arrangements which create a system of local war-time government. Based on the date supplied by the monitoring system, and against a much greater public understanding of the dangers and the importance of their own protective measures, war-time controllers at the level of the district and London borough councils in England and Wales, would be advising the public when, and for how long each day, it would be safe to emerge from the cover of their homes, without incurring further risk of radiological injury or death. In preparing plans for these arrangements, county councils and the GLC are encouraged, through their emergency planning officers, to assist district and London borough councils in this detailed work. The Government have given local authorities the necessary guidance on the scientific criteria applicable to the radiological risks. Special studies are held for local government and other public officials on this and related civil defence problems at the Home Defence College near York.
So much for the existing arrangements, and how and when we see the public being involved in their own protection. Perhaps I can now mention some arrangements which we do not have in this country and say why we do not have them. First and foremost, successive Governments have taken the view that, whatever the technical obstacles, which are considerable in many parts of the country, this country could not afford to provide a network of public underground shelters which would give considerable protection against the effects of a nuclear explosion.
I am aware that countries like Norway, Sweden and Switzerland have extensive public shelter systems. In Sweden, for instance, I am told that there is separate shelter space designed for over 5 million 427 people out of a population of 8 million. The hon. Member may have seen a recent article in a Sunday paper about civil defence shelters in Switzerland. This sort of thing is not possible in the United Kingdom mainly on the grounds of cost and the numbers involved, but also because of the shortage of suitable sites sufficiently close to the major centres of population. I repeat that successive Governments have taken the view that these are substantial obstacles.
Another solution adopted in some countries is to make laws compelling anyone who erects a factory, office or a house—or perhaps only certain types of building—to provide reinforced accommodation in a basement suitable under fall-out conditions for all the occupants. Such a solution has not been adopted in this country and, of course, it adds significantly to the cost of most buildings, even those where a basement may be a normal feature, as in the case of large office buildings. However, basements these days are rarely to be found in cur domestic architecture, so the financial repercussions on the housing sector would be particularly heavy.
In some countries, the cost of providing these shelters falls on the developer or builder, who presumably passes it on to the occupier. In others, there is a Government grant for all or part of the extra cost, so that the taxpayer pays, whether there are shelters in the area or not.
The Government agree with their predecessors that nothing should be done at 428 present for civil defence purposes which would add directly or indirectly to the cost of housing in the public or the private sector. However, I undertake to consider, in consultation with my right hon. Friends, whether the Government, in respect of housing authorities or more generally, might circulate advice on the incorporation in new buildings of suitable low-cost facilities affording fall-out protection.
Another device is to ensure that all existing buildings are surveyed for their suitability. The Netherlands Government carried out such a survey a few years ago, so that existing accommodation with the best protective qualities can be identified and improved for local public use. The cost of such a survey is considerable and even greater amounts would be required permanently to improve the exits, to control the ventilation and to instal emergency sanitation and supplies of drinking water. It is not that we are unaware of the additional measures which could be taken. So far no Government have been able to find the resources to finance these measures and this Government are no exception.
I hope that what I have said tonight will convince the hon. Member that the Government are ever mindful of their responsibilities for the welfare of the people in this country, if the worst should happen and the nuclear deterrent should fail to deter.
§ Question put and agreed to.
§ Adjourned accordingly at half-past One o'clock.