HC Deb 11 May 1976 vol 911 cc229-37
The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Roy Jenkins)

With permission, Mr. Speaker, I wish to make a statement about the case of Mr. George John Davis.

At the Central Criminal Court on 18th March 1975 Mr. Davis was convicted of robbery and wounding with intent to resist arrest, and was sentenced to consecutive terms of 17 and three years' imprisonment.

He applied to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) for leave to appeal against his conviction and sentence. On 11th December 1975 the Full Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal against conviction but ordered the sentence to run concurrently instead of consecutively.

After the trial, Mr. Davis and those who had been charged with him, but acquitted, made a number of complaints against the police. The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis asked the Chief Constable of Hertfordshire to make available a senior police officer of his force to investigate these complaints in accordance with Section 49 of the Police Act 1964.

I have received interim reports from the detective superintendent who has undertaken this task. These reports relate principally to the identification of Mr. Davis by witnesses, and I have re-examined in the light of them the identification evidence on which Mr. Davis was convicted. As a result, I am satisfied that this evidence has been seriously weakened.

I do not have evidence of Mr. Davis' innocence to justify my recommending a free pardon. I have considered whether I should refer the case to the Court of Appeal under Section 17 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. But this would be a lengthy process and it is not at present clear that all the relevant material now before me could be considered by the court.

My conclusions about the shift in the balance of evidence in the case are such that it would not be right for Mr. Davis to remain in prison any longer. I have therefore decided to recommend the exercise of the Royal Prerogative to remit the remainder of Mr. Davis' sentence. He is being released today.

Since the investigation into the complaints made against the police by Mr. Davis and others has not yet been completed, it would not be right for me to discuss the complaints generally or the results of the investigation in this context in any detail. I would, however, say that my decision today in no sense prejudges the result of the investigation and in no way implies that any police officer has behaved improperly.

Mr. Whitelaw

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it must be right for him to make clear that his decision in no sense prejudges the result of the investigation which, at this stage, is incomplete and in no way implies that any police officer has behaved improperly? At the same time, does he appreciate that if he is convinced that there is a clear shift in the balance of evidence, he is clearly right to act? As the decision he has chosen is somewhat unusual, can he give us some further reasons why he has chosen this alternative?

Mr. Jenkins

I agree with what the right hon. Gentleman said in his opening remarks. It would be wrong, in view of the evidence available, to keep Mr. Davis in prison any longer. Putting the matter back to the Court of Appeal would necessarily involve a delay of many months, during which I do not think it would be right for this man to continue to serve his sentence. There are certain aspects of the report before me which it is easier to deal with by way of the prerogative, for which there are precedendents, than by going back to the Court of Appeal. This would not preclude going back to the Court of Appeal, if it were thought right, on the question whether the conviction should stand as opposed to the remission of the sentence.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon

Does my right hon. Friend not agree that the course he has taken means that this man's name has still not been cleared and he is therefore not in a position to claim compensation for wrongful arrest? Does my right hon. Friend agree that a man is either innocent or guilty and that if there is this substantial amount of doubt about the matter, this man's name should be cleared completely? Does not this situation emphasise again the need to reconsider the tests applied by the Home Secretary in the exercise of the prerogative, as suggested by the Devlin Committee?

Mr. Jenkins

There are two tests involved here—first, whether it is right that a free pardon should be given and, second, whether the verdict appears sufficiently unsafe that the sentence should not be allowed to stand. I am not in a position in which I think it would be right for me to give a free pardon. The Court of Appeal could test this at some stage in the future and I shall consider whether that should be done. Some of the evidence in this case has been considerably weakened, and that makes it right for me to take the course I have taken and to do so immediately.

Mr. Beith

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that many people inside and outside the House who very much doubted the strength of the identification evidence in this case will welcome the decision to free George Davis? Does the fact that the report received by the right hon. Gentleman was an interim report leave open the possibility that a continued investigation could lead to a free pardon if, in the light of the evidence produced, that is thought appropriate? Will the opportunity still exist for George Davis to clear his name through procedures which are already in operation?

Mr. Jenkins

The report is the second interim report and I received it as recently as 6th May. I was anxious to act quickly in this matter. There will be a further and complete report which will deal mainly with the question of complaints against the police rather than more specifically with the position of Mr. Davis. I have indicated that I should be prepared to consider, when the full report has been received and considered, whether it will be appropriate for the Court of Appeal to look further at the matter with a view to what the hon. Member has in mind.

Mr. MacFarquhar

Can my right hon. Friend explain to hon. Members who have no legal training what kind of evidence there is which can convince him but which might not be appropriate for the appeal court?

Mr. Jenkins

It would not be appropriate for me to go into details of evidence which might prejudice the result of the remainder of the report, which refers to Section 49 procedures against the police.

Mr. Donald Stewart

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that once the doubts to which he referred had arisen, most people would have welcomed the decision to release this man from prison? Will he draw the attention of his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland to the case of Patrick Meehan, which is causing great concern in Scotland?

Mr. Jenkins

I am sure that my right hon. Friend's attention has been drawn to that case and that he will approach it—as I do with all these cases—with a determination to see, as far as it is possible for any Secretary of State to see, that justice is done.

Mrs. Millie Miller

Is my right hon. Friend aware that there are a number of men serving lengthy prison sentences on the strength of dubious identification? I refer especially to the case of Patrick Murphy, who is serving an eight-year sentence after the original charge against him of murder was quashed, the original evidence being based on identification. Will my right hon. Friend look again, carefully, at that case?

Mr. Jenkins

I always look extremely carefully at all individual cases. However, as I am sure my hon. Friend and the House will appreciate, it is important that one should proceed in these matters with expedition and decisiveness when one is convinced that it is right to do so. One should not get into the position of not being able to do what is right in a particular case because to do so would mean having to act in the same manner in a number of cases which may be far less strong. It would be quite wrong if one case were prejudiced by other cases. However, I shall certainly consider any representations that my hon. Friend wishes to make.

Mr. Brittan

As the right hon. Gentleman says that he is still considering referring the case to the Court of Appeal, does he agree that he will be putting himself in an extremely difficult position, in view of his decision today, if he refers the case and if the Court of Appeal does not allow the appeal? In those circumstances does he agree that a very difficult question is raised as to the circumstances in which the Prerogative should be used, rather than referring the matter to the Court of Appeal? Will the right hon. Gentleman make a more general statement not in relation to this case but on the criteria which he proposes to adopt in future?

Mr. Jenkins

I agree that there are considerable difficulties, but in my view I would have been in a less defensible position if, on the information before me, I had kept this man in jail for another six months or nine months.

Mr. Molloy

Is my right hon. Friend prepared to consider the view that is held by many of us who have no legal training—namely, that although we support his action this afternoon, there remains the anguish in our minds that, while George Davis has been freed, there are certain investigations which still have to be carried out? Will my right hon. Friend ensure that whatever those investigations are, they are carried out as speedily as possible so that George Davis will not have to live outside prison in a twilight world?

Mr. Jenkins

I hope that the investigations will be carried out as quickly as possible. I think that the investigations have been carried out expeditiously, but I am not sure that I accept what my hon. Friend says at the end of his question as being correct.

Mr. Lawrence

To take up the question raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Cleveland and Whitby (Mr. Brittan), what is the point of referring the matter to the Court of Appeal if it is unable to consider the sort of evidence that the right hon. Gentleman has taken into consideration in coming to his decision?

Mr. Jenkins

I have not said that the matter should be referred to the Court of Criminal Appeal. I shall consider whether it would be appropriate to take that course when we have the complete Moulder Report. There could then he the question whether the Court of Appeal might or might not think it right to expunge the charge. However, in these circumstances the Prerogative is a firmly established right. I am sure that I have used it properly in this case, bearing in mind the evidence and the precedents.

Mr. Edward Lyons

In the light of my right hon. Friend's apparent view that at the moment the Court of Appeal Criminal Division cannot do justice in these cases, does that not indicate an argument for enlarging the powers of the Court of Appeal so that it can make this kind of decision?

Mr. Jenkins

I think that my hon. and learned. Friend will appreciate that the Court of Criminal Appeal considered this matter but without the evidence that is now available to me. That is the essential reason for the use of the Prerogative in the circumstances of this case. I do not think it would necessarily be in any way a criticism of the Court of Criminal Appeal to say that I have decided to use the Prerogative. It would not be possible to put the matter before the court until the whole report was completed and processed and until the court was able to seize itself of it. That would at the very best involve a delay of many months, a delay which I would not feel to be justified.

Mr. Crouch

Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether his decision in this matter regarding identity parade evidence in any way establishes a precedent for his future judgment in such matters? If I referred to him another case of possible mistaken identity, would it receive his personal attention?

Mr. Jenkins

There will be no change in that respect. Any case that the hon. Gentleman referred would receive the closest attention. If he referred a case to me I should consider the matter and give him a reply myself. We propose to act upon the recommendations of the Devlin Report as soon as possible, and we shall consider what matters we can act upon without consultation. This does not mean—it would be wrong if it meant this—that any conviction upon identification will not be possible in future. That would be a very grave matter, and I am not propounding that for a moment.

Mr. Whitehead

Does my right hon. Friend accept that most of us agree that he has taken a wise course in these circumstances, where there is still so much, perhaps, to emerge about the identification procedures in the case and the Section 49 investigations? However, does my right hon. Friend envisage any situation in which Mr. George Davis will not have a further opportunity of clearing his name? It is that which concerns my hon. Friends on these Benches.

Mr. Jenkins

I have indicated how I think it possible that one might proceed to that stage. I can assure my hon. Friend that I have considered the matter carefully. I have in certain circumstances proposed a free pardon. In other circumstances I have proposed a remission of sentence, as have my predecessors. I am quite clear that in the present circumstances it is right that there should be an immediate remission of sentence and that I should not at present be justified in going any further.

Mr. Baker

Does the right hon. Gentleman agreed that he could have referred the case to the Court of Appeal and at the same time have granted Mr. Davis parole, rather than adopting the rather extraordinary procedure that has been followed?

Mr. Jenkins

The procedure is not extraordinary. For reasons that I have explained in answer to three or four questions, I believe it to be the right procedure in this case.

Mr. Skinner

I appreciate that it is a bit of parliamentary gibberish by both my right hon. Friend and the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Whitelaw) to talk about a decision of this nature not prejudging the subsequent proceedings. Of course it will prejudge them. But will my right hon. Friend also look at the documents relating to Des Warren, who is still incarcerated? Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that Des Warren was never identified as being involved in any criminal act at any time?

Mr. Jenkins

I have looked at the documents in that case many times. I have considered many representations and I have answered many Questions from my hon. Friend. I do not regard the Des Warren case as being in any way a parallel with the Davis case.

Mr. Sandelson

My right hon. Friend has indicated that there has been some weakening of the evidence of identification as regards Davis. Does that mean that there has been some new evidence which has influenced his decision? In that event, would it not be right that Davis himself should have a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division?

Mr. Jenkins

I think it is possible that he could consider such an application. I shall certainly consider whether the case should be so referred. As I have indicated, essentially a weakening of the evidence has occurred, upon the basis of which I have thought it right to take this immediate decision.

Mr. Grocott

Bearing in mind the inevitable doubts that must result from any conviction now which is based largely on identification, and the current debate that is going on, will my right hon. Friend undertake to look at all the cases, some of which have been mentioned this afternoon, in which conviction has rested primarily on identification? Does my right hon. Friend agree that this is now an issue that must be debated as a general principle and not merely with reference to specific cases?

Mr. Jenkins

We must certainly deal with the Devlin recommendations. I must also say quite firmly what I believe clearly to be the case—namely, that it is essential that a Home Secretary. when confronted with a position of this sort, should be able to act decisively in a particular case. That is of great value from the point of view of justice in this country. It would be quite wrong to believe that because of that everyone who has been convicted on the evidence of identification, whether it be good, strong or moderate, should necessarily be put in an entirely different position. We should not be serving the interests of justice if one could not act in a particular case without calling into question a number of safe convictions, the upholding of which, in my view, is essential for the preservation of the rule of law and the fight against crime.