§ Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Graham.]
§ 3.53 a.m.
§ Mr. Patrick Wall (Haltemprice)Oil production in the North Sea now spreads over 50,000 square miles. There are 22 platforms in position and a further 27 under production, and 25 oil rigs. To this must be added the numerous gas production platforms, together with associated offshore and onshore equipment and installations. Not only this, but of course production is expanding in the North Sea and elsewhere, and we shall soon have to consider protection in the Irish Sea, the Celtic Sea and the South-West Approaches.
We were told optimistically last week, as was reported in the Press, that in the 1980s Britain's oil revenues in one year will repay the whole of the vast sums of money which the Government have already borrowed. I hope this proves true, as there will clearly be a change of Government in the near future, and if it were not for this the future Conservative Administration would have great difficulty in rescuing this debt-ridden country. Be that as it may, we can all agree that in the next decade North Sea oil and gas will be vital to Britain in a world where 270 violence is on the upsurge. The question, therefore, is: how is this oil to be defended?
I suggest that we should take three different threats. I take them in the reverse order of probability: first, defence in war; secondly, defence in time of tension or limited war; and, thirdly, defence against guerrilla activities.
First, in time of war, it has already been agreed that NATO will take over responsibility for the whole area. The planning and responsibility would presumably fall within the area of CINCLANT, who wears both a NATO and a Royal Naval hat. Therefore, communications, command, control and the necessary on-call forces will be available and the problem will be wholly military.
I turn, therefore, to the time of tension or limited war. It seems to me almost inevitable that any period of serious tension or limited war would involve NATO. Therefore, the defence arrangements required would be such as to serve as a prelude to war. The most difficult period appears to be the change-over from a peace situation, in which other countries may or may not be involved, to war-time defence operations by NATO. The main requirements would therefore seem to be a good crisis management and much the same command and control arrangements and communications as in time of peace.
I will therefore concentrate most of my remarks on the third alternative—the peace-time protection of the oil and gas fields against threats from guerrilla organisations. These threats could include sabotage by employees or infiltrators; the seizure of a rig or platform by a terrorist organisation, by sea or by air, designed to put pressure on the Government, to exercise blackmail, or to achieve the 271 maximum publicity for the particular cause which those people represent; and, finally, underwater attack on the legs of the platforms or rigs by frogman or midget submarine.
Any such attack, as has been pointed out by Mr. Roy Corlett in that excellent magazine Defence, can be most cost-effective. These attacks are comparatively easy and could be very effective.
I will give two examples which were given by Mr. Corlett in his article. He claims that the false telephone call which suggested that there was a charge on a rig on 25th May last year probably cost the country £250,000. He goes on to say that if two large charges or mines with delayed action or radio-activated fuses, which could cost about £5,000, were dropped near a platform, the cost of the disruption caused could amount to £500,000 a day. One can see from that the kind of threat which can be posed by a small operation.
Mr. Corlett also points out that there are on average 50 Soviet intelligence-gathering trawlers operating round our coasts and that any one of these could lay a mine without the slightest risk of being caught in the act. He ends by quoting the editors of Jane's Weapon Systems:
In Britain, in so far as is possible to discern a consistent theme in the defence politics of recent years, it would seem to amount to a determination to be taken by surprise whatever happens".I would only remark that perhaps the cod war is a case in point.As regards Government plans, at a Government conference held in Whitehall about two years ago the peace-time defence of the oil rigs was said to be the responsibility of the Chief Constable of Aberdeen. How he was to exercise that responsibility was far from clear. Presumably the Home Office is the Department mainly involved, though clearly a number of other Departments have responsibilities. Collectively, they are called "the civil power", which can request the assistance of the defence services if the situation appears to be getting out of hand.
The hon. Member for Huddersfield, East (Mr. Mallalieu), in the Navy Estimates debate, spoke of his dissatisfaction with the organisation of the defence of 272 the oil fields, and raised certain questions which have not been answered. There is in my mind a general confusion as to ministerial responsibility, and that is one of the main issues I wish to put to the Minister.
In the event of an incident on a rig, who is responsible for taking action at each stage? Is it, on the rig, the oil company or the police? Which Minister is responsible at this stage? There must be one Minister in overall charge. Who is he? Who then decides to call in the Armed Forces?
Once the Armed Forces have been called in, which Minister is responsible? Is it the same Minister or the Secretary of State for Defence? Once the Armed Forces are given the task, the command and control structure becomes clearer. I understand that Flag Officer Scotland and Northern Ireland at Rosyth takes responsibility from his integrated headquarters. Does the headquarters have a police liaison officer attached to it? What forces does it have under immediate command, as rapid reaction to the seizure of a rig is essential? Presumably, these forces at the moment include HMS "Jura" and HMS "Reward", certain Royal Marine Commandos and helicopters?
I understand that the four vessels of the "Kingfisher" class are designed for fishery protection, and that the five vessels of the "Island" class will be used for oil rig protection. These latter vessels have a speed of 16 knots, which is suitable only for the "police on the beat", but I understand that they are to be fitted with helicopter pads. Will the Minister please confirm that? The Expenditure Committee has already expressed doubt about the value of these vessels.
It seems to me that it would have been much better had the Government purchased—perhaps they will consider this—some of our distant-water trawlers, which are fine modern vessels, made redundant by the Government's recent capitulation to Iceland. These vessels are strong, they are designed for operation in Arctic waters and could be fitted with helicopter pads. They could be used for fishery and oil rig protection while the Government concentrated on building vessels which would be required for fast reaction forces, such as the 24-knot Mexican "Azteca" class, or their faster 273 follow-up vessels, which I referred to in the Navy Estimates debate. They would allow immediate reaction on the part of Royal Marine Commandos or whatever forces are called in. There is also the possibility of the use of the new type of hyrofoil now being developed for use in rough waters. If an oil rig is captured, the chances are that helicopters will not be able to land and fast vessels will be essential for quick reaction.
Reconnaissance will be of great importance as the oil areas extend to other seas, particularly when our fishery limits are extended to 200 miles, as I hope they will be next year. Nimrods and Vulcans will, I hope, be available in sufficient numbers, but it is no good our having this information and intelligence unless we are able to react to it.
I come now to the oil companies. There is the question of the security of the rigs and platforms. This is, presumably, the responsibility of the companies. What are they doing? To put it another way, what are the Government encouraging them to do? The Government now have a very large stake in the oil companies and therefore they have the power.
The owner's responsibility should include the screening of personnel, restriction and protection of entry points. protection devices such as internal television, security guards, communications to the security forces, control of supply ships, floodlights, radar/sonar, nets, barbed wire, acoustic equipment and other devices.
I do not believe that nearly enough is being done in this field. The Government must take responsibility for insisting on the maximum protection being provided for each rig or platform. After all, the oil companies could be held up for several millions of pounds in blackmail or ransom. They should, therefore, spend some of their own money on their own protection. The same applies to shore installations, but that is a different problem which I shall not develop now.
My last point concerns international co-operation. Clearly, the best and most cost-effective form of protection can be obtained by international co-operation between the nations involved in North Sea oil and gas—Norway being the country most concerned, but also con- 274 cerned are Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Germany and France. All are members of NATO, and there are, therefore, great advantages in co-operationg in peace-time protection through NATO in terms of crisis management, communications, joint operations, exercises and so on. I appreciate that some countries, such as Denmark and France, are not keen on this peace-time co-operation for political reasons. But at least we could start with close co-operation with Norway on joint patrols and exercises, and other countries could join in later.
It would be expensive to create a new system of communications in a time of tension or change-over to a war situation. It would be far easier if the maximum use were made of the existing system in peace time.
I sum up by asking the Minister five questions. Have the Government put any responsibility on the oil companies to install protective devices on their platforms and rigs? If not, why not? Second, by 1977 there will be a requirement for joint oil rig and fisheries protection, air-sea rescue and pollution control. Have we the necessary ships and aircraft for these tasks? Third, will the Government consider the provision of fast ships for quick reactions forces? If not, why not? Fourth, there have been three meetings of North Sea countries to consider peace-time co-operation, the last on 2nd June, 1976. What progress has been made and what systems of co-operation are envisaged? Finally, what is the sequence of responsibility for dealing with an escalating incident by the civil administration and then by the Services? Above all, which Ministers are directly responsible?
Clearly, the details of our defence preparations should remain secret but I believe that there is some public disquiet. That is why I tried to sum up with these questions. If the Minister cannot answer them all tonight I hope he will write to me. I believe that they should be cleared up and that they can be cleared up.
§ 4.0 a.m.
§ Mr. James Johnson (Kingston upon Hull, West)I shall not detain the House for more than a few minutes but I wish to widen the debate slightly and take up something which was touched 275 upon by the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall). He mentioned those vital two words "cod war". Both he and I feel somewhat unhappy about the events which led to its conclusion. Not only will our offshore gas and oil installations need to be safeguarded but so also will the whole of the North Sea fisheries. We shall be faced with immensely increased fisheries jurisdiction.
There is no doubt that, following the new limits which are bound to come after the Law of the Sea Conference—whether it be 200 miles, 50 miles or a wavy line about our shores—many more vessels will be needed and there will be a much heavier load for the all-weather patrols beyond this narrow sense relating the oil and gas installations which we have been talking about. Magnificent work was done by the Royal Navy during the cod war but there is no doubt that frigates are not the best vessels in very bad weather. We saw that in the Icelandic dispute.
I want to say as a Humberside MP that Hull fishing trawlers are operating in the filthiest conditions, sometimes force 6, 7 or 8 gales. They have specially shaped hulls. They sit on the water like ducks and are much more stable than possibly some naval vessels in bad weather. Many vessels laid up in the Humber at this moment could perhaps—and I say no more than that—be utilized in the larger naval protection squadron or fleet that will be needed so badly in the years to come. I believe that the Select Committee on Defence suggested this not many months ago. It specifically advised this might be looked at. I hope my hon. Friend can say something about that.
Secondly, the NATO forces are basically there to function in war time. They are defence forces for Western Europe against some unspecified opponent, possibly in Eastern longtitudes. But what about peace time? NATO is a military alliance which is much wider than the EEC. Indeed, it goes as far as Turkey. To many people, including myself, the North Sea is looked upon as a Community fish pond.
In my view, NATO Powers must co-operate in future much more fully in protecting their interests in the North Sea than they are doing through the com- 276 mon fisheries policy, the common agricultural policy and so on. But if our hearts and minds, not only tonight but constantly, are governed by logic, why not an international force for the North Sea joined together for peace-time purposes?
I understand that there was a meeting in Oslo not long ago on the initiative of the Dutch Minister of Defence. Can my hon. Friend say something about that, and whether it is possible in peace time to have more co-operation in the North Sea than we have now? We shall need it, particularly for fisheries duties. If we were ever to exhaust the supplies of fish in the North Sea, Heaven help us.
§ 4.12 a.m.
§ The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy (Mr. A. E. P. Duffy)It is just over a year since the House devoted time specifically to the subject of protecting North Sea oil. No doubt the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) and other hon. Members recall the previous debate, and no doubt also, like me, they have cast an eye over the Official Report for 23rd May last year.
In reading my predecessor's remarks, I was struck by the fact that not so very long ago he began by observing that, while the security of the North Sea oil and gas installations attracted a good deal of attention, it also unfortunately gave rise to a good deal of misunderstanding. I am pleased to note from tonight's debate that those areas of misunderstanding are beginning to diminish, and I congratulate the hon. Member for Haltemprice on the efforts he has made, both as the general rapporteur of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly and in the House, to throw light on the subject.
I read with great interest the extracts from his status report to the Military Committee last year, which were published in a recent volume of the journal NATO's Fifteen Nations, and I have listened with admiration to his speech tonight, as I did in the Navy debate. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving me this first opportunity to describe the matter as I see it, and, in doing so, I hope to cast a little more light on the areas of uncertainty which remain.
277 First, let me briefly sketch in the background. When the Labour Government entered office in 1974, we were immediately concerned to safeguard the country's maritime interests, and it rapidly became clear that the offshore oil and gas reserves, and, indeed, the increased fisheries jurisdiction which was in prospect in the slightly longer term, were of prime and growing importance to the country's economy.
We saw an extension of the Armed Services' traditional peace-time roles in support of the civil authorities as the best way of meeting the requirement to safeguard these interests, but whereas in the past the Armed Services had been asked to carry out such tasks using only those ships and equipment provided for their primary job of countering external aggression, we decided that additional resources were required for these new and expanding offshore tasks.
In parentheses, I should stress that, though they are additional, they are, of course, at the same time an integral part of the whole Services inventory.
We put HM Ships "Jura" and "Reward" to sea in 1975 to patrol the offshore installations, and we also routed other ships and RAF aircraft through the areas. Then, on the basis of a carefully thought-out concept of operations, we ordered five new "Island" class ships, provided for four surveillance aircraft to be allocated, and earmarked a force including Royal Marines, ordnance disposal teams and the required helicopter lift for quick reaction.
Hon. Members therefore preach to the converted when they underline the importance of the offshore tasks. But I should like to devote a little more time to explaining more fully the concept of operations, since it seems to me that it is misunderstanding of this which prompts suggestions, such as some made by hon. Members tonight, that a different type of ship is required. Firstly, as I know the hon. Member for Haltemprice will be the first to agree, any sensible military strategy is based on the threat which is to be countered. It is not easy to talk about a terrorist threat in public, but I can assure the House that it is kept very much under review. In many ways the threat of accidental 278 damage is more serious in the North Sea.
Secondly, the protector has to show the will to protect his assets. Thirdly, he has to dispose his resources to best advantage.
Our examination of these factors led to our adopting a concept of deterrent sea and air patrols backed by reaction forces. For the deterrent patrol in the Northern Sea areas around the United Kingdom—and that, as I well remember, can be the most hostile of sea areas—we need to deploy ships and aircraft which are available in all weathers. That is why we have based our deterrent patrols on long-range surveillance aircraft and ships with good sea-keeping qualities which can stay on patrol for extended periods in all weathers. The kind of ship I have described could well be a frigate, since frigates possess admirable sea-keeping and endurance qualities, but I am sure I need not tell the hon. Gentleman that they are very sophisticated and expensive machines for routine patrol work. Therefore, after a thorough search of the market we chose the "Island" class, which, as I said in the recent Navy debate, we believe to be the most suitable and cost-effective ships for the patrolling task involved.
§ Mr. Peter Viggers (Gosport)Has the Minister considered the possibility of building less-sophisticated frigates, costing about £20 million rather than the present £40 million, which would be capable of being fitted with more sophisticated equipment later?
§ Mr. DuffyI am glad to take note of that point and perhaps the hon. Member for Gosport (Mr. Viggers) will permit me to look into it. I shall be in touch with him.
We have a contingency plan and we exercise regularly. No plans based on deterrence can be seen positively to be successful in the short term, but we have had certain indications of our success. "Jura" and "Reward" have, for instance, been on hand when incidents have occurred on several occasions during the past year. We are learning from our exercises, and we have said that we shall review the arrangements if, in the light of experience, that appears to be desirable.
279 Having said that, I must make absolutely clear my view that light displacement fast patrol craft—like the Azteca class—are not suitable for all-weather patrol in the Northern Sea areas in winter. As the hon. Gentleman knows, the Royal Navy knows something about patrol craft. We know that crew effectiveness declines markedly after a day or two in heavy seas in a fast patrol craft, and the ship has quickly to run for cover. The fisherman, however, in a different shaped hull, goes on fishing in up to force 6 wind conditions and would not ordinarily think about sheltering in less than a force 8. We decided to take a lesson from him, and so the "Island" class design is based on a trawler hull. It will stay at sea long after a patrol craft would have been forced to retire.
Rapid, accurate and wide-ranging situation reports are provided by the Nimrod aircraft, which can sweep the areas at speed, providing valuable information. When trouble brews the warning may come from these patrols, from the vessels, the installations themselves or from other sources. The Maritime Headquarters at Pitreavie—and I cannot stress this too much—can then call upon frigates, Sea King helicopters, the Royal Marines and explosive ordnance disposal teams, as required.
I should like here to underline the role of the Maritime Headquarters at Pitreavie. Those who advocate the creation of a separate command overlook the fact that in Pitreavie the Flag Officer Scotland and Northern Ireland and his RAF counterpart operate ships and aircraft over the relevant areas as part of their routine defence task. It therefore makes absolute sense to operate the offshore resources from the same joint headquarters, which already has close contact with the coastguard, the police, the oil companies and the other authorities involved. Centralisation beyond this would probably be superfluous.
Now I should like to turn to the question of international co-operation. As the hon. Member for Haltemprice himself pointed out in the recent Navy debate and tonight, in a period of tension or war the oil and gas installations in the NATO area would be defended against attack like any other part of that 280 area. Britain joins fully in the formulation of NATO plans to this end.
Now, turning away from the war situation, I should like to take up the question of peace-time international cooperation. It has been suggested that peace-time as well as war-time countermeasures should fall under the NATO umbrella, and, though the arguments in favour of that are, in practical terms attractive, we must be realistic and ask how far the argument really can be taken and to what extent every subject of mutual interest to Europeans or to nations bordering the North Sea should be the concern of NATO. NATO, after all, is regarded by a large proportion of the world as a military alliance. I am very much aware that, as a study of the treaty will show, it is much more than that in our eyes, but we must face the facts.
It is sometimes difficult to do business—and I say this with the very greatest respect to the hon. Member for Haltemprice, who I know contributes enormously to the essential well-being of the Alliance—in any forum which is seen to be a military one. The Government, therefore, following the initiative taken by Mr. Vredeling, the Dutch Minister of Defence, announced their intention to pursue their aims of peace-time co-operation in the protection of North Sea oil and gas installations in the forum of an ad hoc non-military grouping named the Regional Conference. The other members of the conference are, as the House is probably aware, Holland, Norway, France, Denmark, Belgium and West Germany, and three full meetings have been held so far—in the Hague, in London and, most recently, in Oslo last month. We are satisfied that this provides the most promising way ahead. We accept absolutely that co-operation and co-ordination by the countries bordering the North Sea in solving the problems which occur in this area are essential—
§ Mr. DuffyIf time permits. If not, I shall write to the hon. Gentleman.
The Secretary of State for Energy is responsible for the safety of oil rigs. The 281 Home Secretary is responsible for antiterrorist measures. The Secretary of State for Defence can render assistance as required. The Lord Privy Seal is responsible for the co-ordination of all these maritime matters, and procedures have been worked out.
The oil companies and the Government are in constant touch in considering the physical protection required on the oil rigs in the North Sea. The oil companies are fully aware that they are primarily responsible for the protection of the rigs, and they are given every encouragement to take the necessary protective measures.
I come to the point about how far trawlers can be taken up from the industry. As the Government made clear in their observations on the Second Report of the Expenditure Committee, we tried 282 without success to acquire a suitable vessel at a reasonable cost in 1974, when we considered how the interim task of patrolling offshore oil and gas installations could be carried out. In the event, the more satisfactory, rapid and cost-effective solution was to deploy H.M. Ships "Jura" and "Reward". We now have five new ships in build. To take a number of other trawlers, almost inevitably all of different design, out of retirement would not in the short term, we think, prove cost-effective. We are still considering—
§ The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock on Monday evening, and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. DEPUTY SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
§ Adjourned at twenty-three minutes past Four o'clock a.m.