§
Amendments made: No. 22, in page 4, line 24, leave out
'subject to Part II of Schedule 2 to this Act'.
No. 23, in line 29, at end insert:
'(1A) Subsection (1) above shall not impose an obligation to take any steps to serve a notice on a person at a time when he is outside the United Kingdom.'—[Dr. Summerskill.]
§ Mr. BeithI beg to move Amendment No. 24, in page 4, line 29, at end insert—
'(c) set out the general reasons for the issue of the exclusion order'.
Mr. Deputy SpeakerWith this Amendment we may take the following amendment: No. 26, in page 5, line 10, at end insert:
'at which he may be accompanied by a legal adviser if he so wishes'.
§ Mr. BeithI am glad, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that you have selected for consideration with this amendment a related, though not identical, point about the procedure for the discussion of exclusion orders and about the presence of a legal adviser.
I deal first with Amendment No. 24. The House has just decided that exclusion orders, repugnant though they are to us all and unlike the normal pattern of British justice as they are, must be accepted as a necessary evil. That having been decided, however, we are not absolved from the need to ensure that the procedure is as fair and reasonable as possible, and we have just passed Government amendments which represent improvements on that procedure.
I look for quite specific improvements by this amendment. An important one is that the person upon whom an exclusion order is served should have some general indication of the reason for having that order served against him. It is difficult and sometimes dangerous to provide excluded persons with information which is so detailed that those from whom the information was obtained would be identified, with the result that their lives might be put at risk. However, it is fundamental to the principles of British justice that people should know what they are supposed to have done, are likely to do, or are liable to do. We enter new areas when we think of offences that people are liable to commit, but in this as much as in any other situation a person served with an exclusion order is entitled to a general statement of what the nature of the activities concerned are supposed to be. Therefore, some effort should be made to give this general indication, although we are aware of the difficulties involved.
However, there is a difficulty on the other side. If no indication is given of the basis for the exclusion order, how is 524 the person concerned to prepare representations to the Secretary of State against the order? What is he to say if he has the benefit of an interview with one of the Home Secretary's advisers? On what can he ground his defence? I hesitate to use the word "defence", because we have been instructed to avoid construing this as a trial or hearing. However, the person on whom an order is served needs to know in general terms what is alleged against him, and there must be something that could be stated when an order is issued.
I hope, therefore, that the Government will look favourably upon this amendment. I see it as sufficiently important to want to press it upon them and, indeed, to press it to a Division if it does not find favour with them.
As for the right of access to a legal adviser and other parts of the procedure, the Bill allows accused persons or persons on whom exclusion orders are served to appeal and to seek a personal interview with the Home Secretary's appointed advisers. There is some difficulty about defining the precise rôle of those advisers, and the Secretary of State has helped the House by describing the way in which that procedure is followed and the different ways in which his two advisers choose to carry out their duty. But we must remember that even if we make it clear that we are not erecting a trial, a hearing or an appeal, some of the difficulties in the procedure still apply to the person confronted with it. The ordinary person with no legal training or experience of being confronted with a situation in which he has to account for himself before someone of considerable authority and standing is at some disadvantage.
Without seeking to make a trial out of what is not a trial, I feel that it is desirable to have someone to assist such a person in presenting his case and to advise him about what would be helpful for him to say and what would not be helpful for him to say in that situation. I do not seek to challenge the Home Secretary's approach to the procedure by trying to reconstruct it or to make some second-rate form of appeal procedure which is defined differently in his mind. I am not sure what the definition is, but I think that the job of the adviser is to make an assessment of the credibility of the person against whom an exclusion 525 order is served and of what he says about his standing and to decide upon the appropriateness of the order.
I grant that that is a different exercise from a trial, a hearing, or a re-hearing of what the Home Secretary has determined. But it remains necessary for a person unfamiliar with proceedings of this kind if he feels that he needs it to have access to someone who can help him in matters of presentation and help him to avoid difficulties in proceedings which he does not understand.
It would not necessarily go against the express desire of the Home Secretary to retain an informal procedure to ensure that those who have to go through it have access to legal advice during that procedure. Therefore, I hope that this amendment will find favour as well.
§ 8.30 p.m.
§ Mr. Roy JenkinsThe hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) has moved the amendment in a persuasive and very reasonable way. Indeed, our whole debate has been conducted in a similar tone. I should like to be able to accept both of the hon. Gentleman's amendments, but I do not think it would be right to do so and I shall explain briefly why I take that view.
Amendment No. 24 provides for the setting out of
the general reasons for the issue of the exclusion order".I do not think that I can make any meaning out of going beyond what is contained in the Bill at present without coming up against the difficulty which I outlined in dealing with the last major amendment. In a general sense—the hon. Gentleman said that he wanted it to be fairly general—the matter is specified in Clause 4. I freely admit that it is very general. It says:If the Secretary of State is satisfied that any person—That is firmly the position in the Bill and indeed, it has been the position for the past 15 months. I have not and 526 would not make an exclusion order without being satisfied on those grounds.
- (a) is or has been concerned (whether in Great Britain or elsewhere) in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism, or
- (b) is attempting or may attempt to enter Great Britain with a view to being concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism".
Therefore, those are the general grounds upon which an exclusion order is made. If there be any doubt about it, I shall make sure that these grounds are drawn to the attention of the people concerned so that they are in no doubt that they are regarded by me as being within one or other of these categories. Indeed, they will know in which category they belong, because one category concerns those people who are in this country and the other applies to those people who are trying to enter this country.
I believe that by attempting to move to a type of half-general position we would be at a half-way house which it would be extremely difficult to defend. Moreover, if we are more specific, we come up against the difficulty of safeguarding information. My view, based on experience, is that we could endanger sources of information and involve a risk to life.
We cannot have the best of both worlds. That is the difficulty. I cannot see a reasonable half-way house in which we could stop between what I admit is the very general provision in Section 4 of the old Act—Clause 4 of the Bill—and giving information which would go too far, indeed, so far as to endanger sources and thereby lives.
Therefore, I cannot accept the amendment, but I undertake that if there be any doubt, we shall make it clear to anyone against whom an exclusion order is signed in future that it is because of these grounds relating directly to my satisfaction that he
is or has been concerned … in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism".Amendment No. 26 provides that a personmay be accompanied by a legal adviser if he so wishes".Again, I am in difficulty about this matter. On Second Reading and during other debates on this subject I think the House accepted, though not without dissent, my view that this process cannot by its very nature be a judicial one. I make no bones about it. It is an executive process subject to certain limited safeguards. It is a procedure which I should justify only under the threat with which we have had to live for the past few years.527 I do not believe that there is any halfway house between getting the best of both worlds so that we have a quasi-judicial, quasi-executive procedure. If we try to do that, we shall fail and get into a hopeless position. If the right of legal representation is automatically conferred at such proceedings, I am sure that the next step will be that we shall be asked to keep records and to have a stenographer making a formal record of everything that happens. We are then moving to the borderline of a judicial procedure.
In the first place, there is no question of someone who goes before an adviser being denied the right to have consultations with and advice from his solicitor before he sees the adviser. That has been the practice and I will certainly ensure that it is the practice in future. As far as I know it always has been the practice in the past where the person against whom the order is served has a legal adviser and wishes to consult him.
I would also be prepared to say that, when the adviser takes the view that it is reasonable in the circumstances, the person should be accompanied by someone, by a legal adviser or a friend or relation if that is thought appropriate. But I must hold the position that in certain cases which could be very difficult and sensitive the question must be whether the adviser, knowing what he has to deal with, thinks that that is a reasonable procedure.
§ Mr. BeithI hope that the right hon. Gentleman will not mind my asking him to be a little clearer or to repeat what he said a sentence or two back. In drafting the amendment as I did, I was conscious of the alternative possibility of some other person accompanying the person concerned. Indeed, as I said earlier. I was not seeking to create a trial but to enable him to have the benefit of some assistance. If the right hon. Gentleman would clarify or repeat that, in many circumstances which he did not define, he would make this possible, that would help me.
§ Mr. JenkinsWhat I will say is that I am not prepared to accept a blanket provision that in all cases there is a right to legal representation. That moves towards a quasi-judicial procedure which 528 this is not, should not be and in my view cannot be without undermining its whole purpose. What I am prepared to say and what I tried to say is that in many cases the adviser might be content that the person should be accompanied by someone else, whether a legal adviser, a friend or a relation, according to the view of the individual and of the adviser. That would be reasonable in many cases, but I could not accept it as being a statutory right, because there might be cases in which it would be inappropriate.
I should like to take this oportunity of correcting information that I gave in a discussion of a previous amendment. I accepted the point of my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, North-West (Mr. Thomas), which was true as far as it went, that there was, in the early stages of the operation of the first Act, a difference in the procedure adopted by the two advisers. One saw the case first, before the interview, and the other did not. The one who did not see it first at that stage was anxious not to let anything slip in discussion which might give the man who was to be excluded a lead as to who had informed against him, or whatever the case may be, and he wanted to approach the interview with an open mind. However, after he had had experience of doing this, he decided that, although this had not been an unfair practice—in my view also it had not—it was probably better to adopt the practice of the other adviser and that he should see the case against the man before the interview. They both now follow the same practice.
§ Mr. ThorneI am trying to follow what my right hon. Friend has said. Clause 6 refers to the setting out of the rights afforded to the person concerned "by this section ". I assume that to mean Clause 6. Subsection (2) sets out what some of those rights are and refers to the serving of a notice and to his ability to make representations in writing to the Secretary of State.
I should have thought that anyone served with a notice would be much more able to fulfil the requirements of subsection (2)(a) in his own defence if he were provided, as the amendment suggests, with the general reasons for the issue of the order. Despite what the Secretary of State said, the amendment has 529 the value of providing for someone an additional defence, which will tend to preserve his individual liberty in difficult circumstances and against a background of difficult legislation.
Amendment No. 26, dealing with the presence of a legal adviser, would help the individual to preserve his rights. I appeal to my right hon. Friend on that basis. In his original statement when we first discussed the Bill, he referred to the Draconian measures he was taking in the Bill. I believe that he was sincere in expressing regret at being forced to introduce powers which invaded the liberty of the individual. I ask him to accept the amendments.
§ Mr. MikardoI also ask my right hon. Friend to accept the amendments. His case against them was pretty thin.
On Amendment No. 24 my right hon. Friend said that the House would understand—and we shall—why it was impossible for a chap to be told in full what was alleged against him, because sources must be protected. But I do not understand why, because one cannot tell him everything, one cannot tell him anything. That is almost an argument reductio ad absurdum, and is not up to my right hon. Friend's usual standard.
One of the first hallmarks of a totalitarian society, one in which the machinery of law does not protect the liberty of the individual against the executive, is that it is possible to take action against people without telling them why. As far as I know, this will be the first time in peacetime that we have empowered a Minister to take action against a person without giving him the least inkling of the reason, and it is action that separates him from his wife, his kids and his job.
I turn to Amendment No. 26. My right hon. Friend said that a person should not be accompanied by a solicitor, because then the process would turn into a trial. That will not do. The majority of solicitors in the House, if not all, would tell my right hon. Friend that attendance at trials represents a small part of their work. For example, a man will often take a solicitor along when attending to business negotiations, and for very good reasons. It is a laughable idea that, because a solicitor is present, the trial process is started. A trial is 530 created if there is a judge, a charge sheet, a prosecution, a defence and evidence. In the circumstances covered by the Bill, there could never be a trial, because there is no charge and there is no evidence.
No doubt some of the people against whom action is taken under this provision are hard-boiled cookies who can take care of themselves. But many will be terrified by the procedure. Many innocent people have been involved—presumably if they had not been innocent exclusion orders would have been made. Such people have probably never before been dealt with by the long and powerful arm of the State. They could be absolutely terrified of what was happening to them. There they are, alone, with all the high-powered apparatus ranged against them, and a very competent, clever and experienced adviser talking to them, apart from all the apparatus of the police, and they are not allowed to have even a mate with them, let alone a solicitor or anyone else.
This is weighting the scales much too heavily on one side. I think that the hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed made his case, and that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary did not really answer it.
§ 8.45 p.m.
§ Mr. George CunninghamI have great sympathy with both of the amendments. However, my concern is that if we were to carry the first amendment I feel sure, not only in the light of what the Secretary of State has said but in the light of what one might expect without his having said it, the notification to the subject of the order would simply be in terms of Clause 5(1) of the Bill, and the recipient would be no better informed than he is now.
I am rather surprised, if it is the case now, that the recipient is served with an order which does not draw attention to the wording of the section under which it is made. I hope that that is not happening. But I fear that if the amendment were to be carried we would not add anything to the information that he is given.
I seem to remember that during the war there was a famous case about the serving of an order under Regulation 18B in which the court finally held that reasons for the making of the order did 531 not have to be stated, but one of the judges trying the case made a very fervent statement of his belief that it was totally contrary to the principles of English justice, even in the conditions of the war and the context of Regulation 18B, that reasons should not have to be stated to some extent or other.
I would incline, regretfully, to not voting for the amendment. However, I should like to take this opportunity of asking the Secretary of State about something very much related to it. If the subject of the order is not to be informed of the reasons in the mind of the Secretary of State and of the adviser, I think that it is all the more important that, as a matter of administrative procedure within the Home Office, the reasons which have compelled the adviser and the Secretary of State to decide to make the order should be set down in the dossier.
As I have previously said to the Secretary of State, the British are sloppy decision-takers. Unlike the French, they do not put all the facts into one dossier so that people may know what has been taken into account and what has not. For all I know, and for all any of us will ever know, it may be that the British are acting totally contrary to their character in these cases and setting down the secret reasons very carefully—but I suspect not.
I ask the Secretary of State to look at that point and to ensure that when the records are finally opened up in 50 years' time or 100 years' time, even on these cases, when historians look at them they at least can see that, right or wrong, the reasons were clear in the minds of those who took the decisions. This would be at the very least a useful mental discipline and some safeguard—though they will not know it—for the people who are the subjects of the orders.
§ Mr. Ron ThomasI very much hope that my right hon. Friend will accept the two amendments. In supporting them I should like to make one or two brief points.
Under Clause 4(1) the Secretary of State may issue an exclusion order if he is satisfied that any person 532
is or has been concerned (whether in Great Britain or elsewhere) in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.Presumably there are a number of documents which indicate certainly likely happenings and "evidence"—I use that word in inverted commas—which the Secretary of State has to examine before being satisfied. I take it that those documents are typed by a young woman or man—I suppose it may be a man now that we have the Sex Discrimination Act—in the police station. She or he will know all about the case. A number of police officers will know all about it as well as some Home Office officials.My right hon. Friend tells me that the assessor has now decided to consider the evidence before he sees the individual who is faced with an exclusion order. That is a much better system than the one which I understand operated in the two cases about which I have spoken. In those cases the assessor had not seen the evidence. When he saw the individuals concerned there was a general conversation.
It has been suggested that one of the Bristolians who had exclusion orders made against them engaged in certain activities when he reached Northern Ireland. I understood that in both cases the individuals concerned were excluded to Southern Ireland, but it is suggested that in one case there were certain activities in Northern Ireland. As a non-lawyer it seems strange that we have a situation in which the Home Secretary is satisfied that certain individuals have been concerned in the
commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorismand excludes them to the North or South of Ireland, leaving them to go about whatever business they may have. Presumably, some of them have jobs and live part of the normal life of the community. That is strange if there is sufficient evidence to satisfy my right hon. Friend that they have been concerned with terrorism within the terms of the Act.I support the first amendment. I think that the individual should be given some indication of the evidence against him, as I tried to make clear in an earlier debate. If not, I am not too happy about the second amendment. Does the hon. 533 Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) consider that it would be a good thing to insist that someone should have legal advice, when that advice may be useless as the solicitor who is attempting to help the individual cannot get any indication of the evidence and cannot prepare any brief or representation? It could be that the hon. Gentleman feels that when the individual meets the assessor it would be useful to have a solicitor present to assist him. If the solicitor has no indication of the evidence his presence will still be unhelpful.
§ Mr. MikardoIt would provide a bit of moral support.
§ Mr. ThomasYes, that is fair enough. I hope that the Government will accept both amendments because they go hand in hand. It would be far better if the individual could be given some indication of the evidence. He could then obtain legal assistance to help him produce a case against the evidence that has been suggested against him.
My right hon. Friend talked about the acts of terrorism which he feels have been prevented by this legislation. I honestly do not feel that there is any way of saying whether acts of terrorism have been prevented by it. I should not think that they have been prevented under any exclusion order process. I and all my hon. Friends insist that we want to ensure that a person is brought to trial and charged in the appropriate manner, with the full force of the law, if there is any evidence against him. But we are now talking about situations in which people are excluded and families are broken up, situations in which no indication is given of the evidence against the individual either to themselves, Members of Parliament, lawyers families or anyone else.
§ Mr. Roy JenkinsI am sorry, but I cannot be moved regarding a statutory change on these two matters.
My hon. Friend the Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Cunningham) was right when he said that one could accept the first amendment and get away with it by merely giving the reasons which already appear in Clause 4. However, that would be to mislead the House and would not be an honourable way to proceed. We cannot go further 534 than we have gone without seriously undermining sources to which I must have the greatest regard.
Regarding the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, North-West (Mr. Thomas), I cannot prove that the Act has prevented particular acts of terrorism. If we can apprehend the people who have committed acts of terrorism, we can bring them to justice. Often 20 or 30 people are killed. This is the Prevention—not the punishment—of Terrorism Bill. There are provisions in ordinary law for the punishment of acts of terrorism. We cannot sit back and wait until people have committed acts of terrorism in the hope of catching them afterwards. That is not the philosophy underlying the legislation.
I am not prepared to accept a statutory provision on the second matter. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) that it would not in itself erect the whole mechanism of a trial, but it would move towards a more rigid procedure. It could lead to interchanges between the adviser and the man concerned becoming matters of public controversy, and that would lead to a more formal kind of interview. Such formality might be deleterious to the interests of the person concerned.
The object of the adviser is not to try a man, but to apply a second opinion to my judgment and, in certain cases—this has already happened—to say, "I think that, on the balance of the evidence submitted to you, the case is not strong enough." The adviser will apply a second test to whether I am acting reasonably, based on a judgment of a man's character in a fairly free-ranging discussion with him and knowledge of the facts. It is not a judicial procedure.
If it is felt that people are unduly exposed, I should be willing to consider as a matter of general practice—I cannot guarantee it in all circumstances—to discuss with the advisers whether it would be reasonable, if an individual wished, for him to be accompanied by somebody else, whether he be a lawyer or not. I cannot go further than that.
§ Mr. BeithI share the Home Secretary's assessment of the purposes of the Bill and do not seek to challenge it. The right hon. Gentleman said that it 535 is the Prevention of Terrorism Bill. We are dealing with provisions which we would not employ as part of the trial and punishment process, but we still need to improve them for the protection of the individual in so far as that is consistent with the protection of society as a whole.
I am grateful for what the right hon. Gentleman said about the provision for some other person to accompany a man on whom an exclusion order has been served. I shall need to read and re-read in Hansard what he said before being clear how far he has gone in that respect. I am still puzzled by some of his reservations.
I welcome the attempt to broaden the terms of my amendment by bringing in persons other than legal advisers. I share his reasons for wanting to do that. However, I am not clear why in certain circumstances he would not wish any particular person to accompany someone on whom an order had been served. I can understand why certain people might be inappropriate. I can understand why, if the accompanying person is not restricted to a category with certain professional disciplines, he might say that person is not appropriate to accompany the man served with the exclusion order. However, it is more difficult to understand why any individual, whatever the case against him, should be wholly precluded from being accompanied by a friend, legal adviser or other person when he goes to meet the Home Secretary's adviser.
§ 9.0 p.m.
§ It must be made clearer to those on whom exclusion orders are served that such a possibility might be open to them. I do not know whether a person on whom an order has been served has ever been accompanied as suggested, but if the Home Secretary accepts the principle, it is reasonable that the situation should be made clear. People must know that the opportunity is open to them.
It may be said that Amendment No. 24 will add nothing to the Bill since it would remain possible for the Secretary of State to use the provisions in Clause 4 as a general reason for exclusion in every case. I do not believe the courts will look with approval on persistent use of such a provision by the Executive. The possibility of a challenge in the courts is open in relation to every order. The same form of words could be trotted out each time, but I doubt very much whether that would find favour with the judiciary. I am sure that neither the present Home Secretary nor his successors would wish to proceed in that way. I am sure that he could find a half-way house between the two arguments. Since he fails to find such an opportunity at present, I believe that the House should have the opportunity to press the matter so that the possibility should be quite clear.
§ Question put, That the amendment be made:—
§ The House divided: Ayes 35, Noes 116.
537| Division No. 44.] | AYES | [9.2 p.m. |
| Beith, A. J. | Hooson, Emlyn | Rooker, J. W. |
| Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N) | Howells, Geraint (Cardigan) | Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight) |
| Bidwell Sydney | Lamond, James | Skinner, Dennis |
| Canavan, Dennis | Latham, Arthur (Paddington) | Steel, David (Roxburgh) |
| Colquhoun, Mrs Maureen | Litterick, Tom | Thomas, Ron (Bristol NW) |
| Cook, Robin F. (Edin C) | Madden, Max | Thorne, Stan (Preston South) |
| Corbett, Robin | Mikardo, Ian | Thorpe, Rt Hon Jeremy (N Devon) |
| Cryer, Bob | Newens, Stanley | Wigley, Dafydd |
| Evans, Gwynfor (Carmarthen) | Noble, Mike | Wise, Mrs Audrey |
| Flannery, Martin | Pardoe, John | TELLERS FOR THE AYES: |
| Freud, Clement | Parry, Robert | |
| Grimond, Rt Hon J. | Penhaligon, David | Mr. Cyril Smith and |
| Hooley, Frank | Rodgers, George (Chorley) | Mr. Richard Wainwright. |
| NOES | ||
| Alison, Michael | Bishop, E. S. | Carson. John |
| Archer, Peter | Blenkinsop, Arthur | Cartwright, John |
| Armstrong, Ernest | Boardman, H. | Cocks, Michael (Bristol S) |
| Ashton, Joe | Booth, Albert | Crawshaw, Richard |
| Atkins, Rt Hon H. (Speltho[...]e) | Bradford, Rev Robert | Crouch, David |
| Barnett, Guy (Greenwich) | Bray, Dr Jeremy | Cunningham, G. (Islington S) |
| Bates, Alf | Brown, Hugh D. (Provan) | Davies, Bryan (Enfield N) |
| Biggs-Davison, John | Buchanan, Richard | Deakins, Eric |
| Dempsey, James | Lewis, Ron (Carlisle) | Small, William |
| Doig, Peter | McCartney, Hugh | Smith, John (N Lanarkshire) |
| Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James | McCusker, H. | Spriggs, Leslie |
| Dunn, James A. | McElhone, Frank | Stewart, Donald (Western Isles) |
| Eadie, Alex | McGuire, Michael (Ince) | Stewart, Rt Hon M. (Fulham) |
| Ellis, John (Brigg & Scun) | Mackenzie, Gregor | Stoddart, David |
| Ellis, Tom (Wrexham) | Mackintosh, John P. | Stradling Thomas, J. |
| Evans, Ioan (Aberdare) | McNair-Wilson, P. (New Forest) | Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley |
| Evans, John (Newton) | Mahon, Simon | Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton W) |
| Ewing, Harry (Stirling) | Marks, Kenneth | Thatcher, Rt Hon Margaret |
| Fernyhough, Rt Hn E. | Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole) | Tinn, James |
| Fookes, Miss Janet | Millan, Bruce | Torney, Tom |
| Golding, John | Mitchell, R. C. (Solon, Itchen) | Viggers, Peter |
| Goodhart, Philip | Molyneaux, James | Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne V) |
| Graham, Ted | Moyle, Roland | Walker, Terry (Kingswood) |
| Grant, Anthony (Harrow C) | Mudd, David | Ward, Michael |
| Harper, Joseph | Murray, Rt Hon Ronald King | Watt, Hamish |
| Harrison, Walter (Wakefield) | Oakes, Gordon | Welsh, Andrew |
| Henderson, Douglas | Page, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby) | White, Frank R. (Bury) |
| Hughes, Mark (Durham) | Park, George | Whitelaw, Rt Hon William |
| Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N) | Pavitt, Laurie | Whitlock, William |
| Hunter, Adam | Peart, Rt Hon Fred | Williams, Alan Lee (Hornch[...]) |
| Jackson, Miss Margaret (Lincoln) | Powell, Rt Hon J. Enoch | Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton) |
| Jenkins, Rt Eon Roy (Stechford) | Rathbone, Tim | Wilson, Cordon (Dundee E) |
| John, Brynmor | Rees, Rt Hon Merlyn (Leeds S) | Winterton, Nicholas |
| Johnson, Jamas (Hull West) | Ross, Rt Hon W. (Kilmarnock) | Woodall, Alec |
| Jones, Dan (Burnley) | Ross, William (Londonderry) | Woof, Robert |
| Judd, Frank | Rost, Peter (SE Derbyshire) | Wrigglesworth, Ian |
| Kilfedder, James | Rowlands, Ted | TELLERS FOR THE NOES: |
| Lawrence, Ivan | Shepherd, Colin | Mr. James Hamilton and |
| Le Marchant, Spencer | Short, Rt Hon E. (Newcastle C) | Mr. J. D. Dormand. |
| Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton & Slough) | Sims, Roger |
§ Question accordingly negatived.
§
Amendment made: No. 25, in page 5, line 7, leave out
'or as the case may be the United Kingdom'
and insert
'Northern Ireland or the United Kingdom, as the case may be'.—[Dr. Summerskill.]