HC Deb 28 January 1976 vol 904 cc447-62

  1. '(1) If any person—
    1. (a) intending that it shall be applied or used for or in connection with the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of 448 terrorism to which this section applies, solicits or invites a gift or loan of or receives or accepts, any money or other property from any other person, or
    2. (b) knowing or suspecting that it will or may be so applied or so used, gives or lends, or otherwise makes available, any money or other property to any other person,
    he shall be liable—
    1. (i) on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to a fine not exceeding £400, or both, or
    2. (ii) on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to a fine, or both.
  2. (2) A court by or before which a person is convicted of an offence under this section may order the forfeiture of any money or other property which, at the time of the offence, he had in his possession or under his control and intended to be applied or used for or in connection with the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism to which this section applies.
  3. (3) This section and section (information about acts of terrorism) of this Act apply to acts of terrorism occurring in the United Kingdom and connected with Northern Irish affairs.'.—[Mr. Roy Jenkins.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Roy Jenkins

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Myer Galpern)

I understand that it will be convenient to discuss at the same time Government Amendments Nos. 32 and 68 to 71.

Mr. Jenkins

The new clause and the consequential amendments create a new offence in respect of fund-raising for purposes related to acts of terrorism in the United Kingdom which are concerned with Northern Irish affairs. I do not think that we had a specific amendment on this matter in Committee. We certainly did not have a Division on it. Underlying part of our discussions, however, was a concern on both sides, which has been shared on both sides of the House in previous debates, that fundraising could conceivably take place for and in support of terrorist activities within this country.

What happens outside this country we cannot control by law, although we might try to control it by other means, such as exhortation and bringing home the effect of what is done. But the fundraising could take place within this country and, because the actual fund-raising was not directly concerned with the IRA or did not appear so to be, might escape any legal net.

I must make it clear that while we would all, I think, condemn and regard as worse than reprehensible fund-raising, collecting or subscribing to funds to support terrorism, this is not by its nature something which can be dealt with infallibly and completely by a process of law. However, since the Committee stage I have considered whether I could reasonably proceed in any way which, while not giving us an infallible legal process here, would somehow improve the position.

I believe that we can do that. It is being done by this new clause. Subsection (1) makes it an offence for anyone to solicit or invite a gift or loan or to receive or accept any money or other property which he intends shall be used for or in connection with the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism occurring anywhere in the United Kingdom and connected with Northern Irish affairs.

It will also be an offence not merely to solicit money but to give, lend or otherwise make available any money or other property if the person so doing knows or suspects that it will be used in connection with such acts. The maximum penalty for the offence will be, on summary conviction, six months' imprisonment or a fine of £400, or both, or, on conviction on indictment, five years' imprisonment or a fine, or both.

Subsection (2) enables the court to order the forfeiture of any money or property which was intended to be applied or used in connection with acts of terrorism found at the time of the offence in the possession or under the control of a person convicted of an offence under the clause.

The clause places an onus on people contributing to collections to avoid making contributions if they have any grounds for suspecting that the money will be applied to terrorism. It will not be sufficient to say that the tin did not have "IRA" written on it. That is the essential point of the clause. It goes reasonably far and I believe that it is the right point to which to go in dealing with these matters by law.

Of the consequential amendments, No. 32 applies the powers of arrest and detention under Clause 9 to the new offence. Amendment No. 46 applies to Clause 11 the provisions of Schedule 3 about stopping and searching. Amendment No. 49 includes the new clause in the list of temporary provisions—in other words, it is subject to the considerations applying to how and when the Bill can be renewed and parts of it may or may not be dropped at certain stages.

Proceedings for an offence under the new clause, which raise certain fairly difficult issues of law, will for that reason be subject to the Attorney-General's consent.

I do not claim that the new clause or any legal provision will completely or absolutely deal with this abuse. What I have tried to do, which I think is in accordance with the view and the spirit of the Committee and the House, is to see whether we could sensibly find any means of legally strengthening the position. I believe that we have done that in a worthwhile and reasonable way.

4.30 p.m.

Mr. William Whitelaw (Penrith and The Border)

I am certain that the Home Secretary is right to introduce this clause. The House should be grateful to him and support it. I, like him, have some reservation about how effective it could be. The right hon. Gentleman properly stressed its limitations, and it is sensible to embark on the new clause on that basis.

No one with experience of dealing with terrorism in Northern Ireland or elsewhere can doubt the considerable impetus that is given through money which is extorted by protection rackets, intimidation and many other methods. It is also true that some of the money comes from persuading innocent people to donate to causes which are not what they believe them to be. It is easy to give people the idea that they will be helping children in some part of the world, the unemployed or the underprivileged, but in fact the money might go to an organisation which would do no good to the children or anyone else.

That happens outside our shores, and we can do nothing about it except seek to stop it by persuasion. I know that the Government, like previous Governments, are exercising persuasion on all the people concerned in different parts of the world. We can do something towards warning people who might be tricked into subscribing to such an organisation of the dangers involved and the legal risks which they run. The clause should command considerable support.

I am particularly glad that the clause refers to the instigation of acts of terrorism in general. I fully support the right hon. Gentleman's view that it should be no defence that a collecting tin does not bear the initials "IRA". If it was, it could lead immediately to clever acts of evasion. A wide provision is absolutely right.

I hope that the House will give the new clause every support. It may have a limited value but even if it prevents only a few subscriptions and denies terrorists some money it will be worth while.

Mr. Ian Mikardo (Bethnal Green and Bow)

The only reservation I have about the clause is that it devalues our legislative process by putting on the statute book provision which will never issue in action. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary said that we must not imagine that the clause will completely stop the collection of money for terrorist purposes. That was a grossly over-optimistic way of putting it. In fact, it will not only not completely do the job but it will in practice make no contribution to doing it, for the reasons given by the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Whitelaw).

No one will go round the pubs of West London or elsewhere admitting that he is collecting money for bombers to blow up people in Belfast or Birmingham. I do not believe that those concerned have ever done that, nor would they if they were in their right minds. But I believe that it has been done in the United States and perhaps in Canada. I am sure that Colonel Gaddafi knows full well what will happen to the money which he contributes. Collections that are made to aid the victims of terrorism or for some other purpose will not be caught by the clause. We are talking about people within the jurisdiction of this country. I would be surprised if a prosecution ever resulted from the clause. Only a man with suicidal instincts would lay himself open to action under the clause, since he can achieve his objectives by the "nod is as good as a wink" process.

It might be said—I think that the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border hinted at it—that even if the clause was not much good it might create a climate of disapproval. If I believed that I would be an enthusiastic supporter, because none of us object to the end which it seeks. But I do not think that there is the least chance of its creating that climate. No collecting done up to now will be lessened or stopped by the operation of the clause.

I shall not oppose the clause, because we are all agreed about its objectives, but it is a bad thing that, for the sake of show, public relations or whatever, we should put on our statute book laws which we know will never issue in action.

Mr. Powell

I agree with the general principle which the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) has just stated. Indeed, I would go further and disagree with his statement—if I heard him aright—that legislation might be engaged in in order to create a climate of approval or disapproval. I do not think that that is the function of legislation. Nevertheless, I believe that practical cases might well occur in which it would be possible to bring home the provisions of the clause. That being so, it is also legitimate to take account of the fact that there is considerable public indignation at the knowledge that collections take place. Consequently, if only a small proportion of those concerned can be brought to book it is right to provide powers to do so. Therefore, my hon. Friends and I hope that the clause will be added to the Bill.

I have two points with which I should like the Secretary of State to deal. Reference has already been made to acts which take place outside the jurisdiction. Does the expression in line 4, "receives or accepts", refer only to acts within the jurisdiction, or is a person liable to penalty under the clause if he has gone abroad, collected sums there and come back to this country with the product of his activities?

Even if that does not bite, does not the clause bite at some subsequent stage at which those sums collected abroad are handed over, as they must be, within the United Kingdom to those who will put them to the felonious objects to which the clause refers? Perhaps we could be clearer exactly to what extent the clause can bite on collections made outside the jurisdiction although they are to be applied within the jurisdiction.

My second point relates to matters of drafting. I imagine that the clause may have been drawn fairly hastily, and if in another place its drafting can be brought up to the best standard of legislation that would clearly be desirable. There are two points at which I think that it falls below that standard. In subsection (1), which reads, If any person— (a) intending that it shall be applied", the pronoun "it" refers forward to the antecedent "gift or loan" which comes two lines later. That is bad English anyhow, and it is bad English in a statute. It should not be beyond the wit of a draftsman to convert this subsection into good English. We should as far as possible put good English on the statute book.

My second case is in subsection (2), which describes the "money or other property". I refer to lines 15 and 16, where I select the words with which I am concerned: money or other property which … he had in his possession … and intended to be applied". This links together as qualifying the word "property" a relative clause, which … he had in his possession", and a participle, "intended", used adjectivally. This is shocking English which would bring down condign punishment upon even a young student who dared to show up an essay which contained an ungrammatical expression of this character. I am sure that we shall have the sympathy of the Home Secretary, who is himself a writer of choice English, in ensuring that before the new clause finally reaches the statute book it is purged of its blemishes.

Mr. George Cunningham (Islington, South and Finsbury)

If the right hon. Gentleman feels so strongly about this matter, ought he not to bring forward a draft which combines linguistic beauty with clarity? Has he an alternative to offer?

Mr. Powell

I cannot believe that at this stage it would promote the cause that I have at heart for amendments to be put on the Notice Paper. My point will be on the record and I am sure that it has been taken by the Home Secretary. Fortunately, there are subsequent stages of the Bill. It is a known fact that however nicely one drafts amendments, the parliamentary draftsmen can draft them better. All I am asking for is that the Government should take the principle of my objection into account so that a minor and purely drafting amendment may be made to the clause later.

Mr. A. J. Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed)

I have much sympathy with the arguments advanced by the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo), both on the general principle that we should not write into the statute book laws which we do not think will be effective and on his specific criticisms of the applicability of the clause. I should not be willing to support the clause if I did not think that one could divide clauses into parts that were effective and parts that were not.

The hon. Gentleman raised the difficulty regarding the financial purposes for which collections were made. He gave some examples, but I do not think that he gave a crucial example. Most of the collections are ostensibly on behalf of the dependants of those who were interned, previously, or who are now convicted prisoners, those who in some way or other are alleged to be victims of violence—not in the terms that we would use in this House but in terms of being victims of the application of punishment.

Perhaps it should be considered whether the clause could be used against that kind of collection. It is a fairly subtle framing of the invitation to contribute money but one which might escape even this clause. On the other hand, the later stages in the chain could possibly be affected by the clause and made the subject of action under it. It is the acceptance of money so collected, the applying or using of money so collected, particularly in paragraph (b) but also in parts of paragraph (a), against which there may be applicability. That gives me sufficient grounds for thinking that the clause should be included in the statute.

However, I hope that the Government Front Bench will reflect on the particular kind of invitation to the public. Perhaps it is not unfair to say that it is disguised in many cases and proclaimed as a collection on behalf of the dependants of the boys in Long Kesh or the men in Armagh, or whatever it may be, but then the money is used in part for those dependants and other parts may be badly misused.

Mr. George Cunningham

In view of some of the criticisms of the clause that have been made, I want to ask the Home Secretary to put my mind at rest in one respect. It seems to have been implied that if a person collecting money were to say at the time when he was collecting it that he was collecting it for dependants or that he was collecting it for other charitable type purposes, he would put himself outside the scope of the clause. As I understand it, he would not do any such thing. In most circumstances it might be difficult to prove that although he said that he was collecting it for dependants, he intended it to be used for direct purposes in connection with violence or suspected that it would be so used. It might be difficult to prove that. But there certainly are situations in which one can believe that such proof would be sufficient to satisfy a jury.

As I see it, what the Home Secretary is doing in the proposed new clause is to provide for what might be a later occasion but one on which we do not want to leave ourselves without an offence on the statute book should the evidence be sufficient to bring before and convince a jury.

4.45 p.m.

I hope, therefore, that the Home Secretary can say that no person will put himself outside the scope of this offence simply by pretending that he is collecting money for charitable type purposes, and that he would be subject to the offence if it were proved that his intention or his knowledge was sufficient to come within the very wide ambit of some of the phrases in the clause.

Mr. Ivan Lawrence (Burton)

I very much welcome the Government's willingness to try to tighten up the legislation as it first appeared when presented to the House. I would welcome any improvement to the Bill which closes any of the loopholes. However, as one of those who advanced a probing amendment in Committee, I must confess that I am a little puzzled as to how the new clause will improve the existing situation.

As a lawyer—I must confess that at the start to those who do not already know it—I believe that it is important that we should make sure that our legislation is clear and simple and is not in any sense confusing. I have no doubt that something will be done to Clause 1(1)(b) as a result of the new clause. However, does the wording of the new clause add anything to Clause 1(1)(b) as originally presented? Clause 1(1) says, Subject to subsection (6) below, if any person … (b) solicits or invites financial or other support …". The new paragraph says, solicits or invites a gift or loan …". "Gift or loan" would be financial support.

Mr. Roy Jenkins

At the same time, the difference is "proscribed organisation".

Mr. Lawrence

I understand that. That is another matter. The Home Secretary has moved on to another point. I see a re-wording "gift of loan", which adds nothing.

When we come to "proscribed organisation", the new clause says, acts of terrorism to which this section applies. The section to which it applies is presumably Section 1, which includes Schedule 1, which proscribes the IRA. Perhaps the Home Secretary will help me on this point.

Mr. Beith

Does not the clause refer to terrorism occurring in the United Kingdom connected with Northern Irish affairs"?

Mr. Lawrence rose

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Myer Galpern)

Does the hon. Gentleman wish to consult a solicitor?

Mr. Lawrence

My experience of consulting a solicitor, Mr Deputy Speaker, is that I am none the wiser after a long consultation than I was at the start.

However, if the new clause is limited to acts of terrorism to which this section applies and this section applies to the IRA or acts of terrorism in Northern Ireland, it actually adds nothing to that which already exists.

Mr. George Cunningham

Perhaps I may put it as a non-lawyer and, therefore, one who is very ignorant on these matters. Is not the situation that in one case a person has to ask for subscriptions to the IRA, and in the other case he could ask for subscriptions to the Red Cross or the WVS, but so long as he was aware that the subscriptions were going to the IRA he would be caught? That is the difference.

Mr. Lawrence

With respect to the hon. Gentleman, I should have thought that any court would construe the words other support for a proscribed organisation", which is what the original wording was, in a way which would embrace support for that organisation even though it is not specifically named. The Home Secretary will recall that in Committee I did not support the views expressed by some of my hon. Friends that because the words "proscribed organisation" were implied, it merely meant that the person had to put "IRA" on the collection box. I do not agree with that. I think that any court construing support for a proscribed organisation would look at the wider connotation and consider whether the spirit of the thing was that money was going to a cause for which the proscribed organisation stood. If my interpretation is correct, the new clause adds nothing. No doubt I shall receive some assurance from the right hon. Gentleman.

I make no apology for raising that point because time and time again we are told, and we see for ourselves, that we are producing legislation which is practically incomprehensible to lawyers or laymen. I am for simplicity. Although the Government seem to be employing their best endeavours to improve the Bill as it stood I cannot understand that the new clause adds anything to collections.

I move on to another matter that is perhaps more important in the sense of its application. We were told in Com- mittee that Section 1 of the 1974 Act had resulted In three prosecutions. I think that there was one case in Scotland in which there were two acquittals and one conviction. I believe that there was no prosecution in England. The point was made in Committee that it was well-known that collections were taking place not only in London public houses but in public houses in other areas. I sought not an amendment of the wording as the Government have now provided; I questioned whether the police needed greater powers to stop collections in public houses. I meant by that some extra power vested in the police to go in to search, to ascertain whether collections are taking place and to stop them.

I was given an assurance in Committee that the police did not require any further powers. I was told that the Government were satisfied that the police had adequate powers and that nothng more needed to be done. I welcome the new clause in so far as it is a second thought on the part of the Government. However, the matter requires more thought and continued thought as time passes. The fact is that collections are still being made.

The Home Secretary will recall that early in December, shortly after the Bill left Committee, two persons made statements that appeared in the national Press to the effect that it was laughable that they and their colleagues had all been making contributions, or that collections had been taking place, and that that continued to be the position. I think that one of those persons was the leader of the Sinn Fein in England. I think that the other person was an ordinary individual who happened to attend one of the public houses concerned. They both gave their names and addresses. Presumably they are known and are interviewable by the police. I wrote to the right hon. Gentleman about the matter but, alas, as yet I have received no answer as to the action that he has taken.

If there is evidence that money is being collected and will continue to be collected to support the proscribed organisation or any organisation relating to it, or in support of the ends of that organisation, it is clear that an offence is being committeed. However, there appear to be no prosecutions.

Mr. Mikardo

Will the hon. Gentleman give me and the House the benefit of his legal advice? There is a worthy organisation that with the best possible objectives collects money in pubs on Saturday evenings not by taking collections but by its members—generally they are ladies—selling copies of its journal. They do not solicit gifts, donations or anything to which objection could be taken. The money so collected is used for the very best of purposes. If someone went around the pubs selling a journal, would that fall within the ambit of the clause? As a layman, my reading is that it would not, but I should be glad to have the hon. Gentleman's legal opinion.

Mr. Lawrence

My reading as a lawyer is that it would. If one is making money, even though offering money's worth and even though others are buying, financial support is being given. If a journal is produced on behalf of a proscribed organisation I should have thought that the courts would rule that that was support for the organisation. There may be other views on that matter.

In Committee I asked whether something could not be done to fill the obvious gap. I was surprised when I was told by the Government that it was not a gap, that everyone was satisfied that the rules existed and that collections had ceased. I think that those were the words of the Under-Secretary of State. I was surprised to hear her say that. The object of the exercise was to ask the Government to consider any way in which we can close the gap and stop the collections. Although we may differ in interpreting certain words in the new clause, I do not believe that the clause adds anything to that which already exists. Further, I do not believe that it is even remotely liable to close the loophole through which these collections are passing. I hope that I am wrong, but the evil is that the collections continue. I am sure that we are all agreed on that. If there is that agreement, the next thing is to consider what we can do to remedy the evil. Neither the clause as it stood nor the new clause remedy that evil.

I return to the question to which I received what I consider to be an unsatisfactory answer—in Committee—namely, what more can be done and what consideration is being given to extending the powers of the police to go into public houses. Is there any other thinking that the Government have been toying with, is there any other clause which we might add to ensure that the absurd situation surrounding collections shall be remedied? The newspapers publicly flaunted the circumstances surrounding the collections, and it was their duty to do so. It is a matter that deeply offends many people of parts of Britain and Northern Ireland.

Mr. Roy Jenkins

In what will be a brief reply I begin by saying that I do not agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) that the clause is inoperative. I do not want to overstate the case for pieces of legislation or amendments which we bring forward, and I shall endeavour not to do so on this occasion, but I would not bring forward the clause if I did not think that it would have some practical effect. It can and will have some practical effect. I do not wish to sell it to the House on the basis that, like a philosopher's stone, it will solve the whole problem.

On jurisdiction, the act of receiving or accepting would apply only within the United Kingdom. It will be difficult enough to prove such an offence without trying to erect a somewhat fantasy world where one could have prosecutions for what happened in Boston, New York, or elsewhere. If the money is passed at a certain stage in the United Kingdom, that act could be caught even if the donor were outside the United Kingdom.

5.0 p.m.

Mr. Tom Litterick (Birmingham, Selly Oak)

My right hon. Friend's last remarks prompted a thought which may, on the face of it, seem absurd, but it is in my head and should be expressed. Is the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland exempt from the provisions of the legislation? Several hon. Gentlemen opposite have from time to time made allegations that public money passing through the Northern Ireland Office is finding its way into the coffers of the Provisional IRA through commercial organisations engaged in building houses, and so on. The words in the clause are "knowing or suspecting". There will always be areas where we suspect that unpleasant things are happening but will allow them to go on for other reasons. However, a zealous police officer might consider that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should be arrested.

Mr. Jenkins

When my hon. Friend has absurd thoughts in his mind, I hope that he will not always feel compelled to express them to the House. I assure him that his thought is fairly absurd. I say that with the utmost good will. If by chance a zealous police officer were to take that view about my right hon. Friend—one can never exclude the possibility that a zealous police officer might take that view about him, or me for that matter—and my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General were prepared to endorse the police officer's view, no doubt the matter would lead to a prosecution. I hope that we may not concern ourselves unduly with that thought.

I was about to turn to the stylistic points made by the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell). I do not share his absolute faith that it is possible to combine the prosaic need for clarity of parliamentary draftsmen with all the benefits of the most excellently and elegantly expressed English. In general, clarity and elegance of language go together. However, I have not on the whole found this with statutes. I can think of very few phrases in statutes which have resounded down the centuries as outstanding examples of English prose which have made a memorable contribution to our language. No Minister could possibly undertake to try to improve drafting from the point of view of the beauty of the language. If there be any lack of clarity, I shall look at it. There is another stage.

Looking cursorily and quickly at subsection (1)(a), the word "it" appears to occur a little prematurely. The drafting may not be ideal. The right hon. Gentleman was fair to me. I am sure that he is right that subsection (2) does not obey the strictest rules of English syntax, but I do not find the use of the two phrases to which he referred offensive. The wording is perfectly clear. But I will have the matter looked at before we get to the later stage.

The hon. Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) made a number of points with which I do not agree. I thought that he was clearly answered by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Cunningham) in an intervention. The process of the hon. Gentleman's mind is singularly opaque. I am sure that he was anxious to help the House and to make an effective Bill. However, he seemed to outline a problem and, when coming near to a solution, to turn away from it and to run down some quite different alley way.

The hon. Gentleman said that collections were going on and that we needed greater powers to deal with them. We have provided greater powers here to deal with two specific points. It will no longer be a defence to say "The collecting box did not have on it 'IRA'. It claimed to be for something else. The collectors said that it was for our boys in Ireland." The power that we are providing is substantially wider from that point of view. It means that if the person subscribing money has reason to suspect that it will be used for purposes connected with terrorism, he is at risk. Those are two substantial widenings of the power.

It is no use the hon. Gentleman saying that the provisions are not wide enough and then, when they are made somewhat wider, saying that it is pointless—

Mr. Lawrence rose

Mr. Jenkins

—let me finish my sentence—making the provision somewhat wider because he wants greater powers for the police. I should have thought that even his limited experience at the Bar had led him to the conclusion that the way to give the police greater powers was by means of a statute. That is what we have endeavoured to do. The House would not carry a proposal merely that the police should have greater powers to deal with this evil. We must consider in what way we can give the police greater powers. We have done that in two important respects—by widening the form of the collection and by putting the responsibility upon the donor as well as the collector. That is an important provision which is well worth making.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

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