COAL INDUSTRY (DURHAM COAST) (Hansard, 26 February 1976)

§ Mr. T. W. Urwin (Houghton-le-Spring)

The subject of this debate is of vital importance to the coal industry in the constituency of Houghton-le-Spring and especially to the people of the township of Seaham.

I make it clear at the outset that my references to the coal-mining industry on the Durham coast will be confined to the three collieries which lie within my constituency. I think it is worthy of note that for almost two decades the economic problems of the Northern Region have been seriously exacerbated by massive contractions in the coal-mining industry. In the Durham coalfield alone, the number of working pits declined from 127 to 27 between 1947 and March 1974, with an accompanying colossal reduction in manpower from 148,676 to 38,281, due largely to exhaustion of reserves and uneconomic working.

It must also be placed on record that further individual closures have occurred since March 1974 and that the industry as a whole has been conditioned to accept the ultimate and fairly early withdrawal of all activity to the line of coastal pits in Durham and Northumberland.

In March 1973 the National Coal Board publicly announced with great jubilation its plan to invest immediately more than £1 million in a tunnelling project to prove vast resources of undersea coking coal reserves lying beyond a known geological barrier some two to three miles offshore.

Described by the mining fraternity as Zone 29, this 10-mile-square coalfield, estimated to contain about 50 million tons of coking coal, forms part of the southern section of the 550 million tons of reserves already proved in the 1960s by the National Coal Board's offshore drilling programme.

The neighbouring collieries of Dawdon and Vane Tempest, ideally located on 758 the seashore, highly modernised, with a total work force of 3,800 men and already producing combined annual outputs of 2¼ million tons, began the monumental task of boring twin drivages through the sea faults and the Seaham faults towards the enormous undersea bonanza.

Spurred as they were by freely-expressed confidence in their future, highly-skilled teams have worked with commendable zeal. The Vane Tempest team claims to have progressed more than half-way towards its ultimate objective at an acknowledged expenditure of only £500,000 of the £1 million-plus that the National Coal Board decided to invest in 1973.

Then, in July 1975, out of the blue, the NCB decided that the Vane Tempest project would have to be abandoned, this decision being confirmed in October 1975. The dramatic change thus brought about in NCB policy arose from the fact that more recent borings at sea had produced evidence of the existence of a much more considerable geological problem in the shape of a dome structure rising steeply towards the sea bed. Subsequent borings revealed that part of the coal measures had been eroded and overIain by Permian measures. The obvious conclusion is that the coal cannot be reached as quickly as was first anticipated. This induced a morale-shattering impact on the labour force involved with the realisation that the life of a modern pit would be drastically shortened if the NCB's argument of prohibitive additional capital expenditure was to be accepted.

The latest estimates of the cost of reaching these rich coal resources vary between £5 million and £10 million. The latter figure apparently includes some development costs and is based upon the NUM-sponsored geological survey, the conclusion of which is to the effect that there is an indeterminate amount of coal of varying quality in three seams of a workable section at the No. 18 borehole east of the anticline which would need some 10 miles of drivage and up to £10m. of capital. The pertinent question which must then logically be asked, since the geological barrier is not by any means impenetrable, is whether it is in the best interests of the industry and the nation for the NCB to take an irrevocable decision permanently to freeze the vast amount of 759 coking coal lying in the sea opposite the Vane Tempest Colliery.

Recalling that the initial planning for the exploitation of these resources estimated an annual production of 600,000 tons from the Vane Tempest Colliery, primarily to feed the Redcar steel complex, I wonder what would then be the cost to the nation and the industry of the replacement of this volume of coal. What estimate has the NCB made of coking coal requirements over the next few years? In the event of permanent immobilisation of these resources, will it become necessary to import coking coal from abroad or even from other parts of the United Kingdom? What discussions has the Board initiated with the European Coal and Steel Community on the quantity of coking coal required in the context of a European energy policy? Has the Board considered making representations to the ECSC for grants and loans to help the exploratory and extractive projects?

I fully appreciate the difficulty of my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary in answering these questions and the statutory limitations imposed upon the Department in intervening in the management functions of the NCB, a factor which has prevented me from tabling Questions on the subject to the Secretary of State for answer on the Floor of the House. This subject is nevertheless of such tremendous importance that it merits urgent discussion between my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary and the Chairman of the NCB. In the best interests of morale and sound industrial relations, I further earnestly suggest that transfers to other pits and redundancies be deferred until top-level consultation has been exhausted and an unequivocal statement on undersea operations has been issued by the Board.

The extensively-declining morale of the labour force in this important section of the mining industry in my constituency cannot be stressed too much. Until June 1975 Vane Tempest, one of the newer collieries in the coalfield, was receiving miners decanted from the Seaham Colliery a short distance up the road. That is in accord with the planned reduction of the labour force from a peak of 962 760 men, a reduction arising from the NCB's refusal to invest a modest £800,000 for the exploitation of Seam C. The men, in common with many more who were transferred from other pits which had closed, were assured that Vane Tempest was a long-life colliery.

I appreciate that there is no possibility of the immediate closure of either pit. The socio-economic problems already arising from reducing labour forces will be seriously compounded if either pit—or both—is the subject of advance closure due to premature and probably unwise investment decisions at the present time. That is especially so when increasing emphasis is quite properly being laid on the importance of discovering new coal deposits, on full capitalisation of all available resources and on maximum production from the labour force.

The common denominator in the vast majority of pit closures has been the exhaustion of reserves but such is not the case in the Seaham area. Conversely there is a positive embarrassment of riches, although quantitatively somewhat undefined. We know that the independent geological survey carried out by the NUM in April 1975 revealed that 3 million tons of coal remained in reserve in Seam C at Seaham Colliery, a seam formerly worked from the now defunct Ryhope Colliery presently being mined from Murton Colliery and provenly accessible from Seaham provided that the necessary investment is sanctioned by the National Coal Board.

It has to be accepted that Seam C is also capable of exploitation from the Vane Tempest Colliery. That is a matter which only the National Coal Board can decide, a decision upon which I do not intend to speculate.

It is evident that there is an undeniably huge quantity of coal to the seaward side of the fault. A Sunderland Echo report of 25th February states: Both the miners' lodge and the NCB agree that there is coal to be mined there but the fault was found to be blocking the way. The impression is thus created that the reserves are irrecoverable because of inaccessibility due to geological structures. But that is not so. The National Coal 761 Board's case is that the cost of exploration in the new situation is too high because of the greater distance of drivages.

On the assumption, which I sincerely trust is correct, that the Dawdon Colliery drivage is to be allowed to continue, the board has a clear responsibility to ascertain the full extent of workable reserves in Zone 29, if necessary by putting down further boreholes at sea, and most certainly investing the estimated £10 million in the Vane Tempest driveway, the absolute maximum amount considered necessary by the NUM's independent geologist. That is surely not too high a premium to pay for access to a huge mountain of black gold.

In the all-too-brief time at my disposal I have attempted to convey to the House some idea of the difficult problems confronting some 4,500 miners without, I hope, minimising those besetting the NCB. I urge upon my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary the importance of entering into early discussions with the NCB with the clearly expressed purpose of ensuring a secure future for the existing labour force.

§ The Under-Secretary of State for Energy (Mr. Alex Eadie)

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Houghton-le-Spring (Mr. Urwin) for raising this matter on the adjournment. In case I do not have time to reply in detail to all his points, I assure him that I shall write to him about some of his detailed suggestions.

As he will know, I always welcome debates on the coal industry. I may not approach them in quite the same freedom as I did when I occupied a similar place on the Benches as my hon. Friend, but I still enjoy them and I endeavour from my position in the Department of Energy to make a constructive contribution.

My hon. Friend and the House will appreciate that in replying to a debate about a particular coalfield and particular pits I must bear in mind the broad distinction between the responsibilities of the National Coal Board and those of the Government. The Government's role is to approve the strategy for the industry and, having approved the strategy, to help facilitate it by means of legislation, the 762 lending of money for investment and the assumption of financial responsibility for burdens of the past that the industry cannot itself properly carry. Within that strategy it is the Coal Board's responsibility to take decisions on the development of particular coal reserves, though the Government must take a close interest in major decisions which involve very sizable investment or which have important implications for employment in certain areas.

I think that it is quite clear that this Government's commitment to the industry is a firm one. We have endorsed the general strategy of Plan for Coal and have honoured, with legislation both enacted and in hand, the undertakings that we made in the coal industry examination. The 1975 Coal Industry Act and the present National Coal Board (Finance) Bill will both help to secure the industry's future. Within the broad strategy that has been agreed, it is the duty of the Board to decide how best to achieve its targets and to manage the industry. Not only would it blur responsibilities for Government to intervene in particular management decisions, but in order for the Government to do so it would have to duplicate the Board's own expertise. Previous Administrations of both parties have adhered to this policy, and I am sure this is right.

Within the industry, the colliery review procedure ensures that the unions are brought into full consultation at all levels, and it is important that this procedure is properly and fully used. If direct discussion with pit or area representatives does not produce a satisfactory result, an appeal can be lodged with Board headquarters. I think it is true to say that the Board gives the unions access to all the information they need to assess the position and the unions, of course, have their own mining engineers to advise them. This procedure does not involve Government at any stage.

I would stress that when it becomes known that reserves at any colliery are nearing exhaustion, there is normally sufficient warning of this for full consultation with the unions and agreement to be reached on an orderly rundown. The House will agree that the Board has a successful record of redeploying men and minimising the social effects of such closures.

763 In the light of the comments I have already made, I should now like to turn to the industry in the Durham coastal area. The particular collieries affected by decisions on and possibilities of the development of new reserves are Seaham, Vane Tempest and Dawdon, to which my hon. Friend referred.

The position is a complex one. Reserves of coal exist under the seabed, and it was originally thought that these could be reached about three miles off-shore from Vane Tempest, which could in any case continue on its present reserves for some time. Drivages were begun from Vane Tempest, but borings disclosed a serious geological disturbance which meant that the amount of coal thought to be present was considerably reduced.

Following this, a local meeting was held on 15th October 1975 at which the Board said that, as a result of the new evidence disclosed by the borings, there seemed no alternative to stopping the two drivages. Further exploration is being made to discover whether it will be possible to exploit undersea reserves from Dawdon, but this is a matter still undergoing investigation on which I am afraid I can supply no more detailed information.

However, I can assure my hon. Friend that the Board is using every means to make sure that any reserves which can safely and economically be worked are not left unexploited for lack of investigation—not only in this area but in in the country as a whole.

Seaham Colliery is at present producing all its coal from one face and working conditions are difficult. It is gratifying to see, however, that present results are good and that the colliery has recently reversed its loss-making trend. Productivity this year has shown a marked improvement over last year.

With regard to both Seaham and Vane Tempest there is another inland seam, Seam C, which could affect the future of either colliery. This is still under investigation and a decision has yet to be reached. It would be technically impossible and quite improper for me to attempt to prejudice the decision, or to forecast how it might affect either of the two collieries.

It is important that the admitted problems facing these Durham pits and 764 the efforts that are being made to solve them should be put into perspective against the prospects for the North-East area as a whole. My hon. Friend need have no fears that a rundown will take place in the Board's North-East area or specifically in the Durham coastal area. To illustrate the Board's intention of fully exploiting all workable reserves, I should like to refer to some of the capital projects approved by the Board during 1975. These include rapid-loading facilities at Easington and Horden/Blackhall collieries for the disposal of coking coal at an estimated capital cost of some £2.4 million. Also, further north at Wear-mouth and Westoe major drift drivages have been approved at an estimated capital cost of £2.7 million. As I have said many times before, this Government have put their money where their mouth is in relation to mining. These projects are in addition to the major expenditure previously approved on merger of Hordern/Blackhall and on reconstruction of Easington, together totalling over £20 million. The saleable output of the north-east area was 16.2 million tons in 1974–75, compared with 15.3 million tons in 1973–74. In the nine months to December 1975, disposals reached 11.9 million tons, 6 million to the electricity market and 3.3 million to the coking coal market.

The Board's view is that, provided coal's competitive position can be maintained, there is likely to be a ready market for all production from the North-East coalfield. The investment already undertaken and that to be undertaken at colleries is evidence of the importance the Board attaches to the area's contribution to its overall plan of maintaining productive capacity wherever possible.

Manpower at the coastal pits of Durham has been maintained at about the same level since 1972—around 14,000 to 15,000—which is an achievement. Future manpower requirements at these collieries will depend on decisions on further exploration of reserves. Any proposed changes in plans for collieries will of course be discussed between the Board and the unions under the colliery review procedure.

I have tried to deal with the question raised by my hon. Friend and to describe the prospects for the North-East area and for the Durham coastal pits in particular. 765 There is no doubt that this continues to be an important part of the coal industry of Great Britain. I should like to thank my hon. Friend once more for the opportunity to debate a subject of such strong mutual interest and one which will not 766 have been without some interest to the House.