§ Mrs. KnightI beg to move Amendment No. 232, in page 21, line 24, leave out Clause 31.
§ Mrs. KnightThe amendment is moved in the firm belief that the whole principle of payment for adoption and continued payments for adoption is quite a wrong principle. After all, parents have their ordinary family allowances, which are very welcome. But if we adopt this principle that some adopters will be paid for the children they have adopted, how on earth are we to say to the foster mothers of others, "You are not eligible for payment"—in other words, that some people are and some people are not eligible.
If would-be adopters needed to have payment—and certainly there are many people not well endowed with cash who would be happy to give a child a home if only they had the money to do so—we should have to find the money for them, acting as a fairy godmother. I completely agree with that principle, but surely any parent in that position could be a foster parent. There is full and easy machinery for the payment of foster parents.
I do not think foster parents are paid enough. I should like to see them getting more. If we could, by making it financially viable, encourage more people to have children in their homes, it would be a very wise and sound move.
Clause 31 permits some adopters to be paid simply for having adopted children, and I think that is a very difficult principle to carry out unless it is done for all adoptive parents. Since it is fully established that foster parents come into this category and get paid, why are we in this clause suddenly saying that there may be a totally new category of adoptive parents, somehow different and somehow more deserving, and somehow singled out for special State help, apart from all the other adoptive parents? Are we not putting ourselves into a very difficult position indeed when the decision comes to be made as to which is in the magic category of the receivers and which is in the less fortunate category of not receiving money at all? Are not we making a rod for our own backs in this regard? Will not the Minister please look carefully again at this principle?
§ Dr. OwenI recognise that this is an issue on which the Committee was fundamentally divided. Indeed, it was the casting vote of the Chairman which resulted in the retention of the clause in the Bill.
I have always respected the major issue of principle behind the Opposition's amendment. However, in Committee, concern was expressed on two points. The first was the breach of the principle that adopted children should be in the same position as children born to the adopters. The second was that there was nothing in Clause 31 to indicate the experimental nature of relaxation in the law. It was the second which created the stronger current in the Committee's proceedings, and I undertook to consider whether this objection could be met.
Subsection (7) of Amendment No. 155 provides that the Secretary of State's power to approve schemes shall expire seven years after Clause 31 comes into force, unless the Secretary of State under subsection (8), by an order made by statutory instrument at any time before the seven years is up, repeals subsection (7)—in which case the power continues.
Subsection (9) provides that the Secretary of State shall not make an order under subsection (8) unless a report has been published under subsection (6) and a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by resolution of each House, so that the House would make a decision on the basis of information on the working of it.
Subsection (10) provides that payments made under an approved scheme may continue even if that scheme is subsequently revoked by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of State's power to approve such schemes expires. Without such a provision, persons who adopted a child on the understanding that they would receive payment so long as they had need of it would be at risk of breaking the law if the scheme were revoked and the Secretary of State's power to approve such a scheme came to an end. In other words, once started, it needs to go through on a continuum.
The effect of Amendment No. 154 is to amend subsection (6) in Clause 31 to provide that the Secretary of State shall, within seven years of the date on which Clause 31 comes into force, and every five 1471 years afterwards, publish a report on the operation of the schemes of payments. As the Clause stands, the first report is to be made seven years after the first scheme is approved.
Subsection (9) of Amendment No. 155 requires a report to be made under subsection (6) before Parliament is asked to consider whether the power to approve schemes should continue. If by any chance the first scheme were not approved within seven years of Clause 31 being implemented, the report could not be made. The amendment avoids this remote possibility by tying the requirement to report to the date of implementation of the clause.
If Parliament resolves that schemes should continue, the Secretary of State will still be obliged to report on the operation of the scheme every five years.
This is a serious attempt to meet some of the very fair objections which were raised in Committee. The original intention and, indeed, the recommendation of the Houghton Committee was that it should be experimental. But it was not sufficiently spelt out in legislative form that it was experimental.
My view remains the same, that it is right to make this limited experiment. The Adoption Resource Exchange, which is particularly concerned with children who are hard to place, has written to all hon. Members who served on the Committee supporting Clause 31. Islington borough has inquired when Clause 31 is likely to be implemented as its councillors are anxious to submit a scheme. They have a number of suitable foster parents who are prevented from adopting only because they cannot afford to forgo the boarding-out allowance.
With this important modification to the principle of legislation, I hope therefore that the House will agree that the Government's amendments are preferable to that moved by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Mrs. Knight).
§ Dr. VaughanBefore the Minister sits down, will he say up to what age he envisages these payments being made?
§ Dr. OwenI have to admit that that question has caught me out slightly. I assume that it would be until the child becomes an adult, or possibly 16 might 1472 be the age. I am not certain about this. I shall have to look into it. But I think that we would tend to take account of when the child was of earning age. However, in the case of a mentally or physically handicapped child, I should not want to see any specific age level introduced into legislation.
This is a decision that I have not consciously made. Each case must be considered on its merits. Some of these children will be severely mentally and physically handicapped and will be very unlikely ever to be able to earn their living. In that situation the family would get no financial relief as the children grew older if the burden were relieved from them.
§ 11.15 p.m.
§ Mr. HoosonMay I, as one who spoke strongly against the clause in Committee, say that I now think that the Minister has met my main objection to it, namely, that it was drawn too widely? I have been greatly persuaded by the letter written by the Adoption Resource Exchange. I see the great difficulty of placing some children without some form of financial subsidy. It would be difficult to arrange the adoption of a family of two or three coloured children who had been abandoned, but who it was desirable should be kept together, unless there were some form of financial subsidy.
I can also see that difficulties might arise about arranging the adoption of two spina bifida children unless there were a subsidy.
The objection of the hon. Lady the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Mrs. Knight) is wrong in principle. It does not follow that, because a subsidy is given in hard cases, there will be a general demand for a subsidy. I therefore think that as amended the clause should be supported.
§ Mrs. KnightI urge the Minister of State to take on board my point that the way out of this difficulty is by keeping to the foster parent principle, which is an excellent one. Money is paid to foster parents. It is difficult to see how fish can be made of one and fowl of another by saying that one adoptive parent will be eligible for money but another will not. If the foster parent scheme were not already established and recognised as an excellent way of making homes available for children, I should not be arguing 1473 in this way. It is now proposed that there should be two different sorts of adopters. This is what worries me.
Nothing that the Minister of State said convinced me that there is an easy way out of the dilemma of how to decide which adoptive parents shall have financial assistance. It is easy with foster parents. It will be very difficult with adoptive parents, particularly when adoptive parents get to hear that by some magical means money is available to adoptive parents in the same street, for instance.
§ Amendment negatived.
§
Amendments made: No. 154, in page 21, line 40, leave out:
'the first scheme is approved under this section'
and insert
'section 31 of the Children Act 1975 comes into force'.
§
No. 155, in page 21, line 43, at end insert—
'(7) Subject to the following subsection, subsection (4) of this section shall expire on the seventh anniversary of the date on which it comes into force.
(8) The Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument at any time before the said anniversary, repeal subsection (7) of this section.
(9) An order under subsection (8) of this section shall not be made unless—
(10) Notwithstanding the expiry of subsection (4) of this section or the revocation of a scheme approved under this section, subsection (1) of this section shall not apply in relation to any payment made, whether before or after the expiry of subsection (4) or the revocation of the scheme, in accordance with a scheme which was approved under this section to a person to whom such payments were made, where the scheme was not revoked, before the expiry of subsection (4) or, if the scheme was revoked, before the date of its revocation.'.—[Dr. Owen.]