§ 12.43 a.m.
§ Mr. Patrick Wall (Haltemprice)It has been said that up to 50 per cent. of the vast sums spent in the research and development of weapons in Europe is wasted because of duplication of effort. In the United States of America the Callaghan Report has estimated wastage through duplication to be as much as 10 billion dollars. Both these figures may very well be on the high side but, clearly, at a time when the electorate are pressing their various Governments to make economies any wastage on this scale is unacceptable. I would go further and say that if Europe 1530 is to afford an effective defence in the next 20 years it must standardise its hardware in all fields and that the first task is to remove duplication.
The standardisation of tactical missiles in Europe and between Europe and the United States of America is probably an easier task than in other fields such as aircraft or armour as it is a relatively new technology and, therefore, vested national interests are not so entrenched.
Having visited most of the missile producers in Europe, I would first like to consider the weapons and the duplication that exists, make some suggestions about the present and the next generation of missiles, and then compare the various types of missiles produced in Europe and in the United States of America. Having done this, one is in a position to make suggestions for maintaining an effective European missile industry as well as eliminating undue duplication with the United States of America in future generations of tactical missiles.
I fear this will be a rather technical debate, and I hope the House will excuse me if I glance at my notes rather more often than usual. For the benefit of those who record our speeches, I have provided a comprehensive list of the large number of missiles to which I shall refer.
Existing European tactical missiles can be divided into three basic categories—ship-borne, land based and airborne, each category having a number of subdivisions. 1531 Taking first ship-borne missiles, we have the shorter range Penguin from Norway and Sea Killer II and III from Italy, which have a range of some 20 kilometres and a relatively small warhead, suitable for fast patrol boats. It is about time that we followed Norway's example and built missile-armed fast patrol boats. Before the last war, we led the world in fast patrol boats. Now we have only four and they are not armed at all, let alone with missiles.
In the longer range, there are the French Exocet, to be followed by the MM40, the Otomat produced by Italy and the Harpoon by the USA. Exocet has been purchased by the Royal Navy but has to be fired within plus or minus 30 degrees of the direction of the target, whereas Otomat can be fired within plus or minus 300 degrees, giving much greater flexibility. Harpoon has the great advantage in that it is designed to be fired from ships, submarines or aircraft. In the surface-to-air category we find greater duplication—in the medium range the French Marine Roland II and the Naval Crotale and Italy's Albatross using the Sea Sparrow III or Aspide missile, together with the very successful, but shorter range, British Sea Cat and the rather specialised SLAM.
In the longer range, there are the British Sea Dart—which is replacing Sea Slug—the French Masurca and the United States Standard II.
Mention must also be made of the unique British Sea Wolf, which is the only anti-missile missile in existence and is said to be able to hit an object the size of a cricket ball travelling at Mach 2.
Helicopter-borne anti-ship missiles include the Italian Marte, the French AM39 and the British Sea Skua, Hellcat and Hawkswing, with the Franco-German HOT and the American TOW for use against armour.
Here I would like to ask the Minister a direct question. The Government have cancelled Hawkswing, which leaves our helicopters armed with a near-obsolete weapon AS 11 or 12. Are they now going to consider the purchase of HOT or TOW, as these seem to be the only alternatives that would provide modern weapons for our army/air helicopters?
1532 As far as land-based missiles are concerned duplication in certain categories is even greater. Tactical surface-to-surface missiles with nuclear capacity include the American Lance, now adopted for many NATO armies, and the French Pluton. In the field of surface-to-air missiles the long-range category, now that Bloodhound and Thunderbird are obsolete, is dominated by the American Improved Hawk, with a range of some 40 kms. In the medium range, we find the French Roland and Crotale, the British Rapier and the Italian Indigo and Spada, and in the short-range infantry missiles the British Blowpipe and the American Red Eye, to be replaced by the Stinger.
In the anti-tank weapons we have the British Swingfire, which is the only one to be capable of being fired from behind cover, the Franco-German HOT and the American TOW. In the lightweight range, the Franco-German Milan, the now obsolete British Vigilant, the Italian Sparviero and Mosquito and the German Mamba.
Airborne missiles provide an even greater variety. These include the long-range air-to-surface Anglo-French Martel and the Italian Otomat. In the medium range there are the French AS30, the United States Bullpup, the British Sea Skua and the German Kormoran. In the air-to-air category, medium range, there is the very advanced French Super 530, the American-United Kingdom XJ 521, the Italian Aspide, the British Red Top and the American Sparrow. For close combat there are the French R550, the British SRAAM and the American Sidewinder.
I have mentioned all these missiles by name to illustrate the number of designs produced and the intense competition between nations for a relatively limited market.
What is needed, and this is the nub of my speech, is an evaluation of those missiles whose life could be extended for the next decade, together with a new standard weapon in each main category for the next, or third, generation, of tactical missiles. In this evaluation it is interesting to note that five companies dominate the European market—Aerospatiale and Matra from France, MBB 1533 from Germany and BAC and Hawker Siddeley Dynamics from Great Britain. There is already considerable co-operation between these firms—some are producing joint weapons—and there is a general feeling that this co-operation could be greatly increased, given the right circumstances.
The problem is how to standardise the existing 79 European-built tactical missiles together with the 13 types purchased from the United States. I propose to be so bold as to attempt such an evaluation for at least the following categories. The first is naval sea-skimming, in which would come the MM40—that is, the improved Exocet—and the Otomat.
Next is naval underwater-to-surface operations. Now that the British Government have abandoned the Sub-Martel, the United States Harpoon is the obvious choice. With naval area self-defence there is a considerable query because there is no ideal weapon in this category yet. Possibly the Sea Dart could be used, or the Maritime Roland or the American Aegis system now under development. For naval point defence there is no query—the Sea Wolf is a world beater. The American Lance is the main weapon system for army ground-to-ground, while for army ground-to-air there are Roland, which has been chosen by America for protection of armoured forces, and Rapier which is best for airfield defence.
For air-to-ground, long range, the Martel is supreme, while for air-to-ground, short range, there is HOT or TOW. Martel or Harpoon come into the air-to-ship, long range stand-off category, and the Sea Skua is my choice for the air-to-ship, short range. In the air-to-air medium to long range category there is the Super 530, and the 550 for the air-to-air, short range, dog-fight rôle.
Such an evaluation would entail Europe adopting at least two major American weapon systems—Lance and Harpoon—and leaves open for future development three categories; namely, medium-range army ground-to-air, single man portable ground-to-air, and anti-tank systems, in which areas I hope that British companies will take the initiative.
Of the 12 European missiles listed six are now coming into service and others, now in service, have a considerable 1534 development potential. A high degree of standardisation could, therefore, be achieved within the next five to 10 years with the weapons already in existence or coming into service in the near future.
The key to standardisation in the following, or third generation lies in the staff requirement or design study. At present the Conference of National Armament Directors has agreed that there should be only one European naval surface-to-surface missile in the next generation, and a family of four anti-tank missiles in the 1,000 metres to 4,000 metres range. It is hoping to agree on one design of medium-range ground-to-air missile, which at present is nonexistent. So far so good, but, as usual, there is a snag. It has agreed in principle that there should be only one weapons system, but each country will undoubtedly bring forward its own candidate. Armaments directors wear national hats; although they have agreed in principle on a standardised weapon, when the time comes they are almost bound to press for their own country's weapons.
This is the main point of my speech. We shall not achieve standardisation until the requirement and design study is prepared by an international staff. Once that is done, firms can easily arrange the various international consortia for the production of these missiles. But they must first have clear guidance as to the common design requirement. They have told me that time and time again.
How can that be done? I believe that it could be done now. The design study could now be carried out by an international staff; namely, the Military Committee of NATO, provided that it is given adequate technical staff with which to carry this out. At a later date I hope that a European Armaments Agency will be developed and set up to draw together the present groups—namely CNAD and EURONAD, EUROLOG and EURO-LONGTERM—into a co-ordinated whole, with a defined institutional basis. Only when that is done will Europe be able to achieve a satisfactory trade-off with the USA.
The Government have, in my view correctly, announced the suspension of the Sub-Martel and the Hawkswing, and the purchase of the United States Harpoon and the Franco-German Milan. What 1535 weapons will these countries buy from Britain in return? That is the key operation if our missile industry is to survive. Sea Wolf is a world beater and should, therefore, be a candidate, but very little seems to be done to push the sale of this weapon compared with the efforts of the American companies, backed by the United States Government, to push their hardware. The Minister must appreciate that he will not be able to make a convincing case for purchasing abroad unless he can tell the House what weapons of British manufacture foreign countries will purchase in return.
To summarise, tactical missiles seem to me to be the best field in which to achieve standardisation. First, the multiplicity of European missiles must be pruned down in the next generation to certain specific categories. Then adequate exchange arrangements must be made with the USA. True standardisation and, therefore, a true basis of exchange is, in my view, unlikely to be reached until design studies are undertaken not by a national but by an international staff. This should be tried out as soon as possible and should be followed by the institution of a European Armaments Agency, which, I remind the Minister of State, was recommended both by the North Atlantic Assembly and by the Western European Union. I hope that the Minister will be able to assure the House that action in all these important matters is either being taken or is contemplated.
§ 1.58 a.m.
§ The Minister of State for Defence (Mr. William Rodgers)It is a convention on these occasions to welcome virtually every Adjournment debate with which the House is faced, but it is more than a convention on this occasion when I say that I am very glad that the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) was able to raise these important matters today.
In the House we have too few opportunities to discuss detailed matters related to weapons systems, for example, and, therefore, it has been to the advantage of us all that the hon. Gentleman sought this opportunity to enlarge in the House on his distinguished work elsewhere. Many of the matters which he raised today need detailed consideration 1536 by Ministers and by our advisers, but I think that he has helped to push the frontiers forward. I hope that in the subsequent debates in matters of defence policy, and in our annual debate on the White Paper, we will pick up where he left off and examine some of his suggestions in more detail.
When I say that this is a particularly appropriate time, of course I have in mind the announcement, to which the hon. Member referred, which we made on 23rd September, indicating three very substantial purchases for the Armed Forces. I was pleased to have his broad endorsement of this decision this evening, because when the House debated defence at the beginning of May he indicated that he supported the broad principles which I suggested should underlie the purchase of equipment of all kinds.
We on both sides of the House are concerned with two different considerations. In the first place, we want to see a strong United Kingdom guided weapons industry as far ahead as we reasonably can. We believe that we have a special expertise and wish to see it flourish, not only for our own domestic needs but also in so far as it makes an important contribution to the alliance.
Secondly, we have an anxiety to see standardisation both to make the alliance effective and because we cannot expect to have the full range of guided weapons in our possession unless there is a higher measure of agreement than hitherto between the countries within the alliance.
Standardisation is an old issue, but we should not dismiss it for the reason that it has had perhaps only limited success. My right hon. Friend has been seeking to give new impetus to it in the discussions in the Eurogroup. It will come as no surprise that matters of this kind have not been wholly absent from the agenda in recent visits by Mr. James Schlesinger, the United States Secretary for Defence, and M. Bourges, the French Defence Minister. Therefore, in so far as the hon. Gentleman has given a further direction to this thinking, it is greatly to our advantage.
The hon. Gentleman made it clear that he was anxious mainly to put a number of important matters, as he saw them, on the record. I had previously had the opportunity of looking at his WEU report, 1537 Document 671, in particular the recommendations in paragraph 522. I undertake to give further study to that document and to his additional remarks tonight.
I have also looked at the part of the report on the security of the alliance to the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly, which is also relevant to the question of choice of equipment and the desirability, if we can, of having a higher level of standardisation even if it is within this one relatively small area.
I want now to set out the principles determining the United Kingdom procurement policy, endorsing what I tried to do in setting them out in the debate on 7th May. I there said that we had two objectives—first, to provide the Armed Forces with the equipment they need, and, secondly, to ensure as far as possible a strong British industry by giving it the greatest possible amount of work. But I contested on that occasion—and there was no argument—the view that it was wrong by definition to buy foreign weapons and right by definition to buy British weapons at all times. I said that to pursue that policy would make nonsense of standardisation because, although it seemed legitimate for this country, it could equally be claimed to be legitimate action by other countries too.
I said that, given the whole range of missiles, the cost of going it alone in each of these sectors was far beyond the means of any country in Western Europe and somewhat beyond the means of the United States as well. I said that as a background to standardisation. But I agree—and it is right to focus on this point—that if we buy abroad we hope others will buy from us. The principle of standardisation will work only if it means reciprocity as well. We shall be looking, as far as possible, for reciprocal arrangements, not only as a result of this purchase of foreign equipment. It is not always right to relate one item to another. The whole field should be examined.
If we could provide all-British weapons which precisely met the needs of the Services, if they were the cheapest available, were then adopted by NATO and sold in large quantities to other countries round the world, we should be delighted. However, it is too much to expect that it will always be as easy as that. Therefore, 1538 increasingly we must work towards European solutions without in any way excluding transatlantic ones as well. I hope that what was announced on 23rd September and what has been said by the hon. Member for Haltemprice tonight is all part of the same story of seeking to achieve the right weapons, to meet the needs of our Armed Forces.
§ Mr. WallWill the Minister answer the two questions that I put to him? Will he confirm that we shall press hard for sales of Sea Wolf abroad, because it is a unique weapon? Will he also state the future armour with which our helicopters will have to deal? This question was asked in another place and received no answer.
§ Mr. RodgersI had not overlooked the hon. Gentleman's questions. I was coming to them. We shall do all we can with Sea Skua because it is important. Sea Wolf is a unique weapon and we want it to be accepted. Bearing in mind the financial pressure on the Armed Forces, we decided that we could not at present go ahead with Hawkswing, but further consideration persuaded us that for the time being we did not have to make a purchase of any kind. The House may assume that it is unlikely that we shall in the foreseeable future make any announcement on this matter.
In this package we sought to deal with a number of related matters in order that they could be presented together and, in a sense, one could be offset in our own minds and in discussions with our allies against the other.
As long as we seek reciprocity people will be anxious about the employment consequences. This is why I am glad that the matter has been raised this evening and was debated on 7th May. It is important that as far as possible we should speak with the same voice and have a consistent policy towards the industry.
As a result of the decisions that we have made, we expect expanding work loads on the production side in the next few years which should fully maintain job opportunities in the industry. Our decisions will inevitably mean some redundancies on the design side but as far as possible we shall endeavour to offset these and we wish to maintain the design capacity of the industry. During the next decade there 1539 should not be any real anxiety about the future of the industry. From now on we shall seek to obtain agreements which will represent genuine reciprocity within the alliance from which we shall all benefit.
The hon. Gentleman referred not only to standardisation as a principle but also to the institutional framework for getting the right answer. This is not easy, as the hon. Gentleman knows very well. We have had co-operation within NATO, and particularly through the Eurogroup. I should welcome a good deal more cooperation between the individual firms concerned, because it must not always be assumed that the intervention of the Government is the first point of departure towards a successful collaborative venture. British firms in the guided weapons business are themselves taking the initiative and looking forward to the prospect of co-operation, particularly in Europe but not excluding transatlantic co-operation.
We must examine all institutional means of securing co-operation. It may 1540 be that there should be a new framework of the kind the hon. Gentleman suggests. I do not want to commit myself to that tonight beyond saying that we will examine it in detail and consider whether it can perform a function which is not now performed within the alliance bilaterally or in some other way within firms themselves.
I sometimes think that the thoroughness of the work done within the Western European Union—I say this because I once led a delegation to it—amongst NATO parliamentarians, and in the Council of Europe should make us a little ashamed of the way in which the House of Commons approaches these matters. It should make us a little dissatisfied with our procedures. The House is not over-full of Members who are prepared to give careful and painstaking attention to defence matters. The hon. Gentleman has once again tonight shown that he is an exception. We are very grateful to him.
§ Question put and agreed to.
§ Adjourned accordingly at eleven minutes past One o'clock.