HC Deb 15 October 1975 vol 897 cc1385-413

Lords amendment: No. 4, in page 2, leave out lines 43 to 47 and insert— "(5A) For the purposes of this Act employees are to be treated, in relation to a union membership agreement, as belonging to the same class if they have been identified as such by the parties to the agreement, and employees may be so identified by reference to any characteristics or circumstances whatsoever."".

The Minister of State, Department of Employment (Mr. Albert Booth)

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment. This was a Government amendment in another place. At that time, and when we discussed the issue previously, the Opposition welcomed the intention behind the amendment and even went so far as to assist in its wording.

The purpose of the amendment is to clarify the meaning of the term "identifiable class" when that term is used in the definition of a membership agreement in the Bill for the purposes of identifying groups of employees who are to be covered by or excluded from a union membership agreement by the terms of that agreement. The amendment has the advantage of overcoming a serious issue which has been raised. This is whether "identifiable class" would have to relate to the circumstances of the employment of the members of that class, including such matters as the job they do or the premises in which they work and whether the way in which the union membership agreement as originally defined in the Bill would have prevented a union membership agreement from being made in a way which could have excluded people on grounds of their age, reference to their current union membership, or any grounds of conscientious objection which were agreed between the parties to the membership agreement.

The amendment also meets a further point which has been in question—namely, whether the common characteristics by which a class of employees are identified in a union membership agreement, or the circumstances used to define that class, could be any circumstances or characteristics that those employees happened to have in common, or whether it was the case that to identify the class by characteristics would mean that the characteristics had to be agreed by the parties to the membership agreement and, therefore, included in the agreement.

The amendment makes clear that the characteristics for identifying the class must be agreed between the parties to the membership agreement. As the amendment clarifies where clarification may be required, and makes more flexible the provisions of a membership agreement that can be made between the parties to the agreement, enabling them to accommodate it more nearly to the wishes and desires of those working in the establishment who will be affected by it, I believe that the amendment should be welcomed by the House, and I accordingly commend it.

Mr. Barney Hayhoe (Brentford and Isleworth)

The Minister of State has characteristically explained the amendment clearly and has made it clear that the Opposition had some hand in its being brought on to the statute book. This matter started off with a Government amendment. We were worried about its wording and we put an interpretation upon it which I do not think the Government had thought could be put upon it. However, they realised that the points we were making were fair and redrafting has now taken place. This is a fairly technical matter, as those who have been listening to this short debate will have appreciated. Nevertheless, it is important. We are grateful to those in another place for having made this clarification. I think it right for the House to agree with them.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 5, in page 3, line 4, at end insert: and after the word 'belief' there shall be inserted the words 'or reasonable grounds of conscience'.

Mr. Booth

I beg to move, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment.

The effect of the amendment is to provide that it is unfair to dismiss an employee who is not a union member in a closed shop if he objects to membership of any union whatsoever on reasonable grounds of conscience. This is an issue which we have debated many times on the Floor of the House and in Committee. I have been involved in those debates on the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974, the Employment Protection Bill and during the passage of this Bill.

Although the Government have given some careful consideration to this matter on many occasions as a result of issues raised in the debates to which I have referred, the Government's position has remained consistent. We have taken the view that the statutory qualification as regards the rights of unions and employers to make closed shop agreements is a matter which should be of a very limited nature. We are considering how far the law should provide an individual with the right to remain outside a union membership agreement on grounds which up to now the Government have resisted and will continue to resist. The question is also raised of the proper rôle of an industrial tribunal in upholding the right of an individual to remain outside a union membership agreement.

4.45 p.m.

As I say, the Government's position on this issue has been fairly consistent, but those who have opposed the matter and have sought to widen the protection of the individual, as they would put it, or, as we would say, to open up grounds for attacking the basic position of the membership union agreement and achieve exclusion from it on individual bases, have produced a number of formulae by which to widen exclusion or exception.

It might be interesting to reflect quickly on some of the formulae we have discussed for widening what is probably best defined as the "conscience clause", In Committee on the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act we debated the definition of religious belief, political opinion, the code of conduct of a profession of which an individual is a member and whether an individual has reasonable grounds for refusing membership of a closed shop union. We also debated yet another possible formula involving religious belief or conscience, or, alternatively, political opinion, professional codes of conduct or deeply held personal conviction as amounting to grounds for objecting to joining a specific closed shop union rather than any union whatsoever.

On Report on the 1974 Act we debated not only a repeat of the formula to which I have just referred but another one—namely, reasonable grounds for being a member of a particular trade union. That was the one which was carried. On the Amendment Bill we also discussed a number of possible ways of tackling this matter, including placing in the Bill words to the effect that an employee may object to membership of a union on the ground that his work is different from that of the majority of union members or because he considers membership of a union is likely to hamper the discharge of his duties relating to the dissemination of news. That obviously takes in the position of a news- paper office, which we may debate at some length at a later stage.

We also debated on Report a much shorter formula—namely, religious belief or conscience regarding membership of any union whatsoever. In another place a number of other formulations have been debated, including substituting conscience for religion or having reasonable grounds in terms of conscience, the formulation that was carried.

It is clear that the House has not only examined the matter in broad principle but has examined very carefully the principle that should be embodied in this legislation. Although there is considerable controversy on the wider exclusions, we start from the position that there is broad agreement on the grounds for excluding the religious objector. We believe that those grounds reflect the importance which the overwhelming majority attach to the right to worship freely and to practise the tenets of an individual's faith. That leads to a tolerance on the ground of religious belief which does not attach to any of the other formulations which would seek to widen exception to the closed shop provision.

Mr. Norman Tebbit (Chingford)

Will the Minister of State tell us where we shall find the words "religious belief" defined? How does the law define religious belief?

Mr. Booth

I do not know where we can find the definition of religious belief. I know that the practice of tribunals which I have examined is such as to relate it to the established practice of the members of one particular faith, and normally the members of one particular Church. In practice that is not a matter that has proved a difficulty for the tribunals which have had to deal with these narrow grounds. Tribunals in other circumstances have had to deal with slightly wider grounds, but certainly not on the issue of the closed shop provision in relation to conscience issues.

Therefore, I believe that our previous debates both in Committee and on the Floor of the House have failed to define conscience in a way which is broadly acceptable to hon. Members. The addition which is proposed by the Lords amendment of the word "reasonable" makes the issue no clearer, and I would argue that it could make it considerably more ambiguous.

If one is judging what are reasonable grounds of conscience there are at least two different approaches that one can take to the matter. If the word "reasonable" was put in, I suppose that a tribunal would have to decide whether this House was of the view that there were two hurdles. The first is that a man had to establish that he was doing it on the basis of conscience. The tribunal would then have to judge whether his ground of conscience was reasonable, which postulates the idea that there are unreasonable and reasonable grounds of conscience. I should not like to be a member of the tribunal that had to take the decision on that basis. I am advised by those who have greater knowledge of the operation of tribunals than I have that it might be viewed in an entirely different way and that "reasonable grounds of conscience" might be thought by tribunals to mean something much wider than "grounds of conscience". That, of course, would be the case if tribunals took the view that conscience, of itself, was a thing which could operate only in very narrow circumstances.

Therefore, I believe that we should create a difficulty if we followed the amendment and gave the tribunal that test to make, as well as having to make up its mind whether we were intending, by attaching the word "reasonable", to qualify or widen what we had previously at least agreed to on the basis of religious grounds.

I wish to make the plea that when we debate the matter we keep a certain perspective. Some of the contributions which have been made in previous debates on this issue have been in terms which suggested that the vote the House took on this issue would determine immediately, almost once and for all, whether people would be in or out of employment in closed shop circumstances. Of course, hon. Members who have studied this issue know that that is not the case. They know that the overwhelming majority of trades unions and employers in this country have traditionally preferred to conduct their collective agreements and bargaining arrangements on a basis other than the closed shop basis and that it is only in about 20 per cent. of cases that any closed shop arrangements are made. They also know that where these arrangements are made they are normally to cater for particular groups of employees. Therefore, the main determinations which in practice decide whether a person is in or out of a closed shop are those made between unions and employers.

We are dealing with the narrow, but nevertheless important, ground of whether we interfere with the rights of those trade unions and those employers which make these agreements to include a certain category or categories of people.

I take the view that the inclusion of these words in the statute would make the law unclear, render closed shop agreements invalid to an indeterminate extent and render employers liable to pay compensation in circumstances which they could not accurately foresee. It would encourage vexatious complaints from employees who think that they could have a right but would find too late that tribunals think otherwise. Above all, it would create uncertainty and fertile ground for industrial relations difficulties.

We do not argue that there may not be grounds for excluding persons, other than religious believers, from closed shop agreements. However, we believe that we have ensured by the provisions of the legislation that there would be no legal impediments to any such exceptions, but that those exceptions should be worked out and agreed upon by those whose consciences and beliefs are involved, so that a workable basis for toleration is established. If this amendment were carried it would be likely to have the opposite effect. Therefore, I hope that the House will reject it.

Mr. Brittan

It is not surprising, faced with basically so unattractive an argument as the Government are bound to deploy, that so astute a debater as the Minister of State should have felt obliged somewhat inadvertently, no doubt, to distort the consequences of the passage of the amendment.

It simply is not right to say that if this amendment were passed it would interfere with the rights of employers or trade unions to conclude certain types of closed shop agreements. It does not stop employers or trade unions from concluding any kind of closed shop agreement, however unreasonable it may be, and there may be those behind me who would say "More's the pity". It does not do anything of the kind. It is not an attack or a limitation on the closed shop in any way. It does not give an individual the right to employment or the right to remain in a trade union.

As the Minister of State appreciates, all the amendment does is to prescribe the circumstances in which a person can obtain compensation not from a trade union but from his employer if he is dismissed. It provides that a man shall be entitled to compensation if he is dismissed because he genuinely objects to being a member of a trade union on reasonable grounds of conscience. That is a matter which bites not on the trade unions but on the employers. It is perfectly open for a trade union and an employer, if they so wish, to engage in negotiations which lead to a closed shop agreement with no exceptions or exclusions at all. If the employer does that, and the trade union compels or persuades him to do so, the only person who suffers from the passage of the amendment is the employer.

Therefore, the question is narrower and one in which the rights of the individual are not pitted against the closed shop agreement, but, if anything, are pitted against an employer. We believe that in this situation it is right that the protection of the individual against unfair dismissal or, more strictly speaking, the compensation that he can obtain if he is unfairly dismissed should not be confined to those who object to joining a union purely on grounds of religion. It is surely small-minded, illiberal and insensitive to say, in effect, that only those who object to union membership on grounds of religion should be compensated and that those who object to it on grounds of conscience should not be compensated.

There are two questions that should be asked in considering this matter, and they are the framework within which I suggest we should consider the problem. First, is conscience or conscientious objection of sufficient importance for it to be singled out so that if a person is dismissed because of it he can obtain compensation? Secondly, is conscience a workable test to apply, or is it an unworkable one as the Minister of State would have us believe?

Mr. John Lee (Birmingham, Handsworth)

As religious grounds have been accepted for a long time as being an acceptable reason for not being a member of a trade union, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will give us an example of what might be termed non-religious "reasonable conscience", because these are, as he knows, very imprecise terms.

5.0 p.m.

Mr. Brittan

I was about to consider whether it was a workable criterion. I thought I was indicating that there were the two tests.

I suggest that conscience, if it exists, is indeed of sufficient importance to be singled out in this way. By definition, "conscience" involves beliefs held not merely on the balance of convenience after mature consideration of competing practicalities, but on the basis of a fundamental belief. I suggest that should be respected.

It seems strange that the Labour Party, which has not been exclusive in its sympathies over the years, should so narrowly confine its sympathies to those who have a religious belief. Many people do not have religious beliefs. None the less, they may sincerely, genuinely and even passionately have beliefs on grounds of what they would regard as conscience.

I come then to the question whether this is a workable test. Is it possible to determine whether a person has a genuine and reasonable belief on grounds of conscience? Before considering that, let me deal with the problem of the word "reasonable". If the only objection by the Government to the amendment passed in another place was the use of the word "reasonable" and if they had no objection to the insertion of the words "on grounds of conscience", it would have been open to them at this late stage in these deliberations to have proposed an amendment deleting the word "reasonable". That would have dealt with the problem in a satisfactory way.

I do not think that the real issue between us is whether "reasonable grounds of conscience" is difficult to determine. The grounds of conscience are not. The real question is whether grounds of conscience are sufficiently important to deserve protection and whether they can be applied. There is a lengthy history of their application in circumstances which may differ radically in content from the circumstances we are now considering but do not differ in principle.

First, concerning the content of the matter that we are discussing, the words used in the Donovan recommendations on this question are "conscientious objection", not "religious objection". When Donovan was reporting on this matter he certainly thought that "conscientious objection" was the appropriate term and that it was not right to confine it to the narrow ground of religious objection.

Secondly, hon. Gentlemen opposite will perhaps be more familiar than I am with the fact that until recently the Labour Party had a conscience clause, not a religious clause, which enabled or permitted Members to disagree with policy on grounds of conscience, not just on grounds of religion.

Finally, on the history, hon. Members will know the analogy which has been drawn with conscientious objectors in time of war. When this matter was raised in Committee some hon. Gentlemen opposite got heated and said that it was monstrous to compare membership of a trade union with being compelled to fight for one's country. Many of us would agree that there are significant differences between the two. The question is not whether there are differences between the two, but whether the application of the conscientious test is viable. We had a situation where in time of war, when the country was fighting for its life, it was still thought appropriate to have a tribunal before which people could appear and persuade the tribunal, if they could, that they should be exempt from military service, not because they had a religious objection, but on the wider ground that they had a conscientious objection. Thousands of cases were determined in which people had conscientious objections, some of which were not religious in foundation.

Hon. Gentlemen opposite may recall that when we debated this matter on another occasion quotations were made from a book by a gentleman who had been a member of a conscientious objectors' tribunal in which he talked of the differing bases of objection. Some were founded on what could properly be regarded as an organised religion, but others were founded on questions of conscience. Those tribunals looked into the question whether a person genuinely had a conscientious objection. That is not a particularly novel matter for courts or judicial tribunals of other kinds to consider. Every day courts in this country have to consider whether somebody is being honest, sincere, genuine and telling the truth. Therefore, from the point of view of a conscientious objection to military service, a tribunal, in considering whether a person really held the belief that he claimed was so profound and fundamental, was engaging in a task which was difficult and delicate, but not unique in the operation of normal procedures in judicial and quasi-judicial bodies.

Mr. Lee

I think that the hon. Gentleman will agree that the conscientious objection tribunals were faced with persons who raised objections which could be termed the test of moral acceptability of war. Is not that a different situation from somebody who may conscientiously object to being a member of a trade union because of a purely political objection to trade unions? He might be a supporter of Mr. Edward Martell or somebody like that. Does the hon. Gentleman regard that as a proper ground?

Mr. Brittan

The fact that the hon. Gentleman has drawn that distinction shows that it is possible to draw a distinction between a political and a conscientious objection. If it is possible for the hon. Gentleman to draw that distinction, it is possible for a tribunal to draw it.

I will explain the distinction. The supporters of Mr. Edward Martell would plainly have a political objection. That would, therefore, not be upheld by the tribunal applying this test.

Taking the example given by the hon. Gentleman of somebody who held views on this question, and on this question alone, that would be the same as a man who had been a member of the Plymouth Brethren. Perhaps he disagreed with the sect, perhaps he had cast off his beliefs in many of the principles of the Plymouth Brethren and was no longer a member of that religion, but kept as a residue of his former beliefs a belief in the particular principle that the Plymouth Brethren held. That would be a belief on grounds of conscience. It would not be a political belief, nor would it be a religious belief. It would be a fundamentally held belief which any person who was committed to principles of individual liberty should surely support. Indeed, it is not only a question of "should support". I suggest that we would be bound to support it because the terms of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is binding on this country, state that everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Conscience and religion, as far as that legally binding document is concerned, are not identical. They are similar, equally important, but different rights which ought to be protected. Therefore, if in a legal instrument of that kind the distiction is drawn, it ought to be drawn in this House. Both are equally worthy of protection.

I ask the House to approach this matter, which is not subversive of union membership agreements, but at worst imposes a greater liability on employers, in a more large minded spirit of greater generosity, tolerance and breadth of mind than one which confines the protection to the individual who happens to come within a circumscribed and recognised religious organisation.

Mr. William Small (Glasgow, Garscadden)

I intervene for only a few minutes as an ex-convener of shop stewards with practical experience on the shop floor.

When the expression "Plymouth Brethren" was mentioned, I recalled a certain incident. We have entered into the Continental shift system, which means that there is a demand that everybody should work on a Sunday if needed. If, on religious grounds, a man does not want to work on Sunday, what do we do? Let me give a practical illustration. One such case arose, and my tuba-playing colleague John Boyd of the AUEW was asked to intervene. I am a witness, together with the labour officer, the ICI management, and so on. We had Plymouth Brethren and two men who believed in Zen Buddism. It was a question of somebody not wanting to work on Sunday. I listened to John Boyd praying for the soul of someone of a different religion. I object to the use of the closed shop. There is no such thing. What is needed is a persuasive struggle and the advocacy of shop stewards to get 100 per cent. trade unionism, and not the closed shop, which is the easy way out.

In terms of general practice, is it an unfair dismissal if a man refuses to work in a normal way in a situation where shift work has been accepted which includes working on a Sunday?

Mr. David Madel (Bedfordshire, South)

In opening the debate on this amendment the Minister of State reminded us that we have gone round this topic again and again both on this Bill and on the Employment Protection Bill, and no doubt we shall find a way of considering it again when that Bill comes back from the other place.

I draw the Minister's attention to the fact that during the Committee stage in the other place on the Employment Protection Bill the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cleveland and Whitby (Mr. Brittan) about Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights was not properly answered.

The Government's answer was given by Lord Jacques, who said at column 206 of the Official Report for 23rd September 1975 that he would have preferred this question to have been answered by the noble and learned lord the Lord Chancellor but he, Lord Jacques, would be brave enough to give an opinion. That indicates that the Government are thinking a little more about this and perhaps want more time before giving a definitive opinion on whether what they propose is in collision with Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. There is still time for the Solicitor-General to come to the House today and give an opinion, or to do so later, and I think that we are right to stress that a full answer has not been given to the point about Article 9.

I am sure that in the many debates that we had on this subject the Opposition convinced the Minister that we were not seeking to pave the way for free riders by changing the rules about why someone may not belong to a trade union. I think the Minister is aware that Vauxhall Motors is now in the process of bringing about a 100 per cent. union shop. A draft agreement is being undertaken which provides that everbody must join a union, but there is a let-out on religious or other reasonable grounds and it says that objectors to joining a union will first face a joint committee of their own plant and that if no agreement is reached each individual case will be heard by Vauxhall's joint negotiating committee.

5.15 p.m.

I repeat that that is not a final agreement, but a draft, but as it has been published in the Press it invites comment when we are discussing this matter. But that which has been agreed appears to indicate that an employee may, after appeal, be allowed not to join a union on reasonable grounds other than religious beliefs, which would indicate a conscientious objection. I stress that there has to be an appeal, and I think that the appeal procedure will be eminently satisfactory.

I ask the Government to wait and see how this agreement works out. Why not give it a year? Let us put in the amendment which their Lordships have suggested and see whether the conscientious ground is fairly applied and whether the unions find such an alteration intolerable. In view of the Government's links with the TUC, I am convinced that if the amendment goes through and the unions find that many people are trying to get by and become free riders the TUC will quickly approach the Government and say that the Bill must be amended. What I am pleading for is some time, because I think that union appeal committees will find it in their hearts to allow people not to belong to a union on other than religious grounds.

What will determine the Government's attitude, and what ought to determine it, are the practical examples from plants and factories such as Vauxhall's as to how the arrangements are being carried out. What we are asking for is time. I am convinced that if in a year's time the Government can produce evidence of a charter for free riders having come about because of the amendment we shall consider the matter again, but in view of the cautious way in which unions and management are proceeding in this matter at Vauxhall's, and in view of the evidence at other factories, I hope that the Government will agree to the amendment being made to the Bill and see how we go for a year or 18 months and then consider whether it is necessary to make an alteration to what is proposed.

Mr. Stan Throne (Preston, South)

The hon. Member for Cleveland and Whitby (Mr. Brittan) referred to conscience and beliefs and was anxious to show that beliefs extended far beyond the range of religious beliefs. I recall a definition given some time ago of ideology. It was defined as a pattern of beliefs. Most of us have an ideological position, which emerges from time to time in this House, based upon a set of beliefs, and it seems to me that, against that kind of background, if we were to pass the amendment it could give rise to an ideological position derived from the acceptance by an employee of an employer's right to exploit an employee and the employee's decision not to join a trade union because of that belief. That would be legitimate, given the view taken by the hon. Member for Cleveland and Whitby, and, therefore, anybody who did not want to join a trade union could argue that he was against doing so on reasonable grounds of conscience.

This is the nub of the whole question, because it is unacceptable to trade unionists that a worker can argue that he will not join a trade union, faced possibly with the continuing struggle against an exploiting employer, on ideological or conscience grounds. That is unacceptable to the majority of trade unionists, and it seems to me that on that basis the House must reject the amendment.

Mr. Tebbit

When the Minister opened the debate he must have forgotten the events of yesterday, and the legislation which this House enacted then, when he criticised their Lordships for producing legislation which would possibly lead to difficulties in its implementation. I should have thought that that was a criticism that might well have come from the other end of the corridor rather than this.

I take the view, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cleveland and Whitby (Mr. Brittan) did, that we should add the conscience clause. Religious belief is far too narrow in the way that it is put into the Bill, although the definition of "religious" seems to be becoming a little wider. The Oxford Dictionary says that "religious" means Imbued with religion, exhibiting spiritual or practical effects of religion, pious, God-fearing or devout. That seems to have gone a bit by the board in the minds of some education authorities which, for example, wish to include instruction in Communism within the time given to religious instruction, so perhaps we are all becoming broad-minded about these things. None the less, we probably think that the religious ground is still a rather narrow one.

My hon. Friend and others have referred to what happened during time of war. I should like to read a very short extract from the official History of the Second World War. In relation to conscientious objection it states: Objections to taking up arms, it was recognised, might spring from a personal conviction of its wrongfulness, and should not be brushed aside or overruled just because the attitude of mind and the reasoning behind it seemed to those who thought otherwise immature or perverse. That was the thought in time of war. The quotation continues: What did matter was the genuiness with which such beliefs were held, and sincerity must be the criterion on which claims for exemption from military service were adjudicated. That was good enough for many people at a time when this country was facing a possible invasion and being overrun by a foreign invader. Why cannot we be as liberal now as we were then? What is it that the Government really fear about taking as wide a view in 1975 as we were able to do in 1940? According to the Minister, it is that employers would be caught in a vice between the awkward man's conscience and the power of a trade union, and that the employer would suffer. Would that we had heard that argument a few weeks back, when we were worried about the employer caught in the vice between the trade union asking for more than £6 a week and the Government which prohibited the employer giving more than £6 a week. There was no worry then about the employer's unfortunate position. That was hard luck. But today we have the Minister sympathising with the employer. The Minister knows, and we know, that he is taking this line not to protect employers but to protect unions.

I doubt whether many people outside this House today would think that it is the trade union which requires protection against the individual's conscience. Certainly in the past trade unions required protection, but I do not really believe that the massive power of the trade union movement today requires to be protected against a handful of those who are regarded as the awkward squad in the eyes of the Government and their supporters.

What is the potential size of the problem? None of us can know. Clearly, it would not be a bad idea to let the Bill run in its present form and see what happens, but it is instructive to look back and see what was the size of the problem when the grounds of conscientious objection were drawn as widely as they were during the war.

I looked at the official History of the Second World War to find how many conscientious objectors there were. A total of 59,192 men and women asked for relief as conscientious objectors, and 12,204 were removed from the register of conscientious objectors, so that during the whole of the war only 47,000 were confirmed as conscientious objectors.

Are we to say that there are more people today in Britain who would say that their conscience prohibited them from belonging to a union than there were people 35 years ago who said that their conscience forbade them from taking up arms? If that is so, it is a queer commentary on how people regard unions. Or are we saying that we could not afford to have 45,000 or 50,000 men and women who were granted the right not to belong to a union? Are the unions in need of protection, with their 10 or 11 millions of members, from a mere handful, a few tens of thousands at the most? I do not believe so. If we could afford to exempt 47,000 people in our struggle against the Nazis, surely the unions can afford to go without a few people in their struggle against the employers—if indeed they still see life in terms of a struggle against the employers.

There have recently been many voices coming from the Secretary of State's past, asking him to go back to his previous and rather broader views of the rights of the individual as opposed to the rights of the establishment. All we can do from this side of the House this evening is to echo those voices and ask him to regain the steel that he used to have in standing for conscience against the establishment, even though the power of the establishment is no longer held by the same people against whom he pitted himself in the past.

Mr. Bidwell

Following the theme of the hon. Member for Chingford (Mr. Tebbit), I suggest to him and to the House that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, although I may disagree with him in other respects, has to face the realities of the British industrial scene and industrial relations.

The hon. Member for Chingford was, I believe, an airline pilot. I assume that he belonged to his appropriate trade union, and (hat he did not think very much of those who were not in their appropriate trade unions, and who enjoyed for nothing all the advantages and the benefits of the very fine trade union of which he was a member. I do not know what feelings were engendered by such people, or whether that union has any "nons". Perhaps airline pilots are too intelligent to have a situation in which there are non-unionists.

We have to consider the background and the realities of the British industrial scene, and we cannot go by the industrial experiences of other countries. That is where the previous administration slipped up, in trying to borrow from the United States.

Mr. Tebbit

Let me make it plain to the hon. Member for Ealing, Southall (Mr. Bidwell) and to the House that I was a member of my union. Indeed, I was a shop steward—although we did not use such terms in BALPA—for my union. I believed in 100 per cent. membership. I worked for 100 per cent. membership. I would always do so. I also maintained that the day anybody declared a closed shop I would resign from the union, because I respected the right of conscience, and I would rather have a few free loaders, in the interests of conscience, than make the mistake the other way.

Mr. Bidwell

That was a very long intervention, and I join issue with the hon. Gentleman and with other hon. Members opposite on the question of conscience. I do not know what has taken place in Committee, and I have not followed very closely the arguments made there on both sides. The hon. Gentleman has attempted to make a comparison in particular with the facilities for conscientious objection during the course of war. It was not a question whether one was to be conscripted to fight, but whether one was to be conscripted to die, so there is not an exact parallel. But, even in regard to the substance of what he was saying earlier, the tribunals did not only determine whether or not one had to go into the armed forces. The tribunals determined what one did if one was not in the armed forces. It does not, therefore, fall within the realms of an exact parallel, which is what the hon. Gentleman leading for the Opposition has tried to make out. There is just no comparison at all between the two situations of the emergencies of the war and the normal decent requirements of the British industrial scene.

I imagine that the hon. Member for Chingford, as a representative of his fellow workers, would not have thought very much of a non-unionist who took all the benefits without contributing to the funds of the union and to what is necessary in order to build trade unionism.

5.30 p.m.

Apart from the pre-entry closed shop, apart from the print industry where union control of the supply of labour produces what is perhaps the closed shop par excellence, that situation does not prevail in industry generally. The trade union movement has always aimed to achieve 100 per cent. unionism by the efforts of the workers. Here we are not considering normal practices, however. We are considering, instead, how the law should be fitted into normal practices and the normal mood of tolerance in the trade union movement.

I know a great deal about this matter because before I came to this House I was a tutor and organiser with the National Council of Labour Colleges, and for two years I was London regional education officer of the TUC. I was a school director at summer schools which brought together trade unionists from all sections of the movement. I know, therefore, the true spirit that exists in the movement. When the London bus workers achieved almost 100 per cent. trade union membership they were prepared to tolerate the genuine non-unionist who had a religious objection to membership. Whether or not the law is applied, therefore, the organised workers in genuine free trade unionism—not in company trade unionism—will continue to display that attitude and approach.

Trade unionism will grow in Britain and the workers will continue to adopt the traditional practice of tolerating the odd man out who for genuine religious reasons cannot join a union. However, law or no law, they will not tolerate the fly-by-night, the blood-sucker who will not pay his whack. The Opposition should not waste the time of the House but should instead learn to face up to the realities of industry.

Mr. Cyril Smith (Rochdale)

I agree that a great deal of time has been wasted on this matter, but that has not been all on one side of the House.

As I understand it, the clause has nothing to do with whether a man should belong to a union or should refuse to belong on grounds of reasonable conscience, and I wish that some hon. Members had understood that fact. The argument is quite simple. It is whether, if in a closed shop situation an employee decides, on grounds of reasonable conscience, that he will not belong to a union and the employer dismisses him, he can sue the employer on grounds of wrongful dismissal. All the arguments about whether a man should be made to join a union are irrelevant to the debate. The question is whether he should have the right to sue his employer for unfair dismissal.

Mr. Booth

I must concede the point raised by the hon. Member for Cleveland and Whitby (Mr. Brittan) that the strict legal effect of this clause bears only on whether a person dismissed in a certain situation has the right to unfair dismissal compensation. The whole of the debate on the issue of the closed shop which arose from the original Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 hung upon the influence which such a provision would have on the formation of closed shops. The contention was that we have so amended the unfair dismissal provisions in order to take account of the closed shop that we risk biasing the law in favour of those who seek to make closed shops, and it was argued that what we have done is not even-handed.

Our argument was that it was absolutely impossible to marry the legal existence of a closed shop with unfair dismissal legislation which would give anyone dismissed for refusing to comply with conditions of a union membership agreement the right to sue his employer for unfair dismissal. We may have had differing formulations about how the right to unfair dismissal may run. That was where the whole thing started. However, whatever degree of exemption one believes there should be, one must accede to the view that the employer is entitled to say that he would not complete a union membership agreement with a union in circumstances where by doing so he considered himself liable to a considerable amount of unfair dismissal compensation.

Most trade unionists recognise that fact, and that is why those few recent discussions which have taken place on whether closed shop agreements should be made or not have reflected this consideration. In the narrow area where that has happened there has been something of a moratorium on the discussion. Now, however, the argument is being based on a whole number of different grounds as well. It is being contended that by having a closed shop we are in breach of Article 9 of the European Convention. That has been suggested in this debate—

Mr. Brittan

By whom?

Mr. Booth

That was my understanding of one of the references—not, I accept, by the hon. Member for Cleveland and Whitby, because he used that reference to show that the law can distinguish between religion and conscience. My recollection, however, is that it has been held that the closed shop should be regarded as illegal on the ground I have described. However, it can in no way be held that the closed shop conflicts with the rights that exist by virtue of Article 9. A person is free to take the view that he need not join a trade union in order to continue to work. There are millions of non-trade unionists who work in this country in firms which are organised, where unions are recognised. We are not arguing the contention, therefore, that a non-unionist does not have the right to work. We are arguing on the very narrow ground of the extent to which reasonable grounds of conscience to object to a trade union should affect a person's right to unfair dismissal compensation, and the effect of that situation on the formation of closed shop agreements.

The hon. Member for Chingford (Mr. Tebbit) suggested that I have argued that trade unions require protection in this matter. That is not the way I face the issue. I do not argue the issue on the grounds of trade unionists requiring protection. What I argue is that the tolerance traditionally shown in this country and the respect that the majority of unionists and employers have for the objections of individuals, which have resulted in the overwhelming majority of places where unions organise not pursuing a closed shop policy, can work fully only if the law leaves open to them the possibility of giving the widest possible range of union membership arrangements.

If we take that away by determining in an Act of Parliament that people must receive unfair dismissal compensation if certain forms of agreement are made, the legislation must have an influence. The decision will not be completely free. This matter is worked out in practice most satisfactorily by the union membership agreements which are made in this situation, and to widen the grounds of unfair dismissal compensation must logically influence far more the position of employers as well as unionists in recognising unions and determining how to recognise them. Those who realise the good practice and good sense and tolerance which prevail in industry will reject the amendment.

Mr. Brittan

With permission, I should like to answer what the Minister of State has said. It may do him little harm in this debate, but it is profoundly subversive of the Government's position in matters that we shall discuss later. He argued up hill and down dale, usually down dale, in Committee that the Government's policy towards the closed shop was neutral. Now he tells us that by the wording of these provisions they seek to influence the formation of the closed shop. If that is so, their attitude cannot be called neutral.

There is all the distinction in the world between influencing the formation of the closed shop in this respect and the more general question of influencing the categories of people to be included or excluded—particularly journalists. Employers will be affected by the question whether they have to pay compensation and whether or not they form a union membership agreement.

If one is talking about large groups of people, employers are seriously at risk if they have to pay compensation for dismissing people who have refused to join a union. When we are talking about a tiny number of people, as we should be in the case of those who object on grounds of conscience, employers will not be so influenced. It is open for a union, if it feels that it must, to press for a union membership agreement with no exceptions. If that happened, the employer would bear the brunt of the proposals that we are seeking to support and would have to pay compensation for people who have been dismissed for refusing on grounds of conscience. That is why it is a fair distinction to make and one which we support.

This is not an attack on the closed shop but an extension of the rights of the individual on grounds of conscience. It is significant that in considering the points so powerfully made by my hon. Friends the Members for Chingford (Mr. Tebbit) and Bedfordshire, South (Mr. Madel) and others, the Minister of State has not dealt with the fundamental question why conscience cannot be distinguished.

It can be distinguished. The Minister's point about the European Convention is a complete red herring. He conceded when I intervened that I at least was using that example only to show that international legal instruments accepted that a distinction of legally binding quality and validity could properly be made between conscience and religion.

That is what we seek to do. We remain unpersuaded that their Lordships got it wrong. I would seek to persuade my hon. Friends to support what their Lordships have done.

Question put, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment:—

The House divided: Ayes 292, Noes 254.

Division No. 336.] AYES [4.27 p.m.
Abse, Leo Brown, Ronald (Hackney S) Cunningham, G. (Islington S)
Allaun, Frank Buchan, Norman Cunningham, Dr J. (Whiteh)
Anderson, Donald Callaghan, Rt Hon J. (Cardiff SE) Davidson, Arthur
Archer, Peter Campbell, Ian Davies, Bryan (Enfleld N)
Armstrong, Ernest Canavan, Dennis Davies, Denzil (Llanelli)
Ashley, Jack Cant, R. B. Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Atkins, Ronald (Preston N) Carmichael Neil Davis, Clinton (Hackney C)
Atkinson. Norman Carter, Ray Deakins, Eric
Bain, Mrs Margaret Carter-Jones, Lewis Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)
Barnett, Rt Hon Joel (Heywood) Cartwright, John Delargy, Hugh
Bates, Alf Castle, Rt Hon Barbara Dell, Rt Hon Edmund
Benn, Rt Hon Anthony Wedgwood Clemitson, Ivor Dempsey, James
Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N) Cocks, Michael (Bristol S) Doig, Peter
Bidwell, Sydney Cohen, Stanley Dormand, J. D.
Bishop, E. S. Colquhoun, Mrs Maureen Douglas-Mann, Bruce
Blenkinsop, Arthur Concannon, J. D. Duffy, A. E. P.
Boardman, H. Conlan, Bernard Dunn, James A.
Booth, Albert Cook, Robin F. (Edin C) Eadie, Alex
Bottomley, Rt Hon Arthur Corbett, Robin Edelman, Maurice
Boyden, James (Bish Auck) Craigen, J. M. (Maryhill) Edge, Geoff
Bradley, Tom Crawshaw, Richard Ellis, John (Brigg & Scun)
Bray, Dr Jeremy Cronin, John English, Michael
Brown, Hugh D. (Provan) Crosland, Rt Hon Anthony Ennals, David
Brown, Robert C. (Newcastle W) Cryor, Bob Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)
Evans, Ioan (Aberdare) Luard, Evan Roper, John
Ewing, Harry (Stirling) Lyon, Alexander (York) Rose, Paul B.
Fernyhough, Rt Hon E. Lyons, Edward (Bradford W) Ross, Rt Hon W. (Kilmarnock)
Fitch, Alan (Wigan) Mabon, Dr J. Dickson Rowlands, Ted
Fitt, Gerard (Belfast W) McCartney, Hugh Ryman, John
Flannery, Martin MacCormick, Iain Sandelson, Reville
Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston) McElhone, Frank Sedgemore, Brian
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington) MacFarquhar, Roderick Shaw, Arnold (Ilford South)
Foot, Rt Hon Michael McGuire, Michael (Ince) Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-u-Lyne)
Ford, Ben Mackintosh, John P. Shore, Rt Hon Peter
Forrester, John Maclennan, Robert Short, Rt Hon E. (Newcastle C)
Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin) McMillan, Tom (Glasgow C) Short, Mrs Renée (Wolv NE)
Fraser, John (Lambeth, N'w'd) McNamara, Kevin Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)
Garrett, W. E. (Wallsend) Madden, Max Sillars, James
Ginsburg, David Magee, Bryan Silverman, Julius
Gould, Bryan Maguire, Frank (Fermanagh) Skinner, Dennis
Gourlay, Harry Mahon, Simon Small, William
Graham, Ted Mallalieu, J. P. W. Smith, John (N Lanarkshire)
Grant, George (Morpeth) Marks, Kenneth Snape, Peter
Grant, John (Islington C) Marquand, David Spearing, Nigel
Grocott, Bruce Marshall, Dr. Edmund (Goole) Spriggs, Leslie
Hamilton, James (Bothwell) Marshall, Jim (Leicester S) Stallard, A. W.
Hardy, Peter Mason, Rt Hon Roy Stewart, Donald (Western Isles)
Harper, Joseph Maynard, Miss Joan Stott, Roger
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield) Meacher, Michael Strang, Gavin
Hart, Rt Hon Judith Mellish, Rt Hon Robert Strauss, Rt Hon G. R.
Hattersley, Rt Hon Roy Mikardo, Ian Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley
Hatton, Frank Millan, Bruce Swain, Thomas
Hayman, Mrs Helene Miller, Dr M. S. (E. Kilbride) Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton W)
Healey, Rt Hon Denis Miller, Mrs Millie (Ilford N) Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)
Heffer, Eric S. Molloy, William Thomas, Ron (Bristol NW)
Henderson, Douglas Moonman, Eric Thompson, George
Hooley, Frank Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe) Thorne, Stan (Preston South)
Horam, John Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw) Tierney, Sydney
Hoyle, Doug (Nelson) Morris, Rt Hon J. (Aberavon) Tinn, James
Huckfield, Les Mulley, Rt Hon Frederick Tomlinson, John
Hughes, Rt Hon C. (Anglesey) Murray, Rt Hon Ronald King Tomney, Frank
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N) Newens, Stanley Tuck, Raphael
Hughes, Roy (Newport) Noble, Mike Urwin, T. W.
Hunter, Adam Oakes, Gordon Varley, Rt Hon Eric G.
Irvine. Rt Hon Sir A. (Edge Hill) Ogden, Eric Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne V)
Irving, Rt Hon S. (Dartford) O'Halloran, Michael Walden, Brian (B'ham, L'dyw'd)
Jackson, Colin (Brighouse) O'Malley, Rt Hon Brian Walker, Harold (Doncaster)
Jackson, Miss Margaret (Lincoln) Orbach, Maurice Walker, Terry (Kingswood)
Janner, Greville Orme, Rt Hon Stanley Ward, Michael
Jay, Rt Hon Douglas Ovenden, John Watkins, David
Jeger, Mrs Lena Owen, Dr David Watkinson, John
Jenkins, Hugh (Putney) Padley, Walter Weetch, Ken
Jenkins, Rt Hon Roy (Stechford) Palmer, Arthur Weitzman, David
John, Brynmor Park, George Wellbeloved, James
Johnson, James (Hull West) Parker, John Welsh, Andrew
Johnson, Walter (Derby S) Parry, Robert White, Frank R. (Bury)
Jones, Alec (Rhondda) Pavitt, Laurie White, James (Pollok)
Jones, Barry (East Flint) Peart, Rt Hon Fred Whitehead, Phillip
Jones, Dan (Burnley) Pendry, Tom Whitlock, William
Judd, Frank Perry, Ernest Willey, Rt Hon Frederick
Kaufman, Gerald Phipps, Dr Colin Williams, Alan (Swansea W)
Kelley, Richard Prentice, Rt Hon Reg Williams, Alan Lee (Hornch'ch)
Kilroy-Silk, Robert Price, C. (Lewisham W) Williams, Rt Hon Shirley (Hertford)
Kinnock, Neil Price, William (Rugby) Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)
Lambie, David Radice, Giles Wilson, Gordon (Dundee E)
Lamborn, Harry Rees, Rt Hon Merlyn (Leeds S) Wilson, Rt Hon H. (Huyton)
Lamond, James Reid, George Wise, Mrs. Audrey
Latham, Arthur (Paddington) Richardson, Miss Jo Woof, Robert
Lee, John Roberts, Albert (Normanton) Wrigglesworth, Ian
Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton & Slough) Roberts, Gwilym (Cannock) Young, David (Bolton E)
Lewis, Arthur (Newham N) Robertson, John (Paisley)
Lewis, Ron (Carlisle) Roderick, Caerwyn TELLERS FOR THE AYES
Lipton, Marcus Rodgers, George (Chorley) Mr. Thomas Cox and
Litterick, Tom Rodgers, William (Stockton) Mr. David Stoddarl.
Lomas, Kenneth Rooker, J. W.
Loyden, Eddie
Adley, Robert Bell, Ronald Boyson, Dr Rhodes (Brent)
Aitken, Jonathan Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torbay) Braine, Sir Bernard
Alison, Michael Bennett, Dr Reginald (Fareham) Brittan, Leon
Amery, Rt Hon Julian Berry, Hon Anthony Brocklebank-Fowler, C.
Arnold, Tom Biffen, John Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)
Atkins, Rt Hon H. (Spelthorne) Biggs-Davison, John Bryan, Sir Paul
Awdry, Daniel Blaker, Peter Buchanan-Smith, Alick
Baker, Kenneth Boscawen, Hon Robert Budgen, Nick
Banks Robert Bottomley, Peter Bulmer, Esmond
Beith, A. J. Bowden, A. (Brighton, Kemptown) Burden, F. A.
Carlisle Mark Howe, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Peyton, Rt Hon John
Carr, Rt Hon Robert Howell, David (Guildford) Pink, R. Bonner
Chalker, Mrs Lynda Hurd, Douglas Price, David (Eastlelgh)
Channon, Paul Hutchison, Michael Clark Pym, Rt Hon Francis
Churchill, W. S. Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye) Raison, Timothy
Clark, Alan (Plymouth, Sutton) Irving, Charles (Cheltenham) Rathbone, Tim
Clark, William (Croydon S) James, David Rees, Peter (Dover a Deal)
Clegg, Walter Jenkin, Rt Hon P. (Wanst'd & W'df'd) Rees-Davies, W. R.
Cockcroft, John Jessel, Toby Renton, Rt Hon Sir D. (Hunts)
Cooke, Robert (Bristol W) Johnson Smith, G. (E Grinsiead) Ridsdale, Julian
Cope, John Jones, Arthur (Daventry) Rifkind Malcolm
Cordle, John H. Jopling, Michael Roberts, Michael (Cardiff NW)
Costain, A. P. Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith Roberts, Wyn (Conway)
Critchley, Julian Kershaw, Anthony Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)
Crouch, David King, Tom (Bridgwater) Ross, William (Londonderry)
Davies, Rt Hon J. (Knutslord) Kitson, Sir Timothy Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)
Dean, Paul (N Somerset) Knight, Mrs. Jill Rost, Peter (SE Derbyshire)
Dodsworth, Geoffrey Knox, David Sainsbury, Tim
Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James Lamont, Norman St. John-Stevas, Norman
Drayson, Burnaby Lane, David Scott, Nicholas
Durant, Tony Langford-Holt, Sir John Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)
Eden, Rt Hon Sir John Latham, Michael (Melton) Shelton, William (Streatham)
Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke) Lawrence, Ivan Shepherd, Colin
Elliott, Sir William Lawson, Nigel Shersby, Michael
Evans, Gwynfor (Carmarthen) Lester Jim (Beeston) Silvester, Fred
Eyre, Reginald Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland) Sims, Roger
Fairbairn, Nicholas Lloyd, Ian Sinclair, Sir George
Fairgrieve, Russell Loveridge, John Skeet, T. H. H.
Farr, John Luce, Richard Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)
Fell, Anthony McAdden, Sir Stephen Smith, Dudley (Warwick)
Finsberg, Geoffrey McCrindle, Robert Speed, Keith
Fisher, Sir Nigel Macfarlane, Neil Spicer, Michael (S Worcester)
Fletcher, Alex (Edinburgh N) MacGregor, John Sproat, Iain
Fletcher-Cooke, Charles Macmillan, Rt Hon M. (Farnham) Stainton, Keith
Fookes, Miss Janet McNair-Wilson, M. (Newbury) Steel, David (Roxburgh)
Fowler, Norman (Sutton C'f'd) McNair-Wilson, P. (New Forest) Steen, Anthony (Wavertree)
Fox, Marcus Madel, David Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)
Fraser, Rt Hon H. (Stafford & St) Marshall, Michael (Arundel) Stokes, John
Freud, Clement Marten, Neil Stradling Thomas, J.
Fry, Peter Mates, Michael Tapsell, Peter
Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D. Mather, Carol Taylor, R. (Croydon NW)
Gardiner, George (Reigate) Maude, Angus Taylor, Teddy (Cathcart)
Gardner, Edward (S Fylde) Maudling, Rt Hon Reginald Tebbit, Norman
Gilmour, Sir John (East File) Mawby, Ray Temple-Morris, Peter
Glyn, Dr Alan Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin Thatcher, Rt Hon Margaret
Godber, Rt Hon Joseph Mayhew, Patrick Thomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)
Goodharl, Philip Mills, Peter Thorpe, Rt Hon Jeremy (N Devon)
Goodhew, Victor Mitchell, David (Basingstoke) Townsend, Cyril D.
Goodlad, Alastair Moate, Roger Trotter, Neville
Gower, Sir Raymond (Barry) Molyneaux, James Tugendhat, Christopher
Grant Anthony (Harrow C) Montgomery, Fergus van Straubenzee, W. R
Gray, Hamish Moore, John (Croydon C) Vaughan, Dr Gerard
Grimond. Rt Hon J. More, Jasper (Ludlow) Viggers, Peter
Grist, Ian Morgan-Giles, Rear-Admiral Wakeham. John
Grylls, Michael Morris, Michael (Northampton S) Walder, David (Clitheroe)
Hall, Sir John Morrison, Charles (Devizes) Wall, Patrick
Hall-Davis, A. G. F. Morrison, Hon Peter (Chester) Walters, Dennis
Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury) Mudd, David Warren, Kenneth
Hampson, Dr Keith Neave, Atrey Weatherill, Bernard
Hannam, John Nelson, Anthony Wells, John
Harrison, Col Sir Harwood (Eye) Neubert, Michael Whitelaw, Rt Hon William
Harvie Anderson, Rt Hon Miss Newton, Tony Wiggin, Jerry
Hastings, Stephen Nott, John Wigley, Dafydd
Havers, Sir Michael Onslow, Cranley Winterton, Nicholas
Hawkins, Paul Oppenheim, Mrs Sally Young, Sir G. (Ealing, Acton)
Hayhoe, Barney Page, John (Harrow West)
Heseltine, Michael Page, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby) TELLERS FOR THE NOES
Hicks, Robert Pardoe, John Mr. Cecil Parkinson and
Higgins, Terence L. Pattie, Geoffrey Mr. William Benyon.
Hordern, Peter Penhaligon, David
Division No. 337.] AYES [5.46 p.m.
Abse, Leo Fitch, Alan (Wigan) Maclennan, Robert
Allaun, Frank Flannery, Martin McMillan, Tom (Glasgow C)
Anderson, Donald Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston) McNamara, Kevin
Archer, Peter Fletcher, Ted (Darlington) Madden, Max
Armstrong, Ernest Foot, Rt Hon Michael Magee, Bryan
Ashley, Jack Ford, Ben Maguire, Frank (Fermanagh)
Atkins, Ronald (Preston N) Forrester, John Mahon, Simon
Atkinson, Norman Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin) Mallalieu, J. P. W.
Bain, Mrs Margaret Fraser, John (Lambeth, N'w'd) Marks, Kenneth
Barnett, Rt Hon Joel (Heywood) Freeson, Reginald Marquand, David
Bates, Alf Garrett, W. E. (Wallsend) Marshall, Dr. Edmund (Goole)
Bean, R. E. George, Bruce Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)
Benn, Rt Hon Anthony Wedgwood Ginsburg, David Mason, Rt Hon Roy
Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N) Gould, Bryan Maynard, Miss Joan
Bidwell, Sydney Gourlay, Harry Meacher, Michael
Bishop, E. S. Graham, Ted Mellish, Rt Hon Robert
Blenkinsop, Arthur Grant, George (Morpeth) Mikardo, Ian
Boardman, H. Grant, John (Islington C) Millan, Bruce
Booth, Albert Grocott, Bruce Miller, Dr M. S. (E. Kilbride)
Bottomley, Rt Hon Arthur Hamilton, James (Bothwell) Miller, Mrs Millie (Ilford N)
Boyden, James (Bish Auck) Hardy, Peter Molloy, William
Bradley, Tom Harper, Joseph Moonman, Eric
Bray, Dr Jeremy Harrison, Walter (Wakefield) Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)
Brown, Hugh D. (Provan) Hart, Rt Hon Judith Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)
Brown, Robert C. (Newcastle W) Hattersley, Rt Hon Roy Morris, Rt Hon J. (Aberavon)
Brown, Ronald (Hackney S) Hatton, Frank Mulley, Rt Hon Frederick
Buchan, Norman Hayman, Mrs Helene Murray, Rt Hon Ronald King
Butler, Mrs Joyce (Wood Green) Healey, Rt Hon Denis Newens, Stanley
Callaghan, Rt Hon J. (Cardiff SE) Heffer, Eric S. Noble, Mike
Campbell, Ian Henderson, Douglas Oakes, Gordon
Canavan, Dennis Hooley, Frank Ogden, Eric
Cant, R. B. Horam, John O'Halloran, Michael
Carmichael, Neil Hoyle, Doug (Nelson) O'Malley, Rt Hon Brian
Carter, Ray Huckfield, Les Orbach, Maurice
Carter-Jones, Lewis Hughes, Rt Hon C. (Anglesey) Orme, Rt Hon Stanley
Cartwright, John Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen, N) Ovenden, John
Castle, Rt Hon Barbara Hughes, Roy (Newport) Owen, Dr David
Clemitson, Ivor Hunter, Adam Padley, Walter
Cocks, Michael (Bristol S) Irvine, Rt Hon Sir A. (Edge Hill) Palmer, Arthur
Cohen, Stanley Irving, Rt Hon S. (Dartford) Park, George
Colquhoun, Mrs Maureen Jackson, Colin (Brighouse) Parker, John
Concannon, J. D. Janner, Greville Parry, Robert
Conlan, Bernard Jay, Rt Hon Douglas Pavitt, Laurie
Cook, Robin F. (Edin C) Jeger, Mrs Lena Peart, Rt Hon Fred
Corbett, Robin Jenkins, Hugh (Putney) Perry, Ernest
Cox, Thomas (Tooting) Jenkins, Rt Hon Roy (Stechford) Phipps, Dr Colin
Craigen, J. M. (Maryhill) John, Brynmor Prentice, Rt Hon Reg
Crawshaw, Richard Johnson, James (Hull West) Price, C. (Lewisham W)
Cronin. John Johnson, Walter (Derby S) Price, William (Rugby)
Crosland, Rt Hon Anthony Jones, Alec (Rhondda) Radice, Giles
Cryer, Bob Jones, Barry (East Flint) Rees, Rt Hon Merlyn (Leeds S)
Cunningham, G. (Islington S) Jones, Dan (Burnley) Reid, George
Cunningham, Dr J. (Whiten) Judd, Frank Richardson, Miss Jo
Davidson, Arthur Kaufman, Gerald Roberts, Albert (Normanton)
Davies, Bryan (Enfield N) Kelley, Richard Roberts, Gwilym (Cannock)
Davies, Denzil (Llanelli) Kilroy-Silk, Robert Robertson, John (Paisley)
Davies, Ifor (Gower) Kinnock, Neil Roderick, Caerwyn
Davis, Clinton (Hackney C) Lambie, David Rodgers, George (Chorley)
Deakins, Eric Lamborn, Harry Rodgers, William (Stockton)
Dean, Joseph (Leeds West) Lamond, James Rooker, J. W.
Delargy, Hugh Latham, Arthur (Paddington) Roper, John
Dell, Rt Hon Edmund Leadbitter, Ted Rose, Paul B.
Dempsey, James Lee, John Ross, Rt Hon W. (Kilmarnock)
Doig, Peter Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton & Slough) Rowlands, Ted
Dormand, J. D. Lever, Rt Hon Harold Ryman, John
Douglas-Mann, Bruce Lewis, Arthur (Newham N) Sandelson, Neville
Duffy, A. E. P. Lewis, Ron (Carlisle) Sedgemore, Brian
Dunn, James A. Lipton, Marcus Shaw, Arnold (Ilford South)
Dunnett, Jack Litterick, Tom Sheldon, Robert (Ashton-u-Lyne)
Eadie, Alex Lomas, Kenneth Shore, Rt Hon Peter
Edelman, Maurice Loyden, Eddie Short, Mrs Renée (Wolv NE)
Edge, Geoff Luard, Evan Silkin, Rt Hon John (Deptford)
Edwards, Robert (Wolv SE) Lyon, Alexander (York) Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)
Ellis, John (Brigg & Scun) Lyons, Edward (Bradford W) Sillars, James
English, Michael Mabon, Dr J. Dickson Silverman, Julius
Ennals, David MacCormick, Iain Skinner, Dennis
Evans, Fred (Caerphilly) McElhone, Frank Small, William
Evans, Gwynfor (Carmarthen) MacFarquhar, Roderick Smith, John (N Lanarkshire)
Evans, Ioan (Aberdare) McGuire, Michael(Ince) Snape, Peter
Ewing, Harry (Stirling) Mackintosh, John P. Spearing, Nigel
Fernyhough, Rt Hon E.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 6, in page 3, line 9, at end insert— ( ) After Schedule 4 to the principal Act there shall be inserted the following Schedule—

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