§ 1.29 a.m.
§ Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles (Winchester)I apologise to you, Mr. Speaker, to the "First Lord of the Admiralty" and to the staff of the House for keeping anyone up even a few minutes later at this time of the night. But the maritime Harrier seems to involve a lot of waiting and there have been incredible delays.
I admit that Governments of both parties have been equally slow and indecisive. In past years I have often attacked my own Front Bench about this, so I hope that tonight the Minister will not spend time criticising my party but will get down to brass tacks about the future of this aircraft.
Incidentally, I shall be speaking about the company which has developed the Harrier and I should say that I have no interest to declare except an abiding interest to ensure that our Service men, of all three Services, shall have the weapons and equipment which they need and deserve—and also, incidentally, the pay.
My whole message tonight is to ask the Government to go ahead immediately with the development of the maritime version of the Harrier or, if not, to say why not. The Harrier is a spectacularly successful British aircraft. When I first saw the prototype fly at Farnborough, I thought "This is God's gift to naval aviation ". That was as long ago as 1963, and now, 12 years later, I believe that there are distinct and strong arguments 2062 for going ahead with a maritime version of the aircraft.
Those reasons fall under four main heads. First and foremost, the Navy needs the aircraft. Any naval task force must have air cover and air support. Most of all, it must have air reconnaissance from shipborne aircraft. Without this the Navy becomes no more than a coast defence force. This was a most bitterly learned lesson in the Second World War, and I saw a lot of it myself. It is not that the Royal Air Force will not, but that it obviously cannot, provide adequate air cover from shore bases. I do not think I need enlarge on that basic fact of life.
The next point, and here I am sure that the Minister will agree with me, is that the prevention of war is the prime task of our forces nowadays. The White Paper speaks a lot about the Soviet Navy's rapid developments in ship-to-ship missiles. Naval intelligence—I was in it at the time—knew that this development was in progress 15 or 20 years ago. But a conscious decision was taken at that time not to spend money on such developments, not to follow them along such an expensive path, for the good reason that we had aircraft carriers. Successive Labour Governments have reduced our aircraft carrier force to only the "Ark Royal ", and now she is to be phased out.
The Navy must have some replacement weapons system, and the essential point is that missiles can only start or can only continue a war, whereas manned aircraft can be sent out to see what is happening, to report back and to stop minor incidents from escalating into major incidents as, for instance, President Kennedy's aircraft did at the time of Cuba in 1962. They can be used for the prevention of war rather than the prosecution of it.
The third point is that the Harrier works at sea. There have been successful landings at sea and in harbour in all sorts of weather. These have taken place on 18 different ships of many different navies. I have seen the aircraft myself on board the USS "Guam" and we have read in the Press about the notably successful interception of a Russian long-range bomber in the Atlantic by one of the United States Marine Corps Harriers operating from a ship.
2063 Recently I have seen the prototype of the maritime version at Hawker Siddeley, Dunsfold. The V/STOL capability enables the Navy to use much smaller and less sophisticated ships. This ought to appeal to whoever is Minister for the Navy—there is no need for the giant attack carriers of yesteryear with their catapult systems and so on.
The V/STOL capability allows flexibility in the aircraft. There are about 20 Royal Navy ships on which such an aircraft could land in emergency, and certainly the aircraft would be extremely valuable in the context of oil rig protection, which I know the Minister takes seriously.
I ask the Minister to come clean, to admit that the naval staff approve of the Harrier and want to have it. I ask him to admit that the absence of a decision up to this moment—I hope we shall get one within the next quarter of an hour—is not for military or technical reasons but for financial ones.
The second heading is the export potential of the aircraft. The maritime version is recognised as the prime export model of the Harrier for the next decade. It is suitable for countries which need its wider capability irrespective of whether they wish to fly it from ships or from shores. The original development order in 1965 led, I believe, to an export of nearly 120 aircraft. I believe that the exact number was 118. That was in addition to the 100-plus that were supplied to the Royal Air Force. Exports already represent earnings for Britain of over £250 million.
Hawker Siddeley tells me that a development contract for the Royal Navy version, plus, for example, an order of only 24 aircraft for the British Service, would cost some £10 million per year for the next six years. I also understand that the market surveys which it has undertaken have shown that the export potential is estimated at 150 aircraft once the British Government place their order first to show that they have faith in the project. I have seen in the Press that Australia, India, Iran, Brazil, Argentina, Spain, Japan and many NATO countries are interested and that the United States Marine Corps wants more. It might want as many as 350 aircraft. I have also seen that the Shah of Iran is ready 2064 to place a large order, plus possibly a complete through-deck cruiser to go with them, so to speak. That is again provided that the Government order the Harrier for the Royal Navy.
I know only too well that Ministers do not by convention name countries or details of export orders in advance. No doubt that is the answer that I shall receive tonight. However, will the Minister please confirm that he is aware of the export potentialities of the aircraft and that he has taken them into account? Secondly, will be appreciate that the foreign customers I have mentioned can quite reasonably expect to see an order from the British Government first as evidence of British faith in the project? That is a reasonable stipulation for foreign countries to make.
Next, has the Minister taken the export potential into account in his deliberations? Even if he cannot say what the figure is, will he admit that it is a large one? Will he agree, merely as a theoretical example, that a return of some £300 million of exports over 12 years for a design investment of £20 million or £25 million—for any project—would be good business for our country?
Another good and valid reason is employment and job security within the United Kingdom. An order for development and production of, for example. 24 maritime Harriers, plus the most conservative estimate of export orders, could reach over the next 10 or 12 years an average of 4,000-plus jobs in the United Kingdom spread over dozens of aerospace factories all around the country. I could give the Minister a copy of a map which shows the various places in the United Kingdom where the work would be done. I shall give it to the Minister afterwards behind the Chair. If export business is as brisk as may reasonably be expected, the United Kingdom level of employment might be twice the figure I have mentioned and might reach a level of 8,000 jobs.
The Harrier is the world's first and only V/STOL fighter. It is the first British aircraft to be delivered in quantity to the United States since the First World War, when the old Sopwith Camels and other similar aircraft were sold to the United States. The aircraft is a great tribute to British design, technology and engineering 2065 skill. It is a triumph for British designers and workmen. Do not let us leave the exploitation of this British initiative to the Americans. They will inevitably cash in on it if we do not.
Has the Minister received representations from the shop stewards about the need to continue production? They are rightly concerned about the need to continue production and the future of their jobs. If the Minister has not received such representations, will he undertake to see a delegation? One? Will he give me a specific answer to that question? I should appreciate a ringside ticket if he would be kind enough to offer me an invitation.
My fourth and last heading covers the wider implications. If Britain is to prosper we must remain in the broadest sense among the world's technological leaders, the highly industrialised nations. This means having the farsightedness—the plain guts and willpower, in fact—to grasp this sort of opportunity. As our forces grow numerically smaller it is essential to have the flexibility and the versatility. for instance, of an aircraft which will operate equally from ship or shore to carry out a multiplicity of different contingency plans. Any Minister of Defence will understand that. There is the additional specific economy of not needing huge prepared runways.
There is a wider point still which I hope is in order. I do not accept the main concept of the White Paper that the plains of Central Europe are where the threat is greatest. The flanks, the far North, the Mediterranean and the trade routes—particularly oil supplies corning around the Cape—are where there is most danger. Through all the political changes of many centuries, in peace or in war, no British Government, until the current White Paper, have ever considered it practicable to withdraw altogether from the Mediterranean.
With the Middle East now the number one powder keg, with the troubles in Cyprus and with the difficulties between Greece and Turkey, our NATO allies, throwing the alliance into disorder, I cannot believe that this is the moment from which all will suddenly be tranquil. Events in Portugal even since the White Paper went to press have altered the whole strategic balance in the Atlantic. If NATO is the linchpin of our defence, 2066 to quote the Secretary of State, I believe that events will show that a maritime strategy will still be Briain's most effective contribution to the Alliance.
I hope I have made the point that the maritime Harrier is essential to such a maritime strategy. While recognising the political difficulty for the Government presented by their "Lunatic Left ", and fully admitting the feebleness of my own Government on the subject when they were in office, I urge the Minister to grasp this nettle firmly and to be as forthcoming as he can tonight.
§ 1.42 a.m.
§ The Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy (Mr. Frank Judd)I am grateful to the hon. and gallant Member for Winchester (Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles) for this opportunity to speak to the House this morning about the Harrier. The House is well aware of the hon. and gallant Member's keen and continuing interest in the maritime version of this aircraft, and, indeed. in naval matters generally.
The Government themselves are no less interested, and it is because we are so conscious of the importance of this decision—with its implications for employment and sales, as well as defence—that we embarked upon such a thorough and detailed appraisal of the project.
Perhaps I could first deal with the wider question of the improved versions of the Harrier. It will be some time yet before a firm decision is needed on a replacement for the Harrier and Jaguar, and a developed version of the Harrier is just one of a number of possible solutions which are being considered. We have been co-operating with the United States Government in joint studies of a future development of the present Harrier. which, as the House will know, is in service with the United States Marine Corps as well as the Royal Air Force. We fully recognise the technological and industrial benefit of continuing V/STOL developments, and we shall be doing all we can to ensure that the long-term interests of British industry in this area are safeguarded.
The hon. and gallant Member has pressed very strongly for a decision on the future of the maritime version of the Harrier. He has been very critical of the Government for not pressing ahead 2067 with the project, and announcing this in the White Paper published yesterday. He was, I recall, equally critical of the previous Conservative administration for not reaching a decision on the future of this aircraft. I remember that we, as the then Opposition, shared his feelings.
I can well appreciate the frustrations of those concerned in industry with the maritime Harrier, those, like the hon. and gallant Member, who have championed its cause in the House and outside, and others. I sympathise with them. After all, the then Secretary of State for Defence said in another place nearly two years ago, in July 1973, that
The evaluation of the results of the project definition studies has now been completed, with technically satisfactory results ".He went on to say that he very much hoped to be able to announce the final decision within two or three months. Whilst the technical studies had been completed and the operational requirement justified, as the then Secretary of State said in 1973There still remains …the question of the priority to be accorded to the project in comparison with other important projects which compete for Defence budget resources".— [Official Report, House of Lords, 23rd July 1973 ; Vol. 344, c. 1509.]The previous Conservative administration, as the hon. and gallant Gentleman fairly pointed out, failed to reach a decision when in office. After our election we announced the defence review and felt it right to consider the requirement for the maritime Harrier against the background of the major decisions on strategy and resources. We have, as the hon. and gallant Gentleman knows, just announced our broad decisions on the review, and now we shall be moving forward with decisions on a number of more detailed matters, including the future of the maritime Harrier. I would be misleading the House if I did not say candidly that the decision over the maritime Harrier is a very difficult one, especially as defence budget funds, in the wake of the defence review, are a great deal more limited today than they were in 1973. I would like to explain to the House the various factors we have to weigh up in coming to a decision.First of all there is the operational case. Fixed-wing air support for the Fleet is at 2068 the moment, as the hon. and gallant Gentleman underlined, largely provided by shore-based RAF aircraft. Once" Ark Royal "is paid off at the end of the decade, fixed-wing air support for the Fleet will be wholly provided by land-based RAF and allied aircraft, and, of course, allied shipborne aircraft. Embarked V/STOL aircraft would complement these aircraft, and provide a quick-reaction capability to the naval commander on the spot.
As the hon. and gallant Gentleman said, it would give the naval commander an additional weapon option, enabling him to carry out reconnaissance and to attack enemy ships and aircraft at considerably greater ranges than his other shipborne systems allow. This would be an added operational capability in view of the Soviet Navy's formidable long-range offensive shipborne missile armoury. It would be another dimension that hostile forces would need to take account of. As such, V/STOL aircraft would contribute to the overall deterrence function of our forces. In this context, of course, I take the hon. and gallant Gentleman's point that we are all in this business to prevent war, and that the day that the balloon goes up we have all failed the real test for the effectiveness of our defence, which is the prevention of the outbreak of warfare.
The present Harrier could not undertake this task. It is a ground-attack aircraft designed for army support. The Harriers which are in service at sea with the United States Marine Corps are used in this army-support rôle. However, the project definition studies which have been undertaken have shown that the development programme required to convert the Harrier design to a maritime rôle should be entirely feasible. The modifications required concern principally the aircraft's radar and avionics.
As for the practicability of operating V/STOL aircraft at sea, there are clearly differences between flying an aircraft on and off a ship's flight-deck and flying it from a ground airfield. The limited space available and deck movement are obvious ones. Other things have to be considered, such as whether there are adequate facilities to permit operation over any length of time. Shipborne facilities have to cover maintenance and servicing of the aircraft and suitable hangarage and workshops as 2069 well as storage space for the aircraft, fuel and weapons, and shipborne command and control facilities.
As the hon. and gallant Gentleman, with his infinite knowledge of these matters, has pointed out, a considerable number of trials on ships' decks have been carried out using the existing Harrier to prove the concept of shipborne V /STOL operations in the particular rôle we have in mind. I am sure that the hon. and gallant Gentleman's "bush telegraph ", of which he has spoken in the House, will have led him to know that ships used have included the aircraft carrier "Ark Royal ", the commando carrier "Bulwark ", the cruiser "Blake ", the assault ship "Intrepid ", and the Fleet auxiliaries "Engadine and" Green Rover". These trials went well and showed that V /STOL aircraft could be operated effectively from a suitable ship at sea.
If we decide to go ahead with the maritime Harriers, although they would be capable of flying off a number of types of ship, we would operate them principally from the new "Invincible" class of anti-submarine cruisers and probably "Hennes" as well. The new cruisers, together with "Hermes ", which will be transferred to the anti-submarine rôle next year, are designed as a counter to the massive expansion in the Soviet submarine fleet in recent years. The growth in its nuclear submarine fleet—many of which are missile-armed—is especially worrying. "Hermes" and the cruisers will carry large anti-submarine helicopters like the Sea King, each of which, with its own sonars and weapon systems, provides a very economical anti-submarine capability equivalent to a frigate when on task. The addition of a number of V/STOL aircraft to the complement of our anti-submarine ships would add a new dimension to their capability.
Having said all this, we have to recognise that, inevitably, with a limited defence budget there is not enough money to go around for every project that ideally we would like to undertake. We have just completed the most thorough, detailed and critical examination of our defence needs and resources to be undertaken for very many years. We have eliminated from our programme everything for which we considered an incon- 2070 trovertible case could not be made, to give us a defence system tailor-made to the needs of post-imperial Britain in the next decade.
There is a good operational case for the aircraft. Equally, however, there are also many other weapon systems for which a good operational case could be made out. Some of these, although desirable, were not essential, and in the cold, hard light of Britain's straitened economic circumstances, we have unfortunately not been able to go ahead with them. We have to decide whether the case for the maritime Harrier is so compelling that we are willing, if necessary, to forgo other items of equipment. We have had to assess whether the job could be done in a more effective and perhaps cheaper way. But, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence re-emphasised very recently, the project has not been abandoned design work is still going ahead, funded by the Government.
Much has been made, both in the House and elsewhere, of the overseas sales and industrial implications of the decision. These are, of course, considerable, and the Government arc well aware of both the balance of payments arguments and the human and technological dimensions for the industry concerned. I can assure the House of that.
I recognise and understand the concern which has been expressed on these fronts. My hon. Friend the Minister of State met trade union representatives from Hawker Siddeley on 3rd March. I have met trade union representatives myself and listened with great interest to their powerful and articulate arguments. When my hon. Friend the Minister of State met trade union representatives, he emphasised the Government's determination to save the extensive sums on defence which we have announced in the defence review and pointed out that this could not be done without some painful consequences on employment. He said, however, that every effort would be made to minimise these, and promised that, in particular, the points they had made about the maritime Harrier would be carefully and sympathetically considered. I welcome this opportunity to reiterate this promise. In this context I look forward to comparing my industrial map with that of the hon. and gallant Gentleman's behind Mr. 2071 Speaker's Chair after the debate concludes.
The industrial, employment and sales implications will be borne in mind and taken into account when the Government finally reach a decision. It would, however, be wrong for the decision to depend on these factors alone. The project would be funded basically from the defence budget, and it must be justified on defence grounds as a weapon system.
I again express my appreciation of the way in which the hon. and gallant Gentleman has brought his concern on this issue once more so clearly to the attention of the House.
§ Rear-Admiral Morgan-GilesWill the Minister assure me that the Government consider that it would be reasonable for foreign buyers to look to the Government to show faith in the aircraft by ordering it first and that this is a factor in the promotion of export sales?
§ Mr. JuddWe recognise that the Government's endorsement of a military project has sales significance. No one would dream of denying that.
§ Question put and agreed to.
§ Adjourned accordingly at four minutes to Two o'clock.