MINISTERS OF RELIGION ETC. (Hansard, 18 June 1975)

§ Mr. Ivor Clemitson (Luton, East)
I beg to move Amendment No. 31, in page 15, line 4, leave out 'for purposes' and insert 'in the ministry'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker
With this amendment, it would be convenient to take Amendment No. 32, in page 15, line 5, after 'the', insert 'said'.
Amendment No. 33, in page 15, line 6, leave out from 'sex' to end of line 7 and insert 'but only in such cases where the discrimination complies with the doctrines of the religion'. 1536 Amendment No. 34, in page 15, line 6, leave out from 'doctrines' to end of line 36 and insert 'or principles of the religion'.
Amendment No. 35, in page 15, line 6, leave out from 'religion' to end of line 7 and insert: 'Provided that the recognised representatives of the organised religion have submitted their reasons for being so exempt to the Equal Opportunities Commission within such time as the Minister shall determine'. and Amendment No. 42, in Clause 33, page 22, line 10, leave out from 'doctrines' to 'or' in line 12 and insert or principles of the religion'.

§ Mr. Clemitson
The amendments which appear in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Kings-wood (Mr. Walker) have three basic and simple objects. They seek, first, to limit the exclusion from the provisions of the Act in respect of employment in the ministries of religious bodies; secondly, to remove the phrase about avoiding the religious susceptibilities of any of its followers; and, thirdly, to restrict the exemption provided in the clause to those religious bodies which have submitted their reasons for exemption to the commission.
As the clause stands, it is clear that any employment in a religious body is exempt from the provisions of the Bill provided that the discrimination complies with the doctrines of the religion or avoids offending the religious susceptibilities of any of its members. In other words the exemption goes very wide indeed. It goes much wider than the ministry of the religious bodies concerned. It seems odd that the phrase used to describe Ciause 19 is "Ministers of religion etc.". Clearly, this implies to my mind that the main category of employees—assuming ministers of religion are employed, and in my days in the ministry I used to pay my self-employed insurance stamp—are intended to be exempt if employed in the ministry of a religious body. This is a fairly well-recognisable category of people even if they do not all wear dog-collars these days. They are capable of some sort of definition.
How do we define "etc."? The Minister quoted certain expressions in Standing Committee and thought that administrative workers at Church House or those who work for the Salvation 1537 Army would be included in the provisions of the Bill, but the caretaker of a Muslim temple would not be. Suppose a religious organisation were set up and it was against its doctrines to employ typists because that would offend the susceptibilities of its members. How is that to be treated within the wording of these provisions? It seems to me that once one tacks on the word "etc." the proverbial flood-gates are opened wide. The extent of discrimination by religious bodies is potentially unlimited. The "etc." becomes a much larger category than the category of ministers. Surely it would be better to confine the exemption to that which is certain of definition. Certainly the word "minister" is more capable of definition than is the word "etc.".
This brings me to my second point—that doctrines of the religion are much more capable of definition than the religious susceptibilities of any of their followers. This is incapable of any sort of definition at all. It is so drawn that it would appear that it needs only one of the followers to say that his or her susceptibilities are offended to put the imprimatur on any discrimination which takes place.
What of the religious susceptibilities of those who think precisely the opposite—of those whose religious susceptibilities are highly offended by the present practice, in some churches of which they are members—for example, of not ordaining women? Are not their susceptibilities equally valid along with those who want to preserve an all-male priesthood?
No one is trying to impose an end to discrimination on grounds of sex upon any bona fide religious body, where genuine beliefs about such discrimination exist, but the limits of exemption must be as carefully drawn and defined as possible—as much for the sake of the bona fide religious bodies as anyone else.
As the clause it written it is possible for discrimination to extend very far and wide indeed, and for the clause to be used by all kinds of bodies which the great majority of us would hardly regard as bona fide religious bodies at all.
This brings me to the third leg of the group of amendments where the onus is on religious bodies to state their reasons 1538 for exemption to the commission. This is not an attack upon bona fide religious bodies such as the Roman Catholic Church or the Jewish faith or the Muslims, and so on, whose religious attitudes about the all-male ministry are deeply rooted in their doctrines. Far from it. These bodies would have no difficulty whatsoever in showing that they should be exempt from the provisions of the Bill. What it would do is to help sort out the wheat from the chaff, to help prevent any non-bona fide body trying to use the clause for not very desirable ends. It would also give a little push to the waverers—to those who are teetering on the brink of the pool, so to speak, wondering whether to immerse themselves in the strange waters of sex equality.
These amendments are very modest. I would admit that they are not as clear-cut as they might be, but I believe that they are a very considerable improvement on the clause as it stands. By limiting the exemption to a specific type of employment—that is, the ministry—by confining exemption to that which is more capable of definition—that is to say, doctrines—by removing the impossibly vague susceptibility provision, and by imposing a duty to report reasons for exclusion to the commission, the clause would he made much more definite than it is. The genuine would be protected and reasons for justified discrimination would be removed.

§ Dr. Summerskill
On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Are we also discussing Amendment No. 35?

Mr. Deputy Speaker
We are discussing Nos. 32 to 35 inclusive and also No. 42.

§ Dr. Summerskill
Amendments Nos. 31 and 32, moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Luton, East (Mr. Clemitson), restrict, as he says, the scope of the employment exception for religious bodies so that it covers only employment in the ministry of the religion in question, and not employment in any other capacity, such as that of a gardener in an enclosed order, or an accolyte, even though the religious susceptibilities of the followers of the religion might still be involved. This is the difference between my hon. Friend's amendment and the Bill as it stands.
1539 In our White Paper we proposed an exemption from the employment provisions in the Bill for the clergy and religious bodies whose membership involves employment. Clause 19 goes slightly wider. It applies to other cases where employment is for purposes of an organised religion. This could vary from the exceptions that I have given to the exceptions concerning an organised religion which is not affected by a religious doctrine, such as those quoted by my hon. Friend—workers at Church House or people in the Salvation Army. Neither does it exempt religious organisations as such from the requirement to treat male and female employees exactly the same or equally where employment is not limited to one sex only; for instance, secretaries working for religious organisations cannot be exempt from the Bill as it stands.
But there will among the many and varied religions which are freely practised in this country be cases where the very presence of a person of a particular sex in a temple or part of a holy place will give grave offence to the religious susceptibilities of the adherents of the religion as well as offending against the religious doctrines. In such cases, we believe it right that the religion in question should be able to insist on employing only people of the appropriate sex where the tasks to be performed are such that their performance by a person of the other sex offends against the religious doctrine or susceptibilities.

§ Mr. Clemitson
My hon. Friend said that typists, for example, would not be exempt from the provisions of the Bill. Let us suppose that a religious body says that to employ a female typist would offend either its doctrines or the religious susceptibilities of some of its followers. Surely that religious body would be entitled under the provisions of Clause 19 to discriminate against women typists.

§ Dr. Summerskill
If it could be shown that it was part of the religion and the accepted religious susceptibilities that typists in general or in some part of the holy place caused offence, that would be accepted. But that is a very extreme 1540 example. I was talking about ordinary secretarial office people who would work for any organised religion. They would be covered by the Bill.
As for the amendment relating to the Equal Opportunities Commission, apart from the fact that it leaves open the question of who is to recognise representatives of an organised religion which some would find not always easy to determine, the amendment does not say what the EOC is to do with the information so supplied. This seems to add a number of additional complications, and it might achieve an unjust or wrong result.
The amendment does not stand or fall by these points of detail. I presume its underlying intention is to enable the EOC, if it sees fit, to publish, perhaps even to comment on, the doctrinal reasons for the exemptions submitted to it by the various religions.
We have to ask ourselves whether it is right or possible to attempt to evaluate religious doctrines in this way.
As to who should or should not be permitted to be a minister of religion in one of the many religions now existing in Great Britain, quite apart from its effect on community relations, it would be difficult in matters of this kind to expect the EOC to evaluate between different religions. I think that the House will wish to deal with these matters with some respect for people who have always held very deep religious and conscientious scruples, and there is nothing to prevent the commission itself from looking into these matters at it wishes, as far as it can.
It is obviously a difficult and vexed question. The EOC can publish its findings and make recommendations, if it considers them to be necessary and desirable. We would be wrong to insert into the Bill an amendment which implies that Parliament thinks that the religious exemptions in the Bill should depend in some way upon a justification to the commission of the doctrines or principles of the religion.

§ Miss Richardson
May I say how disappointed I am by that reply. At least part of this amendment was put forward in Committee, and on that occasion the Minister said that the debate had been 1541 useful and that if the amendment was withdrawn she would carefully consider the wording of it. My hon. Friend has not come back with anything else. I am extremely disappointed that no gesture has been made. There is a considerable volume of opinion about this, particularly on the question of the religious susceptibilities of the followers of a religion. This Bill is too widely drafted and provides an occasion for licensed prejudice. I hope that my hon. Friend will have another look at this issue before the bill gets to another place.

§ Dr. Summerskill
May I now deal with Amendments No. 34 and 32? I undertook in Committee to look again at the wording of Clauses 19 and 33 and to see whether it could be clarified. I have done so and come to the conclusion that the present wording is as good as we can possibly manage in what are difficult clauses. The exception is limited to an activity which is restricted to one sex and is carried on for the purposes of an organised religion. This applies to both employment in Clause 19 and to services and facilities in Clause 33. The activity has to be organised in this way either to comply with the doctrine of the religion or to avoid offending the religious susceptibilities of any of its followers.
The main purpose of the exemption is to ensure that the Bill does not cut across the doctrinal requirements of any organised religion. We are dealing with a great many different religions apart from the Established Church and other Christian Churches—religions such as those of the Jews, Muslims, Sikhs and others.

§ Mr. Costain
I cannot find any reference to "organised religion" in the definition clause. Can the hon. Lady help by saying what that is?

§ Dr. Summerskill
It is not defined in the Bill. We have to define it perhaps as an established religion.

§ Mr. Ronald Bell
"Established religion" has a special meaning which is quite different from that which the hon. Lady suggests.

§ Dr. Summerskill
I will look into the question of the definition of an organized 1542 religion. When we talk about an organised religion most of us are thinking of the main, well-known religions in this country, such as those I have mentioned.

§ Mr. Clemitson
That is precisely what we may be thinking of but it is not what the clause says. It just says "an organised religion." As far as I can see, anybody can get up and say "We are an organised religion" and discriminate until the cows come home—if that is not an unfortunate phrase in the circumstances.

§ Dr. Summerskill
However the phrase is defined, the fact remains that the doctrines and principles of religions vary enormously and it would be invidious or impossible to put a court or an industrial tribunal in the position of having to decide between two different doctrinal interpretations if they were used in support of and in defence of a complaint under this measure.

§ Mr. Leslie Spriggs (St. Helens)
My hon. Friend has failed to answer my hon. Friend the Member for Luton, East (Mr. Clemitson). There is a reference to "ministers of religion etc." Where do we draw the line? How wide does the clause go? My hon. Friend asked for an interpretation of "etc." I can assure my hon. Friend the Minister that not only my hon. Friend the Member for Luton, East but many other hon. Members want to know before the Bill goes any further.

§ Dr. Summerskill
I think that I explained this. I should say that I am informed that the headings in the margin of any Bill cannot be taken into consideration in law. It is only the actual content of the Bill that counts.
The difference between me and my hon. Friend the Member for Luton, East is that his amendment restricts the scope of employment exception for religious bodies, to cover only employment in the ministry of the religion in question. It does not restrict the scope of the employment exception to employment in any other capacity. I gave as an example a gardener in an enclosed order. That is what is covered by "etc."